

State of Local Democracy Assessment in Indonesia (SoLD Indonesia)

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Supported by:



State of Local Democracy Assessment in Indonesia

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This report is a product of an assessment of the quality of democracy conducted on the basis of International IDEA's State of Local Democracy Assessment Framework. The report was developed by the Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada with support and partnership of International IDEA. International IDEA has not participated in the content development nor the research leading to the report. Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council members.

Acknowledgement

The State of Local Democracy Assessment in Indonesia (SoLD Indonesia) was one of the pilot projects on democracy assessment in Southeast Asia countries. This assessment was amongst the first in Indonesia that combined qualitative and quantitative methods in analyzing local politics on the one hand, and emphasized the importance of citizen-led approach in local democracy.

Implemented from 2011 to 2012 in six regions that vary in performance of local government, power relations, degree political consolidation both at state and society realms, and social as well as geographical features, SoLD Indonesia was able to look at local democracy in Indonesia from a fresh perspectives. We can infer from the results of this assessment that democracy in the six regions (Aceh Besar, Parigi Moutong, Kupang, Surakarta, Jombang, and Manokwari) is very rich with interesting stories that cannot be found in national context. This assessment can confirm the famous term that 'all politics is local'.

SoLD Indonesia is intended to contribute to democracy assessment, and to encourage discussions based on the lessons learned from local democracy in the Indonesian towns. It is expected to be fruitful for the strengthening of democracy in Indonesia, by bringing up more local issues in the country's democratic consolidation.

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SoLD Indonesia Team

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ADG	Alokasi Dana Gampong, Gampong Allocation Fund
ADHB	Atas Dasar Harga Berlaku, Regency Based Current Price
AIPMNH	Australia Indonesia Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health
AMH	Angka Melek Huruf, Literacy Rate Index
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget
APBK	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Kabupaten, District Revenue and Expenditure
ATMA	Advokasi Transformasi Masyarakat, Advocacy for the Transformation of Society
Bankamdes	Bantuan Keamanan Desa, Village Security Assistance
BAP	Berita Acara Perkara, Official Report
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional Development Planning Agency
BEM	Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa, Student Executive Board
BKAG	Coordination Intra-Church Agency, Badan Koordinasi Antargereja
BKD	Badan Kepegawaian Daerah, Regional Civil Service Agency
BKD	Badan Kepegawaian Daerah, Regional Employment Agency
BKD	Badan Kepegawaian Daerah, Regional Civil Service Agency
BKKBN	Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, National Family Planning Coordinating Broad

BKP	Bantuan Keuangan Peumakmu Gampong, Financial Aid of Peumakmu Gampong
BKPRMI	Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia, Central Board Council of Indonesia Mosque Youth Assembly
BPD	Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, Village Parliament
BPK	Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, State Audit Agency
BPMK	Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kota, Urban Community Empowerment
BPS	Badan Statistik Indonesia, Statistic Indonesia
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CIS Timor	The Circle of Imagine Timor
CPNS	Calon Pegawai Negeri Sipil, Candidate of Civil Servant
CRC	Citizen Report Card
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAK	Dana Alokasi Khusus, Special Allocation Fund
DAP	Dewan Adat Papua, Papuan Adat Council
DAP	Dana Abadi Pendidikan, Education Endowment Fund
Dapil	Daerah Pemilihan, Electoral District
DAS	Dewan Adat Suku, Tribe Adat Council
DAU	Dana Alokasi Umum, General Allocation Fund
Dispenda	Dinas Pendapatan Daerah, Local Revenue Offices
Dispenduk	Dinas Pendudukan dan Catatan Sipil, Office of Population and Civil Registration
DKT	Diskusi Kelompok Terbatas, Limited Discussion Group
DOB	Daerah Otonomi Baru, New Autonomy Region
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer, Area of Military Operations
DPD RI	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representatives Councils
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representatives Councils
DPRA	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh, The Aceh Provincial of Local House of Representatives

DPR I	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat I, Local House of Representatives I
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, House of Representatives
DPRD I/II	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I/II, Local House of Representatives I/II
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Local House of Representatives
DPRK	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten, The Aceh Regency of Local House of Representatives
DPRP	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, Papua House of Representative
DPT	Data Pemilih Tetap, Permanent Voters List
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FOKER LSM Papua	Forum Kerjasama LSM Papua, The Papua NGO's Cooperation Forum
Fokus Gempar	Forum Generasi Muda Aceh Rayeuk, Communication Forum of Youth Generation of Aceh Rayeuk
Forbes PG	Forum Bersama Peduli Gampong, Joint-Care Forum for Gampong
FORMALIN	Forum Mahasiswa Peduli Lingkungan, Student Forum on Environmental Cares
FPG	Forum Peduli Gampong, Joint-Care for Gampong
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement
GDP	Produk Domestik Bruto, Gross Domestic Product
GMIT	Gereja Masehi Ijili di Timor, Evangelical Christian Church in Timor
GZT	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI	Indeks Pembangunan Manusia, Human Development Index
HIMAB	Himpunan Mahasiswa Aceh Besar, Student Association of Aceh Besar
HIMAB	Himpunan Mahasiswa Aceh Besar, Student Association of Aceh Besar
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Muslim Students' Association

IKAMAB USM	Ikatan Mahasiswa Aceh Besar Universitas Serambi Mekah, Aceh Besar Student Association of Universitas Serambi Mekah
IMB	Izin Mendirikan Bangunan, building permit
IMKM	Industri Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah, Micro, Small and Medium Industry
INRES	Institute for Research and Empowering Society
Jasoil	Jaringan Advokasi Sosial Dan Lingkungan, Social and Enviromental Advocacy Networks
KBS/IKAS	Keluarga Besar Sumba–Sumba Big Family, Ikatan Keluarga Asal Sumba–Family Bondage of Sumba People
KDRT	Kekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga, domestic violence
Keluarga Besar Lamaholot	The Family of Lamaholot
Kemenpan	Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara, Ministry for State Apparatus Reforms
Keppmendagri	Keputusan Menteri dalam Negeri, Decree of Ministry of Home Affairs
Kesbangpol	Kesatuan Bangsa Politik dan Perlindungan Masyarakat, National Unity and Community Protection
KIPAS	Komite Independen Perempuan dan Anak, Woman and Child Independent Committee
KKLDM	Kelompok Kajian Lembaga Demokrasi Masyarakat, Study Group of Community Democracy Institution
KKN	Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme, Corruption, Collution, Nepotism
KKP	Koalisi Kebijakan Partisipatif, Participatory Policy Coalition
Presma	Presiden Mahasiswa, The Presidency Student
KML	Komite Masyarakat Lhoong, Lhoong Society Committee
KNPI	Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Council
KOMPIP	Konsorsium Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat untuk Monitoring dan Pemberdayaan Institusi, Publik Consortium for Monitoring and Empowering Public Institutions

KOMPIP	Konsorsium Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat untuk Monitoring dan Pemberdayaan Institusi Publik, Consortium for Monitoring and Empowering Public Institutions
Koramil	Komando Rayon Militer, Military Rayon Command
KPA	Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS, Commission of AIDS Prevention
KPAB	Kaukus Pemuda Aceh Besar, Youth Caucus of Aceh Besar
KPAB	Kaukus Pemuda Aceh Besar, Youth Caucus of Aceh Besar
KPPS	Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara, voting organizer group
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission
KPUD	Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, Regional Election Committee
KSP	Kawasan Sentra Produksi, Regional Production Center
KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk, National Identity Card
LAKIP	Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja, Performance Accountability Report
LDIP	Lembaga Data dan Informasi Pembangunan, Institute of Data and Information of Development
LeSKAP	Lembaga Studi Kebijakan Publik, Public Policy Institute
LKD	Laporan Keuangan Daerah, Regional Financial Report
LKM	Lembaga Keuangan Mikro, Micro Finance Institution
LKPJ	Laporan Kinerja Program Kegiatan, Performance Activity Report
LKPJ	Laporan Keterangan Pertanggungjawaban, Provincial Accountability Report
LMA	Lembaga Masyarakat Adat, Institution of Adat People
LMD	Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, Village Consultative Council
LMPK	Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan, Institute for Community Empowerment
LP3BH	Lembaga Penelitian, Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Bantuan, Hukum Institute of Research, Analysis, and Development for Legal Aid

LP3ES	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information
LPM	Lembaga Pengabdian Masyarakat, Community Dedication Institution
LPPD	Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah, Local Government Implementation Report
LPTP	Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan, Institute for Rural Technology Development
MA	Madrasah Aliyah
MAPANCAS	Pancasila's Student, Mahasiswa Pancasila
MI	Madrasah Ibtidaiyah
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MP2	Mitra Perempuan Papua, Papuan Women Partner
MP2	Mitra Perempuan Papua, Papuan Women Partner
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, The People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia,
MRP	Majelis Rakyat Papua, The Papua Assembly
MRPB	Majelis Rakyat Papua Barat, West Papuan's People Council
MRPPB	Majelis Rakyat Provinsi Papua Barat, The People Council of West Papuan's Province
Mts	Madrasah Tsanawiyah
Muspida	Musyawah Pimpinan Daerah, Regional Leadership Consultative Councils
Muspika	Musyawah Pimpinan Kecamatan, Sub-district Consultative Leadership
Musrenbang Kota	Musyawah Perencanaan Pembangunan Kota, Kota City Development Planning Consultation
Musrenbang	Musyawah Perencanaan Pembangunan, Development Planning Consultation
MYS	Menghitung Rata-rata Lama Sekolah, The Average Length of School Index
OKP	Organisasi Kepemudaan, Youth Organization

P2DTK	Program Percepatan Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal dan Khusus, Accelerating Development Programme in Disadvantaged Regions
PA	Partai Aceh, Aceh Party
PAD	Pendapatan Asli Daerah, the Regional Revenue
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party
Panwaslu	Panitia Pengawas Pemilu, the Elections Supervisory Committee
Partai Barnas	Partai Barisan Nasional, National Front Party
Partai Buruh	Labour Party
Partai Gerindra	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, The Great Indonesia Movement Party
Partai Golkar	Partai Golongan Karya, The Party of the Functional Groups
Partai Hanura	Hati Nurani Rakyat, The People's Conscience Party
Partai Kedaulatan	Sovereignty Party
Partai Kedaulatan	Sovereignty Party
Partai Merdeka	The Freedom Party
Partai Patriot	Patriot Party
Partai Pelopor	Pioneers's Party
PAUD	Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini, Early Childhood Education
PAUD	Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini, Early Childhood Education
PB IPAR	Pengurus Besar Ikatan Pemuda Aceh Besar, Aceh Besar Youth League
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Star Party
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi, Reform Star Party
PBSD	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, Socialist Democratic Labor Party
PD	Perusahaan Daerah, Regional Company
PD	Partai Demokrat, Democrat Party
PDA	Partai Damai Aceh, Aceh Peace Party
PDAM	Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, regional water companies

PDIP	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Indonesia, Democratic Party of Struggle
PDK	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, Democratic Nationhood Party
PDP	Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan, The Democratic Renewal Party
PDS	Partai Demokrasi Sejahtera, Prosperous Peace Party
PEM	Pengembangan Ekonomi Masyarakat, Community Economy Empowerment Development
Perda	Peraturan Daerah, Local Regulations
PERDU	Pengembangan Masyarakat dan Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam, Developing Society and Conserving Natural Resources
PERDU	Perkumpulan Terbatas Pengembangan Masyarakat & Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam, Developing Society and Conserving Natural Resources
Permendagri	Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri, The Regulations of Ministry of Home Affairs
Perppu	Peraturan Pengganti Undang-Undang, Lieu of Law
PGRI	Pendidikan Guru Republik Indonesia, Teacher Education of Republic Indonesia
PIAR	Perkumpulan Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi Rakyat, the Initiative for the Development of People's Advocacy
PII	Pelajar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Student
PIS	Partai Indonesia Sejahtera, Prosperous Indonesia Party
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, The National Awakening Party
PKBM	Pusat Kegiatan Belajar Masyarakat, community learning center
PKDI	Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia, The Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion
PKL	Pekerja Kaki Lima, street vendor
PKL	Pusat Kegiatan Lokal, Center of Local Activities

PKLP	Pusat Kegiatan Lokal Promosi, Center for Local Promotion Activities
PKNU	Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, Ulema National Awakening Party
PKP	Partai Karya Perjuangan, Functional Party of Struggle
PKP	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, Indonesian Justice and Unity Party
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, The Concern for the Nation Functional Party
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, The Concern for the Nation Functional Party
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, The Concern for the Nation Functional Party
PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Justice and Unity Party
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party
PKWP	Pusat Kegiatan Wilayah Promosi, Regional Activity, Center for Promotion
PMA	Penanaman Modal Asing, Foreign Investment
PMB	Partai Matahari Bangsa, National Sun Party
PMDN	Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri, The Domestic Direct Investment
PN	Pengadilan Negeri, District Court
PNBK	Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia, Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party
PNI Marhenisme	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme, Indonesian National Party Marhaenisme
PNPM	Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, National Program for Community Empowerment
PNPM Mandiri	Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri, National Program for Community Empowerment
PNS	Pegawai Negeri Sipil, Civil Servant Officers
PNS	Pegawai Negeri Sipil, civil servant

Polresta	Polisi Resor Kota, City Resort Police
Polsek	Polisi Sektor, Sectoral Police
PORDA	Paguyuban Masyarakat Rote Ndao, Rote Ndao Community
GMIT	Gereja Masehi Injili di Tomor, Bible Messiah Church in Timor
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulama Council
Posyandu	Pos Pelayanan Terpadu, Integrated Health Post
POT	Persehatian Orang Timor, Timorese United
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah, Government Regulation
PPD	Partai Persatuan Daerah, The Regional Unity Party
PPDI	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party
PPDK	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, United Democratic Nationhood Party
PPI	Partai Pemuda Indonesia, The Indonesian Youth Party
PPIB	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, The New Indonesia Alliance Party
PPK	Pusat Pelayanan Kegiatan, Center of Regional Service
PPL	Pusat Pelayanan Lingkungan, Center of Environmental Service
PPMI	Perhimpunan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Press Association
PPNU	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah, Nahdlatul Ummah Unity Party
PPNUI	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia, Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPPI	Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia, Indonesian Workers and Employers Party
PPPI	Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia, Indonesian Workers and Employers Party

PPRN	Partai Peduli Rakyat Indonesia, The National People’s Concern Party
PPRN	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional, The National People’s Concern Party
PPRN	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional, The National People’s Concern Party
Prolegda	Program Legislasi Daerah, Regional Policy Legislation
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Socialist Party of Indonesia
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Socialist Party of Indonesia
PTPAS	Pelayanan Terpadu Perempuan dan Anak, Integrated Service Centre for Woman and Children
PtPs	Perkumpulan Terbatas Peduli Sehat, Limited Group of Joint-care Health
Putusan MK	Supreme Court Decision
PWD	Power Welfare and Democracy
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RKA	Rencana Kerja Anggaran, Work Plan Budget
RKKL	Rencana Kerja Kementerian dan Lembaga, Ministry and Institution Work Plan
RKPD	Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah, Regional Development and Work Plan
RPJMD	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah, The Regional Medium-term Development Plan
RPJP	Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang, Long-Term Development Plan
RRI	Radio Republik Indonesia, Radio of the Republic Indonesia
RT	Rukun Tetangga, harmonious neighborhood
RTA	Rabitah Thaliban Aceh Besar
RTM	Rumah Tangga Miskin, poor household
RTRW	Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah, Regional Spatial Plan
RW	Rukun Warga, harmonious citizens
SD	Sekolah Dasar, Elementary School

SIAK	Sistem Informasi Administrasi Kependudukan, Population Administration Information System
SKM	Sarjana kesehatan Masyarakat, Bachelor in Public Health
SKPD	Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, Regional Working Unit
SLTP	Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Pertama, Junior Highschool
SMA	Sekolah Menengah Atas, Senior Highschool
SMS	Short Message Service
SOMPIS	Solidaritas Masyarakat Pinggiran Solo, Solidarity Forum for the Peripheral People of Surakarta
SPEK-HAM	Solidaritas Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan dan Hak Asasi Manusia, Women's Solidarity for Humanity and Human Rights
SPP	Simpan Pinjam Perempuan, Women Savings-and-Loans
SPPD	Surat Perintah Perjalanan Dinas, Official Travel Orders
Susenas	Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, National Socioeconomics Survey
TII	Tentara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islam Soldier
TKPKD	Team Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, The Regional Institution of Coordination Team of Poverty Alleviation
TMP	Tidak Menyatakan Pendapat, Disclaimer of Opinion
TPA	Tempat Penitipan Anak, Childcare
TPK	Tim Pengelola Kegiatan, management team
TPS	Tempat Pemungutan Suara, polling stations
TVRI	Televisi Republik Indonesia, Television of the Republic of Indonesia
UKAW	Universitas Kristen Artha Wacana, Artha Wacana Christian University
UMKM	Usaha Mikro, Kecil dan Menengah, Micro, Small and Medium Business
Undana	Universitas Cendana, Nusa Cendana University
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund

Unwira	Universitas Katholik Widya Mandiri
UP4B	Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Papua dan Provinsi Papua Barat, Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua
VTO	Voter Turn Out, tingkat partisipasi pemilih
WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, The Indonesian Forum for Environment
WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, The Indonesian Forum for Environment
WCC	Women Crisis Centre
Yadupa	Yayasan Anak Dusun Papua,-Papua's Village Child Foundation
YAPHI	Yayasan Pengabdian Hukum Indonesia, Indonesian Foundation for Legal Service
Yayasan KAKAK	Yayasan Kepedulian Untuk Konsumen Anak, Love Our Children Foundation
Yayasan Mod Modey	Mod Modey Foundation

Assessing Local Democracy in Decentralized Indonesia by Local Democracy Advocates

Abdul Gaffar Karim, Hasrul Hanif and Amalinda Savirani

Background

Indonesian politics has transformed as it has undergone a massive and excessive process of decentralization and democratization since the late 90s. Political power no longer concentrates at the national level but has decentralized into local domains. For certain regions, especially Aceh, Papua and Yogyakarta, the central government also has given relatively broader autonomy in comparison with other regions in Indonesia.

This has meant that political processes are not conducted in monolithic manners but has dispersed due to considerable progress of democratization and decentralization. Political processes are no longer determined by elite struggle in the capital, Jakarta. Instead, the current political process gives an image where political actors are multiplying and bureaucracy is no longer the only dominant power. Simultaneously, many actors who formally have no authority are able to exert their influences on the day-to-day policy process. In short, state power has undergone a breakdown and has been dispersed in centrifugal pattern, which creates heterogeneous centres of power, both in national or local level (Hanif and Pratikno 2012).

The widely quoted promises of power devolution at the local level are that it would promote vibrant and democratic local politics; that it would make local government closer to the people; and lastly, that it would be responsive to the people's needs in local governance process (Sisk et al. 2001). The extent to which these promises can be seen in reality after the implementation of power devolution has incited

debates. There are at least two main debates: The first group agrees that the quality of democracy is strengthened after power is devolved. The second group remains critical on the promises. The first group based their assessment on formal criteria of democracy, such as political liberties, political participations, and the roles of local government in delivering their basic function (BAPPENAS-RI 2007). By implementing the criteria, previous studies indeed show the betterment of Indonesian local democracy. The limitation of these studies, however, is that they tend to hide practice of democracy, which operates behind these formal categories, such as oligarchy based on ethnic group at the local level that determines policymaking process, constellation of civil society, political structure, social fabrics and participation of civil society organizations. Furthermore, we argue that all of these formal indicators of democracy are situated in a specific social and political context upon which power devolution takes place. In short, as has been argued by many scholars, there is no single picture of local politics in contemporary Indonesia (eds. McIntyre and McLeod 2007; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Hadiz 2010; eds. Nordholt and Klinken 2007). Furthermore, we need to take into account the dynamics of local power relations in order to understand the practice of local democracy in Indonesia.

The Indonesian State of Local Democracy (SoLD) Assessment is aimed to cover both the formal and non-formal democracy indices. This assessment complements previous studies, which attempt to keep score at how Indonesia is doing with democracy. The assessment is needed not only to identify the achievement of political devolution but also to pinpoint the problems and opportunities following such process at the local level.

In fact, there have been some assessments on the extent to which the promises can be fulfilled. The government of Indonesia has initiated some assessments related to the issues of democracy and decentralization such as the Annual Indonesian Democracy Index, which was conducted by The National Development Planning Agency of Republic Indonesia (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional Republik Indonesia, BAPPENAS-RI) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Indonesia and Performance of Regional Government Rank by the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs. Others are initiated by non-governmental organizations, such as Indonesia Governance Index, which was conducted by Kemitraan Partnership.

However, SoLD is a unique type of assessment that has been initiated and created by International IDEA. Unlike many other assessments, SoLD emphasizes the citizen-led approach to practical use for the local people. In addition, SoLD is

essentially a reform-oriented and context-responsive qualitative assessment, which uses a combination of research, debate and dialogue among key stakeholders to draw a picture of the quality of democracy at local level. These are the reasons why SoLD is necessary, despite the fact that there have been previous assessments.

To achieve these principles, SoLD's instruments combine two criteria. On the one hand, it assesses qualitative aspect of local politics, which covers social and political structure of the local politics, constellation of civil society, political structure, social fabrics, and participation of civil society organizations. On the other hand, it also assesses quantitative formal criteria of democracy, such as political liberties, political participation, and the role of local government in delivering their basic function. To achieve the citizen-led approach and participatory principle, as well as to optimize this project, the local people play the main role in this assessment. The multiple local stakeholders at the local level have been recruited as local assessors.

Objectives

The main purpose of this study is to assess the state of local democracy in Indonesia. In addition, it aims to enrich the debates between the communities and their municipalities/councils with a view to deepening and expanding the quality of democracy at that level. The assessment involves research activities, which will also enrich an academic debate of local democracy in Indonesia, such as the issue of local power relations and power structures, practices of local democracy, performance of local government to provide welfare and people's participation as practised in daily life.


Framework

Based on 2002 version of SoLD assessment framework titled, Leadership for Local Democracy: A Local Democracy Assessment Guide¹, this assessment explores two principal elements of local democracy that are critically important to the quality of rule by the people: representative democracy (parties and candidates,

¹After implementing the assessment in more than 60 municipalities in 11 countries, International IDEA then revised this version by offering the new one in 2013 (see Kemp and Jimenez 2013). In this new version, International IDEA provided the State of Local Democracy Assessment (SoLD) Framework by providing a clear conceptual framework, assessing local democracy beyond representation and participation, making it applicable universally, including updated questionnaires and paying increased attention to issues of gender, diversity and conflict and security.

elected authorities and elections) and participatory democracy (civil society, forging consensus and civic engagement). In exploring these broad categories, we pay attention to the institutional aspects (rules, organizations and key actors) as well as the process dimensions (types and methods of practice and implementation).

Figure 1.1 SoLD Assessment Framework



Source: International IDEA 2011

However, this framework also has been customized in order to make it more workable to the Indonesian context. This customization pays specific attention to informal processes in Indonesian local politics, which often determine policy output and outcome. While doing so, this assessment also explores modes of governance in welfare production, distribution and redistribution in order to examine how local democracy work for social welfare.

The Core of Assessment

Indonesian Government Structure

Since the fall of authoritarian regimes in 1998, Indonesia has experienced a fast growth in the number of local governments through territorial splits (pemekaran daerah). Thus, Indonesia today consists of 34 provinces, 349 districts and 91 cities. Instead of special autonomy for Aceh, Papua and West Papua, Jakarta and Yogyakarta, the base of decentralization is district/city. The central government has decentralized almost all responsibilities and governmental affairs to local government (province and district/city) except for foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary affairs, religious affairs, defence and security affairs and law system.

Based on the Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, the provincial government as second tier of government is mandated as the central government's representative at local level. A province (propinsi) is led by a governor (gubernur) and a provincial representative assembly (dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah). The Local House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) consists of 35 to 100 members. Both governors and DPRD members are directly elected. Indonesia has five special regions among 34 provinces. In these special regions, the central government gives more autonomy more than other regions in Indonesia (Table 1.1.).

Table 1.1 Special Regions in Indonesia

Province	Special authorities (Examples)
Aceh	Islamic laws, flag and song, local political parties
Jakarta	No mayoral election
Yogyakarta	Political privilege of the Sultan
Papua and Papua Barat	Flag and song

Source: JPP 2011

District (*kabupaten*)² or city (*kota*) is the third tier of government that enjoys greater decentralization affairs. A district and a city differ in demography, size and economy. Cities usually are smaller and have non-agricultural economic activities compared to districts. A district is led by a *bupati* and has a DPRD, with 20 to 50 members while a city is led by a *walikota* and has a DPRD with 20 to 50 members. *Bupati*, *walikota* and DPRD members are directly elected. In the case of province of Jakarta, the governor appoints *walikota* of cities in Jakarta. The cities of Jakarta also do not have DPRD.


The lowest tiers of government are sub-district and village. Sub-district (*kecamatan* or *distrik* in Papua) is an administrative area within a district and city. Papua (*camat* or *kepala distrik*) heads the *kecamatan*. *Camat* or *kepala distrik* is appointed by the *bupati* or *walikota*.

Desa (in rural areas) enjoys more autonomy and headed by *kepala desa* (directly elected) whereas *kelurahan* (in urban areas) has limited power. *Kelurahan* is headed by *lurah*, a civil servant appointed by (and responsible to) sub-district head.

² The terms *bupati* and *kabupaten* reflect historical circumstances because they have been used since the old Javanese kingdoms with similar meanings to present day usage. The new Indonesian state merely formalized the status of the district government in accordance with national policy. Needless to say, the use of these terms also reflects the Javanese domination of Indonesia.

The village usually is divided into service units called *rukun warga* (RW)³ and *rukun tetangga* (RT)⁴.

Figure 1.2 Indonesia Government Structure



Source: Law No. 32/ 2004

The Selected Regions

The six research areas were selected using multiple criteria. The initial criterion was the rank in the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) 2011 scores based on the Annual Report of Accountability and Performance of Local Government. This data ranked the local governments from the highest to the lowest performance. Based on this data, the assessment grouped the local governments into low, medium and high performance.

In the second step, the assessment looked at the power distribution in those areas. They were analysed based on the characteristic of power relation. Some areas were categorized as mono-centric (centralized) power relation and the others polycentric (dispersed) power relation. Mono-centric refers to the existence of dominant political actor in an area. This actor can be the bureaucracy, market, traditional leaders and so forth, while polycentric refers to a number of political actors in an area. From each group of local government two areas were chosen: one area with mono-centric power relation and one area with polycentric power relation. In doing so, the assessment took into account the representativeness of areas—western, central and eastern part of Indonesia. Table 1.2 shows how these district areas were brought to the assessment process.

³ 'harmonious gathering of citizens'


⁴ 'harmonious gathering of neighbours'

Table 1.2 Power Distribution on Selected Regions

District/City	Areas	Performance of governance	Density of power relation
Surakarta, Central Java	Western	High	Polycentric
Jombang, East Java	Western	High	Mono-centric
Aceh Besar, Aceh	Western	Medium	Polycentric
Manokwari, West Papua	Eastern	Medium	Mono-centric
Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara	Eastern	Medium-Low	Polycentric
Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi	Central	Low	Mono-centric

Source: JPP 2011

Figure 1.3 Map of the Six Regions



Source: Statistic of Indonesia 2010

Table 1.3 Brief Description of Six Selected Regions

Towns	Area (km ²)	Population	Density per km ²	Year of formation	Major mode of production
Aceh Besar	2,974.12	388,422	12.92	1956	Agriculture
Surakarta	44.06	500,642	11.4	[1745] 1950	Trading and small industries
Jombang	1,159.50	1,348,199	1,159	[1910] 1950	Agriculture and Agribusiness
Parigi Moutong	2033.62	373,346	59,91	2002	Farming and plantation
Kupang	165.34	336,239	2,033.62	1996	Trading and service
Manokwari	14,488.50	187,591	12.99	[1957] 1963	Farming

Source: Statistic of Indonesia 2010

Organisation, Methods and Scope of Work

The Team Involved

This assessment was a mutual collaboration between International IDEA⁵ and Department of Politics and Government, Gadjah Mada University (GMU)⁶ Indonesia, along with the abovementioned local stakeholders. It also endorsed involvement of local stakeholders as local assessors, including the local authorities and put it as central to this assessment.

The four parties in this assessment, International IDEA, GMU teams and the local assessors, have their own roles. International IDEA's main responsibilities was providing basic guidelines and analytical framework for SoLD assessment in Indonesia and taking part in providing financial contribution to the SoLD assessment. GMU managed the activities jointly as national assessors while the multiple local stakeholders were the local assessors. The Ministry also used the recommendations gathered from SoLD assessment for policy reform in the country to improve decentralization policy in Indonesia. The GMU team was responsible on core activities of the assessment. It provided the basic guidelines and analytical framework according to the contexts of Indonesian local politics for the local stakeholders. It recruited and led the local assessors concerning content of the assessment. The local government officials were also at the core of this assessment. Together with civil society organizations, activists and academics, they played as the local assessors.

Nonetheless, since the very beginning, SoLD assessment in Indonesia has taken into account the recent empirical findings on the dynamics of local government in decentralized Indonesia. Based on empirical findings, there has been a politicization of local stakeholders at the arena of local politics – local government staff is fragmented, civil society is politicized and local media was taking sides in the local political fragmentation. In other words, these facts seriously made an impact on the methodology and result of the assessment. To minimize its effect on the assessment, there were two things that have been done: First, the GMU team made

⁵ International IDEA is an international organization with long experience in comparative studies, especially on state of democracy and state of local democracy.

⁶ Department of Politics and Government, GMU is now focusing on the issues of power, welfare and democracy (PWD) and has established a vast, nationwide network among civil society organizations (CSOs), academia as well as local governments with main research interest on local democracy, including research on 'asymmetrical decentralization' that is believed to be the ideal format for Indonesian local government.

sure to recruit the key stakeholders with diverse backgrounds as local assessors. In addition to this, the GMU team trained the local assessors, maintained close communication with them and monitored the assessment activities. Second, in the national level, the GMU team established a ‘consortium’ consisting of all local assessors in a forum of sharing and communication. The purpose of this ‘consortium’ was to exercise self-control and self-evaluation among the local stakeholders in the assessment areas. As far as the content of this assessment is concerned, the ‘consortium’ is also aimed to set a similar benchmark and standard of the assessment report.

Stages of Assessment

The assessment was divided into seven main stages, which were conducted from 2011 to 2012:

1. *Preparation and Customization.* GMU prepared for the research activity by establishing the assessment team and customizing the guidelines of assessment. GMU recruited the assessment team consisted of national and local assessors and consolidated the consortium among them. International IDEA and GMU then facilitated a workshop for customization and training for the assessment team.
2. *Desk review.* The assessment team, supported by GMU, made a desk review based on the assessment framework and secondary data, such as official documentary data and media news among others. This review assisted in information preparations and focus of fieldwork.
3. *Fieldwork.* The local assessors conducted fieldwork to collect primary data using various methods, including in-depth interviews, observation and focus group discussion (FGD). The national assessors monitored and supervised the fieldwork process.
4. *Preliminary report writing.* The national and local assessment team analysed secondary and primary data and drafted the preliminary report.
5. *Validation.* The research report was discussed for validation in the six areas and national level to get national and local inputs. Furthermore, such forums were key, not only for validation but also for preliminary dissemination of findings and maximizing utility of the report by the key stakeholders both in the municipalities/districts and at the national level

6. *Final report writing.* The national and local assessment team included the validation from the six local forums and national forum for the final report.
7. *Dissemination.* The national and local assessor disseminated the report to gain feedback from relevant stakeholders.

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Democracy in Indonesia

*Wigke Capri Arti*⁷

This chapter will discuss the practice of democracy in Indonesia within the context of the State of Local Democracy (SoLD) framework. The State of Local Democracy assessment framework (SoLD) was developed by International IDEA in support of citizen-led and locally owned democracy assessment at the local level (Kemp, B and Jiménez, M. 2013, p10).

Democratization in Indonesia was assessed in two areas of democracy: representative and participatory democracy. The assessment was conducted in the six regions in Indonesia using detailed and contextual questionnaires. It was conducted in coordination with the local communities and assessors who assisted in analyzing, criticizing and giving feedback. The result of the assessment in each region is discussed in each chapter, along with the general context of representative and participatory democracy process.

The section on representative democracy is focused on election, political parties and elected officials which will be describes on the dynamics of regulations. The most facinating fact is that the changes of indirect election to direct election has given different atmosphere to Indonesia's politics. In addition, the participatory democracy, which was assessed through civic engagement, non-governmental, community-based organizations and consensus-oriented policymaking is focused on how democracy works on the grassroots. How Indonesian citizens play their role in democracy from state-centered to people-centered mechanism is futher discussed in this section⁸

⁷ This chapter is written by the SoLD assessment team manager in Indonesia who works as researcher in Department of Politics and Government (PolGov), based on the FGD with Mada Sukmajati and AA GN Ari Dwipayana about representative democracy, as well as Abdul Gaffar Karim and Hasrul Hanif about participatory democracy

⁸ For detailed information on SoLD framework and questionnaire please go to page 295

Representative Democracy

Public Bureaucrat Evaluation

a) How does a public official get elected?

Indonesia has had experiences with two models of public officials election. Indirect leadership election was held once before 2005, while direct leadership election was held after 2005. Around the same period, the constitution was amended for the third time.

Indirect election model

The indirect election is regulated by two constitutions, Law No. 5/1974, which was formed during the New Order era and Law No. 22/1999, formed during the Reformation era. The time difference between the formation of the two constitutions indicates that there were also two different political systems, as well as political structures in Indonesia.

When Law No. 5/1974 was implemented, Indonesia's political system was based on centralization with a provincial government structure. The provincial area was known as Regional Level I (*Daerah Tingkat I*), while the regency/city area was known as Regional Level II (*Daerah Tingkat II*). Leaders of both areas were known as Head of Regional I (*Kepala Daerah Tingkat I*) and Head of Regional II (*Kepala Daerah Tingkat II*).

The election of the heads of Regional I and II was different, specifically with regards to the national government election. A head of Regional I is nominated as a candidate by the Local House of Representatives I (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I, DPRD I*); between three to five candidates are collectively selected among the legislatures and whose candidacy have been approved by the leader of Local House of Representatives I or leaders of Fractions⁹ along with the Minister of Home Affairs. The result of the selection is then proposed by the Local House of Representatives I to the President through the Minister of Home Affairs before the candidate is appointed.

Meanwhile, the election of the Head of Regional Level II is carried out by the Local House of Representatives II in line with a candidacy and selection process. Between three to five candidates are collectively selected and discussed among the leaders of Local House of Representatives II and the leader of factions along with

⁹ Subgroup within a parliamentary party

the Governor. The Local House of Representatives II proposes two candidates to the Minister of Home Affairs through the Governor, of whom one will be appointed.

The implementation of Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government has paved way for the indirect local leader election process. The spirit of reform for authority in decentralization system in areas where New Order era regulations previously applied was quite apparent. The government structure of Regional Level I was replaced by province, while the government structure of Regional Level II was replaced by district or city. The implication of such replacement was shown by the authority of *bupati* (the leader of a regency) and *walikota* (the leader of a city), where both are not subordinates of the governor, who leads a province.

A fundamental difference in the election of local governments starts from the candidacy stage, election mechanism, up to the endorsement from the higher authority leader that are completely autonomous from the regency/city level or provincial. For the first time, the Election Committee is established and is able to carry out their functions to filter the future local government candidates administratively and afterward propose the selection (of at least two candidates) to faction mechanism, collective meeting and discussion of legislatures (*sidang paripurna*). After that, one of the two selected leaders will be endorsed as a local government leader by the regency or city local or provincial Local House of Representatives.

Direct election model

The direct local government leader election that was applied after Law No. 22/1999 was replaced by Law No. 32/2004. This change influenced the election process significantly. The local government leader election endorsement was regulated on Article 56 up to Article 119. However, with the implementation of this constitution, some adjustments were made in accordance to the needs and socio-political dynamics in Indonesia and other areas such as in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY).

Technical policies in accordance to local government constitution Government Regulation No. 6/2005 regulates the national government intervention in the process of direct local government election (pilkada). This condition is outlined in Article 124, where the president is able to remove a local government leader and his deputy without any involvement of the Local House of Representatives.

Government Regulation No. 25/2007 has changed the policy related to incumbent candidates, who were previously asked to resign from their position under Government Regulation No. 6/2005. The new government regulation has allowed candidates to take a leave of absence from work without pay. Government Regulation No. 25/2007, as a policy, has showed leniency for local government officials and deputy officials who intend to run for the same position without having to resign completely and leave their current position.

Law No. 12/2008 is the mandated amendment of Law No. 32/2004 and Government Regulation No. 49/2008. There are three important changes on the constitution: First, the mechanism of individual candidacy in the local government election arena. This policy is a mandate that originated from the Supreme Court's Decision (*Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi*) No. 5/PUU-V/2007 dated 23 July 2007 on the inactivation of Article 56 Paragraph 2 and Article 59 Paragraph 1 on Law No. 32/2004.

Second, the policy regarding requirements on supporting a local government official candidacy, which was not regulated on the previous constitution. The requirements in order to support a candidacy of governor and vice governor was regulated under Article 59 Paragraph 2A and Paragraph 2B on requirements to support candidacy of district leader, city mayor and vice mayor. The policy on those two paragraphs was clarified by Paragraph 2C, 2D and 2E. Lastly, the integration of local election schedule was regulated on Article 233, where election was held at the longest in October 2008 and the second round, in December 2008.

Those regulations and policies are applied on a national level. Meanwhile, in the case of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), Papua, and Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, there is some kind of an asymmetrical regulation that is implemented according to the socio-political condition in the three areas. For the province of NAD, the two additional regulations are Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Governance and Government Regulation No. 20/2007 on Local Party in Aceh. The implementation of these two regulations are explained in the Aceh Besar chapter.

The implementation of local government election in the province of Papua is adjusted to Law on Special Autonomy in 2001, where the election process cannot be separated with the crucial role and function of The Papua Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP*), whose responsibility is to provide opinion and endorsement toward the future candidates for governor and vice governor as proposed by the Local House of Representatives. An in-depth look at

representative democracy is discussed in the Manokwari Regency chapter.

Meanwhile, there is one single province, the Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) or Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta that does not implement a local election in the provincial level in order to elect a governor. Since the implementation of Law No. 13/2012 on the Province of Special Region of Yogyakarta, the positions of governor and vice governor are permanently filled in by Sultan Hamengku Buwono and Adipati Pakualam (Article 17 Paragraph 2A). However, the regency and city areas in the province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta still holds direct local government election in order to elect a city mayor.

b) Does the method of local government election resulted in public officials with authority over regulation formulation and implementation or only public officials who hold ceremonial positions?

The authority of local government officials or deputy officials to formulate and implement policy is regulated by Law No. 32/2004, which is explained in more detail in Article 25 (about local government official) and Article 26 (about deputy official). Article 25 states that the local government official holds the authority to formulate and implement policies by proposing a local regulation (*perda*), approving a local policy that has previously been accepted by the Local House of Representatives, compiling and proposing a local regulation on Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD*) plan to the Local House of Representatives and implement it in the local government leadership. However, according to Article 26, the duties of the deputy are to help the local official in the government administration vertical activity coordination and to handle follow-up reports. In implementing the constitution mandate, the local government official and his deputy are in command of the Local Government Task Force (*Satuan Kerja Pemerintah Daerah, SKPD*) as a work unit in regulating and implementing their policy making process.

Therefore, it is concluded that the constitution has granted a proactive statement that the leadership position of local government officials are not just ceremonial. However, it needs to be acknowledged that the capacity of leaders is very diversified. This research on six areas shows that such diversity is an important factor to consider when determining whether or not the position being held is merely a ceremonial position. The city mayor of Surakarta, for instance, is very much different with the district leader of Parigi Moutong regency or Manokwari regency. This is further discussed in the Parigi Moutong and Manokwari chapters.

c) What are the regulations that control the relations between local government officials and DPRD?

In the national level, the constitution that regulates the relations between local government officials and DPRD is Law No. 32/2004 on Local Governance. Meanwhile, the constitution in the provincial level for provinces that implement special autonomy system (NAD and Papua) is Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Governance. Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy applies in the province of Papua.

In accordance to Law No. 32/2004, the relationship between local government and DPRD revolves around their responsibility in local governmental sphere. Moreover, Law No. 27/2009 mentions that in the implementation of local government, the leader and DPRD are coordinating in three aspects: legislation, budget allocation and supervision.

The legislation aspect relates to the proposal of local regulation up to its endorsement and ratification.. Legislation is also regulated on Law No. 10/2004 about making of constitution, Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local Government (Article 1136 to Article 1147), and The Regulation of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) No. 16/2006 on local government's compilation of procedures.

The budget allocation, APBD, is regulated on local government constitution as mentioned on Article 25, where local government leader composes and proposes the local regulation or perda plan regarding APBD to DPRD. The latter will be in charge of discussing the plan and later approving it thoroughly along with the entire members, as explained on Article 42. Meanwhile, the main concern in the context of budget allocation is Law No. 33/2004 on Balancing Funds (*Perimbangan Keuangan*) between the national government and the local government, as well as Law No. 25/2004 on Development Planning System (*Sistem Perencanaan Pembangunan*). The technical regulation regarding this aspect is Government Regulation No. 23/2005 on Financial Management of Public Service Agent, MoHA Regulation No. 22/2011 on Guidance for Local Budget Planning in 2012 and Government Regulation No. 109/2000 on Financial Status of Regional Head.

Lastly, the supervision aspect that is carried out by DPRD to the local government official is regulated in details in Government Regulation No. 16/2010 on Guidance on DPRD's Regulation Compilation about the Orderly Manners of DPRD, as well as Law No. 15/2004 on Inspection of Management and

Responsibility on Government's Finance, in which DPRD is prohibited to intervene during the inspection process. After State Audit Agency (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK*) completed inspection, the result is reported back to DPRD, which is responsible for the evaluation process. If there is any impropriety, DPRD may request a re-check.

d) What are the evaluation methods used by public to assess the performance of officials in office? Performance Accountability Report (LAKIP) and Provincial Accountability Report (LKPJ)

Local Government Implementation Report

There are three evaluation methods applied to assess a leader: First, Local Government Implementation Report (*Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah, LPPD*). LPPD is an evaluation report referred on Article 27, Paragraph 27 of Law No. 32/2004. The law states that the local leader is responsible to submit the implementation report to the national government. Second, the dissemination of the implementation report to public to enable the people to evaluate and monitor government's performance. Third, a leader is obliged to submit an accountability report to the parliament.

In order to evaluate the performance of the Local House of Representatives, six approaches are applied: First, keep and maintain constituent voices in regular visits or during recess that is stated in Law No. 27/2009 on The People Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR*), House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR*), DPRD and Regional Representatives Councils (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD*). Second, encourage the public to voice out their opinions, voices, complaints and criticisms. Third, the active participation of public to guide and monitor the leaders' governance through mass media, such as talk shows, letters to editor and the more institutionalized forum, such as Budget Watch in Aceh Special Autonomous Region (*Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam*), as well as Government Watch. Fourth, the semi-government organization, such as the local ombudsman, is responsible to evaluate public service as mentioned in Law No. 37/2008 on Indonesian Ombudsman. Fifth, through mass mobilization or demonstration. Sixth, personal method. For instance, each legislative member or elected official will hold a meeting with their constituents to listen to their needs and hopes, as well as to share what legislative members have already achieved for the sake of their constituents.

These evaluation methods and active role of the people in assessing policies are parts of what the constitution mandates in Law No. 14/2008 on Public Information Disclosure Acts. This constitution aims to guarantee the information received by the public and encourage them to play a more active role in evaluating public policy (Article 3). The importance of peoples' active public involvement is emphasized on Article 4 and 5 on public information receivers' rights and responsibility.

In district/city and provincial areas, this constitution is applied on local regulation on transparency and accountability. The implementation of its constitution in provincial and city/regency area is legalized by certain local regulation on transparency and accountability. Until the end of this research, none of the six areas where the assessments were conducted has this local regulation. Several Indonesian provinces that already adopted this local regulation include the Regency of Lebak, Province of Banten with local Regulation No. 6/2004 on transparency and participation, Regency of Bantul in Yogyakarta Special Region with local Regulation No. 7/2005, Regency of Palopo with local Regulation No. 5/2008, Regency of Boalemo with local Regulation No. 6/2004 and Regency of Tanah Datar with local Regulation No. 2/2005. Meanwhile in Surakarta, the transparency and financial system can be easily accessed, despite the fact that the local regulation has not been adopted. The people of Surakarta can easily access the local government's website to seek for information, which is such a privilege considering that access to information is rarely practise in other regions.

Election Administration

a.) Explain the last election, specify the voters data collection, political parties and candidates verification, design and counting of voting ballots, voters' information and the counting of election result.

Law No. 22/2007 regulates the Indonesian general elections through the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) and Regional Election Committee (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD*), both in provincial level and city/regency levels. General election is also regulated through Constitution No. 2/2007 on Political Parties, Constitution No. 10/2008 on Technical Guidance on the Election, Verification and Arrangement of Political Parties as the Participants of DPR, Provincial Parliament, Regency/City Parliament Election Members of 2009 and Constitution No. 42/2008 on President and Vice President General Election.

Election in Indonesia consists of four categories: first, the legislative election, which aims to elect members of national and provincial parliament as well as in the level of city or district level; second, election to seek for DPD; third, election for president and vice president; and lastly, the election for public officials such as governor or mayor/head of regency. The last national election was in 2009, which coincided with the election for members of the Local House of Representatives.

During the 2009 election, there were issues regarding accuracy of voters' data. Among these were data percentage of non-registered voters that reached 20.8 per cent (LP3ES 2009), voters who received two invitation letters and list of registered voters consisted of the deceased. These issues emerged because of two factors. First, the information used by the Elections Commission to organize voters were obtained from the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (*Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Papua dan Provinsi Papua Barat, UP4B*), Ministry of Interior rather than from statistics bureau and second, there were differences in the agreement on voters' identities, which was mentioned in Constitution No. 10 and Constitution No. 42/2008 on president and vice president general election. It was also mentioned in the elections commission Regulation No. 14/2008.

The most important election issue in 2009 was on verification process, both on party politics and political party candidates in the administrative. The issue occurred due to three factors: one, verification did not required political party membership card; two, verification was only on checking political party office, such as the address of the office; and three, it only required the name of party officials.

The process of collecting and counting the ballots in the 2009 election was regulated under the Election Commission's Regulation No. 72/2009 on House of Representatives, Provincial Parliament, Regency/City Parliament Election Members. The regulation states that the election of officials and deputy officials should be held 30 days at the latest, and should be conducted during a holiday. The local government, at the advice of the provincial, regency or city elections commission, will determine which holiday it will hold the election.

The voting held by voting organizer groups (*kelompok penyelenggara pemungutan suara*) is composed of its head and members (See Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.1 The Voting Procedure



Source: KPU 2009

Figure 2.2 The Voting Procedure



Source: KPU 2009

Participatory Democracy

Driving Factors

Based on the assessment conducted in six areas in Indonesia – Aceh Besar, Jombang, Surakarta, Kupang, Parigi Moutong and Manokari, the emergence of participatory democracy is found to be driven by four factors: constitution or regulation, donor support, societal linkage and politicians’ interest. These four factors are intertwined and simultaneously drive the implementation of participatory democracy in government, community and civil society levels.

First, the ratification of Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning System was elaborated in Technical Regulation (PP) No. 40/2006 on Drafting Procedure of National Development Planning. These regulations became mandates, as well as basis to implement participatory democracy. The implementation was formulated into a forum called National Planning Consultation (*Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan, Musrenbang*). *Musrenbang* became a forum for participants to draft both national and regional development plans.

Second, donors are very active in encouraging the implementation of participatory democracy, more known as ‘donor-driven’ participatory democracy. This is channeled through at least two strategies. The first strategy is to create a precondition in the form of transparency regulation in the beneficiaries’ areas. World Bank uses this strategy to encourage transparency in the regional level. The

second strategy is carried through ‘shadowing the state’ programs or methods. The National Empowerment Program or the Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) Mandiri initiated by the Asia Foundation, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), AusAid, Danida, DFID, USAid and World Bank, for instance, use Musrenbang or planning consultation approach involving direct participation from the society. Besides PNPM Mandiri, donors also promote programs based on social audit and citizen ‘report card’ (CRC) methods to reposition the society’s role within the state and to strengthen its participation in monitoring and performing its obligation as citizens.

Third, societal linkage has become the leaders’ strategy to change power of discourse owned by the House of Representatives’ domination has been legitimized by Law No. 22/1999. The law has the authority to overthrow a public officials on behalf of the people. The power of discourse has switched by the way of public officials to be more open to its citizens building a harmonious relationship as well as strengthening the executive base of support from the society. In this stage, the local leader and his or her beauracracy become the ‘representative’ from the people, as well as the holder of the same sphere of domination as local parliament who also act as society’s representation. The discourse played within this sphere is a struggle of power between two parties on who can represent better and who can gain the society’s support.

When a local leader is elected directly by the people, societal linkage becomes stronger. It no longer functions as an equalizer of domination sphere, but it is now associated with political populism. In this stage, participatory democracy becomes an introduction for the strengthening of political populism. For example, when the comedy show, Opera van Java, was performed live in the City of Surakarta, Mayor Joko Widodo chose to sit on the floor without a chair (*lesehan*) along with thousands of other people instead of sitting among the VIPs. How Jokowi opened himself up, how he joined and enjoyed the show together with the people in order to establish societal linkage in a non-formal way, was a smart strategy. By doing such, Jokowi has pushed the button on producing a charismatic leader that the people has been longing for. Later on, it will be easy to mobilise the people based on their admiration to their charismatic leader — the same way as how celebrities keep their fan base.

Fourth, the politicians’ interests — Politicians who sit both in DPRD and DPR are responsible to collect listen and absorb their constituents’ opinions within six days of recess for two or three periods in a year. The continuation of this process, which

is later known as Jaring Asmara is a momentum built for the councilmen and women to open a participation flow in order to establish and listen to the voice from their election zone. Then, the councilmen and women will channel the constituents' voice to DPRD. Politicians need to maintain their relationship with the election zone members because they need to strengthen and secure their trust in preparation for the next election.

These four driving factors give the people the opportunity to play bigger roles, such as to plan, determine, monitor and evaluate the development process. The same 'space', which used to be closed and elitist, is now opening and letting the people give suggestions and voice instead of being mere 'audiences'.

The Model of Participatory Democracy

The advantage of participatory democracy is the chance given to the citizens or non-members of government elites to participate in the both national or regional development process, both in planning and monitoring. This participatory approach is not only implemented in the national level but also in the basic government structure in Indonesia, the village level. Such approach has resulted in the formation of two strategies of participatory democracy: contribution to development planning and contribution to monitoring.

Contribution to Planning

Slamet Suryanto, Mayor of Surakarta, was the first leader to initiate the people's participation in planning and budgeting for development. He was known for his effort to establish societal linkage with the people. The people's participation management was Slamet Suryanto's strategy to ease his political function as a mayor. Since 2000, Slamet Suryanto has been facing challenges in policymaking from DPRD, affecting the development and establishment of public facilities in Surakarta. He then invited and encouraged the people of Surakarta to participate actively in the development planning and budgeting process for the city government. As a result, the mayor was able to develop policies that are based on the actual voices and needs of the people from the grassroots level. His people-oriented approach made a positive impact on Surakarta's progress. The strategy was successful in managing the Local House of Representatives' authority over his position as a mayor, resulting in his control over the development of Surakarta.

Participatory democracy implementation through *Musrenbang* was adopted by the state in Law No. 25/2004. *Musrenbang* was implemented in the village, the lowest level of government structure up to the highest, the national level.

Musrenbang is organized according to the level of government. In the national level, *Musrenbang* is handled by the minister. In the provincial level, it is managed by the head of Provincial Development Planning Agency (*Bappeda Provinsi*). In the regency level, it is organized by the head of Regency/City Development Planning Agency (*Bappeda Kabupaten/Kota*).

Besides *Musrenbang*, participatory democracy is also promoted by donors through *Musrenbang PNMP Mandiri*, a community-based program. The assessments performed in six regencies/cities found that *Musrenbang PNMP Mandiri* has been successful. In the Regency of Jombang, this program even developed to become an important social capital for the government and society.

Citizen Control over Policy Implementation

Participatory democracy is not only performed in the planning process but also in the implementation process where donors play a significant role in influencing the people to participate. The role can be divided into two: the role within government institution and the role within the society. The first role is formulated into a precondition given to the beneficiaries, which explains the existence of local regulation on transparency. The regulation affects the government programs, for instance, by showing development programs and budget on the local government website, reporting Regional Financial Report (*Laporan Keuangan Daerah, LKD*) on the website, organizing *Musrenbang*, disclose the information to the society, as well as providing access through text messaging.

The Government of Surakarta has been very progressive in promoting transparency. It is actively informing, as well as inviting the people to participate in monitoring the government performance through the internet, *Musrenbang* or consultation, socialization and text messaging. Besides the public officials' success in establishing a strong link with the people, the technological capacity from the government bureaucracy, as well as high demand from society contribute to the sustainability of this effort. In other areas, such as the Regency of Aceh Besar, the control system is only carried through text messaging. The regency is unable to apply an online system due to technical problems and *Musrenbang* is not effectively conducted.


The second role of donors is within the society, which is formulated through the programs they established with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work closely with the community. The people are able to monitor and evaluate the government performance through programs introduced by donors, such as social audit and citizen report card (CRC). The programs play an important role, especially in areas with a weak civil society. A research in the Regency of Aceh Besar found that social audit program strengthen NGOs' advocacy and Aceh Besar's people in monitoring the local government performance and DPRD Kabupaten (regency).

Issues in Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy can be described as an open space to interact, communicate, as well as exchange ideas in an equal manner. This coincides with the description of Karen and McGee (2004) about policy spaces, where society and decision-makers have the same period of time and opportunity to create a transformative change. Participatory democracy can also be explained through Cornwall and Coelho's (2006) term 'democratic space', where citizens of a society can express their patriotism by taking part in government administration. These two theories describe the presence and active participation of two parties: the government and the people. In such case, further assesment is needed to see whether participatory democracy in Indonesia has reached the the 'claimed space', the highest level of participation in the 'powercube' framework.

The Institute of Development Studies from University of Sussex has developed the 'powercube', a framework to understand power and space relations (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Level of Participation (Powercube)




Source: powercube.net 2014

The framework shows that space is divided into three: closed, invited and claimed. Closed space is a situation where policies are made within special consultation among particular actors or elite members of the society, such as politicians, bureaucrats, experts and organization or institution leaders. The strategy is used to encourage transparency, rights to receive information and public accountability. Invited space is a situation where participation demand creates opportunity for the society to be actively involved and consulted by invitation from authorized institution or organization. In this stage, the strategy used for strengthening participation is by improving capacity and capability based on the existing issues. Technology is utilized to strengthen participation. The last stage, claimed strategy, also known as organic space, is a situation where social and community movement have spaces to gather and perform open debates and carry discussions outside the institutional policies arena.

Based on studying these stages, democracy in Indonesia is experiencing a progress—starting with closed space and moving toward the invited space. Policymaking is no longer exclusive to the elite members of the society and has been involving the common people as well. The problem, however, lies to the possibility that participatory democracy in Indonesia will remain at the invited stage only. It means that the citizen participation will only occur through a system that will impose legal or social sanction as a punishment rather than by the strong political will of the people to participate voluntarily. People will depend on the system to regulate their course of action and if the system fails, such weak participation will eventually come to an end.

Captured Participation

Figure 2.4. Participation Dilemma



Source: JPP 2014

Musrenbang

Musrenbang mechanism is indeed only a formal act. A problem arises when *Musrenbang* became a mandatory act that has to be implemented without the participatory spirit as the basis. This situation has made the elite members, both from the government and society, to take advantage of this forum. The ‘captured’ participation happens after *Musrenbang* veered away from being a consultation or communication forum for both parties to becoming a forum to mainly disseminate government programs. In the District of Aceh Besar, *Musrenbang* is the only forum to bring society and government together and is not merely a dissemination forum. In the Regency of Jombang, *Musrenbang* cannot be carried effectively due to the vested interests within the regency planning, where only the interest of bureaucrats and politicians are accommodated. The similar situation can be found in the City of Kupang, where *Musrenbang* is the only shared forum for government and society. However, the forum has lost its original purpose because it has become a means to raise the elites’ interests.

Patriarchal values remain very strong in *Musrenbang* in the six regencies/cities in this report. The forum only accommodates a limited group of people: village elite members, the head of harmonious neighborhood (*Rukun Tetangga, RT*)/harmonious citizens (*Rukun Warga, RW*) male members of the community. Female and children participation is being marginalized in the state development scheme. Women and children’s rights are not a priority in the country’s development efforts.

Jaring Asmara

Taking advantage of *Musrenbang* for political gains also happens with the mechanism of politicians’ participatory democracy. *Jaring Asmara* mechanism has become a formal act that politicians need to do and no longer an act to accommodate the people’s voices. *Jaring Asmara* has turned to become a political campaign mechanism to strengthen and expand politicians’ supporters in certain election areas.

The rationale of collecting voice is indeed different with the rationale of campaign. The purpose of collecting voices is to put society as resource persons, so that politicians will have better understanding of the problems within their election area. Both society and politicians are active participants. They are equal in expressing their thoughts as a citizen and a politician. On the other hand, the logic of

campaign is to put politicians as speakers, while society becomes an audience. Politicians are 'heroes', a figure needed by the society for a better living. Patron-client relations is very strong and dominant here.

Politicians' taking advantage on Technocracy

Both government and politicians are implementing participatory democracy but in different mechanisms. The government is sticking to technocracy, which is based on its capacity and the political area it covers, such as the village, lower sub-regency (*kelurahan*), sub-regency (*kecamatan*), regency (*kabupaten*) and province. Politicians, meanwhile, work within the electoral regency and *jaring asmara*. One electoral regency consists of two or more sub-regency, which politicians would visit every third quarter of the year for six days. The problem rises when *jaring asmara* recess is turned into a political campaign. In turn, political interest can easily overshadow the interest of the society. In this situation it will be difficult to differentiate the real interests of the people and the interests of politicians.

The same situation has happened in the District of Jombang where the interests of the bureaucrats and politicians have strong influence despite the indication of the society's participation and NGOs' influence. The District of Jombang is the second strongest area after the City of Surakarta.

Apathy towards Participation

Politicians making use of local consultation forums to their advantage has triggered apathy from the people toward participation to democratic processes and its implication to their life. The people are used as 'a tool' to 'certify' that the ongoing process is a real participation process.

In the Regency of Aceh Besar, the people's voice on development planning has not, in fact, been accommodated. Instead, the SKPD (administration) would normally 'cheat' on them by not taking into account the issues raised by the citizens and simply carry on with only the government's interest in mind. As a consequence, the opinions, which mostly consist of problems – both related with the fulfillment of basic needs and infrastructures – were never taken into account. The development in the level of regency/city and province are only focused on the SKPD program. The same situation also occurred in the Regency of Manokwari and the Regency of Parigi Moutong.

Meanwhile in the City of Kupang, the formal act of *Musrenbang* lacks guidelines and is hardly understood by the common people, which makes it difficult for them to fully grasp the idea of development planning. This situation illustrates how the government lacks understanding of the different capacities of its people.

The apathy keeps growing. The people, in general, are reluctant or no longer willing to participate. Their participation only becomes a symbol of either their presence or resistance against the state.

Future Investment through Participatory Democracy

The biggest advantages taken from participatory democracy include political education as a long-term investment. It is a form of awareness that politics is part of the people's daily life, as well as an acknowledgement that one, as a citizen, has rights and obligations to take an active participation in national development. Social awareness towards politics can be established from anything surrounding them. People's political awareness can be established by their social awareness. The awareness of the people of Aceh Besar towards environmental destruction, for instance, has triggered their responsibility to report the situation in *Musrenbang* and discuss to find a solution.

Participatory democracy can establish a social capital between the government and the people. The patron-client relations is now eradicated. This strong social capital is very necessary in order to build a strong nation state.

Therefore, political education and social capital as advantages of participatory democracy need to be improved and to also address the weaknesses. The power of three pillars – state, society and NGOs – if they worked together has the ability to build a stronger and more stable Indonesia.

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Manokwari

Hasrul Hanif, I Ngurah Suryawan and Simon Rizyard Banundi¹⁰

Introduction

Manokwari has a vital position in political constellation in Papua. As an oldest region, Manokwari has a major role in the history dynamics and formation of political characteristics of Papua for 15 periods since 1969 when Papua became part of the Republic of Indonesia. Since then, 10 district heads have led Manokwari through representative selection mechanism. When Indonesia introduced direct election in 2005, the last local leaders were elected directly including Dominggus Mandacan and Dominggus Buiney (2005–2010) and Bastian Salaby and Roberth Hamart (2010–2015). The change of political mechanism is aligned with the democratic processes in Manokwari that has grown and has been developed throughout time. Furthermore, it also cannot be detached from its social, economic, political and cultural structures.

This chapter will explain how democracy works in Manokwari by answering several main questions: How does the local democracy develop in Manokwari? Are there any special conditions, such as certain characteristic, sociopolitical dynamics, historical considerations and leadership pattern that contribute to the practice of democracy? How does the representative democracy and participatory democracy work in Manokwari? Does local democracy in Manokwari also express a distinct practice compared to other regions in Indonesia? How does the society of Manokwari assess the dynamics of local democracy that is taking place in short, medium and long terms?

¹⁰ The first draft of regional report is written by local assessor, I Ngurah Suryawan, an anthropologist at Faculty of Literature at State University of Papua (Universitas Negeri Papua) and Simon Rizyard Banundi, a NGO activist of LP3BH, under previous coordination and supervision of Bayu Dardias Kurniadi, national assessor of Manokwari Regency. Hasrul Hanif, national assessor, has contributed in the supervision, revision and completion of this assessment.

To assess the work of local democracy in Manokwari, this study applies the State of Local Democracy (SoLD) assessment. It focuses on practices of representative and participatory democracy in Manokwari by using various indicators. This assessment also put emphasis on the fact that the practices of local democracy are indeed affected by the social and political dynamics of such regions that cover historical background, sociocultural, economics, population, and geographic and local political characteristics. It has cultivated distinguishing marks of how democracy is carried out in the region.

The local democracy assessment in Manokwari Regency was conducted using three methods: desk study, field research with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Desk study was conducted in the beginning of research in order to get a description, map and understand the democracy context such as regional setting, conditions of economic, social and culture and other aspects of statistical data based on Manokwari in Numbers (*Manokwari Dalam Angka*) gathered from 2008 to 2011. The desk study's data were collected from data of Regional General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD*), Central Bureau of Statistics (*Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS*) of Manokwari Regency and West Papua Province and library of Institute of Research, Analysis and Development for Legal Aid Manokwari (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Bantuan Hukum (LP3BH)*). After identifying the basic data, the assessment also tried to deepen the secondary data by conducting various in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. There were various prominent people of indigenous community including the secretary of Papua Custom Council of Region III Manokwari, academicians and NGO workers who were interviewed and participated in the discussion.

The Manokwari Regency

Manokwari Regency Profile

Manokwari is a unique regency that has specific characteristics of history and social and economic development – human development, security and justice, agriculture and budget –, which has developed in an asymmetrical decentralisation designed to strengthen its capability. Based on Law No. 12/1969¹¹ on Formation of Autonomous Province of West Irian, Manokwari was recognized as one of the Nine Autonomous Regions in West Irian after the people referendum in 1969. In

¹¹This law was then amended by Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province in 2001.

2003, Papua province has developed into two province, Papua Province and West Papua Province. Since then Manokwari has developed as a capital city of West Papua Province through Presidential Decree No. 1/2003, the Law No. 45/1999 and Supreme Court's decision dated 11 November 2004, followed by Lieu of Law No. 1/2008 and Law No. 35/2008 as an amendment of Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy of Papua Province.

The Dutch Christian missionaries brought Bible preaching in the nineteenth century. The mission that initially was organized by Zeending-Germany since 1855 has contributed to social and economic development of Manokwari, even the public services provision. Their significant role in social and political practices in Manokwari then has been declined because of the people's referendum in 1969 that endorsed the formation of modern local government. The widespread of the mission and the beginning of church activities have set off awareness and wider knowledge of Manokwari society with the 'outside world', a contrast to other regions that had no experience or connection outside the country.

Brief History

Since Manokwari was known as the center of Christianity and the seat of the first formation of modern government in Papua, the people, especially who are Biak-Numfor, called it M nukwar. The word *M nukwar* was etymologically derived from two basic morphemes, *mnu* (village) and *kwar* (old). Manokwari was recognized as 'the prioritized, oldest, most ancient village' because this area was the very first entry point and the hub of Christianity missionaries in Papua. In other words, Manokwari has been the cultural meeting point, especially between Papuan traditional culture and Dutch western culture.

Moreover, Sultanate Tidore and Bacan, an Islam-based Sultanate in North Maluku, has put their influence of power in Manokwari in the sixteenth century, which made Manokwari a cultural meeting point between Islamic culture and Papuan culture as well. The influence of the two Sultanates was weakened when the Dutch started to take control of the Bird Head of Papua, which was marked by the proclamation of Fort du bus in Lobo Village (now Kaimana Regency) on 24 August 1898. The growing influence of the Dutch forced the Tidore Sultanate to agree on a transfer of power through *Korte Verklaring* on 3 June 1909. In this agreement, the Sultan of Tidore yielded Manokwari under the *Nederlandsch Indie*. To assert power on this West Irian area, the Dutch government established the first government post, which was located in Manokwari.

Manokwari was chosen as the first government post because of its strategic geographical location apart from the widespread Christianity, especially in Mansina Island, one mile from the centre of Manokwari City. The government post then grew its status from the working area of Resident Assistant under Moluccas Residency located in Ambon. Based on State Gazette No. 16 of 1957, Manokwari, as the capital city, developed as a section that supervised the subsections of Sorong, Makbon, Raja Ampat, Manokwari, Ransiki, Wandamen and Ayamaru.

After the government of Republic of Indonesia took over the area of West Papua from Dutch colonialism on 1 May 1963, the administrative structure was adjusted to the same administrative structure applied in other areas in Indonesia. Furthermore, the government declared Manokwari and other areas in West Papua as a region and regency government in Autonomous Province of West Papua under Law No. 12/1969. Unfortunately, Manokwari, like other regions in Papua, remained underdeveloped with social, political, security and economic problems compared with other regions in Indonesia, especially regions in Java Islands. This condition triggered the demand on more regional redistribution and justice between central (Jakarta) and local (Papua), even the rise of secessionist movement in Papua.

Political changes in Indonesia in 1998 also contribute for opening the new opportunity of regional redistribution between Java Island and the outer Island Indonesia including Papua. Jakarta then has signed the new regulation, Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Based on this law, the central government should give more authorities for local government of Papua followed by more fiscal transfer. This legal opportunity also contributed to Manokwari to grow and develop as one of the progressive regions in Papua. In addition, after the split and the formation of West Papua as a new province, Manokwari then has been transformed to be the capital of the province. Now this region has been growing as the economic hub of western part of Papua Island.

Geographical Profile: Location and Accessibility

Manokwari Regency is located in the Bird Head region, West Papua Province. This region can be reached through transportation by air, land and sea. Sea transportation can be taken through several harbors for passenger and cargo ships. The harbor for passenger ships is considered as class 4. Expanding 73 m, its basic capacity is 3000 dwt, with density of 2 tons/m². The harbor became the docking

port for PT PELNI, the country's national shipping company and other pioneer ships that sail for 10 times in a week. These ships enter the sea harbor of Manokwari either from Jayapura to Sorong and Jakarta and vice-versa. In September 2011, 737 boats sails carrying 74,442 incoming passengers and 71,756 outgoing passengers were recorded to have disembarked in the harbor. The harbor for cargo ships is also classified under class 4 and expands up to 90 m, with a capacity of 7,000 dwt and density and 2 tons/m². The cargo ship harbor is capable in servicing the loading and unloading of containers. Aside from the two harbors, there are three pioneer ports in Manokwari located in Ransiki, Oransbari and Saukorem districts. Another harbor for ferries is planned to be built in Sowi, South Manokwari District.

Manokwari can also be reached through the Rendani Manokwari Airport in West Manokwari District. Rendani Airport's runway extends between 2,000–3,000 m in length and 30–40 m wide. This airport can accommodate Boeing 737 series 200, Fokker 100, Fokker 27, Twin Otter and Cessna among others. The service of commercial flights is done by several airlines, such as Batavia Air, Express Air, Sriwijaya Air and Wings Air. In addition, there are local services in Manokwari provided by Susi Air and Trigana Air, which connects the city center of Manokwari with districts in the hinterland. Frequency of flights to and fro Manokwari is quite frequent as the schedule almost runs every day. Based on a September 2011 data, it recorded 4,631 flights with 5,271 incoming passengers and 43,396 outgoing passengers.

As for land transportation, there is West Papua Trans, which connects Sorong and Manokwari with 12-hour travel time and Bintuni and Manokwari, within seven hours. The availability of information through local media, either print or electronic, has helped promote accessibility of Manokwari Regency to the public. This includes *Media Papua*, *Cahaya Papua*, *Manokwari Pos*, *Papua Barat Pos* for print and Radio Matoa, *RRI Manokwari* and Papua Barat TV for local electronic media. Information access is also supported by national media such as *Kompas* and *Media Indonesia*.

After *pemekaran daerah*, the division of the district/regency into new districts/regencies, the area of Manokwari Regency was divided into three regencies: Manokwari, Teluk Bintuni and Teluk Wondama. Manokwari expanded to cover an area extending 14,655 km² located between 00 15' North Latitude to 30 15' South Latitude and 1340 45' East Longitude to 1320 35 West Longitude. It is bordered by Pacific Ocean in the north, Bintuni Regency in the south, South Sorong in the west and Teluk Wondama Regency and Biak Numfor Regency in the east.

Administratively, Manokwari Regency consists of 11 districts, 405 villages and nine sub-districts. The districts are mostly located in cross-regional border plan, such as Amberbaken District, which is adjacent to Sorong Regency, Kebar District, adjacent to South Sorong Regency and Teluk Bintuni Regency, Minyambow Manokwari and Susurei District, which are directly adjacent to Bintuni Regency. Ransiki District is adjacent to Teluk Bintuni Regency and Teluk Wondama Regency.

City Design and Planning

The local government of Manokwari has planned to develop some growth poles in Manokwari. Thus, they have initiated to develop a master plan of development stages that divided the development of Manokwari into different phases:

First, establishment of a strong and high profile centrum or area of growth (called Order I). The development of Order I area was started from the *Distrik*¹² Manokwari as the capital of district of Manokwari. As Order I area, *Distrik* Manokwari is expected to be the strongest growth center contributing and giving economic multiplier effects to the surrounding *distrik*. It is positioned as the center of trade, services, industry, education and government.

Second, building a strong infrastructure for accessibility by developing and improving the land, sea and air transportation. The local government of Manokwari also stimulates the growth of other *distrik* as secondary growth poles (called Order II) by improving the infrastructures and accessibility. The new growth poles will prevent the privatization of *Distrik* Manokwari and the occurrence of 'backwash effect'. The improved accessibility of Manokwari is expected to increase economic activities, particularly in delivering goods and services from strongest (Order I) to the secondary growth poles (Order II). For example, the development of *Distrik* Manokwari as the first center encourages *Distrik* Masni and *Distrik* Ransiki to be new growth pole (Order II). The development of the second growth pole is expected to trickle down and boost the economy of other supporting *distrik* (called Order III and Order IV).

¹² Sub-district in Indonesian government structure is known as *kecamatan*. However, in the case of provinces of Papua and West Papua, sub-district is called *distrik* referring to Law No. 21/2001.

Third, strengthening the accessibility from Order II area to Order III area. This mainly involves the development of land transportation network that is used to develop other facilities and infrastructures to increase productivity and prosperity of the community.

Fourth, strengthening of accessibility from Order III to the surrounding area (hinterland). It mainly involves the development of land transportation network. In reality, development of other transportation network such as air transportation depends on the area's geographical condition. The development of other facilities and infrastructures is also influenced by enough provision of electricity. In addition, the development in Manokwari also puts agricultural and plantation sectors on the spot of concern.

All these plans are documented in the Regional Land-use Planning (*Rencana Tata Ruang dan Wilayah*), which gives a 10-year road map of area development in Manokwari.

Space utilization in Manokwari Regency is divided into two areas—The protected area, which includes the protected forest and national parks and the cultivation area, which consists of settlements, fishery, animal husbandry, industrial, wet agricultural land, dry agricultural land and plantation/annual plants area. In short, the local government of Manokwari's development approach is driven by spatial- or land-use planning.

Table 3.1 Development Approach Based on Territory

No	Center for Regional Development	Sub Regional Development	Excellent Potential
I	West Manokwari	West Barat, East Manokwari and South Manokwari	Central Government, Center of Trade and Service, Tourism
II	Ransiki	Ransiki, Oransbari, Tanah Rubuh, Mumi Waren	Plantation and Agriculture Sector
III	Masni	Masni, Prafi, Sidey, Warmare	Agriculture, Food Crops and Plantation Sector
IV	Kebar	Kebar, Snopy, Muhrani and Saukorem	Husbandry and Mining Sector
V	Minyambow	Minyambow, Hingk, Testega, Membey, Catubow	Agriculture Sector
VI	Anggi	Anggi, Taige, Surey, Anggi Gida	Tourism, Agriculture

Source: BPS Manokwari 2010

Demography

The demographics in Manokwari Regency are affected by birth, mortality and migration of its population. Based on the 2010 Population Census (Sensus Penduduk 2010), the population was 187,591, consisted of 98,762 male and 88,829 female. This number was distributed in 29 districts (see Table 6.2).

Table 3.2 Population Distribution of Manokwari Regency per District

District	Population Number	Distribution
Ransiki	7,620	4.06%
Momi Waren	2,051	1.09%
Neney	1,193	0.64%
Sururey	2,516	1.34%
Anggi	2,020	1.08%
Taige	1,309	0.70%
Membey	993	0.53%
Oransbari	5,031	2.68%
Warmare	6,169	3.29%
Prafi	14,214	7.58%
Menyamboow	6,194	3.30%
Catubow	1,846	0.98%
West Manokwari	74,924	39.94%
East Manokwari	8,993	4.79%
Senopi	756	0.44%
North Manokwari	2,261	1.21%
South Manokwari	13,268	7.07%
Testega	827	0.44%
Tanah Rubuh	2,112	1.13%
Kebar	2,018	1.08%
Amberbaken	1,879	1.00%
Mubrani	669	0.36%
Masni	13,492	7.19%
Sidey	4,384	2.34%
Tahota	581	0.31%
Didohu	1,572	0.84%
Dataran Isim	2,066	1.10%
Anggi Gida	1,284	0.68%
Hingk	5,349	2.85%

Source: BPS Manokwari 2010

The table shows that the population distribution of Manokwari Regency is concentrated in West Manokwari District with 74,924 inhabitants (39.94 per cent), followed by Prafi District, 14,214 (7.58 per cent), Masni District, 13,492 (7.19 per cent) and South Manokwari District, 13,268 (7.07 per cent). The other districts have population distribution of under 5 per cent.

With the area of 14,448.50 km² inhabited by 187,591 people, the average density level in Manokwari Regency is 13 persons per square kilometer. The district with the highest population density is West Manokwari, with 316 persons per square kilometer. The lowest population density can be found in the districts of Tahota, Kebar, Senopi and Mubrani, with one person per square kilometer.

Table 3.3 Population Density of Manokwari Regency

District	Area (Km²)	Population Number	Population Density (person/Km²)
Ransiki	1,180.20	7,620	6
Momi Waren	440.00	2,051	5
Neney	436.18	1,193	3
Sururey	178.22	2,516	14
Anggi	256.80	2,020	8
Taige	112.13	1,309	12
Membey	49.58	58,993	20
Oransbari	362.95	5,031	14
Warmare	598.14	6,169	10
Prafi	388.00	14,214	37
Menyambow	335.70	6,194	18
Catubow	373.72	1,846	5
West Manokwari	237.24	74,924	316
East Manokwari	154.84	8,993	58
Senopi	1.08240	756	1
North Manokwari	622.79	2,261	4
South Manokwari	542.07	13,268	24
Testega	497.84	827	2
Tanah Rubuh	481.19	2,112	4
Kebar	1,620.60	2,018	1
Amberbaken	1,000.87	1,879	2
Mubrani	508.13	669	1
Masni	1,406.10	13,492	10

District	Area	Population Number	Population Density (person/Km ²)
Sidey	219.95	4,384	20
Tahota	407.44	581	1
Didohu	176.04	1,572	9
Dataran Isim	214.89	2,066	10
Anggi Gida	199.41	1,284	6
Hingk	365.08	5,349	15

Source: BPS Manokwari 2010

From year 2000 to 2010, the annual population growth rate of Manokwari Regency is 6.83 per cent. The population growth rate of South Manokwari District is the highest among other districts in Manokwari Regency at 32.34 per cent with Hingk District in second to South Manokwari District, at 24.71 per cent. Although West Manokwari District has the highest population by number in Manokwari Regency, it only ranks third after South Manokwari and Hingk District in terms of population growth rate at 15.22 per cent. The districts with the lowest population growth rate over the last decade are Dataran Isim, Ransiki and Senopi. Each district has grown its population by 1.31 per cent, 1.57 per cent and 1.74 per cent, respectively.

On the other hand, there are 12 districts that show negative population growth rate. The districts with the least population growth rate are Tahota and Testega Districts, with -4.70 per cent and -4.28 per cent, respectively.

Table 3.4 Growth Rate Based on Gender

District	Number of Male	Number of Female	Total	Sex Ratio
Ransiki	3,997	3,643	7,620	109
Momi Waren	1,099	952	2,051	115
Neney	606	587	1,193	103
Sururey	1,226	1,290	2,516	95
Anggi	1,005	1,015	2,020	99
Taige	659	650	1,309	101
Membey	495	498	993	99
Oransbari	2,643	2,388	5,031	111

Source: BPS Manokwari 2010

District	Number of Male	Number of Female	Total	Sex Ratio
Warmare	3,140	3,029	6,169	104
Prafi	7,436	6,778	14,214	110
Menyambow	3,103	3,091	6,194	100
Catubow	938	908	1,846	103
West Manokwari	40,319	34,605	74,924	117
East Manokwari	4,658	4,335	8,993	107
Senopi	381	375	756	102
North Manokwari	1,190	1,071	2,261	111
South Manokwari	7,125	6,143	13,268	116
Testega	413	414	827	100
Tanah Rubuh	1,087	1,025	2,112	106
Kebar	984	1,034	2,018	95
Amberbaken	952	927	1,879	103
Mubrani	356	313	669	114
Masni	7,167	6,325	13,492	113
Sidey	2,324	2,060	4,384	113
Tahota	321	260	581	123
Didohu	769	803	1,572	96
Dataran Isim	1,059	1,007	2,006	105
Anggi Gida	625	659	1,284	95
Hingk	2,705	2,644	5,349	102

Source: BPS Manokwari 2010

Administrative Zoning

Manokwari Regency consists of 29 district areas: Ransiki, Momi Waren, Nenei, Sururey, Tahota, Didohu, Dataran Isim, Anggi, Taige, Anggi Gida, Membey, Oransbari, Warmare, Prafi, Menyambouw, Hink, Catubouw, Manokwari Barat, Manokwari Timur, Manokwari Utara, Manokwari Selatan, Testega, Tanah Rubuh, Kebar Senopi, Amberbaken, Mubrani, Masni and Sidey districts (BPS Manokwari 2010). Out of the 29 districts, 13 are located close to the sea, while the remaining 16 are in the plain or mountainous areas. Those districts that are adjacent to the sea are Ransiki, Momi Waren, Tahota, Oransbari, Manokwari Barat, Maokwari Timur, Manokwari Utara, Manokwari Selatan, Tanah Rubu, Amberbaken, Mubrani, Masni and Sidey District. Those districts found in the landed or mountainous areas are Nenei, Sururey, Didohu, Dataran Isim, Anggi, Taige, Anggi Gida, Membey, Warmare, Prafi, Menyambouw, Hingk, Catubouw, Testegs, Kebar and Senopi.

Kebar has the widest district area with 1,620.60 km², occupying 11.22 per cent of Manokwari Regency's total area. Membey, which spans 49.58 km² or 0.34 per cent of total area of Manokwari Regency, is the smallest district. Manokwari Regency, in general, has 422 areas with one level under a district that consists of nine sub-districts and 413 kampoong (BPS Manokwari 2010).

Land Affairs

Manokwari Regency, which has an area expanding up to 14,448.50 km², has a fairly conducive land condition. So far, there has never been any major conflict triggered by land issue. Land-based conflict, which once occurred, was due to a dispute as the result of area expansion. It was, however, managed and prevented into becoming a big-scale conflict involving other areas, such as Teluk Bintuni Regency, Teluk Wondama Regency, Tambrauw Regency and Sorong Regency, which are nearby Manokwari. The conflict rose from the plan of merging East Tambrauw Regency, which includes districts in the north coast of Manokwari, with Tambrauw Regency. The dispute was later resolved by involving the local community and following the *adat*¹³ law mechanism.

Other land-based conflicts were related to the process of land transformation from *adat* land to regional government. The occurrence of a conflict can be in the form of unfulfilled promises to solve land compensation for communal rights owner, while their area was already taken and used as a palm plantation. Normally, such transformation factors in the land quality, for instance, in choosing a land that can be transformed into a plantation and can be a reliable source for Manokwari Regency. Oftentimes, the action involved is putting a blockade to government land. Some cases can be resolved through legal action in court, while other cases are resolved through tribal mechanism. It can be said that the process of land-based conflict resolution also represents the extent of function of local democracy. The rise of blockade and strike illustrates the absence of democratic articulation channel.

In the agricultural sector, the Forestry Office, Food Crops Agriculture and Horticulture Office, Plantation Office, Husbandry Office, Fishery and Marine Office are implementing the policy for agricultural development. The development policy covers establishment of integrated people's agriculture, resources development and agriculture infrastructure, establishment of integrated people's plantation,

¹³Traditional customary legal systems

development of resources facility and plantation infrastructure. It also includes the establishment of people's integrated forestry, establishment of forestry business, establishment of integrated husbandry, development of regional production center (*kawasan sentra produksi*) for husbandry, development of resources, facilities and husbandry, training and controlling of animal health and community cattle, development of fishing and fish cultivation.

The implementation of these plans has previously sought the approval from the indigenous people regarding the size of land that will be used.

Social Structure

The social structure in Manokwari Regency is greatly heterogeneous. There are several tribes that are indigenous to Manokwari Regency, such as Arfak, Doreri, and Wandamen. The Arfak tribe alone consists of the Meiyakh, Hatam, Moile and Manikon tribes.

The indigenous tribes of Arfak normally live in highland area of Arfak Mountains in Manokwari Regency. The Meiyakh tribe is centrally located in the Merof River, upper Wariori River, Meofer River and the east side of Kasi River around Arui River, Aimasi River, Prafi River to the coasts of Nuni River and Pami River. The Hatam tribe is located in the surrounding area of Minyambow, Inggem River, Coisi, Hing close to Ngemou River straight to the south of Ngemooh River with Anggi at the north side and to the east, up to Oransabari and Ransiki at the north side. They can be found in north upstream of Prafi River to Irari, Mokwam, Warmare up to Andai and to the north around Aimasi River, Prafi straight to Nuni River, Pami River and continues to Amban. The Moile tribe settles around Mokwam, upstream of Prafi River, Warmare straight to Estuary of Prafi at north coast. They are also in the east of Prafi River to Tanah Rubuh and Anggeresi. The central location of Manikon tribe is around the lakes of Anggi, alongside Ransiki River to the beach, the upstream of Ingsim River, Tidehu River, Meiof River and the north side of Teluk Bintuni Regency (Sakrani n.d.). Several Arfak tribes have come down to the coast area of Manokwari City and reside there. Yet most of them still live in Arfak Mountain. Other than the Arfak tribe, there are the people of Biak, Serui, Sorong, Jayapura, Fakfak and Wamena who became the residents of Manokwari. In the local community of the Papua indigenous people, tribes that originated from Papua are known as *komin* in their local language while *amber* is non-Papua tribe who came and resided in Manokwari for decades. Among those tribes are Java, Timor, Toraja, Ambon, Manado and Batak. Some of them were transmigrants, while others were non-transmigrants.

Ethnic heterogeneity is built through and around the preservation of the indigenous tribes' mother language. Some of the languages that still exist are Arfak, Wandamen, Biak (used by Doreri ethnic), Serui (Yapen), Sorong and other languages that are considered as the mother language in Papua. Meanwhile, the non-Papuan ethnics are using Javanese, Timorese, Toraja, Manadonese, Batak and Ambonese. Arfak and Biak language (Doreri) are the only two languages that are recognized based on its usage by the Regional Government of Manokwari Regency. However, the ethnic heterogeneity and the coexisting language do not create faction or multi-ethnic conflict.

Economy Basis

The local community of Manokwari is generally in the early phase of cultivating and sourcing their own food supply. The main food is rice and sago, while tuber and ravine are staples in inland population. Rice planting has only been known recently in several areas, such as Prafi, Oransbari and Ransiki. The main livelihood in these communities is farming nutmeg and chocolate, particularly in Ransiki, Oransbari and Prafi.

Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are assisting the local community in improving the economy. They are helping in the management of natural resources available in each village and other surrounding areas through community participatory programs. Not all villages, however, get the same assistance. There is also a development program that grants 'soft fund'¹⁴, which is directly managed by the district to improve the economy of the community. The wood management through Community Cooperative (*Kopermas*) is one example. According to some sources, although there are a few who receive direct benefit from the industry, it has become more beneficial to external parties and has, in fact, damaged forests as the logging system does not follow the set rules.

Animal husbandry is another growing industry. It is generally concentrated in the central regency, supplying meat and poultry eggs in the community. In the transmigration area, big animal husbandry and poultry are the main local sources of revenue. Butterfly farming is a developing industry in the hinterlands. The community is trained on butterfly farming, of which, the produce is exported. Cooperative fishing is a rather weak sector as the management does not have any administrative assistance.

¹⁴ A grant that has no direct requirement for return of investment

The presence of NGOs such as Yayasan Lingkungan Hidup Humeibou Manokwari (YALHIMO) and *Pengembangan Masyarakat dan Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam (PERDU)* provides the monitoring of any environmental damage brought about by these projects. As a result, the regional government is preparing to build a place for study of the development in protected areas.

Politics

1. Actors' Involvement in Local Government

In the case of Manokwari, the implementation of regional autonomy is strengthened by special autonomy for West Papua Province through Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua. This has opened a new space to expand the autonomous government based on the existing initiative in their area.

Responses from various stakeholders – from the academe, church, public, youth, women, indigenous groups, NGOs to regional government – on local democracy is influenced by *adat* institutions or traditions, church and government. This study found that among these stakeholders, the elites of *adat* institutions, religious sector and the local government equally play strong roles in the character formation of democracy in the local government. The relationship is comparable to what they call as “one stove with three stones”, indicating the interwoven thread among the three sectors.

The influence of the *adat* institution is strongly anchored in grassroots communities where election of a leader follows the bottom-up process. It starts from every clan or family becoming the leader in a smaller area before continuing to lead in a tribe. In the tribe level, a leader is appointed through the tribe meeting. The head leads the Tribe *Adat* Council (Dewan Adat Suku, DAS) and on the higher level, the custom territory of DAS establishes a regional *adat* council. The regional *adat* council in Papua is called the Regional Papuan *Adat* Council (Dewan Adat Papua Wilayah, DAP Wilayah). Based on this structure, Manokwari is categorized as Papuan *Adat* Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP) Region III M nukwar (Manokwari), of which the leader is elected as the representative of local indigenous people of Manokwari. The DAP Region III M nukwar consists of DAS Doreri, DAS, Arfak, DAS Mpur, DAS Wandamen and DAS Byak Bar M nukwar. These sectors in DAP Region III M nukwar have significant influence in the community. It is interesting to note that the government also supports and facilitates the *adat* institution. For example, they provide office and vehicle facilities

for DAP Region III M nukwar, which is led by Barnabas Mandacan (DAS Arfak) and Zeth Rumbobiar (DAS Doreri).

The involvement of DAP Region III of M nukwar is strongly visible, especially when they support the indigenous people to advocate their interest and basic rights. This is demonstrated by the issuance of Manifest on Rights of Indigenous People against Land Tenure. Through the manifest, DAP Region III M nukwar claims that there is no land to be sold. It means that the communal land can only be rented, not owned, by the government or investor. DAP Region III also actively voice the protests against security policies that have potential threat to human rights in Papua land, especially in Manokwari. The indigenous peoples also strongly support the DAP Region III.

Thus the role of DAP Region III in the development of local democracy is noticeable in Manokwari Regency. DAP Region III M nukwar in Manokwari City supervises several local *adat* councils that are located in bird head area of Papua land. *Adat* and religious institutions (in this case, the church) have a strong participatory influence in local democracy. However, as their influence grows, such institutions face challenges in preserving their *adat* values against cultural transformation within a changing political society.

The local government identifies the *Adat* Council as a separate entity that protects the indigenous community from pressures of state power and global investments. The *Adat* Council, for instance, can assist a community asking for help on land acquisition that is of business interest.

Adat, religion and tribe and family politics maintain a stronghold in the interplay between the community and local politics. Local elites, known as the 'custom kid' have the legitimacy, power and mass influence to seek valued political support from the indigenous community.

It is not to say, however, that the government does not do any intervention to DAP. The Institution of *Adat* People (*Lembaga Masyarakat Adat, LMA*) was established as a rival institution of DAP, which was fully supported by the regional government on the instruction from central government. This resulted to a horizontal conflict in the community because of the differing aspirations of both institutions. DAP often supports activities that fight for the interest of the indigenous Papuan, which conflicts the interest of regional and central government in promoting investments and development in Papua land.

Besides DAP, the religious sector also plays a significant role in impacting the regional government policies. The sector's influence is driven by the interest to preserve Manokwari as the center of civilization from the early Protestants despite the existence of other religions like Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism.

The religious sector established the Coordination Intra-Church Agency (Badan Koordinasi Antargereja, BKAG), which eventually became the unifying voice of Christians in Manokwari, including the effort to preserve Manokwari as a the seat of Christianity. In doing so, BKAG always gets the support from community, whether from indigenous people or Christian migrants of Manokwari. BKAG's actions can also be seen in their effort to influence the government in outlining the Draft of Regional Regulation of Manokwari as the seat of Christianity and the implementation of Regional Regulation No. 6/2006 on prohibiting the distribution and sales of alcoholic beverages in Manokwari Regency. These actions are backed by the church and their followers in the BKAG communities.

The regional government of Manokwari Regency, as the primal governing body, is consists of a regent as executive and the Local House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD*) as legislative. The synergy between the executive and legislative runs well in each development program of regional government. The regent and DPRD work together in law enforcement in partnership with other agencies, such as the District Command Police of Manokwari (Polres), District Attorney of Manokwari and District Court of Manokwari. Such partnership contributes in the success of development programs in Manokwari Regency. DAP and BKAG also work with Manokwari Regency apart from other regional government partners. The regency often works with DAP and BKAG in matters concerning basic rights of the community together with the law enforcement sectors.

2. Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs have significant contribution in the development of democracy in Manokwari. Currently, there are 14 established NGOs in the field. Based on the data from Political and State Unity Agency (*Kesbangpol*) of Manokwari, there are 27 local NGOs in the community. NGOs usually focus on local issues, which eventually become their institutional programs.

NGOs in Manokwari emphasize the grassroots approach towards participatory development. NGOs like Perform Project, LP3BH, YALHIMO, PERDU and

several other organizations have introduced the 'Basic Pattern of Participatory Development', which has encouraged community participation in regional development planning. The approach is focused on fitting the government interest against the community's aspirations and giving priority on participation from community in each phase.

Two participatory approach models are employed in several districts of Manokwari Regency: medium-term village development plan and formulation of strategic programs. In a target district, the community is equipped with a development plan in utilizing the existing resources around them. There are also several assistance programs that provide funding, especially in improving the economy.

The NGOs have made positive impact on the community. First, they gave the community an understanding of participatory development, which transformed the community from merely an audience or object of development to being participants in the development process. Second, they encouraged the community to be their advocacy partners. In the environment sector, for instance, YALHIMO has made community partners located in the north coast of Manokwari, which covers Masni, Sidey, Kebar, Saukorem and Amberbaken districts to the south area, Ransiki and hinterland of Anggi District. In the forestry sector, there is PERDU, which has community partners in Menyambouw, Catubow and Testega districts. In strengthening the *adat* institution and basic rights of indigenous people, LP3BH has reached out and made constituents from the coastal area to hinterland of Manokwari. Some NGOs have specific causes and advocacies, such as PtPs (*Perkumpulan Terbatas Peduli Sehat, Limited Group of Joint-care Health*), which works with its constituents in health sector and HIV/AIDS. In their work, PtPs is affiliated with the regional government. Other organizations are working in partnership with Commission of AIDS Prevention (*Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS, KPA*) of Manokwari Regency in Mnuqwar. These include Social and Environmental Advocacy Networks (*Jaringan Advokasi Sosial Dan Lingkungan, Jasoil*), Yayasan Paradisea¹⁵, Papuan Women Partner (*Mitra Perempuan Papua, MP2*), Papua's Village Child Foundation (*Yayasan Anak Dusun Papua, Yadupa*) *Perkumpulan Terbatas VOYE Papua Barat*, Student Forum on Environmental Cares (*Forum Mahasiswa Peduli Lingkungan, FORMALIN*), Mod Modey Foundation (*Yayasan Mod Modey*), Kamuki¹⁶ and Institute of Data and Information of Development (*Lembaga Data dan Informasi Pembangunan, LDIP*). All of which have their constituent bases in grassroots communities.

¹⁵NGO working on forest conservation

3. Relationship among Actors in the Government

These various sectors play active roles in the community impacting the government. They endorse the interests as well as the needs of community in each phase of the development process, whether it is in short, medium or long term.

DAP and BKAG, in their standard practice, directly influence the regional government to reconcile its interests with the community's aspirations, while NGOs work together with the community to articulate its interest in the district government. However, the lobbying practices of investors can often sway the district government to their business interests, especially in Manokwari Regency that has abundant natural resources. In terms of political party influence, the mandate in Law No. 21 on Special Autonomy of Papua conserves the local political party, in which national political parties have to be more flexible in taking over the region.

The investors and political parties' partnership often support and benefit each other's interests. This situation causes many practices of misusing the budget and bureaucracy in the regional government and DPRD. However, these cases are often closed from press coverage (mass media). Regardless, these irregularities in development budgets are frequently protested in media through LP3BH, which established the NGO Advocacy Network of West Papua. This network put the NGOs as guardians of the budgeting process and pro-community development. The impact can be deemed significant, as suspects in malversation of development funds can be brought to legal proceedings. However, sometimes, the sentence or verdict from panel of judges is not worth to make up for the loss or for the fact that such crime has been committed.

The relationship of each sector encourages community empowerment in terms of independence of *adat* institutions, especially in the Tribe *Adat* Council. It contributes in the training, skill, and critical legal education that can assist in quality improvement of local community resources. This process is implemented by LP3BH together with DAP and the church.

Papuan sectors are also prone to internal conflicts. This is mainly triggered by the massive area expansion in Papua Land along with the accompanying reform. The community, especially the elite in the region, feels the need to 'differentiate' themselves from other communities or elites who are in the same area. As a result,

¹⁶NGO, which has a concern on managing natural resources. It was established from multi-stakeholders meeting supported by Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia

there is a need to make a new province or regency. The issue of development acceleration in hinterlands of Papua and the narrowing government control makes it one of the reasons to continuously do expansion. Therefore, it can be said that the local elite's interest in gaining power access in the government and make profits from natural resources in each region indeed contribute to expansions (ed. Elisabeth 2004, p. 77)

Power localization is another issue, in which power is more fragmented in each expanded area. The potential for conflict among tribes is very high because one tribe will feel more eligible to rule in their own area with the expansion. Local elites of Papua who grew rapidly after special autonomy and regional expansion became 'little kings' who are rushing to gain access and take control of local politics and economy. Timmer (2007) expresses that the expansion is a process of 'dividing power', which will lead to disputes of local officials to acknowledge local demands to become the master at their homeland. Moreover, behavior of political elites who are hungry for power is getting out of control. The impact of special autonomy and regional expansion creates new positions for civil servants, release of budget and project launch that heightens the desire from local officials to support expansion. Finally, there is the rise of power struggle among bureaucrats that involves the use of natural resources and the local identity in Papua Land.

Massive decentralization brought by regional expansion triggers factionalism. With local elites leading the people to negative response toward the development of Papua, they start to compete in getting their politics and economics sources. Personal interest in this context is a realistic view related to the promise in the past and present times. In the perspective of Timmer (2007, pp. 624-625), local elites who compete with each other to get their power in Papua has some of their responses against the postponement of development, which continues to take place along with the failure of policies aimed to strengthen public services for Papuan.

In summary, the 'chaos' in Papua is not just a condition that is created by Jakarta or abandonment but a condition that provides opportunities for Papuan (Papuan local elites) to play up the system.

The occurring fragmentation in regions as the result of expansion creates tensions on local ethnic communities in Papua. They fight over political power and the promise of economic benefits envisioned by regional expansion. This condition makes a huge impact on the establishment of political configurations of local elites

in the expansion area. It affects relations and concession among the political elites, industrial resources, ethnic interest and contested region in the establishment of Papua identity. In their ingenuous way, the local elites in Papua land have played their part in the special autonomy and expansion to make it as beneficial as possible (Suryawan 2000).

4. Civil Society Organizations and Local Media

Although the influence of NGOs and media are apparent throughout the history of Manokwari Regency Government, NGOs have not been around until 1996. Bina Lestari Bumi Cendrawasih Foundation (YBLBC) is the first local civil society organization (CSO) in Manokwari. NGOs' presence came in only during the New Order regime in Manokwari, which at the same time, was generally the most sensitive political status in Papua. The same can be said in the availability of local media, *Media Papua Daily Newspaper* and *Cahaya Papua*, which just appeared in 2003 as the positive impact of development in Manokwari as the capital of West Papua Province. The rapid growth of technology has also sparked the popularity of online media use in Manokwari since 2004.

Currently, there are 27 local NGOs registered either as an association or foundation at the National Unity and Political Agency. NGOs play a strategic role in influencing the grassroots communities. NGOs in Manokwari are mostly involved in environmental causes. Only *Perkumpulan Terbatas Peduli Sehat-Limited Group of Joint-care Health (PtPs)* is involved in the health sector and *LP3BH Manokwari* is the only NGO involved in democracy, law enforcement and human rights. Although the support from regional government is at the minimum and there is limitation of funding from donors, the NGOs are giving their full support to the community. Assistance programs and empowerment of indigenous community has attracted them to become constituents of NGOs. The community even understands government programs and impacts, both positive and negative, through NGOs that actively disseminate every government policy to the community.

The press, *Media Papua*, *Cahaya Papua*, *Manokwari Pos* and *Tabloid Noken* is doing the same. Manokwari's local print media is now the main reference for information for urban people in Manokwari. In addition, electronic media, such as *RRI Manokwari*, *Radio Matoa*, *Radio Arauna* and *Papua Barat TV*, also contribute in public information. To some extent, the role of media has improved although it is in the less healthy democratic situation. *Radio Matoa* is an active radio broadcast that presents opinions and debates related to regional government's public service

together with the local stakeholders of Manokwari. This is one example where the media is quite successful in giving their impact on public opinion about the ideal standard of democracy that should be built or rejected by the society. The same should apply to online media. Manokwari Regency already has a website but it does not show any information update accessible for public viewing. For instance, the regional revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, APBD*) hosted on the regional government website is not accessible. In this occasion, it shows that the media seems to be just a promotional tool for the region's potential investment.

The presence of local CSO as a regulating body to government policy is highly important. As a representative of civil society interest, CSO works to provide the community the understanding about democracy participation and issues they experienced.

Openness and public control through mass media in Manokwari is very strong but it is also full of intervention based on political interests. The same applies to NGOs, which give inputs and criticisms to the government. On the other hand, CSOs in Manokwari Regency are not solid in their operation. Their operation runs separately and there is no organized joint movement with vision, mission and working program.

NGOs in Manokwari still operate by themselves with their own programs. Previously, there was a cooperation known as Foker LSM Papua (the Papua NGO's Cooperation Forum) in the bird head area of Papua, which is headquartered in Sorong–Manokwari. However, until now, their role is yet to be seen¹⁷.

Budget of Manokwari Regency

The revenue of regency is sourced from the regional revenue (*pendapatan asli daerah, PAD*), including regional tax, regional retribution, profit of regional-owned enterprise and other valid PAD, and balancing fund, such as tax profit sharing, non-tax profit sharing, general allocation fund and special allocation fund and special autonomy (*otsus*) fund.

¹⁷Interview with Yan Christian Warinussy, Director of LP3BH Manokwari, 15 December 2011

Table 3.5 Budget Allocation Report of Manokwari Regency

Description	Amount (in Billion Rupiah)
A. Revenue	758,846.76
1. Locally-generated Revenue	28,763.98
- Regional Tax	5,529.08
- Regional Retribution	3,368.2
- Result of separated regional wealth management	8,295.1
- Other Locally-generated Revenue	11,571.57
2. Transfer Revenue	730,082.78
2.1. Transfer of Central Government - Balance Fund	568,964.84
- Tax profit sharing	102,309.42
- Non-tax profit sharing	15,601.95
- General Allocation Fund	397,456.97
- Special Allocation Fund	53,596.
2.2. Other transfer of central government	140,308.74
- Special Autonomy Fund	94,659.58
- Adjustment Fund	45,649.16
2.3. Transfer of Provincial Government	20,809.2
- Income tax sharing	0
- Other income sharing	20,809.2
3. Other valid Locally-generated revenue	0
- Grant Revenue	0
- Emergency Fund	0
- Other Revenue	0
B. Regional Expenditure	800,653.77
1. Operational Expenditure	270,418.43
- Personnel Expenditure	270,418.43
- Goods Expenditure	230,907.47
- Interest Expenditure	0
- Subsidized Expenditure	0
- Grant Expenditure	80,942.74
- Social Aid Expenditure	16,775,
- Financial Aid Expenditure	0
2. Capital Expenditure	260,647.70
- Land Expenditure	6,125.61
- Equipment and machinery expenditure	25,896.51
- Building Expenditure	103,51287
- Street, irrigation and networking expenditure	125,976.40
- Other Fixed Asset Expenditure	1,489.73
- Other Asset Expenditure	0
3. Unpredictable Expenditure	18,608.98

Source: BPS Manokwari 2010

Budget allocation of Manokwari Regency is divided into revenue and regional expenditure. Revenue consists of PAD, of which, in the last 2011 report was over Rp. 28 billion and transfer revenue was Rp730 billion. Transfer of central government, balance fund, including special autonomy fund was more than Rp. 569 billion. Other transfer of central government was Rp. 140 billion and transfer from provincial government was Rp. 21 billion. Meanwhile, regional expenditure of Manokwari Regency was more than Rp. 801 billion, which was distributed among operational expenditure for Rp. 599 billion, capital expenditure for Rp.261 billion and unforeseen expenditure of Rp. 19 billion.

Security and Justice

Manokwari has two concepts of security and justice. One is the security concept that refers to custom mechanism and another that refers to the government. Custom security is a concept/strategy that works through principle and *adat* law and is recognized and applicable in indigenous society. Meanwhile, the concept of government security involves law enforcement institutions in performing their security function and legal supremacy.

Based on these two concepts, there are two applicable court systems: formal court system (district court) and *adat* court. Generally, the district court handles civil and criminal cases that occur in the community. The handling of several legal violations requires the availability of law enforcement office in certain numbers. From the obtained data, a number of crime activities are identified and how the cases are solved. The following is a composition data of officer in District Court of Manokwari and the type, as well as the number of cases handled

Table 3.6 Composition of District Court -System of Manokwari in 2011

No	Status	Male	Female	Total
1.	Judge	5	2	7
2.	Registrar	7	2	9
3.	Other staff	14	6	20

Source: District Court of Manokwari 2010

Table 3.7 Type and Number of Cases Handled, Solved and Queue List

No	Type of Case	Case Status		
		Handled	Solved	Queue List
1.	Criminal	68 cases	35 cases	33 cases
2.	Civil	36 cases	24 cases	12 cases
3.	Misdemeanor	9 cases	3 cases	6 cases

Source: District Court of Manokwari 2010

So far, adat court has not been institutionalized in solving justice problem as what the district court has handled. Several cases managed by adat court are issues related to rights on natural resources and violation of ethics and morality in the society. Cases of violence that harm democracy and human rights are the most common cases. Several violence incidents have left quite an impact on democracy rights of the community that has been warranted by law. According to LP3BH Manokwari – the organization, which is active in human rights and democracy issues – throughout 2011, there are at least 15 Papua and non-Papua civilians who have been victims of violence. There are 11 people who mysteriously passed away, two civilians went missing and their whereabouts were unknown in Sidey Beach, Manokwari. Some of these cases have been uncovered in court but some remain unsolved.

Human Development

One of the indicators of human development success is reflected by life expectancy rate. The high statistical figures indicate the higher physical quality of population in a region. The life expectancy rate of Manokwari Regency in 2005 was 66.6 years and in 2007, 66.9 years. It increased by 0.3 years and continued to grow in 2010 with 68.8 years.

Literacy rate also shows a representation of the population (seven years old above) who can read and write. The literacy rate of Manokwari Regency in 2005 was 77.2 per cent. In 2007, it increased to 83.54 per cent, and in 2010, it reached 84.78 per cent. The average year of schooling for people in Manokwari Regency in 2005 was 5.6 years and increased in 2007 to 7.19 years. Thus, the increase in average schooling was 0.79 years. In 2010, it increased for 0.80 years. This indicates that the average school level of the population is equivalent to elementary school, which is six years.

The purchasing power of population in Manokwari Regency in 2005 was Rp.574.000 annually per person. This population did not experience any significant changes in 2006, which only changed to Rp.579,200. However, purchasing power increased in 2010 to reach Rp.759,450. As a result of this growth, it made Manokwari the most expensive place to live in Papua Province, as well as in West Papua Province. The progress of consumption expenditure per capita of Manokwari population is relatively slow, only less than Rp.1,000 per year.

The status of health influences productivity level in a society. The illness rate is used as the indicator to measure health status. Out of Manokwari's 187,591 total populations in 2010, there were 173 per 1,000 people who experienced health problems. Therefore, about 30,459 people or 17.3 per cent of the population was sick, which indicates that health rate in Manokwari Regency in 2007 was 82.7 per cent (Bappeda 2010).

Representative Democracy

In studying the democracy in Manokwari, we can look at the case of the Act of Free Choice or Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (PEPERA) 1969 referendum process. The democracy through PEPERA 1969 is believed to be not implemented as the normal, common democracy principle. However, the 1971 general election at the beginning of integration of Papua to Republic of Indonesia was regarded as a proper democracy practice. During PEPERA 1969, the 'one-man one-vote' system was not possible to ensue. However, with the 1971 election, it seemed that democracy was exercised. This indicates the vague democracy practice in Manokwari and Papua in general.

The organization of election from 1971 to 2009 is merely a symbol and not an ideal democracy. Democracy, as a government system that puts power in the hand of its citizens, is still far from realization. Power is delegated to a representative who is regarded as capable in articulating the aspiration and desire of the people. They are regarded as having the capability in building relationship with the nation. The problem, however, lies in the community's lack of political education. Therefore, even after the PEPERA 1969, the region has not established a suitable structure of democracy.

Democracy should ideally fulfill certain requirements: First, community participation must be present and not as a result of trade in participation from the elites. Second, there should be transparency; for instance, transparency votes in the national and local elections. Third, demonstration of accountability and liability and fourth, ease of information transparency (openness).

Representative democracy in Manokwari has the potential to lead a democracy based on interests of the elites. Such situation shows that representative democracy in the region is far from the ideal based on principles of a democratic nation. This needs careful thought in improving the leadership situation in Papua in the future.

Constituency Division

In 2009 legislative election, electoral areas (daerah pemilihan) in district of Manokwari Regency has been divided into six areas: *Daerah Pemilihan* I covered Distrik of West Manokwari, North Manokwari, East Manokwari Timur, South Manokwari and Tanah Rubuh districts. *Daerah Pemilihan* II extended to Distrik Testega, Minyambow, Hingk, Catubow, Oransbari and Ransiki. *Daerah Pemilihan* III covered Neney, Momi Waren, Tahota, Dataran Isim, and Sururey. *Daerah Pemilihan* IV stretched to Didohu, Anggi, Anggi Gida, Taige, Membey, Warmare districts and *Daerah Pemilihan* V included Prafi, Sidey, Masni. *Daerah Pemilihan* VI extended to Mubrani, Amberbaken, Kebar and Senopi.

The Local Election

The last election in the local community of Manokwari was held in 2009. The election would have been a success if not for the uninformed behavior of voters. Many villages in Manokwari did not participate in the election process. To this date, it is uncertain when political education and literacy, especially democracy, will be practiced in the community.

Democracy awareness among locals only rests on their ability to participate in election either in the legislative or in the local level. The people's understanding of democracy is based on procedure and not on principle.

The society does not seem to realize that the day they cast their vote is the day when transfer of power from 'people to their representative' comes in formally. Several violence cases that took place during the general and local leader elections in Papua shows that something is wrong in the practice of democracy. One example is the arson of Villa Anggun, the residence of a governor candidate of West Papua Province on 19 December 2011 by supporters of another candidate. This sort of incident shows not only deviation but a failure of democracy that has destroyed social values and norms in the community.

West Papuan's People Council (*Majelis Rakyat Papua Barat, MRPB*) is a cultural institution for indigenous Papuan people, including Manokwari Regency, which was established with its members selected through a local election mechanism. This institution follows the principles and values carried by customs, religion and women groups that comprised the council. The religious sector conducts a selection of their religious representative to sit in MRPB through church organization and applies the same mechanism to Muslims. Women's group determines a direct election of the

candidate who is recommended by women organizations. Lastly, the custom sector must obtain a recommendation from the adat council. Ideally, this institution should be the representative to articulate the voice of Papua indigenous people. However, MRPB as a cultural institution, which is expected to fight for the rights of Papua indigenous people in Manokwari Regency, is incapable to represent the needs of its constituents. The emergence of protests from the society to political elites (local and national) shows the resistance from grassroots communities against their deviation from cultural values. Independence of this institution should be strengthened so it will not be tarnished by interests from particular groups.

Based on observation of the regulations, there are legislations that are very proper and supportive of the local democracy in Papua. The implementation of Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua has put Papua entirely different from other regions in Indonesia, including its local democracy practice. Through this regulation, Papua has the actual potential to initiate the establishment of local political parties that can become the key instrument in building the local democracy.

Evaluation of General Election Participation

The number of voters in Manokwari Regency based on 2010 data of KPUD Manokwari has 361,711 voters. Data was taken from final voters list (data pemilih tetap, DPT) that was outspread in 1,408 of polling stations (tempat pemungutan suara, TPS). Of this, there were 309,955 voters in the final list who cast their votes on 9 November 2011 during the election of local officials of West Papua Province for 2011 to 2016. Voters who did not use their rights numbered to 51,756. Protests also occurred in communities who were not registered in the final voters list.

The Election Result in Each Constituency

The winning party in 2009 legislative general election was very diverse. It was different where big parties, such as Partai Golkar, Partai Demokrat and PDIP, are incapable to controlling more than 20 per cent of the general election's result.

Table 3.8 List of Seats of Political Parties of 2009 General Election at Constituency

No	Party	Constituency			Number of votes
		I	II	III	
01	The People's Conscience Party (Hati Nurani Rakyat, Partai Hanura)	965	185	1,181	2,331
02	The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB)	382	109	143	634
03	Indonesian Workers and Employers Party (Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia , PPPI)	186	1,552	442	2,180
04	The National People's Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional, PPRN)	1,481	589	880	2,950
05	The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, PGIR)	1,445	121	370	1,936
06	National Front Party (Partai Barisan Nasional, PBN)	3,270	2,950	2,263	8,483
07	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI)	19	1	13	33
08	Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS)	1,632	340	1,030	2,992
09	National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN)	6,034	11,184	2,965	20,183
10	The New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, PPIB)	370	1,304	21	1,695
11	Sovereignty Party (Partai Kedaulatan)	601	1,047	188	1,843
12	The Regional Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah, PPD)	988	1,627	250	2,865
13	The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB)	254	1,196	175	1,625
14	The Indonesian Youth Party (Partai Pemuda Indonesia, PPI)	2,240	63	374	2,677
15	Indonesian National Party Marhaenisme (Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme , PNI Marhenisme)	1,087	1,162	408	2,657
16	The Democratic Renewal Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan, PDP)	571	2	659	1,232
17	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKP)	186	0	1	187
18	National Sun Party (Partai Matahari Bangsa , PMB)	314	57	411	782
19	Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, PPDI)	75	1	9	85
20	Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai	3,275	3,090	271	6,636

No	Party	Constituency			Number of votes
		I	II	III	
21	The National People's Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Indonesia, PPRN)	309	1,341	46	1,696
22	Pioneers's Party (PartaiPelopor)	899	3,756	53	4,708
23	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, PartaiGolkar)	7,566	1,137	3,086	11,789
24	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP)	1,722	123	1,099	2,944
25	Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Demokrasi Sejahtera, PDS)	1,408	602	288	2,298
26	Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party (Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia, PNBK)	726	18	499	1,243
27	Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB)	242	18	680	940
28	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP)	2,440	3,025	1,569	7,034
29	Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR)	520	6	156	682
30	Patriot Party (PartaiPatriot)	759	673	1,541	2,973
31	Democrat Party (PartaiDemokrat)	3,156	835	1,758	5,749
32	The Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion (Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia, PKDI)	564	10	228	802
33	Prosperous Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia Sejahtera, PIS)	946	332	52	1,330
34	Ulema National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama, PKNU)	215	191	13	419
35	The Freedom Party (Partai Merdeka)	1,060	154	1,064	2,278
36	Nahdlatul Ummah Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah, PPNU)	0	0	2	2
37	Socialist Party of Indonesia (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI)	175	543	13	731
38	Labour Party (PartaiBuruh)	650	113	94	857
Invalid Vote		1,967	187	1,567	3,721
Total Voter					112,481
Total DPT					151,535
VTO					35,333

Source: KPUD Manokwari 2010

The number of votes as determined by KPUD Manokwari shows that PAN emerged as the winner of 2009 General Election with 20,183 votes. This result is related to the candidate's influence that is rooted from the indigenous people, such as Arfak and Doreri. Meanwhile, Partai Golkar, Partai Barnas/Barisan Nasional and PDIP followed PAN. Each party gained votes numbering to 11,789

for Golkar, 8,483 for Barnas and 7,034 for PDIP in all constituencies of Manokwari Regency.

a. Political Party in Manokwari Regency

The political parties in Manokwari Regency are Hanura, PKPB, PPPI, PPRN, PGIR, PBN, PKPI, PKS, PAN, PPIB, Partai Kedaulatan, PPD, PDS, PNBKI, PBB, PDIP, PBR, Partai Patriot, Partai Demokrat, PKDI, PIS, PKNU, Merdeka Party and PPNU. These parties are representatives and extensions of national political parties in the region; thus, they tend to influence according to their national party's interests. They do not have local ethnic roots and religious affiliations although several parties are identified with certain religious group. These parties are representatives and extensions of national political parties in the region; thus, they tend to influence according to their national party's interests. They do not have local ethnic roots and religious affiliations although several parties are identified with certain religious group.

The political parties in DPRD of Manokwari Regency are divided into six factions: Golkar with nine members, PAN with six members, United Democracy with six members, PDIP with eight members, Star KPK with six members and People's Sovereignty with nine members.

Table 3.9 Political Parties and number of seat in DPRD of Manokwari Regency

No	Political Party	Number of seat	Percentage
1	The People's Conscience Party (Partai Hanura/Hati Nurani Rakyat)	1	4%
2	National Front Party (Partai Barisan Nasional, PBN)	3	12%
3	Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)	1	4%
4	National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN)	6	24%
5	The Indonesian Youth Party (Partai Pemuda Indonesia, PPI)	1	4%
6	Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PDK)	2	8%
7	Pioneers's Party (Partai Pelopor)	1	4%
8	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya , Partai Golkar)	3	12%
9	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan , PPP)	1	4%
10	Indonesian Democ ratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP)	3	12%
11	Patriot Party (Partai Patriot)	1	4%
12	Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)	2	8%

Source: KPUD Manokwari 2010

Evaluation of Elected Officials

Although Indonesia has more fair election compared to the past decade, it seems like there are 'more ceremonial processes' since the public officers, in bureaucracy and legislature, are difficult to be accountable. The absence of strong law enforcement makes them less accountable and tends to seek power rather than public interest. One example is the shady collaboration between DPRD members and regional government on a number of DPRD projects that are tendered by related offices in the Regional Government of Manokwari Regency, which is a disregard to the system of checks and balances.

Meetings of DPRD and executive are ideally always open for public. However, several regional government officials and DPRD members keep the 'transparency does not mean getting naked' principle. In this case, information, especially regarding development budgets, becomes inaccessible to the public. This indicates that representative democracy in Manokwari Regency is far from the expected practice by the public. The representative democracy process in Manokwari Regency also rules out women's role.

Political parties do not recognize the potential of women to sit as key figures in party level and as legislative members. The opportunity to empower women was once open widely when there was a **30** per cent quota for the representation of women in the legislature. Under this rule, a political party must involve women within that quota. If not, such political party will be canceled and cannot participate in general election. During that period, there were **85** women candidates in political parties groomed to be legislative member candidates.

With the quality of women – their education, sociocultural background and capacity – being questioned, the Papuan Women Partner (Yayasan Mitra Perempuan Papua, MP2) initiated to conduct training on legislative candidacy for approximately **85** women in Manokwari Regency on democracy and role of women in democracy.

However, women in Manokwari and West Papua, in particular, did not want to unite as one to achieve their goal. Each went on with their ego and ran on their own. By the end of **2004**, there was only one woman who became a legislative member¹⁸.

¹⁸ As exposed by Thresje Julianty Gazpers (United Women's Network) of Manokwari Regency in a focus group discussion, 15 February 2012

Participatory Democracy

The most ideal participatory democracy in Manokwari is when values held within the society or all ethnic communities remain intact. Practicing democracy does not mean celebrating freedom at the expense of existing values. If democracy is forced, it becomes a tool in taking away values, norms and richness of natural resources.

In representative democracy, idealism to build democracy faces a dead end in the local level. Meanwhile, participatory democracy provides a very wide space for the participation of community as a constituent and a subject, at the same time, in the process of making and implementing the policy. One of key values required in participatory democracy is information transparency, which enables people to understand the goals of the government.

Manokwari as the seat of Christianity requires the availability of stakeholder participation to support the principle of 'one stove with three stones' that is the custom, church and government. However, such condition starts to be neglected in the reality of organizing regional government. This is very crucial and needs support to reorganize the awareness of participatory democracy. On paper, community participation can be counted upon. However in reality, idealism is getting beaten by the pragmatism and political games that destroy social values such as money politics. In such situation, an utmost effort to build community awareness in democracy should be carried out. One NGO activist in Manokwari tells his experience regarding the clash between democracy awareness and pragmatic needs of community:

...Our strength (NGO) is not enough because at the same time, all kinds of virus that attack the democracy will go on. For example, I could meet **20–30** persons before legislative or local leader election with some communities and explain what democracy actually is. In that case, they could understand, but after they go home and at night, somebody gives them rice, money, instant noodles, the community will never see the essential that if they participate in the election that day, they transfer their power to someone they trust. It means, in five years' time, the power they have will be carried by the person they vote for to fulfill their needs provided by the state and government and they never know what the real condition of our democracy in Manokwari and Papua¹⁹.

¹⁹ As exposed by Thresje Juliantty Gazpers (United Women's Network) of Manokwari Regency in a focus group discussion, 15 February 2012

Local Government and Participatory Democracy

Direct access of community to government of Manokwari Regency in the last year has not been any different from the previous years. This can be seen from the presence of a unified and strategic relationship between DPRD and government. This situation has succeeded in forming the mentality of the community that such practice is normal to be done by officials. The community seems to rely solely on the government's capability to provide them with public services. As a result, several processes to formulate policies as well as the general meeting of the Regional Leadership Consultative Councils (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Muspida*) do not give importance to involving the community. The regional government through the Regional Development Planning Agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA*) has presented the Long-Term Development Plan of Manokwari Regency for period 2006–2025. However, it is difficult to find the achievement indicator of the development plan even through its short-term program.

This situation was made even worse when a local media company in Manokwari took advantage. The media company, which supposedly was independent in its coverage, was used by the regional government to build the image and popularity of its officials. Bureaucratic officials even threatened the negative news coverage on their performance. Demonstration of tens of local journalists of Manokwari on 27 March 2012 against Agriculture and Husbandry Office was a testimony to the fact that regional offices were the most frequent and active party in threatening for negative news coverage regarding performance of regional government.

In addition to the restraint in freedom experienced by the press, information updates are also limited or even inaccessible to media. The information on budgets, for instance, is limited to journalists who have rights as guaranteed by the press law to access information, let alone the public who do not have the capacity and direct access to the government. The budget issue is the most common problem that drags bureaucrats and politicians to counter the trial as a result of corruption.

The discussion on limitation of budget information access begins in the exclusion of the community in the National Planning Consultation or *Musrenbang* at the district level. However, *Muspida* often claims that they have involved the community in obtaining their aspiration. This situation is worsened by the inaction of university students, who as young intellectuals, are expected to voice out their community's needs. For the last year, the Student Executive Board (*Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa, BEM*) no longer conducted any protests and demonstrations, even when all

university students across Indonesia fought to defy the government policy. Papua State University (*Universitas Negeri Papua, BEM UNIPA*) even fought for the opposite. While other students have protested to defy the increase of fuel oil, BEM UNIPA organized an action to support this action.

Local Democracy: Lesson from Manokwari

Local democracy in Manokwari and Papua Land in general cannot separate from the dynamics of the debate on conflict of political status, history and counterproductive practices against democracy in Papua land. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI*), in its studies, exposed that the source of conflict in Papua are related to four issues: the integration history of Papua to Indonesian Republic and political identity of Papuan, political violence and human rights violation, failure of development in Papua and government inconsistency in the implementation of Special Autonomy and several policies that marginalized Papuan. One of the issues that is still the topic of debate is the integration process of Papua to Indonesia. The integration history is related to the transfer of power from Dutch to Indonesia through PEPERA 1969, which is considered by most Papuan as invalid as it did not represent the aspiration of Papuan completely. Therefore, the integration of Papua to Indonesia is regarded as colonization of Indonesia. The dominant narration from Indonesia is that the political status of Papua is valid through PEPERA 1969, which decided Papua to integrate with Indonesia and the integration process is interpreted as the form of exemption from Dutch colonialism (ed. Widjojo 2009, pp. 6-7; ed. Elisabeth 2004).

The demand for independence of Papua was collectively fought by Team 100 who met President Habibie in February 1999. Team 100 is a delegation, which represents Papuan elites extensively, covering geographic, social and religious background. Thom Beanal, leader of Team 100, declared the statement to Habibie and his cabinet that Irian Jaya wanted to secede from Indonesia and to set up a transitional government of Irian Jaya under the supervision of UN and if necessary, UN will take part in the international dialog between Indonesian government and Papuan (ICG 2001).

The most important policy from Indonesian Government is the application of Special Autonomy (*Otonomi Khusus-otsus*) to response to the demand for independence from Papua. Special Autonomy is regarded as the most realistic of policy frame where the solution of conflict can be negotiated and welfare of Papua

can be improved. Special Autonomy gives room for Papua to expand its economy. In a fairly positive perspective, Special Autonomy is considered as 'golden opportunity' to establish its own government and develop the applicable values of cultural, religious and *adat* law. Other matters that cannot be ruled out from Special Autonomy is the enormous amount of funding that keeps on increasing every year for Papua and West Papua Province. Ever since the policy was issued, the Government and House of Representative (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR*) agreed to allocate Special Autonomy fund (*Otsus*) for Papua Province for Rp.3.83 trillion and West Papua for Rp.1.64 trillion in 2012. This is stated in Law of State Budget of 2012, which mentions that the Special Autonomy fund of Papua in 2012 increased by about 23 per cent, compared to 2011. In 2012, the government has allocated a budget of Rp 3.10 trillion for Papua Province and Rp 1.33 trillion for West Papua Province. Besides *Otsus* fund, the government has also allocated additional infrastructure fund for Papua for Rp.571.4 billion and West Papua for Rp.428.6 billion (Gatra, S. 2011).

Besides Special Autonomy, the political constellation in Papua land is also affected by other aspects that cannot be neglected, such as the massive regional expansion in several areas in Papua. Inpres No. 1/2003 was issued to re-impose Law No. 45/1999 on the establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency and Sorong City. The expansion continues to take place – which until now, Papua has 36 regencies/cities – three times more than the number of regency/city before the reformation era. The massive expansion process obviously violates Article 76 on *Otsus* Law and dismisses the role of The Papua Assembly (*Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP*) and Papua House of Representative (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, DPRP*). Article 76 of *Otsus* Law declares, "The expansion of Papua Province into provinces is conducted based on approval of MRP and DPRD after considering seriously the unity of sociocultural, the readiness of human resources and economy capability and the development in the future".

Papuan local elites who have a big role in Special Autonomy mention that *Otsus* and regional expansion enable the acceleration of development and narrowed the range of control of government and development. However, what is more important is *Otsus* and the expansion offer a bigger portion from the revenue that is obtained from resources absorption projects in Papua, including 70 per cent of oil and gas industry and 80 per cent from mining business. Moreover, *Otsus* involves special funds that benefit village communities for a period of 20 years. (Sumule 2003; Timmer 2007, p. 605)

Otsus and the regional expansion indirectly offer bureaucracy positions to Papuans and obviously, authority and more power to local elites in holding important positions, such as regent, deputy regent or governor and deputy governor. *Otsus*, followed by the regional expansion became a territorial power—a localized power that leads to the demand of local community to become the master of their own land. Moreover, the thirst for power behavior of political elites is getting out of control. Papua becomes a contested land for elites and bureaucrats to compete and gain power through conquering its natural resources (Suryawan 2011)

The background and context of democracy are important factors in analyzing the local democracy in Papua land as it moves within the dynamics of complex bureaucracy shown by regional expansion, dispute of power and local identity in seizing the economic and political sector. Religious identity (Christianity) that is shown by the outspread slogan 'Manokwari, a Bible City' dates back into history that Manokwari is the city where the Bible entered the civilization path of Papuan on 5 February 1855 in Mansinam Island. In this subject, the relationship between custom, religion (Christianity) and regional government plays a very important role in giving a special character to local democracy at Manokwari Regency. In addition, the new political constellation as identified by special autonomy and regional expansion must also have the capability to put together and revitalize these three sectors to create a local democracy hinged on cultural values of Manokwari.

Summary and Recommendation

Summary

Representative Democracy

- a. The process that is conducted by the Central Government fails in creating MRP of West Papua as representative of the community's interest, especially the indigenous Papuan. The community perceives that the MRP of West Papua is established merely to the political interest of local leader election in West Papua Province.
- b. The administrative framework and regulation of general election and local leader election is still the dominant interest of policymakers. Thus, the regulation leans toward pro-elite ruling and not pro-people's interest.
- c. Local elites often use tribe or clan sentiment to move masses to do violent actions against their political rival.

- d. Transaction of votes through money politics is practiced by political elites and its parties to get votes.
- e. The presence of local indigenous people assembly or representatives does not contribute for accommodating the local people's interest in policymaking process, especially in implementation of special autonomy of Papua.
- f. General election system is incapable in reflecting social diversity but the system tends to accommodate certain groups interest from the elite level.
- g. The base end of general election of local leader is always through a court process in Constitutional Court in Jakarta; therefore, the result of General Election and Local Leader Election process is greatly determined by judges in Constitutional Court rather than direct vote from the voters.
- h. The direct election of heads of district does not guarantee the capacity of elected leader as public official. The elected official tends to have strong personality but lacks managerial and leadership capability when he/she runs the local government.
- i. Political parties that do not rule in DPRD Manokwari have never position themselves as an opposition for local leader or government (executive) but they become the agent to get development projects.
- j. DAP Regional III Mnuqwar is an institution with cultural-based and local custom that is not fully performing their representative function as DPRD.
- k. Monitoring of electoral process is not optimized. Thus the fairness and validity of electoral process really depends on witness acknowledgment or candidate team.
- l. Voter preference in election is influenced by the primordial identification rather than rational choices and vote-buying strongly influences the electoral process. Voters then are trapped in electoral tension or conflict among candidates.
- m. There is no provision yet for information along with good and full political education for the constituents of political parties.

Participatory Democracy

- a. The performance relation between DPRD and Regional Government cannot be accessed yet by the community, especially mass media and public websites.
- b. With a low community participation in the supervision and law enforcement – as well as monitoring abuse of authority from government official – corruption, collusion and nepotism can flourish easily. The early process of preparing and budgeting APBD is not transparent and does not involve the participation from community.
- c. The closed preparation and budgeting of APBD impacts the inappropriate target for regional development implementation.
- d. No involvement of community participation at all in *Musrenbang*, whether in village or district level.
- e. The recruitment process of potential civil servant is still not transparent.
- f. There is no survey yet on public satisfaction level towards the performance and service of Regional Government.
- g. The Regional Government gives less thought in involving community-based organisations CBOs or NGOs as partners to implement a bottom-up development policy process.
- h. Local media tends to be influenced by elite politics and elite bureaucrats' interest.
- i. There never has been any approach to raise community aspiration.

Recommendation

Manokwari in West Papua is a very unique district/regency in Indonesia. It does not only represent a heterogeneous area but also a proof that the rule of *adat* institution is very significant in developing local democracy in place of formal institutions, such as local parliament and local governments. Thus, it is interesting to recommend some critical points in order to strengthen local democracy in Manokwari concerning both representative and participatory democracy.

- **It needs more independent, consolidated and strengthened *adat* institution as informal/alternative representation.**

In reality, there are tensions among tribes and also contested authority among *adat* institutions in Manokwari. These tensions have been transformed, to some extent, into issues of redistricting. Other surrounding tensions are yet to be resolved until now. DAP tends to deny and distrust other *adat* councils, especially LMA and The People Council of West Papuan's Province (Majelis Rakyat Provinsi Papua Barat, MRPPB), since they strongly suspect that these *adat* councils are not really independent institutions and under the government control. Since the *adat* councils are key sectors of representative institutions, it is important to consolidate these institutions. They need to share their interests and communicate intensively to each other. Furthermore, it is necessary to manage conflict among them.

Others are strengthening the institutional capacity of *adat* council. The *adat* institution, even though it remains elite-driven, has strong base from the grassroots society. However, they need more capacity building in order to maximize their roles and function as representative institution. They need to be equipped by more technocratic and technical instruments in articulating, scanning and aggregating the communities' or tribes' interests.

- **It needs a more accountable and independent local parliament.**

The main problem of local parliament members in Manokwari is that they are under government intervention. They mostly work in line with local government's interest rather than do checks and balances in power relation and articulate citizens' interests. They tend to be not certainly transparent in sharing what they have been doing regarding their basic functions: legislation, budgeting and oversight.

Thus, the local parliament has to be more independent and critically engaged with the local government. The communities need to further enhance their control over the local parliament members in order to make sure that their representative works based on their own interests and not for the elites' or local government's interests. This means a call for a more accountable local parliament.

The democratic linkages between citizens and their representatives in Manokwari have to be secured in place. Every formal channel of articulations, such as *Jaring Asmara* or *Musreimbang*, need to be more activated and engage more people.

- **It needs a more vibrant and stronger civil society, active citizens and independent media.**

Participatory democracy will mean nothing in Manokwari if the civil society continues to not be involved in policymaking process and civil society organizations and media are not critically engaged.

Thus, CSOs need to facilitate the community capacity, both power and technical, in enhancing their interest to government. Furthermore, the CSOs also need to drive the local government to open more alternative channels of citizen's articulation and to push for transparency in managing local government and public affairs. Foker LSM Papua, as the hub of CSO network in Papua and Papua Barat should take more initiatives to endorse these strategies.

Every effort to control and limit the freedom to information by the local government or strong local elites in Manokwari should be eliminated. The mainstream media need to be more critically engaged and independent—keeping their distance from the local government, especially if and when they try to 'buy the news'. The community media, as the alternative media, should be distributed to more people by using simpler languages.

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Democracy Assessment at the Pemekaran Region: Regency of Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi

*Amalinda Savirani and Muh. Nur Alamsyah*²⁰

Foreword

Parigi Moutong is a regency in Central Sulawesi Province that is an offspring of the regional *pemekaran*²¹ from the Donggala regency expansion in 2003. Parigi Moutong has an area spanning 6,231.85 km² with a population size of 446,694 spread out in 22 districts. Its physical form resembles a half round moon with the central part facing Tomini Bay, the eastern part of Central Sulawesi. The total area stretches to 472 km (BPS Parigi Moutong Regency 2010). The New Autonomy Region or *Daerah Otonomi Baru (DOB)* status is a significant factor in the dynamics of representative and participatory democracy in this regency. Among the assessed six regions for their local democracy, Parigi Moutong Regency is the only regency with the DOB status. Therefore, assessment against the local democracy in Toraranga land, which means ‘remember us’, is framed and affected by the *pemekaran* aspect.

²⁰ This research is prepared by Nur Alamsyah and Isram Said Lolo. Nur Alamsyah is a staff lecturer at Government Organization Faculty of University of Tadulako. Isram Said Lolo works at NGO, Format. The national assessor who was given a mandate to implement this program at Regency of Parigi Moutong is Sigit Pamungkas. This report is written by Nur Alamsyah and synchronized for the purpose of publication by Amalinda Savirani.

²¹ *Pemekaran* is the Indonesian word for the subdivision of existing districts and provinces to create new units, it also known as administrative subdivision (Nordholt, H.S. and van Klinken, G 2007)


The Pemekaran Politics as the Framework of Democracy Practice of Parigi Moutong

The Pemekaran of Parigi Moutong Regency: A Dream Come True

Parigi Moutong is a New Autonomy Region that has been fought for by the entire community for 39 years. The struggle to establish this entity started on 8 June 1963 when a group of people formed the Claimant Committee for the Establishment of Parigi Moutong Regency. Two years later, on 23 December 1965, the Development of Eastern Beach Foundation was established to consolidate the demands of the creation of a new region. The reason in demanding for the establishment of DOB is related to the distance between the center of government and Parigi Moutong community, which brings together the low quality of public service. The people of Parigi Moutong must walk for 700 km from Moutong, the farthest district in this region, heading to Banawa, the capital city of Donggala Regency and the administration center for government.

The dream to be an independent regency was realized 37 years later when Law No.10/2002 on the Establishment of Parigi Moutong Regency at Central Sulawesi Province was issued by Mr. Hari Sabarno, minister of Home Affairs at Jakarta on 10 July 2002. On 18 July 2002, Drs. H. Longki Djanggola, M.Si was inaugurated as the head of Parigi Moutong Regency by Prof. (Em) Drs. H. Aminuddin Ponulele, governor of Central Sulawesi. Geographically, the region of this new regency is a union of Parigi in the South and Moutong in the North (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1. Map of Parigi Moutong Regency



Source: BPS Parigi Moutong Regency 2011

The creation of Parigi Moutong Regency in 2002 was followed by the *pemekaran* activity in the district and village levels. This event was still taking place when the democracy assessment was conducted. Prior to the regional *pemekaran*, Parigi Moutong consisted of eight districts. Currently, it has been expanded to 20 districts. In 2010, *pemekaran* was also conducted in the village level and turned out 200 villages/sub-districts, from the initial 176 villages and five sub-districts. During the democracy assessment in 2011, there were two additional new districts. The total number of districts in 2011 reached 22 and total villages/sub-districts were 220. Most *pemekaran* villages were in Tinombo Regency, which numbered to nine new villages.

Apart from the increasing number of administrative region in the district level, the establishment of Parigi Moutong as DOB since 2002 has not made any economic impact and significant welfare for its people. The development that accompanied the change in status of this new regency has not reached many areas within the regency. From 2002 to 2012, the improvement progress has been very slow especially in the northern areas of Tinombo, Tomini, Moutong and surrounding areas. The development tends to be centralized at the southern part, at the capital city of Regency, Parigi. Coincidentally, the northern and southern parts were occupied by different ethnic groups. The northern part was occupied by Tinombo, Tomini, Moutong while the south was occupied by Parigi ethnic groups. Because they were not satisfied, residents at the northern part demanded for a *pemekaran* to become a new regency. This demand has been approved by the Local House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD*) and Regent of Parigi Moutong. The suggestion has been submitted to the governor of Central Sulawesi to get his recommendation and support²². The demand of a separate DOB establishment from Parigi Moutong Regency was in order to accelerate the development and improvement of public service at the northern part of Parigi Moutong or the area of Parigi, which is located 290 km from Moutong.

Location and Accessibility: Between Mountain, Sea and the Limited Transportation Infrastructure

Apart from the *pemekaran* demand between the north and south of Parigi Moutong Regency and the difficult access between many areas, its infrastructure condition indeed sets limitations to the regency. To understand the infrastructure issue, it is important to first discuss the geographic characteristics of this region.

²² Currently, the University of Tadulako Team is in the process of conducting an academic research related to the feasibility of expanding two regions from Parigi Moutong.

Parigi Moutong lies between the coastal and mountainous areas in central part of Sulawesi Island. Consequently, there are two major geographical classifications in this regency: sea and mountain. The shoreline of Parigi Moutong stretches up to 472 km. As many as 86 villages or almost 80 per cent of the villages are located at the mouth of Tomini Bay (see Figure 4.1). Therefore, the livelihood of this region is highly dependent on the sea. Based on the legislations on sea administrative borderline, the four-mile location from the shoreline is still an area under the regency/city. This means that the width of the marine area under Parigi Moutong is 16,000 km² at Tomini Bay. From the same definition, the marine area of Parigi Moutong is bigger than its land area, which is only 6.231.85 km². This bay has the potential for natural resources, particularly for marine resources like fish. The second geographical region is the mountain area. Approximately 25 per cent of the villages lies in the mountain area. In this region, the agriculture sector runs very well, especially at the plain from Parigi to Sausu, which is one of the food barns in Central Sulawesi.

In terms of accessibility, Parigi Moutong is located in a meeting point of land transportation from the north (Manado–Gorontalo) and from the south (Makassar–Palu–Mamuju). This makes Parigi Moutong a transit area for the entire Sulawesi in general and Central Sulawesi in particular. To reach the capital city of Central Sulawesi Province, Palu, all transportation from the northern part (Banggai Islands, Banggai, Tojo Una–Una, Morowali, Poso, Buol and Toli–Toli) must pass through Parigi Moutong.

Although Parigi Moutong is at a strategic area in Central Sulawesi, it has an infrastructure problem that is the perturbing land transportation network, which connects regions in this regency. This is due to its mountainous geographical character; for example, the road from Toli–Toli and Buol that passes through Pasir Terang or Tinombala mountains. In certain instances, the road cannot be passed through due to landslide and mud. This road is an important track, which saves distance and time from and to Palu.

Parigi can be reached approximately within two–and–a half hours by land transportation from Palu through Pangi protected forest, which is a Coffee Plantation area with winding and rugged roads. Meanwhile, the sea transportation with wooden ship is limited and traditional. It is used by residents who live in Tojo Una–Una, Pagimana–Banggai and Poso. In the past, the main transportation of Parigi community is the seaway (Charras 1997).

Dreaming of Infrastructure at Parigi Moutong: Government Programs

The geographical condition of Parigi Moutong Regency creates the need for a physical development based on zonality and region. The purpose of this arrangement is to fairly distribute the development in this region and in order to optimize the potential of natural resources based on agribusiness development, fishery and tourism.

The urban development plans of regency system mentioned in the official documents consist of:

- Regional Activity Center for Promotion (Pusat Kegiatan Wilayah Promosi, PKWP), located in Parigi, the capital city of the regency;
- Center of Local Activities (Pusat Kegiatan Lokal, PKL), located in Tinombo City;
- Center for Local Promotion Activities (Pusat Kegiatan Lokal Promosi, PKLP), located in Ampibabo, Sausu and Moutong;
- Center of Regional Service (Pusat Pelayanan Kegiatan, PPK), located in Toboli, Lambunu, Tomini and Torue;
- Center of Environmental Service (Pusat Pelayanan Lingkungan, PPL), located in Taopa, Balinggi, Siniu, Parigimpu'u, Kasimbar, Maninili, Mepanga, Toribulu, Binangga, Dolago and Palasa (Bappeda Parigi Moutong 2011).

Currently, the physical improvement of this regency is very apparent in the development of Parigi City in the south. This is seen particularly by the centralization of offices and the arrangement of urban areas, such as regency roads improvement, the unfinished development of outer ring road, two lanes and installment of traffic lights, which differentiates Parigi City from the north. In the northern part, many areas in Moutong are still untouched.

The Elite Domination in Parigi Moutong: Social Structure

The civil society of Parigi Moutong is spread in several communities that reside in two geographical areas, mountain and sea. In the past, i.e. at the era of local kingdom leadership, the leadership in this region is held by an alongian or

kemagauan, who is known as magau or olongian. They are the local kings²³. The power of local kings faded since the occupation of the Dutch colonial government of the region, which continued until Indonesia gained its independence.

Parigi Moutong community is socially divided into two areas: Tinombo, Tomini and Moutong (TTM) in the north and Ampibabo, Parigi and Sausu (APS) in the south. This social classification is based on the physical zonal division, classification in politics and social community in the regency. The first regent, Longki Janggola and deputy regent, Asmir Ntos were the representatives of APS political power in the south. During the administration of the second regent, Samsurizal Tombolotutu, the social and political representation issues were no longer the focus. This was due to the election of the deputy regent, Kemal Nasir Toana, who represented the province's interest and the elected regency secretary, Badrun Nggai, who represented the East Coast area. There were no representatives for APS in the second period of leadership.

The diversity of ethnic groups in Parigi Moutong Regency cannot be detached from the pluralism of the cultural background of the community. The statistic data shows that native people, such as the Lauje community consists of **3,480** families or **17,323** people and Kaili Tara community, **255** families or **1,484** people. Most of them dwell in the mountain and economically has low income compared to other communities (BPS Parigi Moutong Regency **2011**).

Other than the local people, the composition of Parigi Moutong residents consists of migrant groups who come and reside in Parigi Moutong, such as Bugis, Mandar, Gorontalo and Jawa. The rough estimation of comparison between migrant and local community is **2:3** ratio. This diversity has become an important part in social interaction of Parigi Moutong community.

The religious followers in Parigi Moutong are composed of Muslims (**77** per cent), Christians (**7.56** per cent), Catholics (**1.51** per cent), Hindus (**13.89** per cent) and Buddhists (**0.04** per cent). Other than Indonesian, the common language used is Ian, Kaili (which have several dialects including Tara and Lauje), Bugis, Balinese and Javanese²⁴. These migrants came to Parigi Moutong through incessant transmigration.

²³ *Magau or olongian* to Parigi or Moutong community back then is a representation of power, which currently has faded away. Although it is not as strong as it used to be, it still tries to maintain its power in Parigi Moutong by presenting the wisdom values in community lives.

²⁴ Balinese has been existent in Parigi since Dutch colonialism held an ethical politics. Balinese noblemen were exiled to Banda Island and were taken to Parigi where they had assistance and

Islam is the major religion in Parigi Moutong. The domination of Muslims can also be seen from Islamic organizations such as Al Khaeraat, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Darud Dakwah Wal Irsyad (DDI) among others in this regency. The region encourages virtuous manners/attitudes and a religious life. The spirit of Islam can be seen from the daily community life as supported by the collectivity of local communities of Kaili, Lauje, Tajio, Tialo, Bolano, Tomini or Bajo, which are more identified as a Muslim. The majority of migrants are also Muslims although there are other migrants who come from Manado, Bali and Toraja who are non-Muslim. The Chinese ethnic group has resided in Parigi Moutong for quite a long period.

The relationship between different religions is extremely harmonized. The most apparent form is the celebration of religious holidays and daily social life—both a community tradition to always help and guard each other. It has become the community tradition in Parigi Moutong that when there is a celebration within a certain religion, the other religious group will pay their tribute and tolerance; for example, volunteering as a committee when a group has a religious celebration. The life of mutual acceptance creates solidarity in Parigi Moutong community, which discourages anarchy and racial discrimination. Moreover, the society in Toraranga land has fostered their bonding and spirit of togetherness in developing their region. The regional government describes their development with the motto, Songu Lara Mombangu, which means ‘one heart in the development’.

In summary, the existence of cultural-based groups, i.e. ethnicity (native and migrant), exemplifies the main social and cultural characteristics of the regency. In addition, the cultural-based classification is dominated by each group leader or cultural elites.

Economy

Parigi Moutong Regency has rich natural resources particularly in mining, forestry, agriculture and plantation sites, and fishery at Tomini Bay. Forestry contributes for Rp 18 billion of the regional revenue (penerimaan asli daerah, PAD) in 2011. The forest area of Parigi Moutong is highly promising. About 14.3 ha of the area can be converted to yield forest products. The wide non-forest cultivation area or the land for other use is utilized in wood production for an approximate volume of

protection from Dutch colonialism; for Java community, through transmigration program after independence while other communities such as Bugis, it was through a regional expansion of agriculture and trade.

7,157.2700 m³ and produces meranti, palapi, nyatoh, matoa, cempaka and mixed woods. The rattan production per year is 371.000 tons consists of rattan log for 251.000 tons and commercial rattan for 120.000 tons (BPS Parigi Moutong Regency 2011). However, the forest resource is not being managed properly, which makes Parigi Moutong as a very vulnerable area for illegal logging.

The agriculture sector, which is a smaller scale compared to marine and fisheries sector, contributes for 70 per cent of the total income of Parigi Moutong residents. The regency has opulent resources and strength in agricultural crops. For a long time, Parigi Moutong has been a food surplus and food barn area producing rice, cacao and coconut. Another important product is corn with a plantation area of 3,503 ha and total production of 13,281.79 tons. In 2009, cacao and coconut were the top agricultural products yielding 73,568 tons and 41,600 tons of produce, respectively. Currently, the rice field area spans 45,001 ha with total production of 232,977.83 tons. Other agricultural crops are soybeans, ground peanuts, mung beans and cassava along with horticultural plants within an area of 7,507.4 ha and harvested area of 1,490.94 ha. Those plants are dominated by durian (Monthong), orange, rambutan and banana, which are cultivated by the transmigrants from Bali and Java. The other potential goods are vegetables, such as shallot, string bean, chili, tomato and cucumber among others.

The other reliable resource of Parigi Moutong is marine and fisheries, which include seaweeds, fishing and aquaculture fishery. The marine area is bigger than the land area. The region has abundant marine resources with fishery production of 21,072.2 tons per year. The potential for sustainability is 68,000 tons per year. In 2009, the production of sea and common catch fishery was 23,588.13 tons with production value of more than Rp. 267 billion. Aquaculture fishing reached 1,188.70 tons per year with production value of more than Rp. 49 billion. The marine aquaculture production reached 7,886.50 tons a year with production value of more than Rp. 24 billion while the pond aquaculture production reached 92.60 tons. The fishery sector has yet to be explored and thus, it does not contribute largely to the economy of Parigi Moutong Regency as the agriculture sector does.

The Economic Potential and Its Impact Towards Welfare

The natural wealth of land and marine resources in Parigi Moutong Regency has not brought any benefits to the community welfare. After the regional pemekaran, the position of local community is socially more marginalized because development is centralized to the growth of the capital city. Further consequence of this condition is trading and only the trade in services is getting most of the benefit. Coincidentally, they are dominated by migrants, such as Bugis and Java-Bali ethnic groups. Bugis controls the trading sub-sector and Java-Bali controls the agricultural sector from upstream to downstream. In general, the local community's potential is underutilized. This is partly due to the difficulty in changing the mindset of the community from a farmer/village to an industrial/urban mindset. The local community, which consists mostly of traditional farmers, cannot adapt with the fast economic shift that is becoming service-oriented.

In recent years, land has become a more critical issue in Parigi Moutong. There has been a borderline conflict between Parigi Moutong with Poso Regency in the border area of Sausu district, especially in Tomura village, which is adjacent to Maleali village and covered by the administrative area of Poso Regency. Another land issue has transpired in the border area with Gorontalo Regency. There is also an existing land conflict, in terms of dispute on land ownership, between the transmigrants and local community or among the migrants community. Land clearing, which is intended for transmigrants, often becomes the conflict trigger for community as there is considerable cultural difference in land ownership. This land issue is relatively unsolved and is seen vulnerable to becoming an open conflict.

One of the important economic aspects of the regency is the regional budget profile. The regional budget and income expenditure of Parigi Moutong Regency since its establishment in 2002 continues to increase. The income in regional budget in 2004 was more than Rp 182 billion. The income target in 2011 was more than Rp 571 billion. Regional revenue in 2004 was Rp 4.2 billion, more than double the increase for 2007 target. Meanwhile, the fund allocation from the central government or the balancing fund of Rp 170 billion in 2004, increased to more than Rp 546 billion. The total budget expenditure in 2004 was Rp 180,407 billion (including regular expenditure for Rp 107,657 billion and development expenditure for Rp 72,749 billion) (BPS Parigi Moutong 2005).

The total expenditure for 2011 was targeted to more than Rp 559 billion, including regular/indirect expenditure for Rp 320 billion and capital expenditure component for Rp 239 billion. In other words, ever since pemekaran up to 2011

– when the democracy assessment was conducted – there has been a significant increase on total income of Parigi Moutong Regency although the subsidy budget from the central government has increased as well. General allocation fund (*dana alokasi umum*) for Parigi Moutong Regency in fiscal year 2011 was more than Rp. 447 billion, the second biggest in the entire regency/city in Central Sulawesi Province.

In the economic sector, the income per capita of Parigi Moutong's gross domestic products (GDP) increased to Rp 6,980,468 billion in 2009 from the previous Rp 6,586,596 billion in 2008. The labor force of Parigi Moutong in 2010 numbered to 199,858 with 195,285 employed and 4,753 unemployed. The growth of labor force was 73.58 per cent and unemployment was 2.29 per cent (BPS Parigi Moutong 2011).

Profile of Public Service Infrastructure

Literacy rate is relatively high in Parigi Moutong at 93.68 per cent. This regency is a pilot region for other regions in Central Sulawesi (BPS Parigi Moutong 2011). In 2010, Parigi Moutong served as a pilot area for early childhood education (*pendidikan anak usia dini*,) as the Central Government promotes the rapid development of early childhood education that reached nearly 187 schools in 2009.

There were 104 health facilities and infrastructures at Parigi Moutong in 2009, which included one hospital, 19 public health posts (*puskesmas*) and 84 supporting public health posts (*pustu*). Medical personnels were dominated by midwives and nurses accounting for 419 staff. There were 43 doctors, public health workers and pharmacists. The personnels assisting to child birth at Parigi Moutong were dominated by non-medical personnels or shaman, numbered at approximately 55 staff or 22 per cent in 2010 (BPS Parigi Moutong 2011).

The establishment of social facilities and infrastructures in Parigi Moutong Regency seems to grow from year to year. The social facilities include the mosque and musholla for 754 units (41.21 per cent), church for 167 units (9.13 per cent) and shrine/temple for 162 units (8.91 per cent).

The number of poor households (*rumah tangga miskin*) in this regency each year shows a decreasing trend. Since 2005, the number of poor households in Parigi Moutong reached 27,018 from total population of 367,596. By 2010, the

number declined to **18,479** RTM out of total population of **382,596**. When looking at the existing trend, however, there is no adequate barometer related to the poverty statistics of Parigi Moutong to say that it decreased or increased²⁵. With such condition, the Human Development Index (HDI) in Parigi Moutong was compared against the HDI of Central Sulawesi Province from **2008** to **2009**. The data is shown on Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Human Development Index of Parigi Moutong Regency

Indicator	Parigi Moutong		Central Sulawesi	
	2008	2009	2008	2009
Health Index	65.88	66.40	68.50	68.92
Education Index	77.97	78.22	81.14	81.38
Purchasing Power Index	59.59	60.50	60.63	61.80
HDI	67.81	68.37	70.09	70.70

Source: BPS Parigi Moutong 2010

In **2009**, the HDI value of Parigi Moutong Regency increased and it was under the upper-middle (between **65–80**) classification. Compared to the HDI of Central Sulawesi Province, the human development in Parigi Moutong Regency is still left behind (BPS Parigi Moutong **2010**; BPS Parigi Moutong **2011**).

The economy of Parigi Moutong Regency is largely dominated by its natural resources. However, the economic potential has not been fully explored. This can be seen from the regional budget profile that is still dominated by general allocation fund, which is the subsidy from the central government. The increasing regional budget profile since this regency was created in **2002** is influenced by the increasing subsidy. The natural products of Parigi Moutong have not been put to maximum use.

Security and Justice

Parigi Moutong is adjacent directly with one of the major conflict centers in Indonesia, Poso. For so long, it has been predicted that the conflict in Poso will spread and extend to Parigi Moutong area, but this has not materialized. During the reign of Governor HB Paliudju, Parigi Moutong area has been created as the pilot area for religious harmony. The security level in Parigi is relatively more secure. It is highly influenced by the regional government policy, which from the beginning, has

²⁵ Result of FGD1 (Bureaucrat) in THS Parigi, December 2011

given serious attention to facilities and infrastructure of regional security. This is by providing support to the police service sector in order to do their optimal duty in Parigi area in the form of police vehicles, buildings and stations among others.

Juvenile delinquency is the most common security and orderliness disturbance in Parigi Moutong, which happens several times in the last couple of years. Although the scale is relatively small, the conflict still has an impact to the community. In order to minimize the disturbance, government organizations, such as the National Police and Regional Government established the Village Security Assistance (*Bantuan Keamanan Desa, Bankamdes*), which has been confirmed through a stipulation letter of Regent of Parigi Moutong. This system is a duplication of a participative security system that was developed in Bali. The security condition can also be seen from numerous cases, from criminal to civil, which were filed and resolved. In 2010, the number of criminal cases filed was 204 cases, of which, 186 cases were resolved. Meanwhile, no civil case was filed (BPS Parigi Moutong 2011).

Illegal logging is another security issue. Ebony wood, which is the main forest product in Parigi Moutong Regency, is mostly pursued in the area. This wood is known as the 'black gold', which is worth hundreds of million rupiah (*Harian mercusuar* 2011).

Other cases that are mostly found and handled for community justice are several corruption cases in people's money management either by partners, project leaders or budget utilization officials. Some of the cases that are in the process of prosecution include the corruption allegation related to the logistic procurement during the local leader election at Parigi Moutong Regency in 2008, ring road problem, ship procurement of regional company (*perusahaan daerah, PD*) Parigi case, mark up in cemetery's compensation amount and other cases that compromise a good public accountability.

Security is an important issue in this regency due to its close proximity with the conflict area in Poso. If not for this reason, security issues in this regency will unlikely require such attention. The security issue is not only related to terrorism but it is also related to the economic activities surrounding the area such as illegal logging. This security dimension is considered a crime but it is not politically sensitive such as terrorism. The management done by organizations in Parigi Moutong Regency, such as *Bankamdes*, is an anticipation of relevant security issue.

Local Democracy Actors

Public Institution

The public institution in Parigi Moutong Regency consists of a state actor. This regency has 17 technical district offices and 13 agencies. Besides those offices and agencies, there are regional secretariat, council secretariat and 22 regency units. These are different units under this public institution. The other regional autonomy institutions are Office of Religious Affairs, Educational District Office, General Attorney, Military Rayon Command (*Komando Rayon Militer, Koramil*) or sectoral police, agricultural counseling, National Family Planning Coordinating Board (*Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, BKKBN*), Statistic Indonesia (*Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS*) among others.

The military presence in Parigi Moutong consists of koramil and a task force in the same level as a company located in the Eastern coast. The law enforcement consists of police and district attorney. The presence of other unit is located in Bambalemo village, such as a marine security post, which comes from a naval unit that has a command line to the commander of a naval base (*Danlanal*) located in Palu. The bureaucracy structure in the village level consists of a head of village who is supported by the Village Parliament (*Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD*) and management of Village Consultative Council (*Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, LMD*).

The bureaucracy framework has undergone changes since the *pemekaran*. In the beginning, the framework of Parigi Moutong was to build a professional bureaucracy by recruiting reliable bureaucrats who will sit in each of existing positions to pilot this new area. At the onset of second regent, the bureaucracy framework became politics. This is seen from many high-ranking officers who were recruited based on kinship rather than professional qualification. Many functional positions became structural based on political reason. The functional position of a teacher was changed to structural role. This was due to slow regeneration of regional bureaucracy for the structural position; thus in order to meet the allocation of high-ranking officers, allocation of the functional officer was done. Placement of several public officers, for example a Regency Secretary with inadequate educational background or a field counselor, brought an impact to regional performance²⁶.

²⁶ The first FGD result (NGO and CSO) on 7 December 2012 at THS Parigi Hotel and interview data from several respondents.

Table 4.2 Number of Civil Servant Officers in Parigi Moutong Regency Based on Rank Steps

Educational Institution	Total
Rank I	120
Rank II	2,508
Rank III	2,897
Rank IV	856
Total	6,381

Source: BPS Parigi Moutong 2011

Table 4.2 shows that the rank structure of civil servant at the Regency Government of Parigi Moutong is dominated by rank III (BPS Parigi Moutong 2011). This means that the region lacks strategic officers²⁷. In terms of gender, there were a total of 6,381 civil servant officers composed of 3,474 males (54 per cent) and 2,907 females (46 per cent) in 2010.

Non-Governmental Organizations

The second public actor in Parigi Moutong Regency is the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and mass organizations. The existing NGOs come from a separate regency or province, while mass organizations are mostly created and developed in Parigi Moutong. The existence of NGOs at this regency is not for a long term as there is financing issue. Moreover, the common issue of NGOs at Parigi Moutong, as well as other areas in Indonesia is the limited organizational management.

A community organization is also a strong element that ties the communities in Parigi Moutong, especially the Muslim community. There are two Islam mass organizations, Al Khaeraat and followers of Guru Tua, who is the founder of Al Khaeraat. As with the existence of organization-based communities, the Balinese community, which has long resided and lived in Parigi Moutong, has established both the Balinese and Hindu cultural event. This community is a government partner in raising community support.

The regional government has released a policy in granting honorary funds to *syara'* for Rp 50,000 and imam of a mosque for Rp 150,000. This is one of many

²⁷Every civil servant has a rank to define its structural position in order to show its duties, responsibilities, authority and the right to lead its unit. The position of the structural position of the stratified lowest level (echelon V) to the highest (echelon I/a).

forms of support from the Government of Parigi Moutong to show that they involve and encourage the non-formal institutions in supporting the development policy at Parigi Moutong.

Traditional institutions are another mass organization present in the regency. However, the government support in encouraging the active role of these institutions is still limited. The existence of traditional institutions under the coordination of Adat Council Meeting of Parigi Moutong is a legacy of two big kingdoms, Parigi and Moutong, and several existing ethnic entities. This ethnic entity consists of several custom communities with their own cultures. Yet, in reality, the role of this traditional group has not been performed properly that makes its legitimate purpose questionable and seen as merely an accessory²⁸. In Parigi, there is an Urban Patang Adat Council, which disseminates and coordinates to the wider community the local wisdom that should always be built in uniting and understanding the identity and existence of those local values.

Another ethnic custom institution that exists is Lauje, which is identified with Kaili ethnic group. The role of Lauje is to guard the cultural local values. The Lauje people are still living in underdeveloped condition. They live in mountain slopes along the Eastern Coast, adjacent to Donggala at Western Coast. The existence of these institutions is merely symbolic in ceremonial events but they do not have strategic value in strengthening the life of their ethnic members.

Practice of Representative Democracy at the New Regency

There were 44 political parties that participated at the 2009 national general election. At Parigi Moutong, there were 42 political parties listed in 2009 general election. Two parties that did not have their own management were Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (*Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia, PPNUI*) and Socialist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI*); therefore they could not participate at the legislative election at Parigi Moutong Regency. Political parties that participated in this general election were elected by the community of Parigi Moutong Regency in four constituencies in accordance with the General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU*) stipulation, KPU No. 153/SK/KPU/2008 to the stipulation of KPU No. 185/SK/KPU/2008. Each constituency has a different seat allocation and also a different electoral dividing numbers (*bilangan pembagi pemilih*). Constituency 1

²⁸ Discussion result of FGD 2 in Parigi, February 2012

has 13 seats allocations; Constituency 2 has 11 seats; Constituency 3 has seven seats and Constituency 4 has nine seat allocations. Those 40 seats of representative institution at Parigi Moutong in 2009 legislative election were contested by 700 people who were registered as legislative candidates.

From those 42 political parties, there were 17 parties that earned a seat in DPRD Parigi Moutong. Three political parties had the biggest number of seats: Golkar (six seats), Democratic Party (five seats) and Crescent Star Party (four seats). Functional Groups Party claimed that Parigi Moutong was their strong base; however, they only had six seats from the area. The complete list of seat of political parties in DPRD Parigi Moutong is shown on Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Number of Seat of Political Parties at Parigi Moutong Regency, 2009 General Election Result

No	Party	Seat	%
1	Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS)	3	7.5
2	National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN)	3	7.5
3	The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa , PKB)	2	5
4	The Democratic Renewal Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan, PDP)	1	2.5
5	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya , PartaiGolkar)	6	15
6	Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB)	4	10
7	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP)	2	5
8	Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)	5	12.5
9	The People's Conscience Party (Hati Nurani Rakyat , Partai Hanura)	3	7.5
10	The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya)	3	7.5
11	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI)	1	2.5
12	The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB)	2	5
13	The National People's Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional, PPRN)	1	2.5
14	Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PDK)	1	2.5
15	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan , PPP)	1	2.5
16	Prosperous Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia Sejahtera, PIS)	1	2.5
17	Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia, PPDI)	1	2.5
	Total	40	100

Source: KPUD Parigi Moutong Regency 2011

The 17 political parties have formed five factions: (1) Golkar and PDIP, (2) Demokrat, (3) Crescent Star, (4) PPP and (5) Toraranga, consists of PPDI, Gerindra, PKPI, Hanura and PKPB. Looking at the number of seats on Table 4.3, the internal political map of DPRD is spread out. None of the parties have the seat majority for more than half. Golkar has earned the biggest seat for 15 per cent of the total. Moreover, there are four political parties with had three seats (7.5 per cent) each; three political parties earned two seats (5 per cent) and seven political parties each gained one seat (2.5 per cent). This power distribution can complicate the unanimous decision-making process and subsequently can affect the day-to-day administration.

Meanwhile, the diverse political party at DPRD and their lack of vote from legislative election did not make a significant impact to the regional government administration. This was because there was no party taking the opposition side; no party was against the government as the executive institution.

The local leader election at Parigi Moutong was conducted twice, in 2002 and 2008. The first regent election followed the traditional way, which was election by DPRD. During this period, DPRD appointed Longki Janggola and Asmir Ntosa as the first definitive regent and deputy regent of Parigi Moutong Regency after pemekaran. This duo was a combination of a senior bureaucrat who was a technocrat bureaucrat and one who was supported by almost all political power in the council, especially Golkar and PDIP.


The second election was held in 2008 wherein all residents of Parigi Moutong directly elected their regent. Longki Janggola, who joined with Letkol TNI (Purn) Samsurizal Tombolotutu, was once again elected as the regent-deputy regent after beating his rival, Asmir Ntosa. The latter was the former deputy regent who teamed up with Taswin Borman, former regency secretary of Parigi Moutong. Former Regency Secretary Rustam Rahmatu joined with Thamrin Ntosa, the former vice DPRD Parigi from PDIP.

The Longki Djanggola-Samsurizal Tombolotutu tandem was nominated by five parties: Partai Demokrat, the PKB, PPP, PBB and PDIP. The 2008 local official election was a competition among the elites supporting the pemekaran idea, especially from the bureaucracy elites (KPUD Parigi Moutong 2011). In 2011, Longki Janggola participated in the gubernatorial election and won with Sudarto, a member of Regional Representatives Councils (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD RI*) and representative of Central Sulawesi, as his vice governor. After the regent was elected to the provincial level, the deputy regent, Samsurizal Tombolotutu

became the regent through the decision of DPRD Plenary Meeting of Regency (Regency Council) on 14 July 2011. This made a history for the new autonomous region of Parigi Moutong Regency. With Samsurizal's background as a military member, a different kind of leadership from the previous regent was introduced. This change affected the bureaucracy dynamics; for example, the policy of placement officer at the regency government of Parigi Moutong.

The participation statistics in local official election to vote for the legislative member and head of executive at the regency was relatively high at more than 75 per cent. Citizens who exercised their voting rights in regent/deputy regent election in 2008 was 81 per cent. The participation in 2009 legislative election was lower, which was 78 per cent based on the permanent voters list in Parigi Moutong Regency (BPS Central Sulawesi 2010). In presidential and vice presidential election, the participation from the community was 78 per cent. In the second round of the presidential election, the pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates in 2009, Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto, won in most Parigi Moutong poll stations with 97,897 votes while in other regions in Indonesia, they had less votes than their rival, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Budyono. The participation rate in governor and vice governor direct election in March 2011 was 74 per cent.

Figure 4.2 Election Participation of Parigi Moutong Community



Source: KPUD Parigi Moutong, 2011

Dispute on Election Result

Aside from the extensive political party seats at the legislative election in Regency DPRD, there were other important issues related to election result dispute, especially the loss of political party votes from the vote recap result.

The number of votes in House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR RI) election was 206,948 votes, equivalent to 78 per cent of the total permanent voters. The total votes for Regency DPRD election were 234,096

consisted of **196,928** counted votes or **88** per cent of the total permanent voters and **37,168** votes that were not accumulated to earn a seat as it came from small parties (BPS Central Sulawesi **2010**, p. **63**). This showed discrepancy between the counted votes for DPR RI and DPRD amounting to **27,148** votes or almost **10** per cent of votes from the total number of voters.

There were several possibilities to explain why there was a discrepancy. First was the possibility that the voter did not fill out their ballots for DPR RI and Regency DPRD at once. Second was related to the determination of seat quota in one constituency, which was Constituency **1**. According to the stipulation, the maximum seat per constituency was **12**. However, for Constituency **1**, KPU decided that the quota was **13** seats. This decision later on created many questions of why KPU could legalize a matter that obviously violated the applicable regulation, which was released by the KPU itself²⁹.

The issue on the remaining votes between DPR RI and DPRD resulted in the dispute of votes for Pioneers's Party in Constituency **3**. This party was alleged to inflate the vote. The vote, which belonged to PKPB, was reduced resulting to PKPB's lost of seat in the region. This issue was later resolved at the Constitutional Court in accordance with the Stipulation No. **60/PHPU.C-VII/2009** on the fulfillment of claim related to the vote inflation and restored the vote to PKPB for one additional seat.

Another dispute was the duplication of the governor decree related to the appointment of potential new legislative candidate. This letter canceled the potential **2008–2013** legislative members, Sugeng and Yusuf from Golkar Party, who succeeded in winning the vote calculation. Previously, the first governor's decree contained an invitation to the potential legislative members to be present at the inauguration rehearsal. The names listed in the stipulation letter were in accordance to the vote counting result of **2009** election, including the candidates from Golkar Party, Sugeng and Yusuf. On the inauguration day, those two names were not in the list, while they were already at the location and ready to be inaugurated. The additional stipulation letter of Central Sulawesi Governor was sent by removing their names. They were replaced by another cadre upon the request of Golkar Party's leader. Golkar Party withdrew them from the inauguration for the reason that was only known internally. The additional stipulation letter of the governor made the inauguration and oathtaking of Regency DPRD member a bit tense. To resolve the issue, the internal Golkar Party system

²⁹ Result of FGD 2 and interview with KPU staff of Parigi Moutong Regency.

still inaugurated the biggest vote earners, Sugeng and Yusuf, and ignored the stipulation letter of Central Sulawesi Governor.

Evaluation of Elected Officials

All 40 DPRD members from 17 parties in general have a limited capacity as DPRD member. Their performance in executing the legislative function, preparing budget and supervision does not go well and tends to deviate from the regulation. This is due to the regeneration weakness of political parties to get a capable legislative member. The recruitment process of political parties does not run systematically and is only based on instant needs that are enveloping the general election. Because of this incapability, a legislative member tends to be dominated by executive bureaucracy in managing the day-to-day administration.

The evaluation of an elected official from the executive side (regional government) is ranging from accountability issue to bureaucracy transparency. This is emphasized on the employment issue. The Advisory Board of Title and Rank (Baperjakat) who does the evaluation against the placement and promotion at the regency considers a staff placement that is not in accordance with the legislations, such as an improper appointment of echelon staff while the staff's status is still a candidate of civil servant officer (*calon pegawai negeri sipil*); degradation of title/echelon for staff is not supported by related fact of ethic or oath of office violation; the title is extremely easy to be rotated and replaced by the incapable staff in his field; many appointment of public officials are based on the political consideration and not the capacity; appointment of a structural title from a functional employee, i.e. the teacher, whose rank is enabling them to become a structural employee while their capacity is barely tested³⁰.

Such policy has neglected some stipulations related to the functional teacher and stipulation on structural position of head of district that is governed by the Government Regulation No. 19 on the district and required some important points to be able to hold the position. Since the era of Faisal Tamim as the Minister of Empowerment of State Apparatus, regions have been warned for not adding the formation of teacher recruitment. While there is a region that moves their main functional staff, the teacher, to hold a structural position in Parigi Moutong Regency, there are many existing structural staffs that have the capacity to hold such position. The public burden gets heavier with the number of honorary staffs who concretely are in the list of honorarium recipients but do not have a clear job description.

³⁰ Result of FGD 1 (NGO) in THS Hotel, Parigi

The finding of the State Audit Agency (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK*) against Financial Report of Regency Government of Parigi Moutong FY 2010 labeled the report with status 'disclaimer of opinion' (*tidak menyatakan pendapat*). The audit result was based on the corruption finding worth Rp. 151 billion or approximately 1.43 per cent of audit coverage worth Rp 1.32 trillion. The disclaimer opinion against the financial management of the Regency Government of Parigi Moutong has lasted from 2009 to 2010 (*Harianmercusuar 2011*).

Another regent policy besides promoting functional staff to be a structural staff is the discovery of an indication of civil servants (*pegawai negeri sipil*) recruitment syndicate in Regional Civil Service Agency (*Badan Kepegawaian Daerah, BKD*). There is also the corruption case of fiberglass ship procurement by the Marine Office, Public Works Office and the corruption case in regional company (*perusda*), i.e. PD. Several bureaucracy issues that occurred in the second leadership period of Letkol TNI (Purn) Samsurizal Tombolotutu have mostly originated from the leadership of the first regent. The case of crude palm investment cannot be solved by the second regent because it is a policy made during the previous regent. It is the same with the disclaimer financial report found by BPK in three budget periods of Parigi.

The practice of representative democracy in the new *pemekaran* region can be seen from the practice of election management and the participants of general election, the resolution of election dispute and evaluation of elected officers. From these three indicators of representative democracy in Parigi Moutong Regency, it can be seen that formally, representative democracy is practised, running and occurring peacefully. However, the evaluation of elected officials is not implemented completely and internal issues cannot be solved completely either.

Practice of Participatory Democracy at the New Regency

Democracy, in the definition of community participation, needs to acknowledge the local context. In the context of Parigi Moutong Regency, the community consists of two major groups. First are the native people and second are the migrants. The native people, as has been explained above, are farmers and fishermen with limited education. Migrants come from Bugis, Bali and Java who mostly control the trading and service sector. They are considered as more educated compared to the native group.

There was an attempt to strengthen the community participation conducted by the civil society group. Since the advocacy held was small scale and not sustainable, the impact towards the change of regional government policy was not fully attained yet.

In this regency, there are **27** NGOs, **38** youth organization (*organisasi kepemudaan*) and **103** mass organizations that are listed in Regency of National Unity and Community Protection (*Kesbanglinmas*). These institutions are mostly concentrated in Parigi, which make the region outside Parigi more marginalized in relation to regional development issues (*Kesbangpolinmas 2010*).

The effort to strengthen participation must deal with the characteristic of Parigi Moutong community, which is oriented to the patron and not on the individual or collective rationality. Such type of participation is due to compliance with the local patrons such as the custom leader, head of village or bureaucracy, politician and religious leader, as well as other community figures.

The community participation that is discussed here is related to the first community group. In general, the participation level is very low. If there is participation, it has two sides and both of them are contradictory. The first part is characterized by having the support from all community elements towards development, which is marked by the presence of regional bureaucracy in each community activity. The second part speaks of dissatisfaction from the community.

The dissatisfaction is seen by the decreasing community participation towards development activities after the *pemekaran*. Such decline is caused by first, the growth in politics that is more oriented to the fulfillment of pragmatic needs through the exchange mechanism between the community and political elites. This pragmatism creates a condition, which is not conducive for democracy practice, where one of the indicators is authentic community involvement and not merely related to material objects.

Second, the regional government does not involve the community in the policymaking, except after it has been decided. For instance, the community involvement in area arrangement program is very limited. Rather than playing an active role in the decision-making process, the community remains an audience in policymaking. Discussion and interviews with several respondents revealed that Parigi Moutong community highly expects the government role in many aspects, such as in spatial management in order to create cleanliness and health programs.

The community also expects the strengthening of infrastructure in transportation sector and market facilities, such as Terminal Toboli and Pasar Inpres Parigi. Meanwhile, the community lacks involvement in market development. Only when the market is built that the community is forced to fill the spot that has been prepared. Such example of lack of community role in projects like market development, which uses loan from World Bank, is allegedly indicating mismanagement of funds³¹.

These rising issues are due to differences in needs of the community and the government, of which, an agreement is facilitated by NGO. There is no single point where the government and community needs are met that causes pressure from the government to the community.

The practice of participatory democracy at Parigi Moutong Regency is also demonstrated by the lack of understanding against the structure and function of democracy system. The people's representative, who ideally should take the mandate of their constituent, tends to put self interest and title above the community interest. If there are complaints towards these elites, it is considered as politically motivated. In addition, the absence of a system to accommodate the community demand related to the zoning aspect in the wide area of Parigi Moutong hinders the community to bring the government closer. So far, the voice of hinterland is not heard.

When DOB was first established, the regional government implemented the service mechanism, which gave a service assistant and its budget directly to the district, as well as policymaking that empowers each district to solve its own social issues related to development and establishment of worship facility, youth programs and others. The policy has since been removed that made the service to be centralized in the capital city of regency, Parigi, located 290 km from Moutong, the farthest district.

³¹The World Bank involvement through numerous projects, such as Urban Sector Development Reform Project (USDRP), has been ongoing since 18 January 2006. This is a part of World Bank's contribution in building strategic partnership through empowerment and community participation in the development and government organization. The expectation from the Regency Government of Parigi Moutong with this program is that it will increase the community access to public document, handling community complaint more systematically and eventually, prepare the regional regulation to improve transparency. However, until now, it has not been realized yet.

Joint Initiative of Actors in Local Government Level

The existence of a custom council in Parigi Moutong Regency is aimed to work at local culture preservation in order to support local and regional development management participation. However, the existence of the Custom Council is sometimes used by the council elite for political interests such as in the candidacy of deputy regent of Parigi Moutong in 2011. As a result, it brought a dispute on the political elite on whether it was supported or not by the custom council.

The initiatives from several community institutions through NGOs and youth organizations, more or less, can positively contribute to developing community capacity through several implemented programs. One entity that can be considered as an initiator in the community participation is Yasalu. This NGO has developed the participatory plan model, which was implemented as the project pilot in several villages before becoming the model for other regions that are not only in Parigi Moutong but even in Sulawesi.

Mobilization, which mostly occurred in Parigi at the beginning of new autonomous region, seemed to have extremely changed compared to the era of dynamic development. If, at the beginning, the mobilization was done for the spirit of progress and unity, now it has shifted to fighting several elites whose interests were to rule as well as maintain their power. This has been evident in the intensified mobilization within the community such as those initiated by associations or ethnic-based and sociocultural-based community organizations.

Summary

Parigi Moutong Regency as a New Autonomous Region was created formally in 2003 and already has representative democracy institutions such as government institutions and political parties and participatory democracy institution. General election has taken place since 2008, including the direct local official election in Parigi Moutong community, which enabled the people to elect their local leaders to become public officials for the next five years. The political participation level in general election at Parigi Moutong is relatively high, as indicated in the data gathered. The general election organization is relatively secure without any significant security disturbance.

The participatory democracy relatively runs well, marked by the existence of civil society element, whether in the form of NGO, religious-based community organization and kinship groups. These groups have taken a valuable role in

empowering the economy and politics with significant impact. However, one critical note is pointed out in the existence of these groups, such as dependability of local NGO to funding, which comes from Jakarta or international donor institutions. On the other hand, local community organizations are not strong enough and relatively still fragmented in ethnic and religious identity. Therefore, although quantitatively the practice of these two types of democracy has been sufficient, qualitatively, the practice of representative and participatory democracy is still limited.

Representative democracy is still limited to the procedural and institutional democracy, which is the process of electing people's representative and local leader. Participatory democracy is substantive as well. It has guaranteed the political rights of its people in this pemekaran region to participate in politics. The representative and participatory democracy are still not able to give a significant impact to the public service, particularly in health and education sectors. These two types of democracy are struggling in order to achieve the improvement in managing the relatively rich natural resources in this regency. The people's representative institution is still busy in taking care of their own interests. The regional government, which is the partner of people's representative in their daily activities, is likewise focusing on strengthening the bureaucracy system instead of fully managing the policies that are directly related to the people of Parigi Moutong.

There are two factors to explain the absence of influence of representative and participatory democracy over the daily life in Parigi Moutong community: First, the historical side of Parigi Moutong as a new autonomous region. This region is still in the re-establishment stage, especially in the institutionalization process of the local government. That includes the consolidation process among local political actors. As explained above, these two major cultural groups in Parigi Moutong – between those who live in the southern part (Parigi) and northern part (Moutong) with each of the sub-ethnics – still demand the importance of having a qualified local leader who comes from these two social groups. Unfortunately, the solution to this institutionalization stage of new local government after the *pemekaran* is by continuing to divide the administrative area, which is the district, and even by dividing the two main areas of the regency. The number of districts until 2011 has grown up to 40 per cent since the beginning of this new autonomous region. Likewise, the number of villages/sub-districts has increased by almost 10 per cent.

Second, the physical geography of this regency is far from each location, making it difficult to accelerate development, including the distribution of development

outcomes. As can be seen from the map, districts and villages are evenly spread out in its half round-shaped geography. The center of government is located in southern side, which is difficult to access for Parigi Moutong residents who live in the northern side. This physical geography issue has become the root cause for the *pemekaran* demand for Parigi Moutong Regency from the northern part.

This is the setting of local democracy practice at the *pemekaran* region. This situation is clearly different with other regions that are also subjects of the democracy assessment in which the institutionalization of its regional government is relatively stable, such as Solo, Jombang, Kupang, Aceh and Manokwari. Therefore, several recommendations that cover the work of representative democracy and participatory democracy need to consider the institutionalization stages of government and consolidation of civil society.

Recommendation

Representative Democracy

If practice of representative democracy is measured merely on the presence of a channel and representative institutions, such as political parties and DPRD, then it can be considered that democracy in Parigi Moutong Regency exists. Nevertheless, the empirical assessment shows that the implementation of the channel and representative legislation still has reservations. Both exist and work formally but limitations likewise exist. Political parties, for instance, are not functioning progressively as channels for articulation, aggregation, dissemination and as political participants of Parigi Moutong community. Political parties are instead occupied in finding a good cadre to become their envoy in the representative institution.

This is because in general, cadres of political parties in Parigi Moutong are still low in number. Political parties do not have a strong root in the community level, except for the old ones that have existed before the reformation era such as *Golkar*. The absence of such foundation can be related to the condition of Parigi Moutong as the New Autonomous Region—the political parties are still attempting to establish their base in the community.

The weak cadres of political parties have an impact to the weak representative institution (DPRD) in Parigi Moutong. The main functions of the people's representative institution—making regional regulations, conducting supervision towards the executive (government) and preparing the regional revenue and

expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah*) are not working satisfactorily. As what is happening in other regions with weak representative institutions, DPRD members tend to be more inward and fail to implement the mandate as the people's representative.

The weak role of DPRD as the executive balancing power in the decision-making process is followed by the politicization of the bureaucracy. As previously discussed, the bureaucracy recruitment in Parigi is proportional and not professional. The recruitment is conducted based on the consideration of social classification in Parigi Moutong. Moreover, the bureaucracy of human resources is weak too. The case of transferring a teacher – who administratively has functional not structural function – to be the strategic officer in Regional Government of Parigi Moutong has shown insufficient human resources. Teachers, whose competence is teaching, after transferring their status and scope of work, have to be administrators. Often, their education background does not support their new position. The weakness of representative institution and bureaucracy system causes the check-and-balance process between these two to not work well.

There is, however, an advantage or potential that can be tapped to smoothen and strengthen the practice of representative democracy. The existence of religious-based community organization and cultural classification in the form of cultural and religious community is an empirical fact in Parigi Moutong. The concrete representative democracy in Parigi Moutong is these organizations, not the political party. These organizations, such as Custom Council and Religious Institution (Al Khaeraat) have a strong bonding with the community and informally carrying out functions, which are normatively implemented by the political party. This social fact has been used by the government to streamline the policymaking. They always coordinate informally with the elites from these organizations in strategic issues such as policymaking and security issue.

The above sociopolitical context reflects the practice of representative democracy and evaluation against its practice needs to use a more relevant instrument within the local political situation. The representative democracy in Parigi Moutong at this early stage still needs to be conducted by the elite and by the community institutions, which according to textbooks are non-democratic. Should we assess the democracy in the context of this new region with a manner that is in accordance with the normative democracy standard, we will have the difficulty in finding the democracy practice. Over time and with evolution of political process in

this regency, it is expected that the elite domination will be balanced out by the community-based power through the strengthening of participatory democracy practice.

Participatory Democracy

The participatory democracy in Parigi Moutong is relatively high based on the level of momentum in political participation on general election. However, if the indicator is expanded and participatory democracy is not only measured based on the participation level (quantitative aspect) during political events but also at the quality aspect of the participation, we will see that there is a limitation of participatory democracy in this new regency.

Indicators of limitations in the participatory democracy practice can be seen on the characteristics of community-based organizations such as mass organizations and NGOs. Mass organizations at Parigi Moutong are based on ethnic, religion and other cultural classification. This means that mass organizations are not open for all societies of Parigi Moutong regardless of their cultural background. On the other hand, NGOs is a branch of similar organizations at the capital city and/or capital city of province. They depend on funding from the state and donors. As a result, the role of NGOs in encouraging quantity and quality democracy and active political role of the people is not for a long term. If the funding support ends, then the activity will end as well.

The second indicator is the social characteristics of community in Parigi Moutong that still depends on the leader figures or the elites. This resulted in the domination of these elites in the process of decision-making and in the people's daily living. Their political option is highly dependent on their elites who can be from the cultural, political or economic sectors.

Based on these two indicators, participatory democracy at Parigi Moutong needs to be strengthened – at least by furthering the roles of mass organizations and NGOs – and reduce the political orientation of its people against the elite group. Without overcoming these two limitations, the participation quality at Parigi Moutong Regency will remain at a minimum. Participation will only be limited to the quantitative level such as measuring the high or low participation of Parigi residents in political events such as the local official election.

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Aceh Besar

*Mada Sukmajati, Teuku Kemal Fasya, Rizki Affiat*³²

Foreword

Aceh is an area that has a special position in the structure of regional government in Indonesia. The relationship between Aceh and the central government in Jakarta has upside and downside phases since the 1950s. One of the most crucial issues is the injustice experienced by the Aceh people that led to the demand of independence around 1950s. This demand reappeared at the beginning of Reform Period post-New Order era. Jakarta responded to the demand to secede from the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) by issuing Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Government—a follow up from Helsinki Agreement in 2005. Law No. 11/2006 controls the governance in Aceh Province with special autonomy principle (asymmetrical decentralization) that differentiates Aceh from other region.

Aceh Besar Regency is one of the 23 regencies/cities in Aceh Province. Historically, Aceh Besar is another name of Aceh Rayeuk and Aceh Lhee Sagoe, which, previously, were the administration centers of the government of Aceh Kingdom. Based on Decree of Ministry of Home Affairs No. 120-276/2011 on Determination of Rank and Performance Status of Regional Government Administration towards 2009 Regional Government Administration Report, the government administration in Aceh Regency shows an average figure. In 2009, it ranked 282 among 344 existing regencies in Indonesia. Aceh Besar Regency is one of the biggest regencies in Aceh Province in terms of area and population.

³² Research and report drafting of this chapter is performed by Teuku Kemal Fasya, a lecturer in Universitas Malikussaleh Aceh and Rizki Amalia Affiat, a NGO activist from Liga Inong Aceh (LINA), with the supervision and adaptation by Mada Sukmajati.

This chapter will evaluate the quality of local democracy after the adoption of special autonomy policy in Aceh Besar Regency. The local democracy in this chapter is limited to two main dimensions: the representative democracy and participatory democracy (for instance, participation and public involvement in making public policy). Several key questions that direct the discussion in this chapter are: In general, how is the democracy condition in Aceh Besar Regency? To which extent, the representative democracy condition takes place and what is the implication to Aceh people? To which extent, the public participates in the process of government administration and what are the constraints? What should be followed up in order to improve the quality of democracy?

To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into five major parts: The first part explains the context of Aceh Besar Regency that highly influences the democratic condition in this area. The second part maps the actors and institutions that highly determine the democracy condition in this regency. The third section explores the existing condition of representative democracy in this area. While the fourth section focuses on the condition of participatory democracy. This chapter ends with a summary and recommendation on the democratic condition in Aceh Besar Regency.

Sociopolitical Context

History of Local Politics

The sociopolitical context in Aceh Besar Regency cannot be isolated from the conflict between Aceh and Jakarta. The central subject of the conflict is ideology, which is related to the application of Islam *sharia* in Aceh, gaps in economic structure between Aceh and Java people and the excessive power of centralization policy that is done by the central government in Jakarta.

In the beginning, Aceh people have given their support to the independence of Indonesia. For example, four notable scholars in Aceh – one of them is Tengku M. Daud Beureuh – made declaration for all Aceh scholars in 1947 that contained support to Soekarno against the Dutch invasion. This declaration was then followed by an establishment of several forces to fight against the Dutch. Aceh people have also contributed to buy the first Indonesian airplane, Dakota RI-001, in 1948.

However, the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta led to a conflict when the central government in Jakarta did not immediately establish Aceh Province. Instead, Jakarta put Aceh as a part of North Sumatra Province. Moreover, Aceh people felt more disappointed when the economy development worked very slowly. This was added by the uncertainty of realization of central government assurance on the implementation of regulation based on Islam sharia in Aceh. All this dissatisfaction made Tengku M. Daud Beureuh announced the creation of Darul Islam (DI) movement and Indonesian Islam Soldier (Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII), as well as proclaimed the Aceh states as part of Indonesian Islam Country (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) led by Kartosuwiryo in West Java on 20 September 1953 (Harvey 1977; Sjamsuddin 1985).

Moreover, the demand of Aceh independence reappeared by the establishment of Aceh Sumatran National Liberation (*Gerakan Pembebasan Aceh Sumatera*), which later changed its name to Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM*) in 1976. This movement was led by Tengku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, the grandson of Indonesian national hero, Tengku Cik di Tiro. In order to achieve their objective, GAM launched their diplomacy strategy and established a military wing. The central government then responded to this policy very repressively through the policy of establishing the Military Operational Regional (*Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM*) in Aceh from 1988 to 1998, which resulted in a massive scale violation of human rights.

After the resignation of Soeharto in 1998, the demand for Aceh independence was getting more resonated, not only in the national level but also internationally. In response, the central government issued Law No. 18/ 2001 on Special Autonomy for Aceh Special Region Province as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province. Several diplomatic attempts were performed, including the one that was facilitated by several international institutions, such as Henry Dunant Centre and other nations. However, the agreement between central government in Jakarta and GAM still could not be accomplished.

Change has finally come after the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004. Approximately 126,000 people died in Aceh and in Banda Aceh itself, more than 50 per cent of the buildings and infrastructures were demolished from the calamity that made the district government paralyzed for several weeks. This disaster drew attention and concerns worldwide.

After the tsunami, the central government and GAM signed the Helsinki agreement in 2005. Based on that agreement, the central government issued Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Government. This regulation gave the government in Aceh Province the special authority, special district government institution, special political institution and special natural resources management including special autonomy fund allocation from the central government to Aceh Province, which distinguishes Aceh from other regions.

The security condition throughout Aceh Province after the enactment of Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Government up to this date is relatively stable. Aceh people are also practicing Islam *sharia* law although often, the implementation of Islam *sharia* institutionalization still has problems. For example, there are violence cases involving those who are considered violating Islam *sharia* law. According to the public survey result organized by International Republican Institute (IRI), which was released in August 2011, the informal religious leadership is at the highest level as the most trusted institution by Aceh community. The informal religious leadership means *dayah* scholars (*pesantren*), who is normally called *teungku* or public figure in the community, is considered to have a high level of religious knowledge and is also respected. However, the modern political institutions, for example Aceh Provincial House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh DPR*), Aceh District House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten, DPRK*) and political parties are in the lowest level of the perception of public trust. The awareness of Aceh people towards gender issues is getting higher too. In Aceh community, the custom has a mechanism of protecting and respecting women.

The above developments, however, do not mean that the sociopolitical growth of Aceh has been established. Until now, all areas in Aceh Province are still faced with several challenges and constraints such as the weak performance of government administration. There is also a reconciliation problem after the conflict and the unresolved social rehabilitation of tsunami aftermath. Another example is the civil society movement, which has not given any real contribution for the implementation of democracy and decentralization in this area. Aceh sits in the 18th position from 33 provinces in Indonesia in the Human Development Index (HDI). This province also became the second province with the highest corruption level in Indonesia from 2005 to 2011 (Simanjuntak 2010). It is not surprising that in general, the social welfare level of Aceh people is far from the ideal standard.

Geographic and Zonality View

Aceh Besar Regency is one of the regencies with the widest area in Aceh Province spanning 2,974.12 km² that consists of land for 1,480 km² and extensive sea of about 2,150.80 km². This regency is adjacent to Malacca Straits (connected with Thailand and Malaysia), Sabang City and Banda Aceh City in the north and is adjacent to Aceh Jaya Regency in the south. While on the east side, this regency is bordered by Pidie Regency. On the west, it is surrounded by Indian Ocean that adjoins with Andaman Islands and Nikobar Islands. The most common problem in the regency is that many fishermen can get lost in the sea and then caught by authorities from other countries.

Aceh Besar Regency is divided into 23 districts, several of which are the result of developed regions (*pemekaran*³²). The widest regency is Seulimuem (487.26 km²) while Barona Jaya is the smallest regency (9.06 km²). Besides those 23 districts, Aceh Besar also has 68 *kemukiman*, the sub-office of a district (the custom structure under district level and above village or *gampong*) and 604 *gampong*. In general, the access to other regency/city surrounding Aceh Besar Regency can be reached by land transportation as the development result of road infrastructure under the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency NAD-Nias program. However, Pulo Aceh District, an isolated area in Aceh Besar, has a very minimum physical facility and infrastructure.

In the beginning, the capital city of Aceh Besar Regency and Banda Aceh City is Banda Aceh City. In 9 August 1983, however, Aceh Besar Regency established its own capital city, Jantho City, which is located in an isolated area at the top of Seulawah Mountain. The establishment of Jantho City created a problem because it is not a transit and trade city—it is specially prepared as the government center of Aceh Besar Regency. For instance, people from the farthest district, Lhoong District, must travel for 106 km to reach the government center. Almost 80 percent of civil servant officers (*pegawai negeri sipil, PNS*) who work in Jantho City live in Banda Aceh City. Legislative members even organize many meetings in hotels located at Banda Aceh.

Until now, Aceh Besar Regency does not have any district regulation (*qanun*) regarding regional spatial plans (*rencana tata ruang wilayah, RTRW*). This is because the district government in Aceh Besar is still waiting for the authorization

³² *Pemekaran* is the Indonesian word for the subdivision of existing districts and provinces to create new units, also known as administrative subdivision.

of RTRW policy from the regional government of Aceh Province as the reference. The implication of not having RTRW in Aceh Besar Regency is that there are many development plans for infrastructure in this area that do not have a clear and advanced planning. One of the examples is the construction of regional government office complex of Aceh Besar Regency as the center of government administration, which is difficult to access by Aceh Besar community. Another example is the development of settlements without any building permit (*izin mendirikan bangunan*). Also, many practices of natural resources exploitation do not regard the environment and socio-economic resistance.

Population, Social Structure and Social Relationship

The population of Aceh Besar Regency in 2010 was 388,442 people composed of 200,401 male and 188,041 female. The annual population growth is 4 per cent.

In public community perception, Aceh Besar Regency has two main parts based on historical sentiments and zonality, Aceh Besar and Aceh Rayeuk. People in districts who live near Banda Aceh City are called 'Aceh Raya people' while people in districts near Jantho City are usually called as 'Aceh Rayeuk people'. On one side, 'Aceh Raya people' is considered as people with high education level, good economy, open and modern. On the other side, 'Aceh Rayeuk people' is considered as people with low education level, poor economy, closed and traditional.

According to 2011 Statistic Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) data, the social problems facing Aceh Besar Regency in 2010 is dominated by issue of poor people for 27,356 cases, followed by senior citizen issues for 4,008 cases and juvenile problems for 622 cases. The other conflicts that frequently appear are the private land ownership and *ulayat* land. Since most of the population in Aceh Besar Regency is from Aceh ethnic and Muslims (95 per cent), there is almost no conflict grounded on ethnic and religion tension in this area.

Aceh Besar is a regency where the punishment execution of Islam *sharia* violation is the highest in Aceh Province. Many parties criticize that the execution of Islam *sharia* in Aceh Besar is not democratic, discriminative towards women and far from community engagement. One of the most worrying cases is the violence and insult from the community to a resident on an immoral allegation, where the community is playing judge by hitting the resident, then pouring the resident with ditch water.

The violence that is done by sharia police or wilayatul hisbah on the name of sharia law and custom often happens too. Religious leaders in Aceh, no less, reject the extreme act and behavior in applying Islam sharia because Islam and Aceh customs are highly taking into account humanity, prioritizing peace and highly honoring women.

Socio-economic Basis/Regional Finance

The regional revenue for Aceh Besar Regency in 2012 was Rp. 741 billion, an increase from the previous year. However, the biggest allocation spending for Aceh Besar Regency is the regular direct expenses, such as salary, regular operational and direct spending. The allocation amount for regular spending post is more than 75 per cent. Meanwhile, the remaining percentage of budget allocation is for development, such as health, education and infrastructure sector. This number is obviously very unbalanced; therefore, it is no surprise if there is no significant improvement in social welfare in Aceh Besar.

According to one of the sources, the regional revenue (*pendapatan asli daerah, PAD*) has increased from Rp. 12.3 billion in 2007 to Rp. 19.6 billion in 2008, Rp. 29.2 billion in 2009, Rp. 36 billion in 2010 and Rp. 49 billion in 2011. The biggest contribution of PAD comes from two big mining companies, PT Lafarge Cement Indonesia (LCI) SAI and PT Lhoong Setia Mining (LSM) and the revenue from mining of C minerals. However, the regional government is still having difficulty in encouraging investments to Aceh Besar due to some concerns on banking condition and regulation from central government that makes the licensing process becomes inefficient and ineffective.

In the context of regional revenue source that does not come from PAD, there are many budget management and money transfer from central to regional that do not reflect the spirit of special autonomy implementation. For example, although the central government has given the management of land and building tax (*pajak bumi dan bangunan*) to the regional government, the intervention from central government has not fully disappeared as the fund collected by the regional government must be deposited first to the central government. Afterwards, the central government will again transfer 80 per cent of total fund to the regional government.

The basis of socio-economics in Aceh Besar Regency is mostly in agriculture and marine fisheries. Comprehensively, from 2006 to 2009, there was a decline in percentage of communities working in agriculture, fishery, forestry and plantation

in this regency. One of the root causes was the rehabilitation and reconstruction after the tsunami where many communities that were in agriculture eventually work in construction.

The overflowing aid in the aftermath of the tsunami has also impacted the high inflation rate and flourishing of many luxurious buildings that need high maintenance fee. The huge aid also has psychological impact on the negative progress of community's mentality. For example, overexposure to money has created the mentality of just waiting for aid from others, consumerism culture and higher individualism attitude.

The area in this regency is becoming more familiar with the massive deforestation and highly intensive exploitation of C mineral mining (mineral non-metal and rocks) that impact the damage of ground and deficit of groundwater. Such exploitation can be found in Darul Kamal District and Darul Imarah District. Regional government at Aceh Besar Regency actually has issued a regional regulation to manage it. However, the regional government is not capable to enforce the regional regulation. It is not a surprise that the community sometimes complain about the threat of natural disasters such as erosion and flood.

According to 2011 BPS data, the number of PNS in Aceh Besar Regency is 7,899. From this data, it is known that 2.2 per cent of the total population in Aceh Besar counts on becoming a civil servant. There is even a moniker 'LSM' in Aceh Besar Regency, which stands for three districts: Lubok, Samahani and Montasik. People from these three districts dominate the bureaucracy structure in Aceh Besar Regency. The data on the number of PNS indicates that most of the labor force still relies on becoming a government employee compared to working as a private employee or as an entrepreneur.

On the other hand, the audit result of the Audit Board of the Republic Indonesia (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia, BPK RI*) from 2009 to 2010 found that Aceh Besar is one of the 10 regencies in Aceh Province considered as bankrupt and financially troubled. The regency is considered as no longer capable in financing the community development because more than 75 per cent of regional revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, APBD*) is used for employee expenditure and spendthrift government operational costs. According to the staff of Aceh Besar Regency, more than 80 per cent of total general allocation fund (*dana alokasi umum, DAU*) is used for salary and allowance. The remaining 20 per cent is for direct expenditure. Under the direct expenditure, there is still a routine budget attached to it.

As a reaction to that condition, in July 2011, before the regional government, the community group under the Youth Caucus of Aceh Besar (*Kaukus Pemuda Aceh Besar, KPAB*) evaluated the leadership of Aceh Besar Regent Bukhari Daud and Deputy Regent H. Anwar Ahmad with ‘failure without exception (*gagal tanpa pengecualian*) and ‘opinion of failed without exception’ (*gagal dengan pengecualian*). That opinion is a different response to BPK of Aceh Representative who has given their opinion of ‘opinion of nature with exception’ (*wajar dengan pengecualian*)³⁴ for Aceh Besar.

Regional government in Aceh Besar Regency has tried to make a participative development planning system by referring to the current regional general budget policy, which is based on Development Planning Meeting (*Musrebang*) with reference to the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs No. 54/2010 on Implementation of Government Regulations (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) No. 8/2006 on Reporting and Evaluation of Local Planning System. In reality, however, the implementation of participative planning process is far from ideal. For example, the government of Aceh Besar Regency prefers to allocate the special autonomy fund for procuring family planning (*keluarga berencana*) kits and playgrounds rather than for building irrigation, which is more needed by the community.

Budget manipulation becomes a very serious problem in Aceh Besar. Often, the regional government has already made an implementation report of a development program in the village level while the program has not been done and the budget is still available. Sometimes, they even make an implementation report of a development program in the village level while the fund allocation from such development program is not available yet. On the other hand, the leader and community figure in village level do not have access to gain information on the realization of several existing development programs. Therefore, the transparency and accountability become critical issues in Aceh Besar Regency.

Several corruption cases also take place in Aceh Besar Regency. A source said that in 2010, there was a corruption case of construction of the clean water artesian well, which was funded by Multi Donor Fund (MDF) and cost for Rp. 10 billion. There were also corruption cases in 2010 and 2011 in the Education Office and Highway and Human Settlements Office (*Bina Marga dan Cipta Karya, BMCK*). In 2010, there were 10 cases of corruption in Education Office and BMCK. The following year, there were four cases, one of which involved *Fajar Hidayah*

³⁴ BPK RI's set of opinion standards of audit report on financial statement

Integrated Boarding School (FHIBS) that has support from the Government of Aceh Province for Rp. 30 billion per year. According to one of the sources, indication of budget misuse in Aceh Besar can be seen from many cases. However, those indications are not followed up by the authority.

Indicator of Social Development

The indicators of social development are highly related to the area's basic profile such as population and socio-economic condition. In Aceh Besar's case, however, the regency faces limitation of data and contradiction of available information. For example, data on the width of ricefields owned by the Irrigation Office is very different with the data owned by the Agriculture Office. It is the same case with the agrarian data and poverty data where BPS has a different set of statistics with the Civil Registry Office.

This problem later made disparate benchmarking in measuring the development in Aceh Besar Regency. BPS data showed that poor community population in Aceh Besar Regency in 2010 (18.80 per cent) was reduced from 2009 (20.09 per cent). While according to The Indonesian Forum for Environment (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, WALHI*) that quoted the data of Work Force and Population Office, the poverty rate in 2009 was 45 per cent with the number of unemployed reaching 57,538. Apart from such information difference, it can be seen that poverty is a serious problem that must be resolved by the regional government.

The poverty level is inversely proportional with education level. The basic education at Aceh Besar Regency is quite high, which was 99.07 per cent in 2009 and reached 99.71 per cent in 2010. The same applies to secondary education, which was 95.09 per cent in 2009 and increased to 96.32 per cent in 2010. However, the number is still low when it comes to continuing to secondary education, which was 77.45 per cent in 2009 and 74.60 per cent in 2010. Graduation percentage of national exam (*ujian nasional*) at Aceh Besar Regency in 2010 was only 48 per cent. The education level owes it to the 35 per cent allocation of budget and expenditure of Aceh Besar Regency for the education sector. The regency has a wide availability of teachers although quite a number do not have a specific expertise.

The condition of the health sector in Aceh Besar Regency is not relatively satisfying. In 2009, there were 48.78 per cent of patients who were admitted to

hospitals for 5.13 days. In 2010, that number declined to 33.50 per cent, with the length of hospitalization decreased to three days. Another indicator is the period of breastfeeding for children under five years, which was 15.40 months in 2009 and 20.50 months in 2010. Moreover, the maternity service program is not quite pleasing as there are many failure cases due to mishandling by medical workers and paramedics. There are several reasons for these inefficiencies. For instance, many midwives, especially those who are funded by short-term employee (*pegawai tidak tetap*) program, do not want to be assigned in remote areas such as in Lhoong and Pulo Aceh Regency. In general, the regional government in Aceh Besar Regency is not capable in improving the adequate and accessible health infrastructure. Although there is Aceh Health Insurance (*Jaminan Kesehatan Aceh*) made available by Aceh Provincial Government, there are many people in Aceh Besar who cannot get the health service facility through this scheme.

The biggest development problem in Aceh Besar Regency is equity. There are areas considered as 'step child' of the development. According to one of the sources, only four districts are considered prosperous districts being in the center of market economy, existence of big companies and the population size. Those districts are Ingin Jaya, Montasik, Lhok Nga and Indrapuri. Because of this gap, there is a demand for the establishment of Aceh Raya Regency as a separate entity from Aceh Besar Regency. Pulo Aceh District, which is the most isolated area, also has its own problem. This district is located in a separate island from Sumatra Island. The condition of facility and infrastructure of public service in this area is very poor—for example, there is no asphalt road and sufficient electricity.

The regional government in Aceh Besar Regency has implemented several programs to improve the social welfare level. One of them is by implementing the Development Acceleration Program of Disadvantaged Regions and Special (*Program Percepatan Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal dan Khusus, P2DTK*) in which the source of fund comes from regional and central governments. This program implements the heavy infrastructure construction such as bridge and cross-village road. Moreover, Aceh Besar Regency has also implemented a gampong expansion program through *Gampong* Allocation Fund (*Alokasi Dana Gampong, ADG*) where the regional government allocates fund of Rp. 30 million up to Rp. 90 million to each *gampong* based on the number of poor people, population size, area and the distance from capital city. These programs, however, still fall short in significantly improving the social welfare of the communities in Aceh Besar Regency.

Political Actors and Institutions

In the 2009 General Election, Aceh Party (Partai Aceh, PA) had 33 seats from 69 available seats in DPR Aceh Province. Meanwhile, PA only had 10 seats from 35 available seats in DPR of Aceh Besar Regency. Most of DPR members of Aceh Besar Regency in 2009 General Election earned their seats based on kinship and personage. Most DPR members of Aceh Besar Regency are new politicians and former GAM combatants. However, they are able to build a political and economy network in various ways, including political pressure, which creates integrity problem in the government process of Aceh Besar Regency (Aspinall, E. 2009). This network also dominates the mining exploration of C mineral. They do not hesitate to use violence threat for those who will challenge the mining exploration of C mineral. The violence threat is not only experienced by the organizations in village level but even in the Regent of Aceh Besar.

Aceh's situation cannot be detached from the leadership factor. After the enactment of Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Government, Aceh people have gone through two direct governor elections. The first Aceh Governor Election was held on 11 December 2006, which was won by Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar. The second Aceh Governor Election was held on 9 April 2013, which was won by duo Zaini Abdullah and Muzakkir Manaf. Preparation of the second local leader election was hampered too and several small incidents affected the election.

The people of Aceh Besar have elected their regent directly twice. The first election created a leadership duo of Bukhari Daud and Anwar Ahmad from 2007 to 2012. The second election put Mukhlis Basyah and Samsulrizal to leadership positions in 2012 and will remain until 2017. The information from the field shows that most people in Aceh Besar were very disappointed with the performance of Bukhari Daud and Anwar Ahmad. The regent and deputy regent of Aceh Besar at that time were considered incapable to cooperate with DPR of Aceh Regency. Even without any reason and clear procedure, Bukhari Daud sent his resignation letter to Regional Secretary of Aceh Besar Regency on 5 September 2008. One of the sources said that the action was taken by Bukhari Daud as he felt that his power is highly restricted by the Aceh Party. In general, the leadership in Aceh Besar from 2007 to 2012 has basic weaknesses, particularly in the context of leadership, conflict management and competition.

Bukhari Daud, through his 2012 Performance Activity Report (*Laporan Kinerja Program Kegiatan*), cleared all negative allegations addressed to him. He addressed that from 2007 to 2012, Aceh Besar has received funds to implement

government and development programs for Rp 5.003 trillion. In that five-year period, there was an improvement in the district revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja kabupaten, APBK*) of Aceh Besar with an average of 6.5 per cent annually. He also mentioned several improvements achieved in sectors, such as health, education, agriculture, public works and environment, as well as youth and tourism. However, all those claims were contested by one of the civil society group representatives who mentioned that all of them were actually implemented on the fifth year.

Bureaucracy is equally a vital factor. The bureaucracy of Aceh Besar Regency has problems in running a good, clean government. The reporting result of Kompas in 26 March 2011 declared that Aceh Besar is one of the regencies that experiences bankruptcy. This analysis is due to the teeming bureaucracy, mismanagement and local political pressure. Beside these factors of bankruptcy, the coherence and coordination between offices and government institutions are equally ineffective.

The other important actor in Aceh Besar is the local civil society groups, which is complemented by activists from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Data from the National Unity and Community Protection Office of Aceh Besar Regency shows that in 2011, there were 52 local NGOs and five international NGOs in the area. In general, NGOs at Aceh Besar are divided into two: the critical and the opportunist groups. The latter is usually the group, which has a close relationship with DPRD members of Aceh Besar Regency. Several DPRD members of Aceh Besar Regency even established a NGO to support the outlook and position of their politics—such NGO does not have any influence in improving the quality of government management in Aceh Besar.

Another actor in the civil society group is the community and religious figures who have fairly long history. They are *dayah*-based (*pesantren*) so their role is very vital in creating the community opinion and decision-making in the grassroots level, as well as solving daily community problems. Most community and religious figures joined Aceh's Ulema Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, MPU*) and Sharia Court—both institutions are guaranteed by Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Government. The other community and religious figures are in the Aceh's Adat Council (*Majelis Adat Aceh, MAA*) and Region Education Council (*Aceh Majelis Pendidikan Daerah Aceh, MPD*). Meanwhile, the community figures in grassroots level are *geuchik* and *imam mukim*. The community in Aceh Besar also has customary institution with its own organization, such as sea commander

(*panglima laot*), forest guardian (*petuha seuneubook*), mountain guardian (*pawang gle*) and the master of agriculture, ruling the irrigation water and when the best time to plant (*kejuren blang*). However, they are just figures with limited coverage of influence and are not really able to bridge the communication between community and the nation.

Representative Democracy

General Election

Like other regions in Indonesia, Aceh community also participates in the election for legislative members Local House of Representatives I (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat I, DPR I*), Regional Representatives Councils (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD*), DPRA and DPRK, president and vice president and local leader election. However, Aceh Province has several distinct characteristics: First, unlike other regions in Indonesia, at Aceh Province, there are local political parties that participated in 2009 and will participate in 2014 General Election. Second, there are certain requirements for potential local leader (both requirement for candidacy and individual qualification) as governed in Local Regulation (*Qanun*) Aceh No. 5/2012 on Election of Governor/Deputy Governor, Regent/Deputy Regent and Mayor/Deputy Mayor. For example, each candidate must be able to implement points in Helsinki Agreement. Third, if in other region there is a Regional Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD*), in Aceh, there is an Election Independent Commission (*Komisi Independen Pemilu, KIP*). The number of members and recruitment process of KIP members is different with KPUD.

Political Party

In 2009 legislative election, there were 38 national political parties and six local political parties that participated in Aceh Besar Regency. The six local political parties were Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, Partai Daulat Aceh, Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh, Partai Rakyat Aceh, Partai Aceh and Partai Bersatu Aceh. In 2014, it will be participated by 12 national political parties and three local political parties: Partai Damai Aceh, Partai Nasional Aceh and Partai Aceh.

Electoral District (Daerah Pemilihan, Dapil)

There were five constituencies in Aceh Besar Regency in the 2009 Legislative Election. Dapil 4 was the smallest electoral district, electing six parliament members while Dapil 3 was the biggest electoral district with eight parliament members. Dapil 1 consisted of Lembah Seulawah, Kota Jantho, Seulimuem, Kuta Cot Glie and Indrapuri districts. Dapil 2 included Lhoong, Leupung, Lhoknga, Peukan Bada and Pulo Aceh districts. Dapil 3 consisted of Kuta Malaka, Sukamakmur, Simpang Tiga, Montasik, Ingin Jaya and Blang Bintang districts. Dapil 4 consisted of Mesjid Raya, Baitussalam, Darussalam and Kutabaro districts. Meanwhile, Dapil 5 consisted of Krueng Barona Jaya, Darul Imarah and Darul Kamal districts.

General Election Process

Several fraud cases took place in the 2012 local official election in Aceh Besar. For example, the community found a data manipulation of the national identity card (*kartu tanda penduduk*) to give their support in Lam Sabang Village, Kuta Baro District. However, the community did not have the courage to protest as they were worried that there would be pressure and intimidation. Moreover, many people considered that such manipulation practice was a common practice done during election. Another sample was a PNS who became a succession team of a certain candidate. A representative from National Unity and Community Protection Agency of Aceh Besar Regency conveyed that the involvement of PNS in practical politics was hard to eliminate. The practice of pressuring and intimidation, as well as money politics would often take place. For instance, there was one polling station (*tempat pemungutan suara, TPS*) in Indrapuri District where hundreds of voters only voted for PA while on the same TPS, there were supposedly members and supporters, as well as representatives to vote for other political parties.

There were a number of monitoring institutions, both domestic and foreign, during the 2009 legislative election. One of them was the monitoring institution established by the European Union (EU). However, not many monitoring institutions held their activity in the last 2012 Local Official Election.

Approaching the local official election in 2012, the candidates for regent/deputy regent also held meetings and made a commitment to have a peaceful election. A number of NGOs and youth organizations that joined forces also have encouraged

the process of 2012 election to run peacefully. Several civil society groups have established the Civil Society Network for Peace (*Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil untuk Perdamaian, JMSP*) where they open the Information Center and Study of 2012 local official election of Aceh to ensure the election process runs democratically and without any violence.

The election process for governor/deputy governor of Aceh and local official election in 17 regencies/cities in Aceh were simultaneously held in 9 April 2012 and were characterized by different dynamics. First, the timetable for local official election has been postponed twice from the original schedule defined by Elections Independent Commission of Aceh. Second, Aceh Party (Partai Aceh, PA), which in the beginning decided not to nominate their candidate in this local leader election but in the final moment, finally registered their candidate to participate in the local official election. Third, there was a determination from Constitutional Court that annulled Article 256 of Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh Government, making the incumbent governor, Irwandi Yusuf, to renominate himself. Fourth, Irwandi Yusuf received several threats during his campaign period. Intimidation and threats also took place at the local official election in several other regencies/cities in Aceh. Fifth, the 2012 election of governor/deputy governor of Aceh was only implemented once. The same situation happened to most regencies/cities in Aceh Province except in Langsa City, Aceh Besar Regency, Sabang City, Aceh Barat Daya Regency and Nagan Raya Regency. Sixth, Irwandi Yusuf filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court regarding the election result and it was rejected. The same lawsuit was also filed by several candidates for local official election of regency/city in Aceh, such as Aceh Utara, Aceh Selatan, Aceh Barat and Aceh Tamian but not in Aceh Besar.

The Election Result

The result of 2009 legislative general election provided seven seats in DPRK. This result was a little surprising as PA succeeded in gaining a relatively big vote so it shifted the support of national parties, particularly the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). The seat result from 2009 legislative election in Aceh Besar are as follows: PA had 10 seats, PAN had five seats, Democract Party (Partai Demokrat) had five seats, Aceh Peace Party (Partai Damai Aceh, PDA) had four seats, Golkar had four seats, Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) had four seats, Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB)

had two seats and PPP had one seat. Up to now, PA stands on uniformity attitude and not diversity. This is related to their effort in strengthening the party to shun external aspiration. Although constituency is diverse, the result is the same, where PA dominates and makes the minority group becomes more marginalized.

The 2012 local official election in Aceh Besar Regency cost Rp 29.5 billion. Bio, the voter's data updating system in Aceh Besar Regency, was finalized on 28 December 2011. Aceh Besar Regency has a population of 320,000, of which there were 248,582 fixed voters. There were six teams of registered candidates for the local official election. They were Anwar TM Ali/Haziman R (independent), Harmani Harun/Saifuddin M. Sabi (independent), Rusli Muhammad/Marzuki Yahya (independent), Khairul Huda/Mahya Zakuan (political party coalition), Yusmadi/Amiruddin Usman Daroy (PAN and PDS), Mawardi Ali/ Tgk. Marwan Abdullah (Demokrat and PPP) and Mukhlis Basyah/Samsulrizal (PA). The pair of Mukhlis Basyah/Samsulrizal won the election.

The Community Participation Level in General Election

Community participation in Aceh Besar reached 75 per cent during the 2009 legislative election, while in 2012 local official election, it reached 75.73 per cent out of the 320,000 population and 248,582 fixed voters. In the 2009 presidential election, however, the voter participation level declined although it was still above 50 per cent. This was because Aceh community generally did not have any interest with the national election and was focusing more on the local election.

This study resulted to important findings about the high number of voters who based their choice on the persona factor of a candidate. Considering the context in Aceh Besar as a post-conflict area, it was quite surprising. It was expected that voters in post-conflict areas will base their choice on the ideological dimension. Voters in Aceh Besar, however, tend to consider the persona of the candidate rather than base it on the candidate's ideology and political party programs. As a consequence, the political bond that was created between voters (citizens) and their representatives in parliament was based on patron-client relationship (clientelistic linkage). Political ties in Aceh Besar as a post-conflict and the only region in Indonesia, which has a local political party, did not choose their candidates on the basis of ideology and programs (programmatic linkage).

Executive Institution

In Aceh Province, there are differences in pattern between regency that becomes the base of GAM fighting. These regencies are affected by the policy implementation of area of military operations (*daerah operasi militer*) by the central government. Regencies/cities, which are not the base of GAM, have lower impact of conflict between Aceh and Jakarta. For areas that become the base of GAM like Aceh Timur, Aceh Utara, Bireun and Pidie, the leadership usually comes from PA; thus the influence of PA is very high in the process of making a public policy. If the leadership in that area does not come from PA, the leader usually does not have enough power to detach from the influence of PA.

Aceh Besar Regency is said to be one of the regencies used for the base camp of GAM conflict in the past. It is not surprising that the leader in Aceh Besar Regency from 2007 to 2012, who did not have GAM background, received pressure from PA and was not able to dominate the government administration. Personal leadership issue is also a factor in the weak pattern of leadership in Aceh Besar Regency from 2007 to 2012.

Generally, the leadership in Aceh Besar from 2007 to 2012 was weak because it was lacking in priority scale of clear development. One of the indicators is the performance of regional leadership, which has not been seen in giving a good public service to the community. The other indicator is there is no coordination between regional government institutions in Aceh Besar Regency. In fact, there are frequent frictions between the regent and his deputy regent related to the issue of official promotion in bureaucracy and management of several development projects under the regional government. Moreover, the executive institution in Aceh Besar is not capable in expanding good cooperation with the legislative institution. For example, the legislative followed up the community demand by requesting the regent to provide power distribution in Lambaro Bridge, but the demand has never been fulfilled so the community is disappointed. Most NGOs also think that the leadership in that period is lacking initiative, not eager to take the risk and has poor managerial skill.

One of the factors of the low performance of regional government in Aceh Besar is the overlapping regulation between Law No. 11/2006 on Regional Government and Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government. Bukhari Daud, regent of Aceh Besar from 2007 to 2012, felt that the regional autonomy for Aceh is different with the regional autonomy in other areas in Indonesia—the focus of regional autonomy in Aceh is in the provincial level and not in regency/city level. Therefore,

the regional government of Aceh Province does not have the obligation to provide public service. However, more regents/mayors in Aceh Province, when carrying out their duty, refer to Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government; therefore they are often considered not complying with the regional government in Aceh Province. This overlapping regulation makes the regional government in provincial level and regency/city level put the blame on each other for poor performance of government in fulfilling public service to the community.

The other factor is the strong influence of feudalism culture and pattern of patron-client in the bureaucracy environment. The shift of bureaucracy paradigm from being served by community to serving the community turned out to be only a jargon and not realized in practice. Good governance is, in fact, far from ideal; therefore, it tends to create several problems such as corruption and collusion. In bureaucracy, the entitled management is not based on principle of meritocracy but rather of personal closeness between the superior and subordinate.

Legislative Institution

The level of trust from community of Aceh Besar towards the DPRD performance of Aceh Besar is very low. Currently, it projects an image in the community level that it is an institution, which only chases after facilities, funds and projects. Even the community sees the legislative institution an institution that robs the people authority and does not have any concern to the people since members of the institution are only prioritizing their personal interests. To give a clearer picture, a member of DPRD of Aceh Besar Regency receives aspiration fund (*dana aspirasi*)³⁵ for Rp 600 million every year. This huge amount, however, lacks accountability and transparency mechanism. Such image s frustration and apathy because the community does not have any channel to articulate their disappointment and there is no institution that can be used to perform any changes to make a better parliamentary performance, not only in the local level but also in the national level.

The legislature in Aceh Besar has attempted to run its monitoring function towards the performance of the executive institution. Several problems that often emerge in executive institution are the utilization of official facility that exceeds the platform, a unilateral tender of project and fictitious goods procurement. When these cases were discovered by DPRK, they immediately called the related party and created a special committee as needed. However, the legislative institution in Aceh Besar

³⁵ Constituency fund is popularly known as aspiration fund (*dana aspirasi*).

does not have the specific mechanism to monitor and evaluate the performance of legislative institution. To perform the monitoring function, members of this institution have to use public satisfactory level on government performance as a benchmark. One of the public satisfactory level indicators is whether or not there is a protest/demonstration. They assume that by having many protests, the quality of public service and performance of executive institution is getting worst.

In the context of implementing legislation function, the performance of legislative institution in Aceh Besar is very low as well. The legislative institution only authorizes two regional regulations in 2011—regulation on budget revenue and regional expenditure and regional regulation on retribution. The legislative institution in Aceh Besar also has not replaced several old regional regulations that are no longer compatible with the higher legislations. The result from field observation indicates that the community prefers to meet the legislative members outside the parliament building, which is located at Jantho City and use informal ways. The parliament building in Aceh Besar can be quiet from political activities.

There are several factors that make the performance of monitoring and legislations from legislative member in Aceh Besar weak: First, the very limited education level of the members; second, the limited programs to improve the performance quality of legislative members; third, the developing political culture of patron–client where a legislative member is considered as the patron who gives material contribution to the community while the community is considered as the client who gives their support. One of the sources exposed that there is a difference in the development process between a regions, which has the representative in legislative institution and a region, which does not have any representative in the institution. The development process in the former region would be better than the latter. The existing general election system also makes its representative to focus only on making the public policy in his/her electoral district therefore, it does not answer the problem from the entire community; lastly, the institutionalization of political party, especially local political party is still low. This is related to the transition phase, which is experienced by local political party, particularly PA, from the phase of parliament extra movement (military fight) to parliament movement (fighting in ideology and program). The transition phase is not just faced by the committee of PA but also by the legislative member from PA.

Public Accessibility in the Process of Making a Public Policy

On 13 December 2011, the Regent of Aceh Besar launched the online facility called Aceh Besar Info, which is managed by the Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda) of Aceh Besar. This aid program from UNICEF is expected to be the mode to contain and present the achievement of development result in Aceh Besar through the internet. In addition, the regional government has published other documents from mass media such as newspapers. However, as admitted by the Regent of Aceh Besar for period of 2007 to 2012, the media cannot be fully used. As a result, the process of disseminating information is still using the conventional methods, such as the local leader consultative forum, government ceremony or direct communication when engaging with the community. The regional government also has built a SMS portal to accommodate community complaints related to public service. However, there is an obstacle of small bandwidth, which often causes this program to not function and in the end, the machine is broken due to high volume of incoming complaints.

The regional government has never conducted an empowerment activity on economy, politics and so on. This is experienced by Lam Sabang Village, Kuto Baro District. According to the head of village, Zulmisdar, the Health Office, which came to have counseling on psychology issues only lasted for two years. Many people experienced post-conflict mental disorder in this district.

As has been mentioned earlier, Aceh Besar Regency is currently faced with ecosystem damage issue due to the development policy, which is ignoring the environment preservation. Through the facilitation process from several NGOs such as WALHI and Gempar, the community has tried to reduce the exploitation of natural resources. However, they feel that the regional government does not support their effort, especially with how investments for the regional economic are ran such as having several legal violations in the process of mining permit issuance.

The condition of representative democracy in Aceh Besar in general shows that there is no bonding between the people and regional government to this day. There is no established democracy connection because the ruler is occupied on gaining own authorization to lead the government and the people are focused on criticizing the ruler.

Participatory Democracy

Participative Planning

The local government in Aceh Besar Regency is categorized as the government that is not prioritizing the model of participatory democracy. The reason being, the awareness level and quality of democracy at the community level is still very weak. Even the leader in Aceh Besar gives a negative review on many needs of community that cannot be fulfilled. According to the leader, the bottom-up process and its transparency are not good enough for the community. The community in Aceh Besar is also not a mature community yet, so they are not able to separate their needs and wants, which makes the planning process unrealistic.

According to Bappeda, the participative development planning process has been carried out during the regional government's preparation of the Development Acceleration Program of Disadvantaged Regions and Special (P2DTK) program, which was developed by a team from the district. The team consisted of community representative from several parties. The discussion result was later brought to a forum attended by regional government in order to synchronize the financing. The program implementation was then controlled by a management team (*tim pengelola kegiatan*) whose members are normally community figures.

However, the regional government was unable to implement the good participative planning process. For example, Bappeda never conducted any dissemination to the community in relation with the medium term development plan (*rencana pembangunan jangka menengah*) when the National Planning Consultation (Musrenbang) was held by the community. As a result, the community does not have any guidelines in organizing Musrenbang. At the last stage of the planning process, many proposals from the community, which have been prepared through Musrenbang in grassroots level, were countered by the regional government. The same thing has occurred in the case of environmental management policy—the regional government rarely involves NGOs in the process of making environmental policy. Likewise, the community participation is very limited in the process of making environmental policy and natural resources management. The regional government ignores the input from community related to the illegal logging activity. In order to channel their aspirations and demands, the community prefers to build personal affiliation with political elites.

The weakness of *Musrenbang* is that the planning result will only be funded next year and not in the current year. The biggest problem is when the community's interest is in conflict with the interest of the Regional Working Unit (*Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, SKPD*) during the preparation of Ministry and Institution Work Plan (*Rencana Kerja Kementerian dan Lembaga*) and Regional Development and Work Plan (*Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah*). Often, the community aspirations are lost. Moreover, the budget in *Musrenbang* plan also comes from aspiration fund for legislative member. At this point, it is very likely to create the aspiration, which will produce an 'illegal passenger' in the development planning process. In the village level, *Musrenbang* is more bias to the male group as the activity is held at nighttime. The kinship factor is also influential, which makes several people hesitate to come because they will deal with their senior relatives.

Apart from those two programs, there are other several participative planning programs in Aceh Besar. These are National Program for Community Empowerment (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, PNPM*) and Financial Aid of Peumakmu Gampong (*Bantuan Keuangan Peumakmu Gampong*). Participatory democracy is implemented through PNPM mechanism as stated in Law No. 25/2004 on Planning of Development Plan Meeting. In general, the whole existing development planning process is dealing with challenges to meet technocratic logic and participative idea. This issue is worsened by the obligation for regional government to provide assistance fund worth 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the total budget allocation.

Civil Society Movement

Apart from many 'red plate' NGOs, several NGOs are still consistent in their agenda, which is voicing the community aspiration and criticizing the government policy, such as WALHI and the Anti-Corruption Movement (*Gerakan Anti Korupsi, GERAK*). In addition, there is also a university student movement such as KPAB, which held many demonstrations especially in actions that criticize the government performance and environmental damage issues caused by mining. KPAB is an organization of youth elements, mass organization, youth organization (*organisasi kepemudaan, OKP*). Other associations and cadre organizations that voice issues in Aceh Besar, include the Association of Aceh Besar University Students (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Aceh Besar, HIMAB*) and Communication Forum of Youth Generation of Aceh Rayeuk (*Forum Generasi Muda Aceh Rayeuk, Fokus Gempar*).

The concrete effort done by the civil society in order to advocate the community demand in Aceh Besar is by rejecting the opening of a mining site in Lampanah Lengah. Mass involvement in the action consists of Masyarakat Mukim Lampanah Lengah, Lhoong, Lhoknga, Aceh Besar Youth League (*Pengurus Besar Ikatan Pemuda Aceh Besar, PB IPAR*), *Fokus Gempar* (*Forum Generasi Muda Aceh Rayeuk*, Communication Forum of Youth Generation of Aceh Rayeuk), Indonesian Islamic Student (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII), KPAB, Participatory Policy Coalition (*Koalisi Kebijakan Partisipatif, KKP*), the Presidency Student (*Presiden Mahasiswa, Presma*) Serambi Mekkah, Aceh Besar Student Association of Universitas Serambi Mekah (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Aceh Besar Universitas Serambi Mekah, IKAMAB USM*), Pancasila's Student (*Mahasiswa Pancasila, MAPANCAS*), Pancasila University Students, Lhoong Society Committee (*Komite Masyarakat Lhoong, KML*), Joint-Care Forum for Gampong (*Forum Bersama Peduli Gampong, Forbes PG*), *Rabitah Thaliban Aceh Besar, (RTA)*, Indonesian Student Press Association (Perhimpunan Pers Mahasiswa Indonesia, PPMI), Muslim Students' Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, HMI*), Central Board Council Of Indonesia Mosque Youth Assembly (*Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia, BKPRMI*) and Student Association of Aceh Besar (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Aceh Besar, HIMAB*).

For these civil society groups, working on the political aspect of environmental issue is quite challenging. More often, political issues are covered under the general environmental issues. These groups also involve discussion with stakeholders such as deputy regent, representative of related offices NGOs and community figures.

Related to the performance of government of Aceh Besar Regency in 2007–2012, which had a status of 'failure without exception', 13 NGOs in KPAB held their protest at Ingin Jaya Regency on 27 December 2011. This action proposed four demands related to the realization of community welfare and environmental security for the community life in Aceh Besar:

1. Urge KPK to conduct a thorough investigation on gratification of Aceh Besar Regency Government. The confession of Aceh Besar regent related to the comparative study fully was funded by LCI.
2. Terminate mining activity in Lhoong and immediately conduct reclamation of the former mining site of LSM.
3. Demand the return of Lhoknga community land rights. The regional government policy that claims the community land as a state land cannot be proven legitimately.

4. Reject strictly the opening of mining site in Lampanah Leungah and condemn all efforts to influence the community for the interest of certain groups.

Other organizations, such as HIMAB, often criticize and evaluate the performance of the regional government. HIMAB has a dialog with the Head of Education Office in relation to the honorarium teacher and external contract teacher. The same activity is done by HMI and Indonesian National Youth Council (*Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI*). Several social movements driven by NGOs and activists are quite significant in building the community critical awareness, such as Joint-Care for Gampong (*Forum Peduli Gampong, FPG*). This organization once attempted to initiate the village group like *tuha peut* to function in a better way. Due to negative response from the regional government, FPG currently tries to implement the program independently. One of the NGOs in Aceh Besar, Saree School, has made a community communication forum on environmental management in Saree. According to them, the response from Regional Leadership Consultative Councils (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah Muspida*) and Sub-district Consultative Leadership (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan, Muspika*) is positive but there is no further action to follow up the meeting.

The structure of custom and religious institution still has a role in doing social movement in Aceh Besar. Aceh Besar is a region that is influenced by a custom structure thus, when the state has failed in securing their welfare, the custom and religious institutions are expected to hold an advocacy so the state is forced to fulfill the community rights.

With the criticisms towards the nation and capital owners, the civil society groups are faced with a dilemma. The regional government sometimes gives regular financial assistance to civil society organizations. The amount of budget allocation often depends on the lobbying of organizations leaders with the regional government. On the other hand, the regional government also considers the support factor when they give the budget allocation. For example, KNPI once received big financial assistance from the regional government, which ranged from Rp. 60 million up to Rp. 80 million for a year. PII has once received allocation of Rp. 50 million, while HIMAB, which often criticizes the regional government, once received an allocation of approximately Rp. 20 million.

Types and Methods of Raising Community Participation

The social movement that arises is more of an agenda setting raised by social transformation actors, especially NGOs and university students. The social movement is in the form of motion of no confidence, protests and distribution of pamphlets and leaflets on the government's poor performance. The protest movement is gathered by a group of activists, university students and community. Initially, it was conducted by discussion in *warung kopi* (coffee shop/roadside stall) and *meunasah* (village *musholla*) with village heads and youth people. From that point on, half of the community started to raise their awareness and formal organization, consisted of community leaders, was established.

On the issue of women participation, Aceh Besar lacks women leaders. The Head of Women Empowerment and Child Protection Agency, which is normally held by a woman, is actually held by a man. There is only one female member of DPRK who comes from Golkar Party. Some of the reasons are the community's perception and culture that still has distrust on the female capacity to lead and the masculinity perception in politics. The dominant community understanding is that women are directed to administer domestic affairs. As a result, there is only one seat in DPRK for women representation. It is also difficult to propose an aspiration related to needs in gender perspective.

However, the implementation of *Musrenbang* is relatively successful in encouraging women participation. *Musrenbang* in Lhok Nga District, for example, encourages women to be able to manage and empower the community. Women who attend the meeting mostly are not because they are invited, but they want to address their aspiration. Normally, their aspiration is related to the non-physical facility, such as health and education. This is in the form of integrated health post (*pos pelayanan terpadu/posyandu and posyandu plus*), accompanied with childcare (*tempat penitipan anak*) and early childhood education (*pendidikan anak usia dini*) or recommendations to allocate transportation budget to the *posyandu* counselor. These women address their aspirations related to women savings and loans (*simpan pinjam perempuan*) of PNPM. Besides domestic issues, women in Nusa Village, in general, also conduct supervision and safeguarding.

Several attempts to encourage women involvement in public space are also conducted through the cooperation with international NGOs. The Asia Foundation, GeRAK Aceh, and GeRAK Aceh Besar initiated the establishment of Commitment Charter for Women Group Involvement in budget plan and allocation in December 2010. This charter is signed by the Head of Bappeda Aceh Besar,

Zulkifli Rasyid, Head of Women Empowerment and Child Protection Agency of Aceh Besar, Burhanuddin and District Head of Simpang Tiga, Arifin Abdullah. Nevertheless, the charter and moral commitment tend to be easily forgotten and cannot make a quite strong basis to conduct pressure for the related institution to implement it.

Table 5.1 Types and Methods of Raising the Community Participation in Aceh Besar

Between below method of raising the community participation, which one has ever been used in the last 12 months?	Frequency		
	Never	1-3 times	More than 3x
Public Information			
Distribution of printed material (leaflet, newsletter, etc) to the public ³⁶	V		
Regular meeting of mass media ³⁷	V		
Presentation and exhibition ³⁸		V	
The routine program in local mass media	V		
Computer application (website, email, etc) ³⁹		V	
Public Consultation			
Hearing meeting ⁴⁰	v		

³⁶ In 2010-2011, there was a publication called *Warta Aceh Besar* but it only went as far as its launching time. There was no participation from the community and afterwards, it stopped. The fund was spent on their operations.

³⁷ Usually, the meeting between the government and mass media is more of a ceremonial activity. Activities, such as development plan meeting or other government activity, has never been shared with the media thus, the saying that the government is 'closed'.

³⁸ Once a year, the regency government organizes an exhibition, which in nature is ceremonial, held in Jantho. The exhibition provides promotion of regional potential. However, the theme is monotonous, difficult to reach, the information to public is not distributed extensively, which make the exhibition limited.

³⁹ In 2010, the regency government put up a website, SIGAB, but did not run well and the fund was instead spent for their operations. In 2011, another website was formed, Aceh Besar Info, funded by UNESCO but the content seemed to be for internal consumption as information access can only be installed in the computer. Moreover, there were no information updates.

⁴⁰ The discussion on *qanun* draft (*raqan*) of ABPK was never conducted with the community's participation or through a hearing. Previously, Gerak once conducted a training to the member of DPRK to build a joint *raqan* discussion process. There is a Government Regulation No. 32/2011 on Grant and Social Fund Donation where the council member has the aspiration fund, but often, the program plans are conducted immediately, which makes the regulation ineffective. Now the process is through ADG with a single bank account.

The community forum (Development Plan Meeting and village meeting)			v
The community survey	v		
Public Decision-making			
The discussion group and working group	V		
Public workshop ⁴¹		V	
Cooperation in the Implementation			
The partnership of government –private sector or government-civil society			v

Source: International IDEA 2011

Summary and Recommendation

Summary

The main characteristics of local politics in Aceh Besar Regency in the last couple of years can be seen from the previous discussion. It generally manifests the weak local leadership in managing the existing decentralization and democratization. This is implied in the weak performance of regional government in providing basic public service. There is also the process of political power struggle in the legislative institution between the ‘local’ and the ‘national’ level. The first relies on the military experience in the field while the second relies on the experience in building negotiation and compromises in the politics of diplomacy. The realization of bureaucracy reformation has yet to be achieved; thus, the sectoral and weak bureaucracy characteristic, as well as the feudalism and paternalism culture, have not been changed.

In the scope of community, many organizations are established by the civil society that reaches wider sectors such as environment and governance as well as public service. These organizations also have different movement strategies. Several organizations are identified with ‘red plate’⁴² NGOs but quite many are consistent by keeping their distance with the state and keen in pursuing advocacy of the people’s aspiration. However, one thing that is very obvious is the lack of coordination among civil society organizations thus, a comprehensive social movement to change the situation is difficult to establish. This condition, however,

⁴¹The workshops held by the government tend to be closed. Usually the workshop participant is a kin or has a close relationship with the government. Other than getting an incentive, the workshop does not have other merits. In 2011, OKP was never invited in any workshop event, discussion, development plan meeting or other government events. Usually, the organization that is considered as vocal and critical, do not get the invitation to attend to any activity hosted by the government.

⁴² NGO that is established by the government

makes the democracy in Aceh Besar – in the minimum procedural definition – run better from time to time in terms of guaranteed political rights, free and fair dispute, and assurance of civil freedom.

The democracy in Aceh Besar is unable to produce an effective government so democracy in the minimum procedural definition cannot significantly improve its social welfare. The development direction in Aceh Besar is not guided, whether it focuses on agriculture, maritime or other sectors. Meanwhile, there has never been any new concept, either toward the environment management issue – where Aceh Besar joined in the concession region of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) – or the issue related with the ill-managed maritime potential. The good governance issue, mainly related to the transparency and accountability issue, is still the critical issue faced by Aceh Besar.

The applicable patterns in the representative democracy in Aceh Besar can be specifically identified. One of the prominent patterns is the community's participation in formal democracy institutions such as general election, which is held freely and fairly. This obviously becomes an important note considering Aceh Besar is an area with a very sensitive conflict in the past. The other pattern is the client-based politics between the people and its representative—on who they will sit in the executive or legislative agency. Most communities in Aceh Besar rely more to personal relations when they articulate their interests. They prefer to choose informal channels rather than the formal ones, such as the parliament or political parties. In this client-based mechanism, the community will elect a representative who directly and concretely gives compensation in the form of money and goods to them. In return, representatives only fight for the aspiration of voters who were proven to have elected them. With the other community apathetic towards politics, the bonding between people and its representative in the government remain weak. In this context, many public policies produced under the elite politics are entirely different from the demand of the people.

Meanwhile, in the context of participatory democracy, there are some movements. First, there are various institutions that can do participatory development planning process. Second, the participation level of marginal groups, like women, in the process of making public policy is getting higher. Third, the participatory development planning process is often giving in to the interest of the elites, which legitimatises the elites to draft public policies that are oriented to their own interests. Fourth, it is still related to the previous point, the participatory process in the bottom level is highly political and followed by the administrative and

technocratic procedure. Such characteristics make the in-depth process of democracy in Aceh Besar run although it is far from the ideal.

The practice and quality of democracy in Aceh Besar is highly determined by several factors: First is the fact that Aceh Besar as a post-conflict region (the conflict between Aceh and Jakarta in the past); second, the reconstruction and rehabilitation process after the tsunami, which brought paradigm shift and new way of thinking, as well as attitude of the people; and third, the struggle between values and norms of old socio-religious view against new interpretations in the context of enforcing Islam *sharia*. This includes the shift of trust level of the community against political actors and traditional institutions, such as customs and religion.

Recommendation

There are several approaches that can be done by all levels to establish democracy in Aceh Besar. A number of steps can be taken immediately in one year, while others can be in the medium term, which is five years ahead. Those related to culture and paradigm change can be done in the period of more than five years.

The following are the steps that should be done immediately:

The leadership in Aceh Besar must immediately conduct a dialog with the people of Aceh Besar through its representative from civil society movement to formulate the direction and target of development within one year. The elected official of Aceh Besar from 2012 local election should set the momentum to strengthen the local leadership that is able to accommodate the aspiration of the people.

The people's representative in the legislative should immediately make a regional policy legislation (*program legislasi daerah/prolegda*) to set the completion target of regional regulation (*qanun*) that can respond concretely to the needs of the people, especially to improve infrastructures, education and health quality, environment-friendly forest mining management and optimization of fishery resource potential. Moreover, such supervision has to be improved to encourage transparent and accountable governance.

The people's representative should formulate a concrete program and focus on the issues of community in Aceh Besar. The implementation of legislative election in 2014 should boost the momentum to strengthen the relation between the people and policy, so the political bonding between the people and its representative can shift from client-based to program-based political bonding.

The regional government should conduct information dissemination related to the work plan budget (*rencana kerja anggaran*) and medium and long term development plan (*rencana pembangunan jangka panjang*) before the Musrembang is held. This is to let the community have the knowledge towards national directive and to synchronise the result of *Musrembang* in village level and national development plan.

The civil society should encourage a more participatory development planning process. What also needs to be done is to safeguard the results of planning process against technocratic process. On the other hand, the regional government must introduce innovation to the planning process so it is not limited to the rationale of procedural-administrative.

With the approaching 2014 election, KIP of Aceh Besar Regency and the civil society should hold a short course for voters so they are able to choose a leader who complements the people's aspiration.

While in the medium term, below are the steps that need to be done:

The government, along with the civil society, needs to formulate the political contract, which contains directive and target of development in Aceh Besar for the next five years. To arrange the political contract, a discourse on directive and target of development needs to be extended through several media, both formal and informal.

The regional government needs to optimize the system that guarantees the existing information transparency to public through mass media and online media. The regional government must immediately decide and publish the standard procedure on public service.

The legislative institution needs to formulate the clear supervision instrument and its procedure. The members of legislative institution also need to continuously improve their individual competence.

The executive, legislative and civil society need to build several networks of policy in order to strengthen the relation between the people and public policy in Aceh Besar, especially in strategic sectors, such as infrastructure, education, health, mining, forestry and fishery.

KIP of Aceh Besar Regency, with the support of civil society, should improve the quality of organizing better election (legislative or executive) in all levels. Moreover,

it also needs to improve its performance to guarantee the political rights of each citizen; for example, building a standard and improved system so that all voters can be registered in the election.

The regional government has to revitalize and strengthen the custom institution that has gender equality perspective in order to strengthen the participation of marginal groups in the development planning process in Aceh Besar. Furthermore, all parties need to encourage the involvement of custom institution in the process of making a public policy.

The regional government and international institutions should encourage the role of NGOs to regain the social energy needed for social change such as improving the quality of NGO role in the in-depth process of democracy in the community.

The civil society needs to strengthen the social audit mechanism against the executive and legislative institutions in order to reduce the possibility of authority abuse and strengthen the integrity in government implementing bodies.

The civil society must build the regulation that enables the community to control and evaluate the action from the official government related to Islamic *sharia* violation.

While for the long term, the following are several approaches that can be performed by all stakeholders in Aceh Besar:

The government, along with the civil society, should formulate a blueprint of development in Aceh Besar for the next 20 years. This becomes very vital to be implemented in order to guarantee the continuity of development direction and target inter-leadership period in the future.

The political party has to improve the political institutionalization process. The political party, for example, has to regenerate to produce competent and committed candidates who have full integrity. In a wider context, the political party needs to give political education to guarantee the political rights of each citizen, minimize the political apathy and improve the community participation in the process of making a public policy.

The central government, provincial and regency government need to encourage the synchronization and synergy of the existing legislations in order to minimize the overlapping of regulation and change the old paradigm in the bureaucracy such as the sectoral way of working. With the support of civil society, they also need to encourage the reformation process in the bureaucracy to improve public service.

International institutions need to encourage the quality improvement of organizations that represent the civil society so the ideal character of civil society organizations can be established, which is independent, with strong sense of volunteerism, democracy values and integrity.

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Kupang

*Hasrul Hanif, Rudi Robiand Laurensius P. Sayrani*⁴³

Kupang City, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) province is one of the vital regions for study as the local democracy in this region is very dynamic. Not only because of the social heterogeneity but because this city also shows that the democracy practice, whether in the frame of representative or substantive, has a strong echo and is heard widely in this city.

Therefore, the assessment of local democracy implementation in Kupang City is an interesting subject. The assessment is focused on several important aspects, with least two main aspects: Representative democracy that tends to be a procedural system and participatory democracy that looks more at the substantial side. The instrument based on these two aspects then becomes the indicator to see the strain of local democracy.

The report begins with the brief history of politics and government, population, structure and social relation, regional economy and finance status up to human development to see the basic picture of democracy in Kupang City. It is followed by the observation of the democracy institution, representation, general election, government implementation, value and participation level of the civil society to political system and actors that play important roles in politics and local democracy.

Regional Context

History and Geographical Condition

Kupang City is the capital city of NTT Province. In the beginning, it was a kingdom claimed as a Dutch *openholfd* and then expanded to become a *haminte*. After

⁴³ Research and report drafting of this chapter is performed by Rudi Rohi, a lecturer in Universitas Nusa Cendana and Laurensius P. Sayrani, a NGO activist from Bengkulu APPek, with the supervision and adaptation by Hasrul Hanif.

Indonesia gained its independence, Kupang transformed into a district city and then to administrative city (kotif) in 1978 before the last transformation to city in 1996.

The area of Kupang City is 165.34 km² located at 10°36'14"- 10°39'58" South Latitude and 123°32'23"-123°37'01" East Longitude (Spatial Office 2011; BPS Kupang City 2010). Kupang City consists of six districts: Oebobo, Kelapa Lima, Maulafa, Alak, Kota Raja and Kota Lama. The city is accessible by land, sea and air transport. Land transportation is normally the major option. This is shown by the ratio of vehicle against the population where the number of motor vehicles reached 56,931 units against a population of 336,239. The closest choice besides land transportation is by sea but the distance to the downtown is quite far; for example, Tenau Harbor and Bolok Crossing.

In 2010, the number of sea transport users registered in the Administration Office of Tenau Harbor was 254,518 passengers. The average ticket price was not more than Rp.350,000. Over the same period, there were 489,246 passengers for the air transport registered in El Tari Airport in Kupang (BPS Kupang City 2011).

With the existing geographical condition, the mobility within the city tends to be easy and fast. The overlay of the city is not really extensive and is supported by adequate transportation facilities and infrastructure, which enables high mobility of the people. The distance and travel time is actually a very significant asset for Kupang City in organizing direct democracy programs, such as general election, where the distribution of ballots can be easy and timely, including the general election monitoring, voter participation and so on.

The area of Kupang City according to regional spatial plan (ruang tata ruang wilayah, RTRW) is governed under Local Regulation No. 12/2011, classified into seven city areas urban zoning (bagian wilayah kota), by utilizing 145.33 km² (87.9 per cent) of land. The biggest utilization is for housing (37.25 per cent) and green open areas and conservation areas (33.42 per cent). While Kupang City has the biggest income from service and trade sector, the land utilization to support these sectors do not make it as a priority. Only 3.51 per cent of land is allotted for trade and service, combines with 1 per cent for tourism. Meanwhile, agropolitan development is only allocated with 12.39 per cent of land. Land utilization percentage for offices, on the other hand, is not determined or estimated. The remaining 20.01 km² is a marine area, beach coast and main roads among others (see Table 4.1).

Table 6.1 Land Utilization of Kupang City, 2011

No	Utilization	Ha		%
1	Housing	5,413.17	54.13	37.25
2	Government and Private Office	-	-	-
3	Trade, Service and Mix	510.45	5.10	3.51
4	Education Facility	202.75	2.03	1.40
5	Health Facility	31.32	0.31	0.22
6	Worship Facility	31.48	0.31	0.22
7	Cemetery	32.44	0.32	0.22
8	Green Open Area and Conservation	4,857.06	48.57	33.42
9	Tourism	145.17	1.45	1.00
10	Agriculture	316.66	3.17	2.18
11	Warehouse	41.34	0.41	0.28
12	Strategy of Minapolitan	52.25	0.52	0.36
13	Dam and Absorption	1,098.28	10.98	7.56
14	Strategy of Agropolitan	1,800.45	18.00	12.39
Total		14,532.81	145.33	87.90















Source: Processed Data based on Local Regulation of Kupang No. 12/2011 on Urban Spatial Plan of Kupang

Certainly, the cluster classification of land utilization is more oriented to the development of local economy. Although it is obvious from the welfare aspect that local democracy runs on the substantial side, the city government is not going to that direction. This is because the distribution for land utilization does not support the development in trade sector, which becomes an important stream for regional revenue. The regional revenue through service sector is discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

Population, Social Structure and Social Relationship

The current population of Kupang City is 336.239, which consists of 172,626 male and 163,613 female. The growth rate is between 1 per cent to 3 per cent and the density is 2,034 people per km² (BPS Kota Kupang 2010). The population of Kupang City is spread out in Oebobo District (79,675 people) Maulafa (65,851 people), Kelapa Lima (61,411 people), Alak (51,230 people), Kota Raja (47,876 people) and Kota Lama (30,196 people). Based on the ethnicity, Kupang is inhabited by Timorese with the biggest percentage (31.58 per cent), Rote (17.70 per cent), Flores (13.85 per cent), Sabu (12.34 per cent), Javanese (6.32 per cent) and Alor (5.80 per cent) (see Table 4.2.).

Table 6.2 2011 Population Composition per Ethnic Group

No	Ethnic Group	Number	
		People	Percentage
1	Timor	106,184	
2	Rote	59,520	
3	Flores	46,578	
4	Sabu	41,486	
5	Java	21,263	
6	Alor	19,504	
7	Sulawesi	10,256	
8	Sumba	9,346	
9	Ambon	5,624	
10	Sumatera	2,810	
11	Bali	2,238	
12	China	2,173	
13	Bima and Lombok	1,740	
14	Other Ethnic (< 1,000)	7,517	
Total		336,239	100.00

Source: Processed data based on 2010 BPS Census of Kupang

According to census data of BPS Kupang City (2010), 61.33 per cent of the population is Christian, followed by Catholics (23.16 per cent), Muslims (14.30 per cent), Hindus (1.07 per cent) and Buddhists (0.14 per cent). If the religion composition is connected to the ethnicity, then the majority of the population of Timor, Rote, Sabu, Alor and Sumba are Christians, while the majority of Flores is Catholic. Only a few of these ethnic groups are Muslim.

The population from 2000 to 2011 has grown by 41.73 per cent or a total of 98,966 people, consisted of 48.46 per cent male and 51.54 per cent female. In 2000, the population of Kupang City remained at 237,231 but it increased to 275,066 in 2006 and further grew in 2011 reaching 414,549. The population growth rate in the last 10 years was 3.53 per cent per year (Pos Kupang 2011; BPS Kupang City 2000-2011; Population Office of Kupang City 2011).


If the growth rate is stable in the next decade, it is estimated that the population of Kupang City will add to at least 34,496 people. The increase is highly affected by the number of migration compared to birth rate, which has a sharp difference. In 2010, the rate of migration into the area was 92.15 per cent (30,968 people)

after reducing migration from the outside area . While the birth rate in the same year was only 7.85 per cent (2,649 people) (BPS Kupang City 2010).

Table 6.3 Population Growth Number According to Migration and Birth, 2010

Migration				Birth	
In		Out			
M	F	M	F	M	F
25,752	22,640	8,441	9,280	1,519	1,120
48,392		17,721		2,639 (7.85%)	
30,671 (92.15%)					

Figure 6.1. Gender Comparison of Population Growth



Source: BPS Kupang City 2010

The population proportion for age below 15 years old was 27.73 per cent (93,239 people), consisted of 52.97 per cent male and 47.12 per cent female. Meanwhile, the population for age above 65 years was 2.47 per cent (8,295 people), consisted of 49.07 per cent male and 50.93 per cent female⁴⁵.

Social and Economy Basis

Ethnic and religious plurality in Kupang City are a treasure and a potential of local democracy. However, at the same time, they are quite a serious threat of social segregation. The plurality becomes the catalyst to develop local democracy when primordial gaps are not used to consolidate politics and distribute the allocation of resources. Problems will appear if in the direct regional election (*pilkada*), the

⁴⁵ There is a slight difference of population composition between BPS data and the Office of Population and Civil Registration of Kupang City. BPS Kupang City only succeeded in recording the growth rate and population number up to 2011 based on the last census in 2010. While the Office of Kupang City has their own report based on Population Administration Information System (Sistem Informasi Administrasi Kependudukan, SIAK) that recorded the additional population number up to 2011. The population data in this description uses both combination.

segmentation of voters is changed to segmentation of conflict (actor). This potential will be actualized if the social segregation, both ethnically and religiously, is allowed to continue on wider population, where growth is relatively rapid through migration like in Kupang City.

The widening of social segregation is equal to democracy degradation. As democracy is consolidated within the primordialism spirit, it is impossible to give room for competing freely, equally and openly. If the primordialism classification is allowed to compete openly, then the potential conflict in each local democracy will be unavoidable.






Geertz (1963) found that the solidarity in primordial group generates a fanaticism in the form of strong loyalty to a group and its members, as well as highly honors the cultural value of the group. This in turn strengthens the integration of the group but at the same time, it can facilitate a conflict with other primordial group.

Although the population composition is very diverse where there are more than 17 ethnic groups, the daily relationship works without any significant conflict. This is because the communication among group or individual ethnics is closely intertwined by the use of Indonesian as the language between ethnics. The language usage in communication is done in a highly contextual manner as a mother language (ethnic). Most of them usually communicate in their mother language within the same ethnic group.

There are conflict cases, however, when the model of electoral democracy is offered openly by a political system and the losing party does not often accept the negative result; then the sentiment of ethnic and religion becomes strong.

Having a big number is also not a guarantee that such social group will be dominant in every aspect, including the religious identity. This can be seen from several indications: First, in political sector, the head and secretary from 38 political parties in city level is dominated by Timorese (27.6 per cent), Flores (25 per cent) and Rote (19.7 per cent) (see Table 4.5). However, the composition of 30 members of DPRD Kupang City for period of 2009–2014 –aside from only one person from PPD that is female – is the contrast to the ethnic groups in the political party management. Most ethnic backgrounds come from Rote (26.7 per cent), Sabu (23.3 per cent), and Timor (23.3 per cent). The remaining ethnics are Flores (13.3 per cent) and Sumba–Kisar (13.3 per cent) (KPUD Kupang City 2009).

Table 6.4 2011 Leader of Political Party per Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	Total		
	M	F	Percentage
Timor	21	-	 27.6
Flores	19	-	 25.0
Rote	15	-	 19.7
Sabu	11	-	 14.5
Sumba, Ambon/ Kisar, Alor and Java	10	-	 13.2
Total	76		100

Source: Diagram based on 2011 *Kesbangpol* Data of Kupang

From the religion side, DPRD members only consists of Christians, Catholics and Muslims. Christians dominate with **73.3** per cent of the composition, followed by Catholics for **20** per cent and Muslims for **6.7** per cent. This represents the same religious composition in Kupang City.

Second, the government sector acts as the maker or at least influence the decision-making process in bureaucracy. The history of Kupang City's leadership from the past until the direct general election has never put a mayor or deputy mayor from Timorese although the majority of the population is Timorese. Before the direct local leader election, the executive position of Kupang City is held by a leader from Rote and Kisar (Ambon).

During the direct local official election, the elected officials were again not from Timorese but from Rote (mayor) and Flores (deputy mayor). The similar situation applies in bureaucracy officials in the high level. The number of Echelon IIA officer or people who met the requirement of ranks to serve in that position and Echelon IIB who comes from Timor is **25** per cent and **13.51** per cent respectively, which is a bit less compared to Rote at **50** per cent and **27.03** per cent. Even if it is combined in total, Echelon I to IV officers are still dominated by Rote for **26.2** per cent from total **1,111** existing echelons (**16.07** per cent), of which the total personnel numbered to **6,912** people.

Table 6.5 2011 Echelon per Ethnic Group

Echelon	%				
	Rote	Timor	Flores	Sabu	Other Ethnic > 1
IIA	50.00	25.00	0.00	25.00	0.00
IIB	27.03	13.51	13.51	13.51	32.43
IIIA	35.59	11.86	25.42	11.86	15.25
IIIB	28.57	14.29	18.25	14.29	24.60
IVA	24.66	19.46	16.78	14.09	25.00
IVB	25.95	21.45	15.92	16.96	19.72
Total	26.2	18.8	17.01	14.8	23.22

Source: Regional Employment Agency (*Badan Kepegawaian Daerah*, BKD) Kupang 2011

Christians in echelon ranks dominate in the local government of Kupang at 72.19 per cent. The next position is filled with Catholics (19.44 per cent), Muslims (7.56 per cent) and Hindus (0.81 per cent). Following the list of rank order, other than the secretary of Kupang City who formally holds Echelon IIA position, some people has met the rank requirement to serve the echelon positions as the highest bureaucracy in the local government. All of them are Christians. The domination continues to Echelon IIB (70.27 per cent), IIIA (77.97 per cent), IIIB (68.25 per cent), IVA (70.47 per cent) and IVB (76.12 per cent). This is probably because the majority of Timor, Rote, Sabu, Sumba, Alor and other ethnics are Christians like Flores where the majority is Catholic or Bali, with Hindu (see Table 4.7).

Table 6.6 2011 Echelon per Religion


Echelon	%			
	Christian	Catholic	Islam	Hindu
IIA	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
IIB	70.27	18.92	8.11	2.70
IIIA	77.97	15.25	6.78	0.00
IIIB	68.25	23.02	7.94	0.79
IVA	70.47	20.97	7.72	0.84
IVB	76.12	15.92	7.27	0.69
Total	72.19	19.44	7.56	0.81

Source: BKD Kupang 2011

Third, the economy sector where domination of Chinese holds an important role. None of this ethnic group is listed in the poverty list of Kupang City, which shows the domination on economic wealth. There are several possibilities related to this

factor: There is indeed no poor Chinese or because they are using the identity of native inhabitants for filling the need of population registration. On the contrary, families with Timor background (41.22 per cent) and Rote (21.53 per cent) are the poorest ethnic groups among all poor families in Kupang City. BPS of Kupang City (2011) indicates the number of poor families reached 14,995. The poverty data according to BPS is slightly different with the regional coordinator data of seven National Program for Community Empowerment (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, PNPM Mandiri) in NTT. According to PNPM Mandiri NTT (City Government of Kupang 2011), the number of poor families in Kupang City is 19,393 families or 76,403 people. This is in line with the population composition that is dominated by Timor and Rote.

Figure 6.2 Poverty Rate per Ethnic Group, 2011



Source: BPS Kupang 2011

The control of economy by Chinese and several ethnics outside NTT, together with the fall of ethnic Timor, Rote, Sabu, Alor and several local ethnics to poverty, is in contrast with the political and governmental sector. This reality illustrates how local democracy is still confined in the sectoral primordialism. The emerging competition space as a democracy consequence in the local level creates an imbalance competition. The backwardness of human development in Kupang City is the main cause for low capability of human resources in managing the democracy to reach the goal of joint prosperity.

Looking at the economic basis, Kupang City has several industries that include agriculture as the primary sector (6.72 per cent), mining and excavation, industrial, electricity, water and construction as secondary sector (12.46 per cent) and trade, transportation and communication, finance and services as tertiary sector (80.82 per cent). Most of the people work in secondary and tertiary sectors due to the narrowing number of agricultural fields.

Moreover, the dynamics of city life attract many citizens to work in trade and service sector. On that condition, the GDP of Kupang City is Rp. **4.682** trillion where the biggest contribution comes from trade and restaurant business for **28.63** per cent and the service sector for **26.97** per cent (BPS Kupang City 2010).

Trade and service sector, which dominated the Kupang economy over the last three years, is driven by micro, small and medium business (*usaha mikro, kecil dan menengah* UMKM) and micro, small and medium industry (*industri mikro, kecil dan menengah*, IMKM) instead of big capital investments. In 2011, IMKM held the majority with **99.79** per cent of the market. IMKM has **90.52** per cent share while UMKM has **9.27** per cent. Calculating the number in every one thousand people, there are **28.66** micro, small and medium business per thousand people or in ratio, it is around **0.029**. Based on this figure, the distributed revenue for men are bigger (**79.6** per cent) than women (**20.4** per cent). The big scale of economy investment sector is only **0.21** per cent of investors with total amount in Rupiah for **26.8** per cent. Of this, the domestic direct investment (*penanaman modal dalam negeri*) is **95.8** per cent and foreign investment (*penanaman modal asing*) is **4.2** per cent⁴⁶.

The economic pattern, which forms the community livelihood, is almost proportional to the reduction of land tenure by feudalism. This is seen from the high development rate, which is indicated by the percentage of micro, small and medium economy in wood (furniture) and block (*batako*) as the fast-growing sector (**22.28** per cent). Included in this sector is the garage/workshop business, which becomes an indicator of increasing damage and need for spare parts for land transportation.

Printing and photocopying business constitutes **19.71** per cent, followed by restaurant, hotel, car rental, internet, cellular phone–telephone credit voucher counter and others (**15.12** per cent), convection–screen printing, **13.10** per cent) and food and beverages (**11.42** per cent). The current economy has created a workforce that leans more to service sector (**37.03** per cent) and trade (**30.41** per cent).

This reality is confirmed by the number of employed workers (**52.24** per cent) and individual businesses (**23.48** per cent). The unemployment rate is **12.58** per cent, Unemployment is commonly seen on age ranging from **18–50** years old, which made up more than half (**59.84** per cent) of the total labor force according to the Labor Force Survey for 2010.

⁴⁶ <http://beritadaerah.com>

The unemployment rate impacts the poverty line. The dependency ratio⁴⁷ based on National Socioeconomics Survey (*Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, Susenas*) in the last three years has been fluctuating. In 2008, it was 50.28 per cent before it decreased in 2009 to 43.97 per cent. It increased again to 44.09 per cent in 2010. Thus, there were 14,995 urban poor families equivalent to 22.72 per cent of the population (BPS Kupang City 2011; City Government of Kupang 2011). Poverty data based on gender and age classification were not available to complete this report.

The poverty distribution is a socioeconomics character mostly seen in the suburb area. This is indicated by the highest poverty percentage, which is experienced by suburb sub-districts, such as Lasiana (29.93 per cent) and Oesapa (31.99 per cent). Both sub-districts serve as the main entrance for migration from areas surrounding Kupang City in Timor plain.

The mobilization of population at the borderline to seek jobs in the city has resulted in the abandonment of numerous economic activities in the village, especially agriculture and husbandry. The people choose to work in the city rather than continue working for the village economy. Although there is no data regarding the number of people who live in the village and work in the city, it is easy to see a picture merely through observation.

The potential of land dispute in Kupang City is actually high, including the issue in borderline with Kupang Regency, due to the feudal and agrarian culture of the community. However, the strong assimilation and acculturation has shifted from feudalism, where the landlord who inherits the land ownership no longer dominates the land tenure.

The migration of various ethnic groups becomes the main factor of reduction in land domination by a landlord. However, it does not mean that the city is free from land conflict. The BPN data of Kupang City records at least 84 cases from 2009 to 2012. At least 19 cases (22.62 per cent) were brought by the dispute party to the court, where 11 cases has earned resolution, three were revoked, four are in the court process and one case is still in the investigation process. Several cases have not been followed up. For other cases, a peace mediation is sought by BPN for the disputing parties. A mediation succeeded in solving 41 cases and the rest still could not find its solution. Most cases are a horizontal conflict in the form of disputes on border or annexation, followed by double ownership and inheritance rights.

⁴⁷ An age population ratio of those typically not in the labor force (the dependent sector) and those typically in the labor force (the productive sector). It is used to measure the pressure on productive population.


The percentage of all revenue sources according to APBD Kupang City (2011) is Rp. 535,107 billion with total expenditure of Rp. 557,795 billion (Local Regulation No. 4/2011) or deficit of Rp. 22,687 billion (4.2 per cent). The revenue decreased by Rp. 10,492 billion (1.9 per cent) from 2010 revenue of Rp. 545,600 billion with expenditure of Rp. 604,139 billion (Local Regulation No. 10/2010).

Although the total revenue decreased, the regional revenue (*pendapatan asli daerah, PAD*) increased from Rp. 41,616 billion in 2010 to Rp. 51,500 billion in 2011. It is a nominal PAD so when seeing the actual PAD, it should be related to the inflation factor to determine its growth. The inflation in 2010 was 9.97 per cent and in 2011, 4.32 per cent (BPS Kupang 2012). Based on the inflation statistics, the actual PAD in 2010 was Rp. 37,467 billion and Rp. 49,275 billion in 2011. Therefore, PAD of Kupang City has increased by Rp. 11,807 billion (31.5 per cent).

The total expenditure in 2011 decreased, which impacted the percentage of regional revenue by 95.93 per cent. The indirect expenditure increased from 61.05 per cent in 2010 to 66.42 per cent in 2011. The increase of indirect expenditure was due to the increase of grant expenditure and social aid. Grant expenditure in 2010 was Rp. 6,420 billion (1.7 per cent) and social aid, Rp. 9,852 billion (2.6 per cent) from total indirect expenditure of Rp. 368,854 billion.

In 2011, the indirect expenditure value increased to Rp. 370,510 billion (0.4 per cent) with grant expenditure of Rp. 10,924 billion (2.9 per cent) and social aid for Rp. 9,815 billion (2.7 per cent). This means that grant expenditure increased significantly in 2011 by 70.2 per cent. Similarly, the social aid expenditure has not seen drastic growth although it increased significantly by 2.4 per cent. This explains that the increment in indirect expenditure was not progressive as grant expenditure and that social aid is also growing (see Figure 4.3).


Figure 6.3 Graph of Indirect Expenditure, Grant and Social Aid Percentage of Kupang City, 2010 and 2011



Source: Modified document from City Government of Kupang 2010 & 2011

On the other hand, the direct expenditure (38.95 per cent) in 2010 decreased to 33.58 per cent in 2011 (see Figure 4.4).


Figure 6.4 Percentage of Regional Revenue and Expenditure



The percentage of regional revenue source in 2010 was earned from PAD (7.78 per cent), balanced fund (73.27 per cent) and other valid revenues (19.11 per cent). While in 2011, it was earned from PAD (9.90 per cent), balanced fund (82.41 per cent) and other valid revenue (7.69 per cent). The regional revenue still relies on external subsidy, which continues to increase while other valid revenues decrease. This shows high fiscal dependability.

High fiscal dependability is seen from the subsidy or external aid that reached 70.87 per cent in 2010 and 85.90 per cent in 2011 where the contribution of national government were through the special allocation fund (*dana alokasi khusus, DAK*) and general allocation fund (*dana alokasi umum, DAU*) for 68.16 per cent in 2010 and 83.10 per cent in 2011. The province had 2.76 per cent in 2010 and 2.81 per cent in 2011.

Figure 6.5 APBD Comparison in 2010 and 2011




Source: APBD Kupang City 2010; APBD Kupang City 2011

The low PAD is actually in line with the poor management of regional tax. Regional tax and retribution contribute to PAD for **60.40** per cent, which means, if there is a tax arrear, no matter how small it is, it will impact the number of PAD of Kupang City. In **2010**, the revenue from land and building tax reached Rp. **6,791** billion (**37.23** per cent) from regional revenue through tax, which included arrears for **28.27** per cent according to the **2011** data from Local Revenue Offices of Kupang City (Dinas Pendapatan Daerah, Dispenda).

Meanwhile, total expenditure reached Rp. **557,795** billion with direct regional expenditure (**33.6** per cent) that is dominated by capital, goods and service expenditure (**85.80** per cent). This number left **14.2** per cent as the remaining balance but it is allocated for personnel honorarium in the implementation of activity programs. This is also similar to indirect expenditure (**66.42** per cent) with the biggest allocation in personnel expenditure (**92.23** per cent). This is not including grant expenditure and social aid for **5.6** per cent. The remaining **2.2** per cent is a shared expenditure to the province/regency/city and sub-district/village and unexpected expenditure (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 6.6 Comparison of Direct and Indirect Expenditure of Kupang City, 2011



Source: APBD Kupang City 2011

The dependability of Kupang City on national and provincial subsidy continues to increase from 2010 to 2011. This impacts the regional autonomy in the frame of local democracy: The decentralization in Kupang City is still determined by the national government through balancing fund control (fiscal).

Balanced fund, especially DAK, which continues to increase from 5.68 per cent in 2010 to 7.61 per cent in 2011, explains the widening disintegration since utilization of DAK is determined by the national government. It is difficult to say that the regional autonomy in Kupang City is unimpeded, as well as the spirit. The same thing applies for DAU in 2010 (62.47 per cent) that increased in 2011 (70.60 per cent), therefore indicating the poor management of regional expenditure by the Kupang City Government.

From the security and justice aspect, the police system is spread out in five sectoral police (*polisi sektor, polsek*) besides the city resort police (*polresta*). There are 729 police officers in total. One police officer in every one thousand population is not enough to cover for security. The ratio of police to the population significantly impacts the criminality rate.

From 2009 to 2011, there were 731 cases of crime and violence recorded in Kupang City. Of these, 691 cases were attack, 37 were rape and three were murder cases. The crime statistics has not seen any significant decline. In fact, murder cases has increased by 66.7 per cent (two cases) in 2011 (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 6.7 Types of Crime with Violence in Kupang City, 2009-2011




Source: Kupang Sectoral Police 2012

The attack case is a violent crime that frequently happens in Kupang City. The frequency relatively decreased in 2011 (23.44 per cent) compared to 2010 (47.03 per cent). This type of crime, which mostly occurred between 2010 and 2011, were rape cases. Non-violent crimes also has a high frequency occurrence. Between 2007 to 2011, non-violent crimes reached 1,423 cases.

Domestic violence (*kekerasan dalam rumah tangga*) was also one of the most common violence cases. From 2007 to 2011, domestic violence cases were widespread and even increased in 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 4.8)

Figure 6.8 Types of Domestic Violence in Kupang City, 2007-2011



Source: Women Empowerment Division of Regional Secretary of Kupang City 2012

Data on violation of human rights based on violation indicator is not available. Kupang City Government, through the Legal Division of Regional Secretary of Kupang City, has never identified and collected data of human rights violation. Human rights data is limited to the information around issues collected by the Regional Office of Legal and Human Rights Ministry of NTT, which are based on complaint letters and reporting from mass media. In 2011, there were 15 complaints from four cases where the perpetrator was a security officer, four cases where the perpetrator was a government official and seven cases where the perpetrator was a civilian (Yankomas 2011).

Based on the monitoring result of the Initiative for the Development of People's Advocacy (Perkumpulan Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi Rakyat, PIAR NTT), the number of corruption cases in Kupang City is varying. From 2006 to 2007, there were seven identified corruption cases, which increased drastically to 13 cases from 2008 to 2009. In 2011, based on mass media report, there were four corruption cases known to public. The wavering cases of corruption was in line with the prevention mechanism implemented by the city government, which was limited to the conduct of counseling on corruption and new regulations related to regional financial management. There is no radical step implemented to prevent corruption in this city although it is a destructive force in local democracy.

Local democracy faces a serious obstacle when the security and justice sector, which covers human rights enforcement, corruption and criminality eradication, is not given attention by the government. Good governance will remain a concept if this sector is limited to lip service. In addition, democracy becomes a product of

selling lies, empty slogan and a shield to smoothen the interest of authority and interests of the few.

Human and Social Development Indicator

The population of Kupang City based on revenue per capita in 2010 was Rp 12.05 million. Meanwhile, the economy growth rate increased from 6.13 per cent in 2009 to 8.23 per cent in 2010 (BPS Kupang City 2011). The education level is seen as one of the factors that have influenced the growth in economy albeit not significantly. According to Susenas (BPS Kupang City 2010), the average population's highest education level is senior high school (*sekolah menengah atas*) or equivalent and vocational studies (33.48 per cent), followed by elementary school (*sekolah dasar*) at 18.20 per cent and basic secondary school or equivalent like junior high school (*sekolah lanjutan tingkat pertama*) at 15.98 per cent.

About 21.11 per cent of the population were those do not have a diploma or graduated from primary school. University, diploma and bachelor graduates were at 10.47 per cent and those with graduate studies, 0.75 per cent. The literacy rate was 0.97 per cent. Although the number of illiterate people was still low (3.10 per cent) for a city, it is still worrying.

The low education level in Kupang City corresponds to the available education facility, especially for kindergarten (*taman kanak-kanak*) to upper basic education or the same level and vocational courses. The education facility per one thousand students has a 3:5 ratio, 2:8 for elementary school, 7:8 for junior high school or equivalent and 7:3 for senior high school or equivalent and vocational courses. This reality can be explained by the shortage of teachers per one thousand students. There are 19 universities, which have 1,891 permanent lecturers and 790 temporary lecturers, as well as 200 early childhood education (*pendidikan anak usia dini*), 31 community learning center (*pusat kegiatan belajar masyarakat*) and 308 course institutions.

Human development index (HDI) in Kupang can be seen from the death ratio of children under five years old, the number of doctor per one thousand population and the life expectancy rate. The total mortality rate of children under five years old is 2.64 per cent for each 1,000 birth. The mortality rate of girls under five years old is 0.41 per cent and for boys is 0.30 per cent. There are 16 doctors per one thousand patients. The life expectancy rate for men and women on average is

71.93 per cent. Although there is no data according to gender, the life expectancy rate of women continues to get better by the decrease of a maternal mortality for 78.16 per a hundred thousand births (Health Office of Kupang City 2011).

The local democracy of Kupang City is not fully capable in answering issues on education and health needs. The government is more centered on political issue rather than other sectors. The statistics gathered for the education level, the number of schools and health centers and facilities show where the local government should be focusing on. The budget allocation for health sector is only 6.98 per cent and education, 36.29 percent. Of which, 91.75 per cent of the budget is for indirect expenditures such as personnel expenditure (*Bengkel APPEk 2011*).

Actor Involvement in Local Government

The local democracy in Kupang City tends to be centralized in a certain actors where power is distributed to several sectors only. The mayor, deputy mayor and several bureaucracy officials and DPRD of Kupang City are considered the formal actors. Outside this group, there are informal actors, such as religious figures, ethnic figures, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), academicians, political parties and mass media.

The decentralization has distributed the power that used to be centralized in Jakarta. However, such decentralization has not followed the democratic administration implemented by the central government to the regions. The local government in Kupang City, for instance, is considered highly elitist with the center of power held by few elites and institutions outside the civil society. The involvement of local democracy actors is only a matter of procedural process due to high domination of the state. The legislative and executive are particularly strong and dominated by party politics.

Public Institutions

There are two types of political actors that play an important role in local government – formal and informal actors. Formal actors include the leader, executive and legislative officials as well as the law enforcement. The leader and executive officials are usually dominated by a mayor, supported by a deputy mayor and regional secretary. The deputy mayor is the extension of the mayor for external affairs while regional secretary plays an internal role in the bureaucracy.

The law enforcement supports the local government in issues such as destabilization in bureaucracy and corruption. Political revenge or rejection towards internal policies such as job rotation and promotion are the common issues affecting bureaucracy.

As with the legislative sector, the institution leader will determine the direction and implementation of DPRD functions. For instance, the chairman of DPRD Kupang City has the power to influence materials that will be discussed in each DPRD meeting. The domination of the DPRD leader is strengthened with the absence of a political party with dominant seat or domination coalition inside DPRD. The main role of these actors is generating policy and budget in organizing government and local democracy.

The informal actors, on the other hand, play an important role in the administration of the local government. The most visible informal actors involved are political parties, academicians, religious and ethnic figures as well as a couple of NGOs such as APPEK Workshop, Initiative for the Development of People's Advocacy (Perkumpulan Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi, PIAR), The Circle of Imagine (CIS) Timor, UNICEF and AusAID. Other than UNICEF and AusAID, which are directly collaborating with the government in promoting the capacity improvement and government performance, some NGOs are contributing in the local government by strengthening activities for the civil society in Kupang City.

Academicians, ethnic and religious figures are accommodated by the mayor in the city council. The council of Kupang City exists as a semi-formal forum in supporting the work of the executive sector when the elected mayor and deputy mayor do not have support from a political party or coalition of political parties, which is significant in DPRD. Therefore, political party is placed as a part of central power that shadows the executive and legislative sectors. The dispute between the executive and legislative sector is determined by the political party who has the most seat in DPRD.

During the administration of Daniel Adoe and Daniel Hurek⁴⁸, the city council has contributed in several recommendations, including participation in evaluating and safe-guarding the implementation of several regional regulations. Among these regulations concern the revitalization of traditional market including cadgers (*pedagang kaki lima*), street vendors and cart sellers, sustainable water supply from the water utilization management to provide a minimum of two units of artesian


⁴⁸ Former Mayor and Vice Mayor of Kupang City from 2007 to 2012

well in each village/sub-district, implementation of good governance in order to organize institution and government system, layout of green open area, regulation and management of prostitution industry and reclamation of the city beach that begins to get abrasion and disorderly (Rohi 2008). This role was once criticized by several parties, including DPRD of Kupang City, in relation to the city council's action that acted as if they were taking the role of legislative in legislation and control function.

Non-governmental Actors

There are several types of actors who play a role in the local government with non-governmental background, which include the NGOs (62.3 per cent) and CBOs (37.7 per cent). A total of 284 NGOs are based in Kupang City (see Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9 Non-Government Actor in Kupang City in 2012



Source: National Unity and Community Protection (Kesbanglingmas) 2012

The ethnic groups are involved in almost all existing major ethnic group activities in Kupang City. They are affiliated in associations such as Timorese United (Persehatian Orang Timor, POT), The Family of Lamaholot (Keluarga Besar Lamaholot), Sumba Big Family/Family Bondage of Sumba People (Keluarga Besar Sumba/Ikatan Keluarga Asal Sumba, KBS/IKAS), Rote Ndao Community Association (Paguyuban Masyarakat Rote Ndao, PORDA) and Sabu in Kupang City and many more. There are also religious organizations such as the Bible Messiah Church in Timor (Gereja Masehi Injili di Tomor, GMIT), Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) of Kupang City and Bishop Councils among others.

These organizations usually have a leader who is directly related to the city government. In some cases, the church and mosque leaders are the extension of government in distributing information and government fund for community empowerment. The ethnic and religious groups are the strength of political mobilization in Kupang City as their leaders have quite a strong influence.

Along with it are the actors with academic background who have become the technocracy support of the government. These academicians come from Nusa Cendana University (Undana), Artha Wacana Christian University (Universitas Kristen Artha Wacan, UKAW), Widya Mandira Catholic University (Unwira), Muhammadiyah University and Teacher Education of Republic Indonesia University (Pendidikan Guru Republik Indonesia, PGRI). The capacity of the academics provides beneficial support in drafting short- or long-term policies.

Another important actor is the mass media, which is feared by government officials resulting to discourses. Mass media can be grouped into print (23.5 per cent), excluding newspapers and local tabloids that are not released regularly, TV (23.5 per cent) and radio (53 per cent). Up to 2012, there were 17 print or electronic media in Kupang City.

Lastly, there are the businessmen and contractors who are dominated by political brokers and local economy players. These actors are the financial supporters in political processes, such as general election and local leader election, and are compensated with controlling the development projects in the current government.

Relation Among Actors

The local democracy actors of Kupang City cannot be separated from the religious sector, ethnic groups, political parties, NGOs and CBOs, academicians and bureaucrats in the upper-middle level. The actors in the private sector, whose background is in enterprise or private practice in public institutions, are more involved in the economy.

Big entrepreneurs that invest their capital in Kupang City mostly serve as extension of investors outside the city. Examples of these are PT. Sarana Agro Gemilag (SAG), which acquired PT. Semen Kupang; Hotel Kristal, which is a part of Swiss Bellin's chain hotel; PT. Sasando, which operates Hotel Sasando and Imperial World and Imperial Mansion by PT. Imperial Group, which are located in Surabaya and Bali. Other investments include PT. Ramayana Artha Graha, PT. Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia, PT. Tropical Oil Investment and PT. Camar Sentorsa.

The total investments outside Kupang City is Rp. 535,265 billion or 26.8 per cent of the total investment that covers small, medium and big capital. This amount consists of domestic investments for Rp. 512,909 billion and foreign investments for Rp. 22,356 billion (City Government of Kupang 2012).

A number of local entrepreneurs were formed as contractors who are a part of the politics–economy traders or government’s ‘project players’. Together with several local political actors, they use the state finance as their profit source. This is evident in the fact that local contractors are related to a number of political actors in the executive, as well as legislative offices, which enable them to get development projects that are worth billions of rupiah.

On the other hand, public actors have an important role in the process of drafting and implementing policies, especially the political party and bureaucrats that are quite dominant in the legislative and executive department. Meanwhile, the academicians are leading the technocrat aspect of the government.

The legal and law enforcement sector plays a major role in handling criminal issues especially corruption in the government. Through this sector, legal actors, NGOs, mass media and other external actors can come to examine the bureaucracy consolidation, which is established by the executive leader. Such cases are resolved through transactional political bargain between the internal and external parties in the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, not all cases are resolved in this manner as there are several cases that are dealt with legally.

Religious and ethnic groups, along with entrepreneurs and academicians, are seated in the city council and act like legitimate instruments in policymaking. They are frequently mobilized by political and bureaucracy actors to legitimate policies that will be created. As for local NGOs, it is considered more beneficial to them to be involved in building and strengthening the civil society than spending their energy on guarding the government administration. Pressure from the civil society only comes from several CBOs such as university student movements.

Representative Democracy

Representative democracy is identified with general elections, political parties and other democratic institutions. This type of democracy can be best explained by general election. Tilly (2007) described democracy as the rule of the game, electoralism process and mechanism related to the citizen involvement, equality of rights in general election, understanding and agenda control and community reality

that includes participation, prosperity and social justice. Meanwhile, representative democracy is described as the power linking authority and accountability. The political linkage is between a representative (government) and the represented party (citizen). In Kupang City, however, the outline of representative democracy has not shown any linkage between the citizen and its representative.

Design and Performace of General Election

The last general election in Kupang City was conducted in **2009** before the proliferation of districts in **2010**. The local general election at that time was still concentrated on four districts only, which was divided into three constituencies: Constituency I covered Kelapa Lima District with allocated eight seats, Constituency II covered Oebobo District with **12** seats and Constituency III included Alak and Maulafa Districts with **10** seats.

The election in the local level, however, left many problems. The complexity of the issues in the local general election was an indicator of a weak national regulatory framework. Since the implementation of local election, the local democracy was merely a regulation experiment that kept changing everytime there was a change in legislative political regime. The regulation itself was not even capable in covering most of the potential corruption in the local level, such as data collection and voter's political rights, ballot transaction and money politics, leading to horizontal conflict. As a result, a local election can end up in a lawsuit or endless political revenge that harms local democracy such as the **2007** local official election.

The issue on voters' data collection led to most voters not receiving their voting card. This led voters to stage a demonstration to demand their political rights by occupying KPUD of Kupang City. The implementating institution then invited stakeholders to solve the issue as they were unable to make a decision outside the national regulation and their institutional hierarchy. Finally, through Joint Decree (*Surat Keputusan Bersama*) No. **1/Kota/KPG/V/2007** on **19 May 2007**, voters who were not listed, were accommodated in the local official election based on their population identity.

There was indeed a national regulation made but it was lacking in details to cover specific context of the local election. The constitutional framework governing the democracy institution and election in the local level was Law No. **22/1999**, which was amended by Law No. **32/2004** on Regional Government and Government Regulation No. **6/2005** on Election, Verification, Appointment and

Termination of Local Leader and Deputy Local Leader. However, a regulation that prohibits a foreign citizen to vote at the election in Indonesia is actually less specific for its implementation in the region, as the initiating definition of 'foreign' in many cases are only seen physically. Although it has been governed in Law No. 10/2008 on General Election of DPR, DPD and DPRD member (Article 1 Paragraph 22) and Law No. 42/2008 on General Election of President and Vice President (Article 1 Paragraph 21), the foreign definition must be affirmed that it is not merely physical citizenship issue. Otherwise, the isolated or marginal group that is often neglected will not be covered.

The above series of regulation does not specifically indicate the government to undertake certain steps to ensure the representation of marginal, women, disabled and minor groups, other than the affirmative action on 30 per cent quota of women inside politics. Even for disabled people who are supposedly getting one post in each 100 employment slots never get the attention. The government is supposed to have made adjustments concerning their disability and working needs.

The existing general election system is not creating equality. Transparency in the conversion from electoral vote to DPRD seat is still an issue. This is shown by the objection and lawsuit of voting calculation in each level. Voting calculation cannot be used as an excuse for the KPUD to stop the series of general election's phase. Furthermore, there is no authority to open the voting box in each step of calculation, so the possibility of changes or ballot transaction between candidates in one party can easily occur. The voting ballot box, which can be opened, only contains recapitulation of vote calculation in previous level. This is admitted by one of the members of KPUD of Kupang City during the plenary meeting to determine the result of vote calculation. It is a side that cannot be breached by an external party other than the five KPUD commissioners.

The majority of the voting system gives room for competition that can actually create accountability. However, it does not happen. This is due to the absence of direct control mechanism by the voter that is supported by the loose process of voting calculation other than at the polling station (*tempat pemungutan suara, TPS*). Similarly, the general election system in the local level does not reflect social diversity. Certain ethnic groups dominate the public and political positions such as legislative membership and local leadership. Timor, Rote, Sabu and Flores are four of the dominant ethnic groups in local politics of Kupang City. Their domination is one of the effects of low enthusiasm of the community in guarding their political voice. The community does not show concern about the conversion issue from

electoral vote to legislative seat. As a result, in each general election, it is difficult for the community to differentiate a political party and a candidate campaign. The absence of regulation that governs segmentation in general election, in fact, opens a space for political parties to do a segmentation approach freely according to their way and capability.

In the end, politics in the ethnic and religious segments can become very strong. The national issues brought into several local official elections – such as corruption eradication, health insurance, artesian well, teacher's welfare, people's economy, increment in investment and job employment, making Kupang as Service City and other kinds of issue – did not get significant attention from the community. Even in the last general election, there was no specific difference between local and national issues. It was only limited to the fulfillment of basic needs, such as education and health, free the government from corruption, collusion and nepotism (*korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme, KKN*) and building people's economy projects, which are very common.

Based on the above condition, it is difficult to reflect on the local issues as the competition is formed among parties in the national level. In the local level, it leads to more disputes during election, such as issues on constituency's border, general election's violation, money politics and many others. Although there is no dispute related to constituency, other cases such as violation in the election process is quite common. The violation of general election, such as early start of campaign, placing posters randomly, children involvement, bureaucracy, money politics, duplicate voters and removing voters' names from temporary voters' list are not followed up further by the general election authority. Usually, these violations are not followed up as there are no authentic evidence and only witnesses.

The disputes in general election is usually solved quickly by a quite transparent procedure, especially if it is at the complaint filing stage. Those who feel aggrieved must report to the Monitoring Committee by providing authentic evidences, which should be followed up by the police for at least seven days after the incident (Monitoring Committee of Kupang City 2011). Afterwards, the police will prepare an official report (*berita acara perkara*) to be forwarded to the court. If the report is made after the timeline, then it cannot be followed up.

Some disputes in general election, which occurred in 2009 general election, were lawsuits from labor party to constitutional court (*mahkamah konstitusi*) and community subpoena on KPUD of Kupang City. The dispute between the labor party and KPUD of Kupang City occurred as a dissatisfaction of the labor party on

the voting recapitulation result of the plenary in Constituency III (Alak and Maulafa). The dissatisfaction was based on the suspicion of voting inflation on certain candidate. Meanwhile, the community subpoena was based on the elected nominee, Viktor Lerrick, who was suspected of having involvement in several criminal cases with penalty of five years sentence. During his candidacy in the general election, he was going through a legal process in Polresta Kupang. The follow up of lawsuit and subpoena, however, did not change the stipulation of KPUD of Kupang City.

Basically, general election is implemented by the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), which put the regency/city KPUD as organizer in the local level. This institution is established with five commissioners, who are elected by the selection committee, and established through the proposal of the government, DPRD of Kupang City and Provincial KPU. The implementation of 209 elections in Kupang City were conducted according to KPU Regulation No. 9/2008 on Phase, Program and Schedule of General Election of DPR, DPD and DPRD Member of 2009.

It began with data collection of voters based on the population aggregate data (*data agregat kependudukan kecamatan, DAK2*) and recapitulation list of potential voter of general election (*recap daftar penduduk potensial pemilih pemilu, RDP4*) from the government (Population Office). KPUD of Kupang City then prepared the voters list. DAK2 showed that the population was 409,956 people (male was 53.22 per cent and female was 46.78 per cent) and RDP4 showed 407,185 people (53.08 per cent male and 46.92 per cent female). This is different with RDP4 of previous governor's election (204,648 people). Because of that, KPUD of Kupang City implemented the voter data update through establishment of Committee of Voter Data Update (Panitia Pemutakhiran Data Pemilih, PPDP). Once PPDP finished their duty, KPUD of Kupang City determined the final voters list (*daftar pemilih tetap, DPT*) for 210,620 voters, which were distributed to 964 polling stations. The next phase was registration of general election participants, candidates and political parties and individual candidates of Regional Representatives Council of Republic Indonesia (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Republik Indonesia, DPD-RI). This phase was not conducted by KPUD of Kupang City but by the central KPU and KPUD of NTT Province. All political parties' registration process start from announcement of registration of participants of general election, form collection, form submission, administrative study and notification/result of determination, which were handled directly by central KPU. The registration of candidates of DPD-RI members was performed by KPUD of NTT Province.

Furthermore, KPUD of Kupang City only worked on field verification of political party committee in the city level and supported the candidate of DPD-RI member. The emerging issue was that many political parties have dual management, unfinished internal conflict and obscurity of secretariat's position of the political party. On the verification of DPD-RI member candidates, many names were not on location, names and addressess of the supporters and the success team were difficult to confirm and not all candidates of DPD-RI members had a campaign and success team. During the campaign, KPUD of Kupang City decided on the campaign location as agreed previously with the political party leaders and candidates of DPD-RI member.

The distribution of ballots was problematic on the general election's day on 9 April 2009. There were several issues: (1) ballots were switched between Constituency of DPR-RI, DPRD of NTT Province and DPRD of Kupang City, (2) reduction in ballot amount for all TPS, (3) delayed voting process in some TPS and (4) KPUD of Kupang City could not replace the shortage of ballot papers until three o'clock in the afternoon so it was decided that there would be a continuation of voting collection on 14 April 2009 for nine TPS in Constituency III, which experienced a deadlock.

After the completion of the voting phase, the next phase was voting calculation. The most prominent issue in this phase was the error in filling out the form by the Voting organizer Group (Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara, KPPS), exceeding deadline and delay of KPUD of Kupang City's plenary meeting. The last phase was determination of general election's result on 17 May 2009, which was based on Law No. 22/2007 on General Election's Implementation; KPU Regulation No. 15/2009, which was amended by KPU Regulation No. 26/2009 on Technical Guidance on Determination and Announcement of General Election's Result, Procedure in Determining the Seat, Determining the Elected Candidate and Replacement of Elected Candidate in General Election for DPR, DPD, Provincial and Regency/City DPRD Member of 2009; Stipulation of KPU No. 255/2009 on Determination and Announcement of General Election's Result for DPR, DPD, Provincial and Regency/City DPRD Member Nationally in 2009 Election; Stipulation of KPUD of Kupang City No. 5/2009 on Determination of Recapitulation Result of Valid Voting Calculation of Political Party and Legislative Member Candidate in General Election for DPR, DPD, Provincial and Regency/City DPRD Member of 2009 in Kupang; Minutes of Plenary Meeting of KPUD of Kupang City on Determination of Permanent Candidate List on DPRD Member of Kupang City in 2009 General Election; and

Stipulation of Constitutional Court No. 22-24/PUU/VI/2008 on 14 December 2008 on Dispute of General Election's Result.

The monitoring of 2009 general election did not involve many parties, except for the local mass media that was also very limited (Pos Kupang and Timor Express). In 2004 election, there were only five institutions that participated in monitoring, while in 2009, there was only one. The 2004 general election was observed by one international NGO (European Union Electoral Observation Mission), two national foundation (Yayasan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia and Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Untuk Rakyat) and two local NGOs (Yayasan Peduli Sesama/Sanlima and Yayasan Panggilan Pertiwi Untuk Keadilan/Yapitra). The 2009 general election was observed by one local institution only, Community Dedication Institution (Lembaga Pengabdian Masyarakat, LPM) of Nusa Cendana University . The low level of concern from non-state institutions in monitoring the implementation of general election made an impact on the difficulty of having an honest, fair and righteous election.

The general election still needs to improve its process, such as the data collection and voter's registration. The collection and registration of voters is still done by the Population Office (Dispenduk), thus it is prone to the mobilization and intervention of the incumbent. Data updating of the permanent voters' list is likewise hampered by human error, such as in the case of switched ballots between Alak and Oebobo constituencies, and time efficiency and accuracy in ballot distribution. Lastly, it requires improvement in vote counting and recording system, which is often completely left unguarded by witnesses, as well as the recapitulations (52 sheets) that should be made by the staff. The only phase, which is considered successful, is the campaign period where conflict does not occur.

The voters' level of participation gives an interesting picture. The DPT of Kupang City in 2009 general election had 201,620 voters against a population of 409,956 based on KPUD Kupang City data. Around 99.32 per cent of the population were potential voters. However, only 51.74 per cent registered to become permanent voters. Not all voters in the DPT could use their voting rights.

Voters who used their rights or voters turnout (VTO) were 140,681 (66.79 per cent) and voters who did not use their rights or those who abstained were 29.89 per cent. Therefore, the VTO ratio against population that has the voting rights was 0.52. Compared to the VTO of presidential election (74.97 per cent), it would then be a 0.90 ratio. Comparing the VTO of 2009 presidential election with 2007 local leader election of Kupang City (79.59 per cent), it will get 0.92

ratio. The calculation result was based on the KPUD Kupang City report (2007, 2009a and 2009b).

Based on the above figures, the ratio of female voters against male voters in the last three general elections can be calculated. There was less than 5 per cent difference on the number of male and female voters during 2007 election of Kupang’s mayor, 2009 legislative election and 2009 presidential election (see Table 4.8).

Table 6.7 Ratio of Female Voters against Male Voters in the Last Three General Elections

General Election	Year	Male	Female	Ratio	%
Local Leader Election	2007	95.799	93.253	0.97	33.12
Legislative Election	2009	106.245	104.375	0.98	33.43
Presidential Election	2009	110.788	108.887	0.98	33.45
Total		312.832	306.515	2.94	100.00

Source: Modified Data from KPUD of Kupang City 2007, 2009a & 2009b

The difference of VTO percentage in each general election is affected by the information availability program and education of the voters. So far, such program is conducted by KPUD through information dissemination that covers general election, schedule and the procedure to correct voting. However, the information dissemination does not get serious attention from the government in terms of budget allocation. The budget for dissemination is very little, especially for local official election. Therefore, it is difficult to achieve education and participation from the voters as targeted.

KPUD Kupang City, however, continues to do everything in order to reach its target. Often, KPUD uses religious institutions, such as churches and mosques, for voters’ education. To improve voters’ participation in general election, KPUD Kupang City provides roving TPS for voters who find difficulty in participating. The objective is to help the disabled and sick persons or those who cannot go to permanent TPS to still be able to use their rights in democracy.

There are 38 political parties in Kupang City. However, not all of them were actively involved in the political campaign of 2009 general election. Only the major parties, such as The Party of the Functional Group (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP), Demokrat Party, The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra Party), The People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura) and United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) were seen doing their campaigns, especially the first two parties. This is likely because the membership of political parties in Kupang City is unstable and in some instances, recruitment are based on personal relations or association. Some of the examples are Gerindra, which is considered as a party for Timorese; PDIP, which is known as the party for 'little people' from all ethnicity and religions; Golkar, which is loved by the 80s generation for nostalgic reason that is Soeharto's golden days and Demokrat, which has the influence of SBY figures.

Kupang City is the mass center of Golkar and PDI Perjuangan. If there are other parties that can balance its large presence in the city, then it would only be Demokrat and Gerindra. These four parties dominated the number of seats, where Golkar and PDIP won four seats each and Gerindra and Demokrat won three seats each in DPRD of Kupang City in the last 2009 general election. The rest was earned by other political parties such as Hanura Party, The National People's Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional, PPRN), (Party Demokrasi Sejahtera, PDS, National Front Party (Partai Barisan Nasional, Barnas Party), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI), National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), (Partai Persatuan Daerah, PPD), The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), The Democratic Renewal Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaharuan, United Development Party PDP), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKP) Patriot Party, (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and Prosperous Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia Sejahter, PIS).

Table 6.8 The 2009 Voting Result and DPRD Seats of Kupang

No	Political Party	Name of Elected Candidate	Constituency
Period 2004–2009			
1	Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)	Baddarudin Mahmud Fatmiah Hamzah Frans Dj Adrianus	Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City III
2	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia)	Oliver Albert Mexi Hansen Pello	Kupang City II Kupang City III
3	Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia)	Alexander Take Ofong, S.Fil	Kupang City II
4	National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)	Petrus Krispianus Matutina	Kupang City III
5	National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)	Cornelis Timo Drs. Daniel Hurek	Kupang City I Kupang City II
6	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)	Edwin R. Fangidae Eddy Husain Nikolaus Fransiskus, SIP Yeskiel Loudoe Drs. Hironimus Soriwutun Yeki Thobias Foeh	Kupang City I Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City III Kupang City III
7	Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera)	John Davidson Pandie Johanis I. Haning, A.Md,Par Emu S. Pellondou, STh Drs. Tommy R. Hanas	Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City III
8	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya)	Thomas Frans Drs. Marten Mogilaa Eduard Ndun Oktovianus Puttyrulan, SM Drs. Rudyanto Tonubessie, M.Si Matheos W.S.J. Ballo Adam W. Foenay, BA Manase H. Manafe Drs. EC. Josef Tukan Calacansius Dominggus Bola	Kupang City I Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City III Kupang City III Kupang City III Kupang City III
9	The Regional Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah)	Apolos Djara Bunga, SH	Kupang City I

No	Political Party	Name of Elected Candidate	Constituency
Period 2009-2014			
1	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya)	Victor Lerik, SH Tellendmark J Daud Zeyto R. Ratuarat Martinus M. E. Medah	Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City III
2	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)	Adrianus A Talli, A. Md. T Nicolaus Fransiskus, SIP Yeskiel Loudoe Ir. John E. Seran	Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City II Kupang City III
3	DemocratParty (Partai Demokrat)	Frans Johanis Dominggus Adrianus Kardinand L. Kalle Lena, SH Irianus Rohi	Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City III
4	The People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)	Melkianus R. Balle, SH Jeri Anthon Pingak	Kupang City I Kupang City II
5	Regional Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah)	Agnes Botha Hayon	Kupang City I
6	The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya)	Pieter R. Herewilla Isidorus Lilijawa, S. Fil Mughtar Latif Koso	Kupang City I Kupang City II Kupang City I
7	Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera)	John Davidson Pandie Johnis Imanuel Haning	Kupang City I Kupang City II
8	National People's Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional)	Johanis Isliko, S. Pt Daniel Bifel, SH, M. Hum	Kupang City I Kupang City II
9	National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)	P Krispinus Matutina, SH	Kupang City II
10	The Democratic Renewal Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan)	Janlif Tratus Bullu, A. Md.	Kupang City II
11	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)	Djainudin, SH	Kupang City II
12	Prosperous Indonesian Party (Partai Indonesia Sejahtera)	Drs. Rudy Tonubessi, M. Si	Kupang City III
13	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia)	Mexi Hansen Pello	Kupang City III
14	Functional Party of Struggle (Partai Karya Perjuangan)	Samuel Taglale	Kupang City III
15	Patriot Party (Partai Patriot)	Livingstone A. Ratu Kadja	Kupang City III
16	National Front Party (Partai Barisan Nasional)	Ir. Frans Fanggi	Kupang City III

Source: KPUD Kupang City 2009

The vote distribution in each constituency has caused the conversion from electoral votes to number of seats to become beneficial to some political parties, which did not entirely get a significant vote. For instance, with 3.81 per cent of the total votes, Gerindra earned three seats. It was different for the electoral votes earned by Golkar (11.89 per cent), PDI Perjuangan (11.07 per cent) and Demokrat (9.41 per cent) of which, the first two parties only won four seats each and the latter, three seats. If the disproportioned vote conversion to number of seats is transformed into percentage, then the difference will be 5.6 per cent between Demokrat and Gerindra for three seats (see Table 4.10).

Table 6.9 Percentage of Electoral Vote to Seat

No	Political Party	Vote	%	Seat
1	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya)	16,721	11.89	4
2	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)	15,578	11.07	4
3	The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya)	5,354	3.81	3
4	Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)	13,234	9.41	3
5	The People's Conscience Party (Partai Hanura)	4,715	3.35	2
6	The National People's Concern Party (Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional)	3,921	2.79	2
7	Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera)	5,052	3.59	2
8	National Front Party (Partai Barisan Nasional)	2,919	2.07	1
9	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia)	4,146	2.95	1
10	The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)	3,180	2.26	1
11	The Regional Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah)	3,724	2.65	1
12	National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)	3,889	2.76	1
13	The Democratic Renewal Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaharuan)	3,564	2.53	1
14	Functional Party of Struggle (Partai Karya Perjuangan)	3,467	2.46	1
15	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)	3,624	2.58	1
16	Patriotic Party	3,372	2.40	1
17	Prosperous Indonesian Party (Partai Indonesia Sejahtera)	4,357	3.10	1
Number of Vote/Seat		100,817	47.87	30
VTO		147,657	70.11	
Total Valid Vote		140,681	66.79	
Permanent Voter		210,620		

Source: KPUD Kupang City 2009

The minimum number of seats is the result of weak platform of political parties in the local level of Kupang City. There are only several, such as, PDI Perjuangan, Golkar, Gerindra, Demokrat and Hanura, which are present in the local level. However, the majority of these parties' platform is only an extension of the national platform, which was once translated in the provincial level only. This is because Kupang City is the center of politics in NTT.

The provincial slogan grew strong, such as Anggur Merah's 'Budget for people to reach prosperity' (*Anggaran Untuk Rakyat Menuju Sejahtera*), which is echoed by PDI Perjuangan; Suara Golkar's 'People's Voice by Golkar' (*Suara Rakyat oleh Golkar*); Gerindra's 'People's Economy' (*Ekonomi Rakyat*); Demokrat's 'Clean and Free Government from KKN' (*Pemerintahan Yang Bersih dan Bebas KKN*); Hanura's 'Conscience' (*Hati Nurani*) and so on. In turn, this influenced the way candidates are doing their political campaigns.

The candidates competed in many occasions but they were not able to show the platform of their political parties. Therefore, in approaching the voters – whether in party or personal appearances – certain issues showcasing the platform or ideology of their political parties were not highlighted. The issues raised only revolved around family issues, ethnicity and religion, up to the extent of promise of prosperity and use of money in politics.

Local election starts with nomination in the political party through a number sequence. Candidates are chosen according to name or picture system. This shows that from the beginning, a candidate is already competing to get a number sequence. There is no political party official in the national level who directly and openly agrees or rejects the elected candidate in the local level. Although indirectly, there are officials in the national level who reject a candidate following their hidden political agenda. For those who directly reject a candidate, the system continues to the nomination phase. The local political party management recommends the name of candidates who will then be decided upon in the national level.

This condition shows the one side of the electoral system where the local level party is authorized to recommend a candidate's name from the required number for 120 per cent. While on the contrary, the central political party still have the final decision. This is where money politics come in at the regional level where recruitment is widely open up to the stage of putting the candidate's name in order before it is published. As previously mentioned, there is no rule at the local level that specifically guard the political party's financial status in the region including its source. So far, the regulation only governs the financial status of political parties in the national level.

Political Party

The leadership of political parties over the last three general elections is quite difficult to describe as there is no existing database. There are **38** political parties in Kupang City, which is the same number as in the national level. However, none of these political parties have women leaders. During the last election, men dominated the leadership in political parties. In general, the highest position a woman can get in a political party in Kupang is limited to a secretarial role, which is only **10.53** per cent (Kesbangpol Kupang City 2011).


The lack of women leaders in political parties did not influence the number of female candidates in the last two general elections, according to a limited information source. The number of female candidates continue to increase each election. In **2004** general election, female candidates failed to reach **30** per cent of the quota. In **2009**, the percentage of female candidates increased to **31.97** per cent (see Table 4.11).

Table 6.10 Total Candidates Based on Gender

Year of General Election	Candidate Category				Total	
	Male		Female		Political Party	Candidate
2004	341	70.31	144	29.69	24	485
2009	549	68.03	258	31.97	38	807

Source: City Government of Kupang 2005; City Government of Kupang 2010

Figure 6.10. Comparison between Male and Female



Source: City Government of Kupang 2005; City Government of Kupang 2010

The number of seat is not significantly different and there is no dominant seat, which explains the absence of pure majority power in DPRD of Kupang City. There are, however, at least four factions: Golkar, PDI Perjuangan, Demokrat and Gerindra. At the same time, there is no permanent coalition that can become the majority. The existing factions tend to do a temporary coalition and only follows the common issues and political interests raised. Except PDI Perjuangan and Gerindra, which have a national coalition and informally (not a permanent coalition) forwarded and show common interests and political border in the region.

The only demonstration of the majority's power that ever established in DPRD of Kupang City was the replacement of the chairman of DPRD from Golkar. During that time, there was a motion of no confidence from 21 institution members but the replacement did not move Golkar's position to stay on holding the chairman's post. The replacement was only for the charmain since it still came from the party with a banyan tree logo⁴⁹.

Evaluation of Elected Officials

The replacement of the chairman of DPRD of Kupang City is inseparable from the impact of the adopted party's system. It does not end there as the party system has put the position of political party domineering the executive and legislative power. At the executive level, candidates returning the favor and serving the political party that nominates them is a political deal, which has been made far ahead the local official election. If the elected local official ignores such a deal, the political party will use the legislative as a pressing instrument. A legislative member can give pressure to the executive for his/her personal interest shielded in the political party, such as financing certain activity, tribute to the legislator and so on. Not all political parties, however, have the same practice.

This situation obviously does not create a strong local leader. On the contrary, it creates a local leader who abides to a political party under a legislative shield, not just to the party that nominates him but to those with seats in DPRD as well. The mayor and deputy mayor from 2007 to 2012 were nominated by People's Coalition of Kupang City (15.56 per cent), which consisted of parties without any seat in DPRD of Kupang City besides Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Kesejahteraan Sejahtera, PKS*) with one seat. This coalition consists of the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB*) at 3.27 per cent

⁴⁹ A tree symbol of the Party of the Functional Group (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar)

and small non-seat parties, including Partai Patriot Pancasila (1.61 per cent), PNI Marhaenisme (1.46 per cent), Partai Merdeka (1.55 per cent), Socialist Democratic Labor Party (Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, PBSO) (1.61 per cent), United Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, PPD) (1.34 per cent), The New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, Partai PIB) (1.05 per cent), Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB)(1.14 per cent), Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR) (0.51 per cent) and Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Kesejahteraan Sejahtera, PKS) (2.02 per cent).

With the above condition, it is difficult for the elected local leader to formalize the policy objectively. This is getting more incriminating for the local leader when they have to show their accountability before the legislative as governed in Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government. The accountability of a local leader against the voter is only shown by addressing their successful achievement, of which, the only indicator tends to be politically subjective. This is also happening to other public officials. The evaluation method defined by the Decree of Ministry for State Apparatus Reforms No. 25/2004 on General Guideline of Community Satisfaction Index Preparation has never been used officially as the instrument to evaluate public officials in Kupang City.

In 2010, Research & Development of Kupang City conducted an evaluation according to the regulation but failed to get government support. The rest of the monitoring and evaluation were controlled by a high assembly of public officials. The attempt to improve performance then was not guided as a formal monitoring procedure and recall has changed to a political instrument for the ruler. The basic example is the rotation of officials, which is conducted two to three times a year, but has never increased the bureaucracy's performance.

DPRD, on the other hand, is actually trapped in the 'collector' position rather than a legislator. Many political parties in DPRD have prompted increasing complex interests. This makes DPRD incapable in formalizing a policy quickly without any arguments. According to the Head of C Commission, each draft of regional regulation should go through a commission, so that a public hearing can be conducted prior to session in Legislation Institution and later, in Plenary. However, the drafts will only get past the Commission, which means there is no public hearing. As a result, many of the drafts, which became regional regulations, receive criticism from the community.

In general, community critics and mass media only monitor the output without looking further into the institution and actors involved in the process: While the government and DPRD seem to not have any problem, there are a number of issues that need to be criticized and considered altogether.

The complexity of such issues can disrupt the function of DPRD Kupang City. When a party cannot agree on a certain point in the platform, the 30-member DPRD would pool their issues and interests together and stay away from the draw. The problem is, it is very likely that a draw will happen due to the varying platform differences among political parties. The objectivity of the institution and actor is weakened but new interest between actors are formed to close another potential draw.

The multiparty system actually has a misleading representation in the legislative. The result of 2009 general election left 52.13 per cent votes that do not have a representative from Kupang City. This consisted of 18.93 per cent of remaining valid votes without a seat, 3.31 per cent invalid votes and 29.89 per cent abstain votes from permanent and registered voters. It means that the representation in DPRD of Kupang City is not representative at all as it only has 47.87 per cent votes from the existing permanent voters.

DPRD's position is getting more unreliable. It proves that in practice, its functions and legislative rights differentiate its position with DPR-RI, which purely acts as a legislative. Meanwhile, for provincial and regency/city DPRD, this is not the case. DPRD in each region is positioned as a regional government's partner and even considered as a part of regional government. This has weakened the bargaining position, rights and functions of legislative in the region, especially the monitoring of the government. If the condition remains the same, the local leader and DPRD will only be under the control of a party. While the executive and legislative in the region is weakened, the political party is securing a strong position in the existing party system. Such political parties are not institutional, but they are utilized as pressing instruments by actors fronting democracy.

Political party actors that sit as legislative members are more oriented into building their political party rather than performing the function and role of a legislator. This shows that monitoring and investigation functions are not used properly in offices or bureaucracy. This is proven by several corruption cases involving fishing vessels and fictitious official travel orders (*surat perintah perjalanan dinas*), which, did not come out from the investigation of DPRD of Kupang City.

The domination of political party is not supported by its performance. From the party that nominates the elected executive to the winning party of legislative general election, they are all incapable in giving a significant contribution to the formation of concrete working program. The party that nominates the elected executive enjoys reaping the benefit, while the winning party (that has seats) is busy engaging themselves in a business to find the weak gap of the executive. In the end, there is no party that takes the position of permanent opposition. The opposition is only limited to bluff the critics of the current government in order to get something. The relationship between DPRD and City Government of Kupang is more similar to a comedy–drama.

The performance of a political party is worsened by the presence of segmentation based on religion and ethnicity to gender. Women, for example, have **30** per cent quota. This is the reason why many associations emerged based on gender, ethnicity, religion and affiliation to a number of political parties, which then created a stigma for parties belonging to certain ethnicity or religion. The established segment should be based on objectivity if they want to improve the performance of the existing political parties.

Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy can be seen on the success of the local government in giving room for public involvement extensively. Openness, responsiveness, justice and transparency to encourage initiative from all community stakeholders to be involved actively in organizing the local government are the indicators of success in participatory democracy. The following discussion will describe the extent of complementary relationship built among government, civil society, mass media and other stakeholders.

The quality of participatory democracy in Kupang is still far from what is expected. Based on definition, the organization of local government has not achieved the level of democracy yet. There is little involvement of non–government actors such as the civil society in the government process and administration. The government remains the dominant actor, which can eventually create an enclosed and unresponsive community. This later will also create policies that are not pro–justice and will marginalize certain groups.

Local Government and Participatory Democracy

Openness

In the past year, the formal meeting between the city government or DPRD with community was still very limited. There was only one public hearing held between DPRD and community, which was related to a debate about the mosque development in Batuplat. The other was the supposed regular meeting of DPRD members with community during the recess period, which was only conducted once in 2011. The formal meeting in DPRD that is open for community is only at regular meetings or plenary in DPRD, which is determined by the plenary leader/DPRD as an open plenary.

The openness of government to community is not organized yet as in the case of Kupang City. To address the community's need to express opinion, a suggestion box was provided in the mayor's office. The suggestion box was expected to be the place for the people to address their complaints, suggestions or other problems and services in government. However, it has not been managed and used by the community. A telephone hotline was also launched to further reach out to the community. This method tends to be more personal and informal, where various issues can be responded directly by the mayor or deputy mayor in coordination with the head of related Regional Working Unit (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, SKPD) to discuss and resolve the issue.

Efforts leaning toward establishing an informal approach to the open relationship between the government and the community reveals some points: First, the city government, in fact, tries to limit the public discourse on community issues. Second, this informal approach also encourages the personalization and positive imaging of government bureaucracy officials, such as the mayor and deputy mayor, as well as DPRD members in resolving the community complaints.

The introduction of such approach indicates that the openness of the government is not built institutionally. The provision for public information related to several meetings, which are supposed to be open for public participation, is not intensively conducted. There is no special method developed by the city government to give several information to public. The only information source related to government activities, such as process and meeting result in DPRD, is only through a limited local media coverage. Government activities that should be opened and participatory, such as Development Plan Meeting (*Musrenbang*), is still considered as an elite information (sub-district system and community figure). Information on

project implementation process in sub-district, district and city levels related to the project timelines and results are not widely known by the community. The government is not open yet in explaining the reasons for accepting or rejecting suggestions by SKPD in the yearly development plan. Furthermore, SKPD itself does not explain their programs for implementation in a district or sub-district.

Justice


One of the policies made by the City Government of Kupang to ensure the inclusion of different interests related to identity and stakeholder is the policy to distribute grants for community economy development (*pengembangan ekonomi masyarakat*) amounting to Rp. 4,000 billion. The grant is distributed through economic institutions, especially the micro finance institution (*lembaga keuangan mikro*, LKM)/cooperative, which are based on religion. Other than the reason of effective distribution process, this strategy seems to be developed by the city government to encourage community aid allocation based on religious segmentation. This is where the point of injustice begins.

The PEM grant program is objective, right on target and needs to be conducted immediately. However, the allocation should not be based on religious segmentation. Democracy implies the majority as the biggest beneficiary of such community aid. Justice in a democratic system sets the individual rights equally regardless of any identity. The composition of grant and PEM fund distributing institution can be seen in Table 4.12:

Table 6.11 LKM/Cooperative in Distributing Fund of Community Economy Development in Kupang City. 2008-2009

Name of LKM / Cooperative	Religious Element	Total Recipient	Total Fund	%
KSU Talenta	Christian	285	2,400,000,000.00	60.0
Kopdit Serviam	Catholic	147	1,000,000,000.00	25.0
KSU Nursa'adah	Islam	37	500,000,000	12.5
KSU Dewi Gangga	Hindu	5	100,000,000	2.5

Figure 6.11 Religion Composition in Kupang



Source: Bappeda Kupang City 2009

On a difference case, the government also implements policies or programs that discriminate the urban marginal groups, as experienced by street vendors. The group has no proper place to trade in Inpres market. This includes small fishermen who did not get a capital aid while big fishermen, who already has proper fishing equipment, received the aid.

Transparency

There is no structured system concerning the government's documents, including information on which of those are accessible or inaccessible to the public. This situation is worsened by the perception that such documents are the state's confidential information. The community can only access the public document such as budget reports in informal manner or personal approach with the city government and DPRD members.

The City Government of Kupang maintains a website but it only contains general information. The website contains information on government profile, regional regulation on legal products, population statistics and education, public service, investment opportunity and regional revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, APBD*) summary. However, several information from this website is not updated regularly. The data, which is not updated, for instance, is data on Regional Regulations of Kupang City that is only updated until 2007.

The actual information needed by the community in relation to public service by the government is not available, as well as the information on health service. The website is still limited with information on the government events led by the mayor, deputy mayor and other government officials. Such limitation is not encouraging

the community to access the website regularly to get information on several issues related to the city government. The website is not providing information on actual events related to the day-to-day public issues occurring in Kupang City.

Budget discussion between the executive and DPRD of Kupang City often becomes a debate. The public can only follow the budget discussion through news coverage. Up to now, there is no regulation made by the city government to ensure the transparency of discussion and determination of APBD, which is conducted by the executive with DPRD. Although specifically in DPRD, there is a regulation that governed the APBD discussion plenary to be done openly. However, it is only governed by the plenary rules of order. This condition encourages the process of budget discussion in an assembly and becomes the ground for transaction between the government and DPRD.

Transparent public decision is also not based on clear rules. In the making of regional regulation for example, there is no rules yet on public involvement and assurance for public to access information related to the city government policies. The information on civil service recruitment is usually announced two to three weeks before the registration is closed. Although it is announced publicly, it is quite a short time. It also uses information media that cannot be accessed easily by the majority of the community. This is because the city government is not sincere in managing public information transparently.

The recruitment of civil servants is published through mass media, such as in print and information board of the mayor's office. This method is also used to announce the selection result, such as the information on applicants who passed the test. The other remaining problem is the determination of forming the candidate civil servant (*calon pegawai negeri sipil*), which is determined by the Regional Personnel Agency. The information on civil servants' needs analysis and workload is never open to become a bargaining arena in the environment formation of the city government.

Another closed information is the honorary staff recruitment. The public does not have adequate information regarding time, qualification, amount and institution that will recruit the honorary staff. This problem has been questioned by the DPRD of Kupang City. However, the case is no longer in discussion along with the quota policy for members of DPRD of Kupang City .

The closed distribution of information is implicated on the proportion of honorary staff composition in the city government, which is based on ethnicity. The honorary

staff is mostly dominated by Rote (24.92 per cent), Timor (24.18 per cent) and Sabut (18.61 per cent). Meanwhile, the composition of honorary staff from Sumba and Alor are still very small. This is aligned with the composition of structural official (echelon) in city government of Kupang that is also dominated by official from Rote (26.6 per cent), Timor (18.8 per cent) and Sabut (14.8 per cent).

Responsibility

Systematic response to public issues and solution standards are not established yet in the City Government of Kupang. The city's responsibility mechanism is still limited to personal and informal approach and mostly centered around the mayor or deputy mayor. One of the mechanisms is setting up a special telephone number to file a complaint to the mayor/deputy mayor. The advantage of this mechanism is that the public can directly address their issue to the mayor or deputy mayor. However, the problem is that, it is not a special hotline, which is published and known broadly by the public. The mobile phone number is a personal number that can only be obtained by an individual or a community group through close personal relationship.

Therefore, the government's response tends to be insincere since it is only based on the closeness of the individual or community group with the mayor or deputy mayor. This situation weakens the government capacity, including the sub-district, district and related SPKD in responding to public issues. The government units are not empowered with their responsibility in the institution.

The poor responsibility of the government is also seen from the low capability in providing public service and responding to public complaints. One of the vital service units in Kupang City is a clean water supply service by Regional Water Company (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, PDAM) Kupang. In 2011, the customer complaints regarding PDAM service reached 192 cases. Customer complaints are usually related to water circulation, broken pipe/leakage, broken tap and increased water meter. Almost every month, the frequency of complaints from the customers on the same case kept on growing. This example shows that customer complaints on PDAM's service are not handled directly and properly despite the formal filing (PDAM Kupang 2011).

The satisfaction level of the community on public service in Kupang City is low, which only reached 47.4 per cent (Bappeda Kupang City 2011). The

dissatisfaction is directed toward the individuals, systems and institutions in the government that are not operating comprehensively. Public dissatisfaction is also apparent on service procedure, certainty and capability of the staff, speed and service time, justice in getting service and certainty of cost.

Joint Initiative of Actors in Local Government

Civil Society Group

The emergence of NGOs and CBOs in Kupang City is quite rapid in terms of number. In 2011, the number of NGOs registered in Kesbangpol Office of Kupang was 199, while CBO was 56. The relationship of the city government to the civil society, especially the NGO, is noteworthy.

The current administration of Mayor Daniel Adoe and Deputy Mayor Daniel Hurek has been actively supported by many NGOs in Kupang from the beginning. This political pair is considered as relatively 'clean' in relation to their commitment in corruption eradication, which was prevalent in previous administration of former Mayor S. K Lerik.

Over the last three years, however, many people, including the NGOs began to notice that the current government started to become an enclosed and anti-criticism government. NGOs still criticize the government but it is not as intensive. The criticism is usually related to the rotation process with political nuance, KKN, in project and current government imaging, especially with the 2012 local official election. In 2011, a civil servant of Kupang City criticized APBD during the NTT policy forum through the *Koran Pos* Kupang. The opinion was deemed as polemic by the City Government of Kupang.

The NGOs' influence to criticize tends to weaken. Several cases related to corruption and regional budget discussion – which often finds a deadlock – are not criticized strongly by NGOs and CBOs whether directly through demonstrations and statements or indirectly through media and extensive public discussion. At the same time, the government has systematically dampen the critics from the civil society through counter-attack of opinions in the media such as advertorials in newspapers and social actions in the community.

The partnership between the government and private sector in providing public service has not been established yet. So far, the private sector has not been given any role to provide important public service, such as clean water and electricity.

This condition is similar to the partnership between the government, NGOs and CBOs, which is quite limited. This kind of partnership seems to be temporary and short term. In the last three years, the development of One-Roof License System with PIAR NTT and formalizing the model of public hearing with Bengkel APPEk and GTZ were the only collaboration projects completed.

The collaboration projects are quite wide and became a national strategy, such as the government's Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordinating Teams (Teim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, TKPKD) where Bappeda is the secretary. This forum actually started with building the synergy between the working programs of NGOs and the city government. The public criticism towards such collaboration is the tendency that it is only on a project basis and the only way to continue is when a sponsor will continue to finance it in the long term. It is also considered limited to joint commitment but not implemented consistently.

Another view on the city government's openness in collaborating with NGOs is that, it may only be limited to SKPD and on neutral issues, such as women empowerment with the Women Empowerment Agency or participatory planning with Bappeda, while keeping closed with more sensitive issues such as eradication of corruption.

The regular meeting between the city government with NGOs and CBOs, whether in a forum or other forms, are not routinely conducted. The meetings are done temporarily and solely ceremonial — not in a systematic agenda to discuss joint issues, share resources and synchronize the program in community level.

Local NGOs and CBOs have a set of advocacy programs toward the marginal groups, including women in poverty, small business, street vendors and HIV/AIDS groups among others. Community empowerment is encouraged through routine discussion and advocacy towards accessing government planning and budgeting process, legal institutions, finance and so on. Besides the NGOs and CBOs, religious organizations are quite active in providing social service to the community especially to each of their followers.

Moreover, although in a quite limited scope, a church organization, Evangelical Christian Church in Timor (Gereja Masehi Ijili di Timor, GMIT), has started an attempt to form an advocacy against government process. This is mainly to guard the community, especially their followers' suggestions, in *Musrenbang*, which are held in district and city levels.

There are a number of international NGOs in Kupang. In 2011, there were 15 international NGOs registered in Kesbangpol Office of Kupang, which work with different focus and approach. Several international NGOs, such as Australia Indonesia Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health (AIPMNH), work on health advocacy for mothers and children. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) focuses on food sustainability mainly in the coastline of Kupang and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) for clean water and governance issues. In general, the main approach of these international NGOs is to collaborate with the city government – such as SKPD, which is involved with the issue – to implement their programs besides collaborating with local NGOs. There is no special or regular forum provided by the city government to the international community or the community to be involved in the decision-making or policymaking process.

So far, the only involvement of international institutions are limited to their collaboration with the government in the policy reinforcement. One of the examples is the support from UNICEF to the Women Empowerment Agency in preparing the regional regulation regarding the role of women, which has already reached the preparation of regional regulation draft.

Local Media

There are quite many local media, whether in print or electronic, in Kupang. Some of them are government-owned, such as Television of the Republic of Indonesia (Televisi Republik Indonesia, TVRI) and Radio of the Republic Indonesia (Radio Republik Indonesia, RRI) or private-owned, such as *Pos Kupang*, *Timor Ekspres* (*Timex*), *Kursor* and several private radios such as Trilolok, Suara Kupang, AVB Radio, DMWS and Ramagong.

Print media, especially *Pos Kupang* and *Timor Ekspres*, have become the most popular form of media to citizens of Kupang for city information. Both newspapers run daily and released in print and online editions. In general, the local media is quite independent in their reporting coverage. On the other hand, the media coverage can be dominated by the government's ceremonial events while investigative reporting is still at the minimum.

The media has been criticized on its inconsistency to critically report issues in Kupang. Media coverage is still impartial in reporting several cases that happened in the city. For instance, some of the written objection by the community or city

government to the media is not reported. In contrast, the editor-in-chief of Timex Daily, for example, has revealed that almost no complaints related to their reports were submitted in the last year.

Table 6.12 Types and Methods of Raising Community Participation

Between below method of raising community participation, which one has been used in the last 12 months?	Frequency		
	Never	1-3 times	More than 3x
Public Information			
Distribution of printed materials (leaflets, newsletters and many more) to the public	v		
Regular meeting of mass media	v		
Presentation and exhibition		V	
The routine program in local mass media	v		
Computer application (website, email, etc)		V	
Miscellaneous. Please state	v		
Public Consultation			
Hearing meeting		V	
Community forum	v		
The community survey		V	
Miscellaneous. Please state.	v		
Public Decision-making			
The discussion group and working group	v		
Public workshop	v		
Miscellaneous. Please state.	v		
Cooperation in the Implementation			
The partnership of government-private sector/government-civil society		V	
Miscellaneous. Please state.	v		
Please state other types.			
One-Roof Licensing			

Source: Bappeda Kupang City 2011

Community Mobilization

Evaluation of public participation, mainly in the development planning process, is not conducted yet by the city government. However, the improvement process towards community involvement in the planning and budgeting process has been implemented.

Since 2011, the Urban Community Empowerment Agency (Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kota, BPMK) and Bappeda, with support from AIPMNH, started to encourage the pre-*Musrenbang*, especially for the women's group. This forum is purposely made to ensure the involvement of women's group and formalizing issues related with the fulfillment of women's rights in health sector (mother and child health) and education. However, this method is still not quite effective in encouraging the accommodation of women's group interest in the higher planning level in district and city. This is because the design of public participation is still focusing on the sub-district level and no continuity in the district and city levels. Unfortunately, control mechanism in all government levels to absorb and accommodate public participation is very low. In this condition, the government system has the full authority to formalize public suggestions to be accommodated in planning and budgeting.

NGOs and CBOs encourage participation through direct intensive assistance to groups or through community forum at the basic levels of community, such as the women, business and marginal groups. Through this forum, the community holds a focused discussion on several issues in order to encourage the community group awareness to participate in government process.

This advocacy participation method established by NGOs and CBOs often faces challenges in convincing the community to be involved in a broad discussion forum. At the same time, the community tends to be pragmatic and concerned on economic benefits of participating in such activity. This situation is also due to a formed habit, where the community commonly receives direct aid program provided by the government or NGOs.

The main obstacles of public participation in the government process can be explained by two reasons: First, the government has not made room for public involvement. Public participation is still represented by the elites or the community figures and formal organizations in the sub-district level. The wider community, especially the marginal groups, are not involved or do not have an extensive access in the government process. Second, the community is starting to get saturated in following the *Musrenbang* process from the sub-district to city level.

The regional medium-term development plan (*rencana pembangunan jangka menengah daerah, RPJMD*) for Kupang City for 2007 to 2012 expresses the development vision of Kupang, which is 'Realizing Smart, Courteous, Civilized, Prosperous and Competitive Urban People'. The main development priority includes education, health, economy, social protection, legal and human rights,

orderliness and security, spatial, environment and infrastructure, administration and public service.

Public consultation involving several sectors to formalize the community development vision has never been done. The only regular mechanism to unite community and government is only at *Musrenbang*. The Regulation of Mayor of Kupang No. **18/2008** on Public Hearing is the only policy that has been prepared by the city government together with several NGOs, including Bengkel APPEK and GTZ, to raise public participation and involvement to reach the city's development vision. However, this regulation has not been used as an instrument to conduct public hearings but has only been limited to be adopted in holding *Musrenbang* in Kupang City.

Summary and Recommendation

The previous discussion explains several challenges and dilemma of local democracy institutionalization in Kupang City. The local democracy institutionalization in the city is dynamic but not focused, partial and cannot be measured yet. The sociopolitical awareness of various stakeholders is likely low due to the low level of education and weak empowerment of political institutions and democracy actors, as well as the economy sector. As a result, there is no complementary connection between democracy institutions and actors. The situation is worsened by the national regulation framework, which is incapable in covering issues in the local context. The local government must be oriented to the local democracy empowerment. Such empowerment should at least be directed to the improvement of sociopolitical awareness of all the stakeholders in order to create a comprehensive connectivity, especially through government policies.

The representative democracy in Kupang City has not shown any linkage among its citizens, representatives and government. The goal of linking authority and accountability in order to make local democracy a success has not been realized yet. The government is unable to develop and implement the process and mechanism related to community involvement, equality of rights in general election, understanding and control of agenda, as well as community participation, prosperity and social justice.

This is not any different with the dynamics of participatory democracy. The developing participatory design in this city is incapable to establish a relation pattern between government and community productively. The government is still

dominated by its own political actors, followed by an administration that tends to be exclusive and not responsive. As a result, public policy becomes biased and poor public service takes place.

Table 4.14 shows the summary matrix of the strength and weaknesses, as well as recommendations in short, medium and long term. This includes several categories including the institutional and procedural dynamics of representative democracy and participatory democracy.

Table 6.13 Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses of Local Democracy in Kupang City and Recommended Actions in Short, Medium and Long Terms

Section	Sub-Section	Issue			Recommendation		
		Strength/Potential	Weakness/Challenge	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term	
Contextual Condition	Social	Horizontal conflict is not manifested.	Social segregation in settlements	Encourage communication between social group and settlements intensely through daily media communication	Facilitate public spaces, which enables the availability of social exchange.	Building the bureaucracy recruitment system based on merit system by considering the social representative	
		There is a cross-ethnic and religion communication that is quite harmonious.	Strong relationship, kinship and primordialism in the government. Domination of certain ethnic and religious in government bureaucracy			Expand the regulation, which prevents the accumulation of a certain identity in one region.	
	Economy	Kupang and Indonesian languages as the accepted mutual language used by all ethnics during communication No majority domination	Public space for openly social interaction is still lacking.				
		Small and medium economy sector grows significantly. Domination of feudal economy (land owner) is reduced.	Domination in economy sector No enthusiasm in big capital investment The development gap between central and marginal sectors	Strengthening the capacity of small and medium economy actors in terms of skill and management Facilitate the availability and	Encourage the capital increase for small and medium business Expand the system of one-door licensing that facilitates the small and	Paradigm and strategic plan of regional development that is not centralized but also evenly and encourages the economy	

			government. Evaluation of Elected Officials Progressive advancement of local government's leader is not measured. Difficult to gain progress of regional government leadership due to rotation in bureaucracy Step and mechanism in making regional regulation are violated and not following the stage and procedure. The critic from civil society towards government and DPRD tends to be on the output and not the process so the process creates an unguarded output. The chance of corruption for DPRD and local executive opens wide. The government is still the				
	Evaluation of Elected Officials Has an instrument of annual performance evaluation Performance Accountability Report (<i>Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja, LAKIP</i>) Support from religious and ethnic institution is quite significant towards the good local governance. The leadership solidarity is maintained; the assignment and work classification between mayor and deputy mayor is well conducted						
Participatory	Actor and	There is an attempt for city government		Encourage the affirmative action for	Prepare the instrument for participation space	Design more extensive	

Democracy	Institution	(mayor/deputy mayor) to receive the complaint from people through their mobile phone number and there is a Regulation of Kupang Mayor No. 18/2008 on Public Hearing. There is an attempt to involve religious organization (religious cooperative) to implement community economy empowerment program Civil society organizations (NGOs, CBOs) develop quite good especially in number. Local media, whether print or electronic, develop quite sufficient in number.	dominant actor. Other actors, such as the civil society, cannot balance the domination of government actors in several process and government management. It is still quite a strong orientation that state document is confidential, which cannot be accessed by public	social marginal groups to be involved in policy process	for actors in grassroots	participation system
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	<p>Process</p>	<p>To encourage the community involvement especially the female group; currently it has started to develop pre-Musrenbang specially for women</p> <p>The development of raising community participation method that is done by NGO/CBO</p> <p>Availability of development document of Kupang City whether long term or short term</p>	<p>The involvement room of non-government actors in the government process is still not open broadly</p> <p>There is no room or mechanism that guarantees access and control from community against their participation result.</p> <p>Start to appear the tendency of saturate on development planning process (<i>Musrenbang</i>)</p> <p>The organization of local government can be said that it is not yet democratic from participatory democracy</p> <p>Public consultancy towards various development documents is still not conducted by the City Government of Kupang adequately.</p>	<p>Build more diverse room and mechanism of participation</p>	<p>Encourage social tracking so there will be a monitoring body on the proposal given by the community</p>	<p>Encourage more popular representative system</p>
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Jombang Regency

M. Anshori, Abdul Gaffar Karim and Ali Minanto ⁵⁰

Introduction

Jombang Regency is a region with unique characteristics — within the regency, there are several social elements that are complementary to one another. In general, external community tends to consider Jombang as a *santri* (Islamic students) region. Numerous major and well-known *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) are located in this regency. The most well-known *pesantren* are Tebuireng, Tambak Beras, Denanyar and Peterongan. These four areas are mostly called as the axis of four cardinal directions of *pesantren* in Jombang. A number of national figures who came from Jombang also show the strong characteristic of a *santri*, such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and Emha Ainun Najin. The *santri* they actually play a balanced role with *abangan* (people who practice a much more syncretic version of Islam) in Jombang. Socially, there is no significant domination between *santri* and *abangan* in Jombang. There is a separation of social roles between *santri* and *abangan* in this regency. As such, it is not a surprise that Jombang is sometimes called as a ‘watermelon’ region because it seems like a watermelon. It looks green from the outside (*santri*), but it actually is red in the inside (*abangan*). Even the word Jombang is often interpreted as a combination of two words, ‘*jo-bang*’, an abbreviation of *ijo* (green) and *abang* (red).

Such social map is one that will be tracked further in this chapter. The condition of local democracy in Jombang will be discussed together with unique characteristics of this regency (i.e. history, sociopolitical dynamics and the figure of their leader), which contribute in making the democracy in the local scope works. This chapter

⁵⁰ Research and report drafting of this chapter is performed by M. Anshori and Iva Cahyaningtyas. Preliminary writing of this report was performed by M. Anshori, with the supervision and adaptation by Abdul Gaffar Karim, and editing by Ali Minanto.

explores the representative democracy and participatory democracy in Jombang as a derivative impact of that discussion. It discusses the number of characters in relation to the local power in Jombang in the context of representative democracy and participatory democracy. Moreover, this chapter also presents public perception of Jombang regarding the quality of democracy in their region and their efforts in maintaining the democracy in the long, medium and short terms.

The discussion in this chapter is divided into four main parts. The preliminary part presents the setting of local democracy in Jombang Regency. It covers the demographic, geographic, sociopolitical data in general. The next part discusses the institutional actors who are a part of local politics in Jombang. The third main part in this chapter discusses representative democracy and participatory democracy in this regency. The last part presents and recommends the assesment that has been conducted in Jombang Regency.

The data used to set up the discussion of this chapter was obtained from primary and secondary sources. Data collection was conducted from November 2011 to March 2012 by joint assessment team (one national assessor and two local assessors) using the methods of focused group discussion (FGD), interview and observation. This assessment involved several elements and key stakeholders that exist in Jombang Regency. Not less than 53 people were involved in this assessment whether as a respondent or active participant in the organized FGDs.

Contextual Condition

History of Jombang

As a political and government entity, Jombang is considered as a relatively young regency. However, sociologically, Jombang, to some extent, has a long history. The history of Jombang is very closely related to a big kingdom in East Java, which has an important meaning in Indonesian history, Majapahit Kingdom. In the glorious days of Majapahit Kingdom, Jombang was the gate to its capital city. Two entrance gates at the west and south side of the capital city of Majapahit are located at Tunggorono Village and Ngrimbi Village in Jombang. The trail of connection between Jombang and Majapahit (or Mojopahit) in the past is very obvious in the names of villages/districts, which begins with Mojo as the prefix; for example, Mojoagung, Mojowarno, Mojojejer, Mojotengah, and Mojongapit among others.

After Islam emerged and Hinduism of Majapahit started to fade away, Jombang took its role as a vital region, together with the coastal area in East Java, in

spreading this new religion. In the period of Islam Mataram Kingdom, since the seventeenth century (different from the Hindu Mataram in the seventh to tenth century), Jombang became a part of the kingdom that was based in Yogyakarta until the rule of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC*). Later, Dutch colonialism put Jombang as a part of Mojokerto Regency, which was established in 1811. Under the Mojokerto Regency, the status of Jombang was *kawedanan*, an administrative/government unit that supervised several districts. The former area of Majapahit Kingdom, Trowulan, is a part of *kawedanan* Jombang with a status of *onderdistrict afdeeling* (sub-district government).

During this era, the sociopolitical characteristics of Jombang started to establish, which still exist today. The ethnic group of Tionghoa and Arab started to form a territory, which can still be seen. The heritage of historical buildings, such as Hong San Kiong Temple in Gudo, established in 1700, is also present until now. The characteristic of Jombang as a 'santri city' was also established in this era by having a number of *pesantren* built that became the origin of other *pesantren*. One of the major *pesantren* built in this era was owned by Kyai Asj'arie, who has a son named Hasjim Asj'arie, who played a critical role in the establishment of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)⁵¹ in 1926 and the national movement in the 1940s. His son, Wahid Hasjim, was one of the founders of Republic of Indonesia in 1945 through his role in the Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI*) before proclamation and Ministry of Religious Affairs after proclamation.

In 1910, Jombang obtained its status as a regency. The regent of Mojokerto, Raden Adipati Ario Kromodjojo ordered the separation of Jombang as a single government and appointed Raden Adipati Ario Soerjoadingrat as the first regent in Jombang. The format of government in Jombang was continued until the establishment of Republic of Indonesia in 1945. Law No. 12/1950 on Establishment of Regency in East Java Province confirmed Jombang as one of regencies in East Java Province.

⁵¹ NU is a traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia.

Geographic and Zonal Condition

Jombang Regency lies in a very strategic location, as it is located in the central part of East Java and it is traversed by Primary Arterials of Surabaya, Madiun and Primary Collectors of Malang–Babat. In the east side, it is adjacent to Mojokerto Regency. In the south, it is adjacent to Kediri Regency and Malang Regency as the tourism destination and 'university city', as well as industrial city. In the west, it is adjacent to Nganjuk Regency and in the north, to Lamongan Regency. Geographically, Jombang Regency is located at the south of equatorial line between 50 20' 01" to 50 30' 01" East Longitude and 070 24' 01" and 070 45' 01" South Latitude with an area of 1,159.50 km². The capital city of Jombang Regency is located at ±44 m above sea level. The access to Jombang Regency is quite easy and reachable by public transportation (bus and train). The travel time to Jombang only requires two-and-half hours from Juanda International Airport, Surabaya or Abdurrahman Saleh Airport in Malang.

Figure 7.1 Map of Jombang Regency



Source: Wikipedia.org


Topographically, Jombang Regency is divided into three sub-areas:

- a. *North Region.* Kendeng limestone mountains—half of the area is a plain and the rest is hilly. It covers Plandaan, Kabuh, Ploso, Kudu and Ngusikan districts.
- b. *Central Region.* The south side of Brantas River, mostly an agricultural land, is suitable for rice and non-rice crops as the irrigation is adequate. The area covers Bandar Kedungmulyo, Perak, Gudo, Diwek, Mojoagung, Sumobito, Jogoroto, Peterongan, Jombang, Megaluh, Tembelang and Kesamben districts.
- c. *South Region.* A mountainous land, suitable for plantation crops; It covers Ngoro, Bareng, Mojowarno and Wonosalam districts.

Administratively, Jombang Regency is divided into 21 districts that consist of 302 villages, four sub-districts and 1,258 hamlets. Looking at the composition of villages/sub-districts, Sumobito District has the largest number with 21 villages. However, looking at the width of the area, there are three districts that have the widest area: Wonosalam District with 121.63 km², Plandaan District with 120.40 km² and Kabuh District with 97.35 km².

Figure 7.2 Sub-districts in Jombang Regency

No.	District	Width of Area (km ²)	No. of village/subdistrict
1	Bandar Kedungmulyo	32.50	11
2	Perak	29.05	13
3	Gudo	34.39	18
4	Diwek	47.70	20
5	Ngoro	49.86	13
6	Mojowarno	78.62	19
7	Bareng	94.27	13
8	Wonosalam	121.63	9
9	Mojoagung	60.18	18
10	Sumobito	47.64	21
11	Jogoroto	28.28	11
12	Peterongan	29.47	14
13	Jombang	36.40	20
14	Megaluh	28.41	13
15	Tembelang	32.94	15
16	Kesamben	51.72	14
17	Kudu	77.75	11
18	Ngusikan	34.98	11
19	Ploso	25.96	13
20	Kabuh	97.35	16
21	Plandaan	120.40	13



Source: BPS Jombang 2010

Population and Social Conditions

The population of Jombang was 1,348,199 based on 2009 data. From the existing 21 districts, Jombang District has the biggest population—148,494 people or around 11 per cent of total population of Jombang Regency. The gender ratio of population of Jombang Regency in 2009 was 100:44. For every 10,000 females, there were 10,044 males.

Population density of Jombang Regency tends to increase. Population density in 2008 was 1,014 people/km². One year later, the population density increased to 1,159 people/km². The highest population density is in Jombang District, being the capital city of Regency, and the lowest density districts are Wonosalan, Kabuh, Plandaan and Ngusikan.

Although it is known as 'santri city', Jombang actually has two major groups of population: *santri* and *abangan*. In general, the *santri* group refers to people who are close to *pesantren* community and they are regarded as people who have knowledge and practice Islam better than the second group. The *abangan* group refers to people who tend to stand on value of Javanese life (*kejawen*), although they are Moslem, Christian or followers of other religion. These two groups tend to have different sociopolitical orientation. However, there is almost no record of conflict among these two groups directly and openly. Jombang is known more as 'santri city' because *santri* dominates the image of Jombang. This is related to many *pesantren* and Islamic figures that come from Jombang, including the President of Republic of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wachid, Nurcholish Madjid and Emha Ainun Nadjib. In reality, politics in Jombang is controlled more by *abangan* group. Ever since the reform era, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) continues to win the number of seats in Local House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), even in the local official election. Meanwhile, *santri* group is divided into several political parties, such as The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) and United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). Quite many figures that are identified with such political parties chose PDIP as the basis of their political contest.

The common language used by the Jombang people is Indonesian and Javanese. In daily conversation, Javanese is very dominant. Basically, almost in every layer of community, age and education, they can speak very good Javanese; the majority of Jombang people are of Javanese ethnic. Other ethnic groups, Tionghoa, Madura, Flores and other minority groups generally understand and are fluent in using Javanese. The domination of Javanese is not only in daily language. Javanese group controls 85 per cent of local positions, both as government employees and other public titles.

In general, Jombang is a fairly secure area. The crime level is not really high. The number of crime reported decreased from 1,191 cases in 2008 to 1,019 cases in 2009. However, there are a number of reports related to domestic violence (*kekerasan dalam rumah tangga*). The data owned by the Women Crisis Centre (WCC) of Jombang shows the increase in number of domestic violence from 86 cases in 2010 to 96 cases in 2011. This increase can be related to the dissemination of Law No. 23/2004 on Annihilation of Domestic Violence, which provides awareness to a victim of domestic violence to report the problem, although it is limited to an institution such as WCC.

The Human Development Index (HDI) of Jombang Regency tends to increase. The HDI in 2010 was 72.86. In 2011, this number increased to 73.74. This value was composed of life expectancy index for 77.16; literacy rate index for 92.92; average years of schooling index for 49.34; and purchasing power parity (PPP) index for 65.68. In education sector, the literacy rate index of Jombang Regency was higher than the national rate. The achievement status of literacy rate index of districts across Jombang Regency was already at the top level category⁵².

Meanwhile, the average years of schooling index (*menghitung rata-rata lama sekolah, MYS*) in 2011 for districts across Jombang Regency showed a less satisfying result. Only Jombang District, which was in an upper middle group, had an index value of 68.41. Therefore, it can be concluded that the achievement status of MYS index of districts across Jombang Regency was still in low level category. There were 15 disadvantaged districts in MYS index achievement: Sumobito (47.80), Mojoagung (48.81), Mojowarno (49.34), Bareng (43.87), Wonosalam (36.47), Ngoro (42.41), Bandar Kedungmulyo (45.07), Tembelang (43.14), Kesamben (42.08), Megaluh (47.68), Ploso (44.74), Kabuh (37.07), Kudu (37.07), Ngusikan (44.07) and Plandaan (40.14).

In general, the education level of Jombang Regency is relatively low. The average years of schooling for 15 years old and above since 2009 to 2011 did not have any significant increase—It just reached 7.4 years, which means it is not far from the primary school graduates. That average number is below the national average, which already achieves 7.9 years and far behind compared to the highest figure, which is 10.4 years. Nevertheless, the average year of schooling is higher than the average figure in East Java, which is 7.2 years.

⁵² Final Draft Report of Human Development Index of Jombang Regency 2011

Table 7.1 Education Indicator of Jombang Regency

Indicator	Primary School (SD/MI)	High School	
		Junior (SLTP/MTs)	Senior (SMA/MA)
Net Enrollment Rate	94.16	80.79	69.85
Gross Enrolment Rate	104.97	102.14	94.74
Transition Rate	119.47	105.58	100.4
Drop Out Rate	0.07	0.29	0.96
Repeats Rate	1.98	0.52	0.33
Completion Rate	99.99	99.91	99.98
Pupil/Class Ratio	23	34	33
Class/Room Ratio	1.04	0.98	1.15
Pupil/Teacher Ratio	14	11	10
Pupil/School Ratio	151	268	307

Source: Education Database of Jombang Regency 2011

The number of enrolment in schools has the tendency to decrease in the higher level of education. This shows that not all of school age children are pursuing their education. The number of dropouts tends to increase in higher education level. Several factors influence the low education index – literacy rate index and years of schooling – are accessibility, budget and culture.

In general, the life expectancy index is in the upper middle level across Jombang Regency except for Wonosalam District. The life expectancy index for Wonosalam District in 2010 was only 61.98. Although it increased to 62.02 in 2011, it still had not reached the upper middle group. The low life expectancy index for Wonosalam District was caused by the short life expectancy rate since birth (mother and child mortality, as well as various disease and healthy living behavior) in Wonosalam District, of which on average was only 62.21 years.

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita based on the current price in 2010 has increased. In 2009, the GDP per capita based on the current prices was Rp. 10,411,474 and grew to Rp. 11,693,937 in 2010. Based on the GDP figure of Jombang Regency in 2009, the sectors that contributed largely were trade, hotel and restaurant industry for 33.79 per cent. This was followed by agriculture (30.54 per cent), processing industry (11.39 per cent), services sector (12.16 per cent), financial, banking and corporate services (4.04 per cent), transportation and communication sector (4.10 per cent), building sector (1.98 per cent), mining and excavation (1.57 per cent), and electricity, gas and

clean water sector (1.12 per cent). Although the GDP per capita showed an increase, the population of the poor in Jombang Regency remained relatively high. This condition indicates the income gap in the community or in district level of Jombang Regency.

Table 7.2 Percentage of Poor People in Jombang Regency

Year	Number of the Poor (%)
2005	26.8
2006	26.59
2007	22.14
2008	22.05

Source: Bappeda Jombang Regency 2010

Economics and Finance

The most dominant sector of economy in Jombang is agriculture. About 31 per cent of economy in Jombang is supported by agriculture sector, followed by trade, hotel and restaurant, services and other industries. The agriculture sector greatly benefits from fertile soil condition. An important factor that contributes to soil fertility in Jombang is the heavy river flow and natural resources as the result of volcanic eruptions. It is believed that the eruptions of Mt. Kelud have possibly contributed to heavy flow of Brantas River, Konto River and other rivers, which flow from south-southeast to north, entering the area of Jombang Regency. Land utilization in Jombang Regency is dominated by ricefields that occupy 42.19 per cent of the total area of regency. The rest is shared by settlements/residential areas for 24.08 per cent, forest for 19.46 per cent, moor for 11.62 per cent and other parts for utilization for 2.65 per cent. In rural areas, the majority of infrastructure development is led to support agricultural potential. Optimization of the construction of water irrigation and reservoir is fairly regarded. It is recorded that there are 42 rivers and 19 reservoirs in this regency. This makes Jombang capable in producing around 410,000 tons rice, 120,000 tons corn and 10,000,563 tons sugar cane. Non-staple food crops, tubers, clove or coffee are also produced in large amounts like rice, corn and sugar cane.

The success in production is also balanced out with the process of market penetration in its own area. Several revamps have been conducted to traditional markets, which in total has reached 18 markets. However, in the last three years, Jombang has started to give a wider space for investment in industrial sector. The area along Brantas River is one of the provided areas for the expansion of the

industrial sector, as well as areas in Mojoagung and Diwek. The expansion policy in certain points is balanced by the expansion in several public spaces for the community. Almost all districts have public spaces for the surrounding community to interact. The position of Jombang as the west entrance for Surabaya and meeting point of transportation traffic from several areas, such as Lamongan, Kediri, Bojonegoro and Nganjuk, makes the economic pulse of Jombang increasingly felt. The same is evident in stadium and sport facilities, meeting rooms for public, as well as city parks. Nevertheless, every year, several districts in Jombang are still not fully free from flood threats. One of these is caused by the less than ideal river management.

Another obstacle is the emergence of land conflict. Often, the state and community is in an opposite position when the state wants to acquire the community land for the construction of infrastructure. Presidential Decree No. **36/2005** gives a sort of legality for the state to acquire a land by force. Practically, the objection from community to release their land cannot always be solved by the government of Jombang in a smooth and legal manner. A case that occurred in **2011** was about land acquisition for road toll construction in Mojokerto Kertosono. Other land dispute cases also happened in several locations, such as in Ngoro and Wonosalam. The dispute parties usually involve the community, local government, DPRD member or military institution. The most prominent case are the disputes in Ngoro, which involved the community and military, the community dispute related to *waqf* land with Madrasah Aliyah Negeri 5 and the dispute between Ngampungan and Karanganyar community in relation to the **110** ha land management.

The state has a fairly significant budget limitation in providing public services. Like in other areas in Indonesia, regional/local revenue still highly relies on the Balance Fund given by the Central Government. In **2008** budget year, the total incoming budget was Rp **808** billion. The biggest income came from a balance fund that reached Rp. **672** billion, while regional revenue only contributed for **97** billion. Meanwhile, in **2009** budget year, total incoming budget was Rp **882** billion. The biggest income came from the balance fund that reached Rp **712** billion. Regional revenue was only Rp **90** billion.

In **2011**, Jombang received more than Rp. **1** trillion in regional revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, APBD*). The allocation of amount by APBD is sometimes criticized by several sectors, including community-based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organization (NGOs) and academics, especially when it is related to the big difference between

direct expenditure and indirect expenditure. The comparison can reach a ratio of 30:70. In 2011 APBD, the expenditure budget for development was only Rp. 136,003 billion or around 17 per cent of the total APBD for the year. Meanwhile, indirect expenditure, including employee payroll reached Rp. 815,511 billion (about 75 per cent). Another criticism from the discussion of APBD is also directed to the lack of community participation or the incapability of DPRD in designing public budget policy that is more pro-community.

Table 7.3 Sub-national Budget of Jombang Regency in 2007-2009

Year	APBD (in Rupiah)		
	Direct Expenditure	Indirect Expenditure	Total
2007	339,037,890,133	418,195,435,685	757,233,325,818
2008	365,417,607,851	559,629,392,961	925,047,000,812
2009	362,160,653,975	608,511,719,925	970,672,373,900

Source: Bappeda Jombang Regency 2010

Table 7.4 Development of GDP, GDP per Capita, and Regional Income for Jombang Regency in 2009-2010

PRDB, PDRB per Capita and Regional Revenue for Jombang Regency 2009-2010		
Details	2009*)	2010*)
I. Regency-based Current Price		
1. PDRB (million Rp)	12,451,499	14,060,872
2. PDRB per capita (Rp.)	10,411,474	11,693,937
3. Regional Revenue (billion Rp)	11,977,454	13,538,585
4. Regional Revenue per capita (Rp.)	10,015,096	11,259,569
5. Total Mid-year Population (people)	1,195,940	1,202,407
II. Regency-based Constant Price		
1. PDRB (billion Rp)	5,972,302.39	6,327,278.13
2. PDRB per capita (Rp)	4,993,814	5,262,177
3. Regional Revenue (billion Rp)	5,850,083,60	6,200,954
4. Regional Revenue per capita (Rp.)	4,891,620	5,157,117
5. Total Mid-year Population (people)	1,195,940	1,202,407

Source: BPS Jombang 2011

Actor and Institution

The two main social groups in Jombang, *santri* and *abangan* are the main critical makers of Jombang culture. The culture of *santri* is marked by the presence of a number of *pesantren*, which highly colored the civil society of Jombang. Normally, *santri* group is affiliated with NU, a religious organization, which was established by great scholars from Jombang, including KH Hasyim Asjari. There are four big *pesantren* in Jombang: Pesantren (PP) Tebuireng, PP Tambakberas, PP Denanyar and PP Darul Ulum Peterongan. Each *pesantren* has its big influence in the community, so they all have a fairly solid bargaining position in the government. However, the power of *santri* and *pesantren* are not coherent. Each *pesantren* has different political interests.

Abangan group has its basis outside *pesantren*. This group is spreading even wider compared to *santri* group and is united by a modern affiliation, such as community organization or political party. The cohesiveness of this group is in fact supported by the personal identification of that modern institution. If the *santri* group tends to spread their affiliation with political party, then *abangan* group tends to have the affiliation centralized, such as the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) in the past or PDIP at this era. A political party is an important political institution in Jombang.

NGOs are also a main actor in politics of Jombang. They play a quite significant role in making a policy by the state. The political climate in Jombang is rather heated, as NGOs play quite an active role in politics. About 76 NGOs are recorded in National Unity and Community Protection Agency (Kesbanglinmas) of Jombang Regency. These groups have different backgrounds and orientation of their movement, such as NGOs for labor, farmers, women and urban poor communities.

Other than the presence of NGOs, another actor outside the government that has significant role in politics of Jombang is the community organization (*ormas*). There are at least two community organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, which are highly influential in making the democracy in Jombang works. NU is a major group, which fairly determines the process of making and determining the public policy. This is reflected from pro-contra raised by NU members, in relation to the release of Draft of Regional Regulation of Prohibition of Prostitution in Jombang for period 2006–2007. This shows that NU has a significant role in building a discourse that can be converted into a public policy. However, in the context of

prostitution case, for instance, it cannot detach from the political interests and pressure from women activists⁵³.

The collaboration between government and local actors are established dynamically. There is communication between NGO activists and government sector although it is non-formal. This relationship, however, cannot guarantee the harmonization to create better Jombang in the future. On one hand, the presence of NGO plays a significant role in articulating the idea and interests of the community, but on the other hand, this group also has its own interests. The evaluation of the performance of the NGOs is conducted to determine, which NGO activists are fighting for community interests and which NGOs only care about the interests of their institution. In an interview, Samsu Rijal explained⁵⁴

Even with the term of NGO or activists in NGO or activists which all this time put themselves as the element of the movement, they actually still often communicate with them (government), although it is non-formally. Yet the problem is what the foundation to build their communication with people's representative is, in what motivation and what the objective is? This what makes it different with the previous period, where NGO or activist of the movement really communicated based on the interests to bring changes closer or influence the performance of house member to be more effective.

Rijal suspects that there are personal motivations within NGO activists when they are partnering with government, which in this case is the local parliament. Comparing to the previous role of NGOs, which articulate the interests of assistance (constituent), Rijal said that today, NGOs tend to prioritize their personal interests. Therefore, the relation between NGO activists with a legislative member represents more their personal interests on meetings. Nevertheless, according to an interview with Gus Zuem⁵⁵, there are several NGOs in Jombang that are quite consistent in fighting for the assistance of community groups. NGOs become the watchdog observing the performance of house members and fighting for the community interests. This role necessitates NGOs to maintain its distance from the government, so their independence and integrity is solid. A close relationship with

⁵³ Summarized from FGD on 8 December 2011

⁵⁴ Interview with Samsu Rijal, Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

⁵⁵ Interview with Gus Zuem, Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

the government will send the NGOs to not having any bargaining position and can result to powerlessness in performing a supervision and advocacy of community interests⁵⁶.

Representative Democracy

Electoral

Jombang Regency consists of 21 districts. During 2009 legislative election, the region was divided into six constituencies: constituency I consisted of Jombang and Peterongan districts; constituency II included Diwek, Jogoroto and Sumobito districts; constituency III covered Bareng, Mojoagung, Mojowarno and Wonosalam districts; constituency IV consisted of Bandar Kedungmulyo, Gudo, Ngoro and Perak districts; constituency V included Kesamben Megaluh and Tembelang District; and constituency VI included the districts of Kabuh, Kudu, Ngusikan, Plandaan and Ploso. This regional classification was relatively not changed compared to the previous general election. However, the number of DPRD seats that are competed for increased to 50 seats from the previous 45. The addition of five seats was due to the increasing population of Jombang, which in 2009 general election, has reached to more than one million people⁵⁷. The constituency division was not applied in organizing the local (regent/governor), presidential and legislative elections, both in the provincial and central levels.

In 2009, there were 24 political parties that passed the verification phase and contested in the legislative election in Jombang Regency. The use of open proportional system in 2009 legislative election received many criticisms. One of them was the expensive political cost that must be borne by participants of the general election. One legislative candidate must spend up to hundred millions of rupiah to earn a vote from the voter. The open proportional system that required the most vote forced legislative candidates to compete and attract public sympathy. One of their attempts was by organizing high-cost activities. Besides the high cost, this situation also triggered the implementation of money politics.

As in the national level, electoral mechanism in Jombang regency was organized by the Regional Election Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD). KPUD consisted of five commissioners who short-listed the qualified candidates who were able to pass the assignments given by the selection team. Some of these

⁵⁶ Interview with Gus Zuem, Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

⁵⁷ Article 26 Paragraph 2 Letter G, Law No. 10/2008 on General Election

were explaining the program, implementing the budget and determining the schedule of election in regency/city. This commission was funded by the state revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara, APBN*) and APBD. KPUD Jombang held the local official election (*pilkada*) that was held together with East Java local leader election on 23 July 2009. Besides Jombang, there was a regency/city in East Java that held a local official election in the same time as the provincial election. Three pairs of candidates who competed to be the regent and deputy regent in Jombang Regency were (1) Drs. Ec. H. Nyono Suharli Wihandoko–Drs. Abd. Halim Iskandar, M.Pd, (2) Drs. H. Soeharto M.Si.– HM. Mudjib Musta’in, SH, M.Si. and (3) Drs. H. Suyanto–Drs. H. Widjono Soeparno, M.Si. Meanwhile, in the provincial local official election of East Java, there were five pairs of candidates who competed in becoming the governor: (1) Khofifah Indar Parawangsa–Mudjiono, (2) Sutjipto–Ridwan Hisjam, (3) Soenarjo–Ali Maschan Moesa, (4) Achmady–Suhartono and (5) Soekarwo–Syaifulloh Yusuf.


In general, the implementation process of 2009 general election in Jombang Regency went freely and openly. All the stages in general election—from the registration of voters, candidacy, campaign, voting and vote calculation and determining the result—were held based on the determined schedule and plan. The efficiency of the election process was reflected from not having serious untoward events or incidents, such as riots or anarchy. Nevertheless, there were several protests regarding the implementation of election as reported by an alliance of political parties, Cross–Political Party Forum (Forum Lintas Partai), which suspected that several violations occurred. Among the identified possible violations were favoritism of bureaucracy, covert campaign, use of suspected fake school certificates by legislative candidates, stealing during campaign (assemble giant billboards), misuse of schools for campaign, money politics, suspicion of conspiracy with Voting Organizer Groups (Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara, KPPS), witnesses and groups who led the political choice of community in voting room⁵⁸. They mostly complained that there were suspicions of ballooned ballots in legislative election in Jombang. The alleged violation of cheating by KPPS and witness in polling stations (*tempat pemungutan suara, TPS*) 01 of Cangak Hamlet, Sumbernongko Village and Ngusikan District forced KPUD of Jombang to hold another voting on 13 April 2009. Violation also happened in the implementation of local official election on 23 July 2009 when a certain group

⁵⁸ Reports on Violation of Implementation of 2009 Election of Jombang Regency; sent by 21 political parties as election participants who joined Forum Lintas Partai

distributed money and tens of tons of rice to all districts in Jombang Regency except for Wonosalam District. The Election Supervisory Committee (*Panwaslu*) was having a difficulty in exposing this violation which involved almost all candidates in local official election of Jombang Regency⁵⁹. Although there were still many violations, all candidates accepted the result, which was determined by KPUD of Jombang Regency, so it did not trigger any dispute or riot.

From the 1,343,199 population (672,615 female and 675,584 male) of Jombang Regency in 2009, only 961,945 people were recorded in the permanent voters list (*daftar pemilih tetap, DPT*). From that number, 679,335 voters used their voting rights and about 282,610 voters, who were registered in DPT, did not use their rights. KPUD of Jombang Regency also recorded the number of valid votes reached 631,715 in local official election, while the invalid votes were 48,937. Figure 7.3 shows the comparison of percentage between valid and invalid votes.

Figure 7.3 Valid and Invalid Votes on Regional Direct Election (*Pilkada*) of Jombang Regency 2008




Source: KPUD Jombang 2008

Meanwhile, the percentage of voter participation in 2009 local leader election of Jombang Regency is shown in Figure 7.4.

⁵⁹ See 'Panwas Indikasikan Uang Dibagi lewat kepala Desa', <http://www1.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/07/22/22593022/panwas.indikasikan.uang.dibagi.lewat.kepala.desa>. See also 'Beras dan Uang Disebar', Koran SINDO 23 July 2009

Figure 7.4 Voter Participation in Local Election: Jombang Regency in 2008



Source: KPUD Jombang 2008

The candidate pairing of H. Suyanto – H. Widjono S. that was nominated by PDIP obtained the most votes (353,255), surpassing two other pairs, Nyono Suherli – H. Halim Iskandar who were nominated by Golkar, The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS)(241,678 votes). The other pair, H. Soeharto–HM. Mudjib Musta'in, who was supported by the coalition of Democrat, Nahdlatul Ummah Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ulama, PPNU), The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB), Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), PDS, Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR), Socialist Party of Indonesia (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI), Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party (Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia, PNBK), The Regional Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah, PPD), Patriot Pancasila and The New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, PPIB) obtained 36,782.

These three pairs raised the same initiatives related to allocation of APBD that was pro-community, providing more jobs and employment, aid for the peasant group and small to medium industrial sector and bigger village fund allocation. Another issue brought up as a campaign theme was the aid for *madrasah*⁶⁰ teacher and mosque (*musholla*) caretaker, better basic health service and adequate room for community in controlling public policy.

⁶⁰ The Arabic word for any type of educational institution, either secular or religious (of any religion), which became the root of Indonesian education.

Governor Election of East Java Province


In the provincial local election, the registered number voters in DPT in Jombang who used their rights in the first round of gubernatorial election was 963,482 . This number showed discrepancy of 1,537 voters compared to DPT in regent election. In the preliminary round, the number of voters who did not use their voting right was more than 38 per cent, exceeding the number of votes earned by each pair of candidates. The high number of voters who abstained was due to several technical problems, including the tight schedule of election that caused community exhaustion and some economic factors.

No absolute vote by any of the candidate pairs resulted to a second round of local official election. Two pairs that went to this round were Khofifah Indarparawangsa–Mujiono and Soekarwo–Syaifulloh Yusuf. Interestingly, the number of DPT, which previously was 963,482 people in the first round, has been changed to 970,291 people. This showed that the number of DPT in the second round increased by about 6,800 people. Although the number of DPT increased, the political participant decreased by 19.73 per cent (545,224 voters). The increase in number of abstained votes occurred across the regional scale for 46 per cent from total voters across East Java. Voters turnout also became a national phenomenon with highly significant number in 2009 legislative election, which was 49,677,076 votes. Meanwhile, the invalid votes reached 17,488,581.

2009 Legislative General Election


The 2009 legislative election in Jombang was followed by 24 political parties with a total of 606 candidates, of which 167 of them were women. Out of the total 976,122 voters, only 696,761 (71.34 per cent) used their voting rights, with breakdown of 617,567 valid and 79,194 invalid votes. Meanwhile, the number of voters that did not use their rights was 279,743 (28.66 per cent). From the total DPT, the number of women who voted reached 491,351 (50.3 per cent). However, in reality, out of this figure, there were only 364,174 (74.11 per cent) women who exercised their voting rights. The remaining 127,251 (25.89 per cent) did not use their rights.

Figure 7.5 Valid and Invalid Votes of Presidential Election in 2009 of Jombang Regency




Source: KPUD Jombang 2009

Figure 7.6 Voter and Non-voter Legislative Election in 2009 of Jombang Regency



Source: KPUD Jombang 2009

Figure 7.7 Voters' Gender on Legislative Election in 2009 of Jombang Regency



Source: KPUD Jombang 2009

The trend of abstaining from voting received significant attention from the KPUD regency, which tried to encourage active participation from community in using their voting rights. Several methods were done to promote general election, including endorsing academics, community groups, women and handicapped/physically-challenged groups, mass organizations, religious organizations, professional organizations, as well as the completeness of general election implementation, such as Voting Organizer Group (Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara, KPPS) and Sub-district Elections Committee (Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan, PPK). Table 7.5 shows the data recapitulation of local leader election of Jombang Regency and East Java Province.

Table 7.5 Recapitulation of Local Official Election of Jombang Regency and East Java Province

Description	Legislative Election	Regent Election	First Round of Governor Election	Second Round of Governor Election
Number of DPT	76, 122	961, 945	963, 482	970, 291
Women in DPT	484, 771	not registered	not registered	not registered
Men in DPT	491, 351	not registered	not registered	not registered
Valid Vote	617, 567	631, 715	621, 791	524, 233
Invalid Vote	79, 194	48, 937	57, 465	20, 991
Voters in DPT who used their rights	696, 379	679, 335	679, 256	545, 224
Voters in DPT who did not use their rights	279, 743	282, 610	282, 715	424, 078

Source: KPUD Jombang 2009

The Election Result in Each Constituency

In the legislative election at Jombang Regency, PDIP was the major political party with the highest representative in DPRD with 12 seats. Meanwhile, the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) had significant votes (12 seats) in 2004 election decreased to seven seats in 2009 election. The decreasing vote of PKB was believed to be due to protracted internal conflict. Golkar and Demokrat also earned seven seats each. The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) had four seats, People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, HANURA) had three seats and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI) had one seat. Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB) earned the same number of

seats—two seats for each party. Table 7.6 details the number of votes in 2009 DPRD of Jombang Regency ⁶¹.

Table 7.6 Number of Votes in 2009 DPRD of Jombang Regency

No	Political Party	Number of Seat	Name of Elected Candidate		Constituency
1	Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)	12	1	Suhartini	I
			2	Drs. Joko Triono	I
			3	Drs. Cakup Ismono	II
			4	Choirul Anam ST	II
			5	Matali	III
			6	Suyadi	III
			7	Donny Anggun S. Sos	III
			8	H. Marsaid	IV
			9	Suharto	IV
			10	Kartono	V
			11	Wulang Suhardi	VI
			12	Bahana Bela Binanda	VI
2	Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat)	7	1	Hartono, SH. M. Hum	I
			2	Mas'ud, S. Si, ST, MMT	I
			3	Drs. Fauzie Makarim	II
			4	Drs. H. A. Tohari	III
			5	Imam Hanafi S. IP	IV
			6	Minardi	V
			7	Mulyani Puspita Sari	VI
3	National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)	7	1	HM. Farhan	I
			2	HA. Munif Sufri	II
			3	H. Mas'ud Zuremi	II
			4	Ah. Sholikhin Ruslie SH	III
			5	Aminuddin Nuh	IV
			6	Miftakhul Huda S. Ag	V
			7	Munir Alfanani SH	VI
4	The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Gol ongan Karhaya, Golkar)	7	1	Lukman Oesin SH	I
			2	Dra. Hj. Surati	II
			3	H. Ismanhudi	III
			4	Drs. Ec. Nyono Suherli W	IV
			5	Drs. Mastur Baidlowi M. Si	IV
			6	H. Mansyur	IV
			7	H. Sudarso. SH	VI

⁶¹ Decree of General Election Commission of Jombang Regency No. 188.4. 53/20/KPU/2009 on 17 May 2009

No	Political Party	Number of Seat	Name of Elected Candidate		Constituency
5	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP)	5	1	Nurul Burhan	I
			2	Achmad Silahuddin	II
			3	Fadelan SE	III
			4	Drs. HM. Chamim Supaat M. Hi	IV
			5	Yasjudan	VI
6	National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN)	4	1	Irwan Prakosa SH	I
			2	H. Dukha	II
			3	H. Saichu SE	III
			4	Isman	V
7	People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura)	3	1	Kartijo SH	II
			2	H. Iknan	III
			3	H. Iwan Setiabudi S. Ag. SH	V
8	Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS)	2	1	Ir. Hidayat Darminto	II
			2	Rochmat Abidin STP	V
9	The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB)	2	1	H. Sugiyono	IV
			2	Ir. Siswo Iryana	VI
10	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI)	1	1	Untung Sutigyo ST	III

Source: KPUD Jombang 2009

Political Party in Jombang Regency

PDIP is the winning party that dominates 24 per cent of seats in DPRD of Jombang Regency. The domination of this party is getting stronger when several important positions are occupied by their cadres, such as chairmanship of DPRD and executive titles (regent and deputy regent) of Jombang Regency. The map of political power becomes less balanced because the existing political tradition tends to be pragmatic and temporary, depending on the interest of certain elites. This

can be seen from the election of regent and deputy regent, as well as legislative election, which was full of violations⁶².

The domination of certain political party and absence of significant control against the government hinder transparency, public accountability and counter-productivity for democracy building. The nature of democracy that necessitates the presence of openness and freedom in expressing opinion, in fact, is working the other way around because the political party only works when it is approaching election and not prioritizing political education to build political awareness. The absence of political party in several real problems, which are faced by the community, creates hesitation against their capability in articulating aspiration and public interest. The only supervision that can be expected is only through a political party, which succeeds in making their cadres the local parliament member.

Performance Evaluation

Function, assignment and authority of DPRD are ruled by series of regulations that become the standard performance of the parliament member. DPRD has three main functions: legislation, budget and supervision. The legislation function is realized in the activity of making local regulations; budget function is done in the discussion and approval of budget draft (APBD); supervision function is done to DPRD against the implementation of local regulation and utilization of public budget. In conducting the assignment, DPRD refers to several regulations, of which, one of them is setting the code of ethics and obligation of a DPRD member.

There are 50 DPRD members of Jombang Regency who belong to eight factions: PDIP, PKB, PPP, PAN, Demokrat, Golkar, Justice Concern and HANURA Unity and Justice Faction. Although so far, no institution has been assigned to give the assessment to DPRD members as the people's representative, their performance is still supervised. The community has expressed several criticisms especially related to DPRD, which has not optimized its function in carrying out its assignment. One of the frequent criticisms is the incapability of DPRD in guarding the public budget that should be pro-community. DPRD is assessed for not maximizing their initiative rights to make and produce legal policies. For example, from tens of proposed initiative drafts of regional regulations, only two are legalized and the

⁶² Around 21 political parties formed Cross Political Party Forum to report various violation practice of legislative general election.

remaining drafts are in the study process⁶³. Several proposed draft of regional regulations are not even touching on the main requirement of community in relation to health and education assurance. In addition, DPRD also fails to protect the community interest in relation to being the victim of land acquisition for toll construction⁶⁴. In terms of ethics, DPRD is also under the spotlight due to its involvement in several uneducated cases, such as replacing license plates from official to personal plates and an infidelity case done by one member of the parliament. Several violations, which are indicated to have been done by members of the parliament, do not necessarily granted sanction of dismissal. In fact, a member of DPRD who has been convicted for corruption has not been sanctioned. This uncertainty is due to the case, which is considered not legally enforceable (*in kracht van gewijsde*)⁶⁵.

Participatory Democracy

Local Government and Participatory Democracy

Participatory democracy has a unique character, which is openness. Citizens can use this openness to express their ideas and thoughts freely. Openness is shown by the executive and legislative governments by producing pro-community policy. The people of Jombang idealize openness as a channel to connect people's voice with people's representative (legislative). People can give their contribution in policymaking process. Therefore, all policies produced by DPRD of Jombang Regency involve participation of community and more oriented toward the fulfillment of their needs.

After the 2009 election, the deliberative channel was distributing people's aspiration, which never existed previously. This flaw occurred due to several reasons; among these was the unpreparedness of people's representatives to meet their people. This was also triggered by the people's representative who was less

⁶³ See 'Fraksi Jombang produktif usulkan Jombang' <http://www.pdiperjuangan-jatim.org/v03/index.php?mod=berita&id=4176>

⁶⁴ See 'DPRD Batal Bentuk Pansus Tol' <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/share/?act=TmV3cw==&type=UHJpbNq=&media=bmV3cw==&y=JEdMT0JBTFNbEVO=&m=JEdMT0JBTFNbV0=&d=JEdMT0JBTFNbZFO=&id=MjQ2ODc1>. Also see 'Angket Pembentukan Pansus Jalan Tol Kandas', http://www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=112122:angket-pembentukan-pansus-jalan-tol-kandas&catid=95&Itemid=146

⁶⁵ See 'Sudah Jadi Terpidana Masih Terima Gaji', <http://m.poskota.co.id/berita-terkini/2011/07/19/sudah-jadi-terpidana-anggota-dprd-masih-terima-gaji>

qualified in managing and fulfilling people's needs⁶⁶. Participatory forum often come from the initiative of the people concerned with certain policies by inviting members of parliament to a forum. In this context, Jombang's people is quite active and progressive in initiating groups to discuss and talk about certain problem, which then make it as an input for making a policy. This kind of forum can extend from village to urban⁶⁷

The presence of people's forum is also supported by the executive of Jombang Regency. The people are given the space to participate in making the draft of regional revenue and expenditure budget (*rencana anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, RAPBD*) through a forum called Discussion on Development Planning Consultation (*Musrenbang*) that is held from the village level to district to regency. Through the Community Empowerment and Local Government Agency (*Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Pemerintah Daerah, BPMPD*), the people are prioritized to be involved in a *Musrenbang* forum by stimulating their enthusiasm to be present in this forum; thus it will reach a defined quota and fair representation (attended by religious, women, youth figure, etc.)⁶⁸. Nevertheless, participation from community in *Musrenbang* still leaves a gap when the result, which has been guarded from village to regency level, turns out that it does not give any significant impact to community. Therefore, it requires an evaluation whether the implementation of such forum has been effective enough in accommodating the people's aspirations and needs or it is solely set as a mere formality.

Joint Initiative of Actors in Local Government Level

Jombang is known as 'santri city' with strong religious value. The majority of NU group in this city gives such unique color in religious ritual. The NU tradition also contributes in creating the spirit of diversity – considering that Jombang is very heterogeneous – not only *santri* but also *abangan* and several other religious groups. This diversity creates different political and cultural constellation in Jombang. So far, the regional government has been very accommodating in the existing diversity by creating harmony inter-groups and inter-religious followers. However, there are still obstacles that can disturb such harmony, for instance, in practicing religious ritual. Differences, which is prone to trigger a conflict, needs a dialogue room so it will not create any misunderstanding⁶⁹.

⁶⁶ Interview with Subaidi, Chairman of PKB Jombang, 8 December 2011

⁶⁷ FGD at Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

⁶⁸ Interview with Yulita (BPMPD), Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

⁶⁹ FGD and interview with Head of National Unity and Community Protection Agency of Jombang, Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

One aspect that poses risks on diversity relates to sexual orientation. The perspective on this subject lies on the faith and religious value; thus, making a policy related to such topic spurs serious dilemma. The policy, which has been made, is expected to be the solution in anticipating the disagreement in perspectives. The people's forum becomes a room to facilitate differences in perspectives that can be processed as an input for policymakers⁷⁰. In addition to differences in sexual orientation, another emerging issue in Jombang is the growing imbalance in education level where international education can be accessible to some, but not to many. This difference causes access to education becoming discriminative as it is not distributed evenly to the people of Jombang⁷¹.

As a *santri* city, Jombang has its major strength in the sociocultural sector for democracy. The majority of NU people and the presence of *pesantren* in this area make them the people's pillars of strength. There are at least four big *pesantren* in Jombang: *Pesantren* (PP) Tebu Ireng, PP Tambak Beras, PP Denanyar and PP Darul Ulum. Each of these *pesantren* has strength and extensive political bargaining power to influence the government. *Pesantren* can act as the pressing power to fight for pro-community policy. However, each *pesantren* sometimes has their own interests; therefore, it is difficult to unite them and make them the 'force' when dealing with policymakers. In addition, *pesantren* does not have any information that can be used as their argument when dealing with the government. That is why the position of *pesantren* needs to be reestablished⁷².

The NGO is an influential civil society actor in Jombang. To this date, there are about 63 NGOs, which are registered in the National Unity and Community Protection Agency. NGOs are a bit powerful in performing their bargaining position towards government policy. Regularly, NGOs give inputs to executive and legislative policymakers whether through forums provided by the regional government of Jombang or upon own initiative. Forums, which have been provided all this time by the regional government, are considered as less capable in accommodating problems that should have been solved between NGOs and the government. The failure to synergize NGOs and government causes NGOs to take political action on the streets. This approach is considered as more effective in making their voice heard⁷³.

⁷⁰ Interview with KH.Zaimudin AS'AD PP Darul Ulum Jombang, PP Darul Ulum Jombang, 5 December 2011

⁷¹ FGD, Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

⁷² Interview with KH Zaimudin Asad PP Darul Ulum Jombang, 5 December 2011

⁷³ Summarized from interview with Head of National Unity and Community Protection Agency, Rizal and FGD result; FGD, Rumah Makan Henny, 8 December 2011

Another highly significant actor in the constellation of democracy in Jombang is the media, such as Jawa Pos Group and Radar Mojokerto. The presence of media is a major indicator that information is disseminated in Jombang. News presented by Radar Mojokerto is regarded as fairly accurate and can be counted upon as the result of monitoring team from the Ombudsman's Office. The strategic position of media balances democracy building. Although sometimes they receive warnings as the news coverage put the government in a corner, it does not affect their independence⁷⁴.

Involvement of private groups in building Jombang highly determines the direction of democracy in this area. Collaboration with private sector has been pioneered since 2008 in the form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Conserving Environment Program (Program Kemitraan dan Bina Lingkungan, PKBL). There are at least 10 private institutions that join CSR-PKBL focusing on projects, such as construction of road facilities, health, training and construction of settlements for poor family among others. Cooperation with the private sector is very important in building Jombang⁷⁵.

Community Mobilization

One of the keys that determine the success of regional development is public participation. Jombang Regency gives room for participation for its people through *Musrenbang*, which is done from village to district level. The people are granted rights to express their ideas and opinions, which can affect the policymaking process. NGOs in Jombang also assist the community in encouraging participation through several methods, such as holding discussions within the framework of critical education. This effort, however, is often hindered by the advent of apathy from citizens. Ideally, participation from the people should become the spirit that guides the direction of development in a region. The vision and mission of a region sometimes only serve as a political propaganda during the general or local official election, instead of making it as the goal to meet the needs of community completely.

The vision of a region is a reflection of goals and a description of the entire condition of Jombang's people. In the existing condition, such vision is regarded

⁷⁴ Interview with Jalal, Editor of Radar Mojokerto, 8 December 2011

⁷⁵ Interview with Head of Regional Development Planning Board (Bappeda) of Jombang, Bappeda's Office, 5 December 2011

more as a jargon used during the election of regent and deputy regent as it has not characterized the entire needs of the community. In Jombang, a vision is mentioned in the Medium-Term Regional Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah, RPJMD*) 2009–2013 and passed as a regional regulation under Regional Regulation No. 18/2008.

Summary and Recommendation

The quality of democracy in Jombang is very much influenced by the society's nature of open geographical and sociological landscape. Even though Jombang is considered a remote area with limited direct access to civilization in the past, it is located in a strategic point of land transportation route that connects Surabaya as a coastal city with other areas to Central Java. Jombang's long history of civilization trajectory has influenced and encouraged many people's orientation beyond their original vicinity. This contributes to the society's character, where the people of Jombang are more apt in handling internal conflict. A solid social consensus is also quite apparent in the pattern of relations between two prominent groups in Jombang: *santri* and *abangan*⁷⁶. In the context of this social consensus, *abangan* group is given a bigger role in the governmental bureaucracy, whereas *santri* group has taken an equally bigger role in the social and society-related affairs. The modern democracy practices in Jombang have gained many advantages from the social consensus that was established even before Indonesia existed as a country.

In the electoral sphere, the political power of *abangan* group has always been considered as dominant, whether it is in the legislative or executive point of view. The legislative election post-New Order era has always been won by PDIP, a political party with *abangan* as the social base. Their power in the executive election is quite significant. The candidates of *bupati* and *vice bupati* that PDIP supports never face any obstacles in winning against their rivals during elections. This prominent role of *abangan* group is yet to receive any significant challenge from *santri* group, due to the latter's ubiquitous participation throughout more than one political party that also experience internal conflict.

⁷⁶ The *santri* are a cultural 'stream' of people of Javanese ethnicity who practice a more orthodox version of Islam. The *abangan* is the opposite; it refers to the population of Javanese Muslims who practice a much more syncretic version of Islam. For further reading, see Geertz, C. *The Religion of Java*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

The domination of PDIP in electoral democracy benefits in the context of a stable government. The relation and interaction between the executive and legislative is bound by their support for one political party, although the dominance of the executive (compared to legislative) is often criticized. However, the ability to pre-eminently dominate governmental bureaucracy may have affected the decreasing motivation of other politicians to encourage participatory democracy directed at the society. This is not a problem of Jombang exclusively although this condition is very sorely felt due to the straightforward, high-spirited participation nature of its people, as a result of a robust civil society role. Participatory democracy in Jombang has been focused on the civil society-related affairs instead of the political bureaucracy affairs; for instance, in the *Musrenbang* mechanism or a public hearing between the DPRD and the society. This society participation has utilized various civil society channels, including the *pesantren*, which are a specific and common sphere of *santri* group. Thus, if the representative democracy in Jombang is dominated by *abangan* group, then the participatory democracy is dominated by *santri* group. This social consensus seems to be working as a temporary solution and a middle ground for both groups. However, in the future, strengthening democracy, refinements and improvements are needed, which is explained under the recommendation section.

Recommendation

Representative Democracy

Representative democracy in Jombang revolves around a national context, regulation-wise or the currently ongoing political party condition. Therefore, the understanding on the representative democracy problems in Jombang is quite similar with the understanding on problems in other areas. Generally, there are several similar problems:

1. *The execution of elections needs constant refinement.* The execution and regulations of the practice of election have some problems that need immediate attention. For instance, the relations between KPU and electoral supervisors, as well as other organizations in Jombang, are yet to be strengthened in order for them to present a quality election. A classic problem when it comes to election in Indonesia is the inadequate collection of voters' data, which resulted in the extra work for KPU to make sure that no voter loses their right to vote. The socialization of election has also been mediocre—KPU has not been providing enough

information about elections. Meanwhile, other organizations including political parties barely take any role in it.

2. *The role and function of political parties as a channel in regard to the society's interests is far from being satisfactory. We have to emphasize that this is not only a problem in Jombang exclusively. However, it is important to remember that political parties in Jombang have a more organized pattern of regeneration and recruitment compared to most of the other areas due to the obvious lines of social bases for prominent parties. These social bases are in association with the division of *abangan* and *santri* (which has been elaborated in this chapter). Because of this well-organized pattern of regeneration, Jombang is expected to have political parties that can carry out the society's interests and hopes. This is what we, especially, are all waiting for.*

Long-term Recommendation

In order to improve the electoral regulations, steps that are required are those within the national scale. Election stakeholders should be advised to carry out their roles and functions effectively, as well as improving the voters' data in order to guarantee their voting rights. Political parties have to be encouraged to take upon their role on political education as well as to present a better way in articulating their interests. These points need to be regulated strongly through political party and election policies and regulations. Thus, the refinement of political party system and electoral system needs to be nationally adjusted and standardized in a long-term manner. One of the problems that we face in Indonesia is the organization of political parties and elections that are carried out in a short-term fashion, where problems are fixed temporarily with no guarantee that those problems will not happen again. This short-term fix is susceptible to system manipulation practices by political elites for their own partial gain. As a result, the political party and election system cannot function effectively to contribute on the institutionalized democracy and tend to be a plaything for political elites instead.

Medium-term Recommendation

Besides the national scale, several steps in the local scale in Jombang are considered a requirement. The step that needs immediate action is the strengthening of understanding and capacity building of politicians in Jombang. Why is this considered to require an immediate action? It is because, mostly, quality

of politics is very much influenced by the actors' capacity. The required capacity is including the political understanding about the electoral democracy process in Indonesia, political communication, as well as the legislative process.

Short-term Recommendation

Assistance is urgently needed for the newly-elected politicians of the 2014 election in order to start the capacity building. The political parties and the election stakeholders also need to be assisted in order to improve their understanding regarding the political process and democracy. The linkage between the elected politicians and their constituents also needs to be strengthened.

Participatory Democracy

The system for participatory democracy is already available. In the national level, *Musrenbang* functions as a formal space for the involvement of participatory democracy. *Musrenbang* is a channel that could also function very effectively because of its origins of support from a legal policy and sustainable funding. The level of society's participation is also quite high. Civil society groups show quite an outstanding performance in assisting the society's participation in the process of formulation, implementation and supervision of policies and regulations.

However, a formal channel such as *Musrenbang* does not always prove to be effective because of the 'battle of interests' among politicians in the district level, specifically among politicians in the DPRD and executives. The bottom-up process that has been going from the village level is influenced by the political powers from the higher levels. The Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA) does not always have the political capacity to supervise this bottom-up process, especially because the bureaucratic interest and political interest are too dominant in the local area planning. On the other hand, this bottom-up planning often collides with the top-down planning process from the high levels. Despite those, the district level planning is a part of the provincial planning while the latter in turn, is a part of the national planning. The synchronization of these two streams is proven to be difficult to accomplish.

In the long-term, challenges on this matter will risk the society's level of apathy towards policy participation. At the very least, the society's level of trust towards the formal process in the country will decrease even lower.

Long-term Recommendation

It is crucial to pay attention on the way of thinking among bureaucrats as well as society—that participation is the most important element of a strong democracy in the long run. The process of participatory decision-making and bottom-up approach has to be put as the essential basis for democracy to work on a substantial rate. It also has to be carried out alongside a sustainable political education and socialization.

Medium-term Recommendation

It is important to start the process of improvement in the planning process in the national level in order to minimize the collision between bottom-up and top-down processes. In accordance to recommendations for the representative democracy, the strengthening of bureaucrats' and politicians' capacity is a crucial requirement to undertake. The most important capacity that they must possess is the ability to articulate their interests and aggregations. This has to be an ongoing process alongside the empowerment of society control (including the involvement of mass media and social media) in order to put more pressure on the national sphere.

Short-term Recommendation

A regular (monthly) meeting between the executive and legislative has to be encouraged, especially when there is a new policy to discuss. Along with that, the quality of *Musrenbang* has to be improved; thus the amount of society's aspiration could be accommodated better. The improvement of *Musrenbang*'s capacity needs external actors (such as academics) as facilitators to support the methodological process in the articulation and aggregation of society's interests.

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Surakarta City

Amalinda Savirani, Akbarudin Arif dan Akhmad Ramdhon⁷⁷

Foreword

Surakarta or Solo is a region that has a special position in Indonesian history. Back in the kingdom era, Surakarta is one of the major kingdoms in Java and in Indonesia. At present time, the leadership of Ir. Joko Widodo, who is widely known as 'Jokowi', has made Surakarta known to the entire country since 2004 through the innovations that he has implemented in this region. This chapter explains the democracy in Surakarta and answers two main questions: How is the local democracy condition in Surakarta? To which extent, the special characteristic of this city (historical, social and political dynamic, as well as its leader) contributes to the work of democracy? The derivative question of these two main questions is how does the representative democracy and participatory democracy work in Surakarta? Is there any special characteristic – in the context of representative democracy and participatory democracy – in the democracy practice of Surakarta? How does the Surakarta community assess local democracy and what are their efforts to maintain such democracy in long, medium and short terms?

This report is divided into four main parts: The first part discusses the historical context, the presumed socio-economic and politics of Surakarta in contributing to representative democracy and participatory democracy practice. The second part maps the main political actors in Surakarta and the network relationship among those actors. The third part describes the practice of representative democracy and participatory democracy in Surakarta. For participatory democracy, it uses a case study on the success of one of the policies in Surakarta – the arrangement of street vendors (*pekerja kaki lima*). The last part contains the main summary and

⁷⁷ Research and report drafting of this chapter is performed by Akbarudin Arif, a NGO activist from KOMPIP, and Akhmad Ramdhon, a lecturer in Sociology, Universitas Sebelas Maret, with the supervision and adaptation by Amalinda Savirani.

description of the Surakarta people when conducting their own assessment in identifying democracy strengthening steps at Surakarta in short, medium and long term.

This report is a result of a field research for four months from October 2011 to February 2012. Several data collection techniques are used in gathering the data. Those techniques are focus group discussion (FGD), interview, observation (where the researcher is a part of the daily life of urban people) and a study on secondary data, such as documents, press clippings including studies on several scripts, and research reports about Surakarta.

Setting of the local democracy of Surakarta

Brief History of Surakarta

Surakarta has a long history since the existence of kingdoms at the archipelago in the fifth century. The role of Surakarta as a political entity was apparent during Dutch colonialism. The label given to Surakarta was always related to the kingdom in Yogyakarta. One of the most significant political momentums was the agreement between the Dutch colonial government with Mangkunegaran Palace in Surakarta and Kasultanan Palace in Yogyakarta. The agreement was related to the division of kingdom and transfer of Mataram-Islam Kartasura palace on 1 February 1746. Surakarta was always associated with a kingdom, which had close ties to the colonial government; Yogyakarta was the opposite. Together with Yogyakarta, Surakarta was labeled by the colonial government with *vorstenlanden* or kingdom regions. Under the reign of Kasunanan, Surakarta grew as a land-based feudal economic society with a unique social class between the royal member, the aristocratic (*wong gedhe*) and common people (*wong cilik*).

The palace is the central of Surakarta's life, whether from political side, cultural and land tenure. All lands in Surakarta belong to the palace. After the independence of Republic of Indonesia, half of the lands was given to the nation and the other half became the property of Surakarta City Government. The transitional process created many disputes on land ownership (*bumi daleman*). A different land status also created an ownership conflict: An empty land without a clear identity of the owner can be occupied by residents and transform it into settlements or land for business area. The government conducted a land acquisition process by giving compensation to the people in the form of fund as a replacement of the building value, land or asset.

The construction of Surakarta's current urban space is a part of the history's legacy. The power of traditional palace becomes the reference to establish values, whether political, economic or cultural. Moreover, colonial policies in the past also influenced the contemporary condition of Surakarta. For instance, the urban area of Surakarta was constructed by applying the kingdom philosophy, *papat kiblat limo pancer*, which means 'the effort to harmonize human world/micro-macro/universe'. As for its demographic situation, the colonial government managed the ethnicity-based population issues. The region was classified into race-based settlements (*wijk-wijk*) in accordance with the classification of residents that was organized in the past. This policy gives an impact in conflict among the existing social classes and it still can be perceived until now (eds Mulyadi and Soedarmono 1999).

After the Independence Day, Kasunanan Hadiningrat was defined as an integral part of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI). Furthermore, NKRI defined Surakarta as the Municipality/Level II Region and as an administrative region of Central Java Province on 16 June 1946. At once, Surakarta became the coordination centre of surrounding area, which was the former area of Kasunanan Surakarta, such as Klaten, Boyolali, Sragen, Karanganyar, Wonogiri and Sukoharjo.

Administratively, the area of Surakarta is 44.06 km² and consists of five districts: Laweyan, Serengan, Pasar Kliwon, Jebres and Banjarsari. The population size in 2009 was 500,642 with 257,279 (51 per cent) females and 243,363 (49 per cent) males (BPS Surakarta City 2010). The male population was 5.41 per cent lower than the female. The density of the city was 11,370 people/km², which made Surakarta the city with the highest density in Central Java.

Lying in the middle of Central Java Province, Surakarta has a strategic position. It is reachable from several directions: through the Adi Sumarmo Airport, Tirtanadi Bus Terminal, Jebres Railway Station and Purwosari to Balapan Railway Station. The road infrastructure is intensively developed over time to facilitate the daily mobility of Surakarta people and the surrounding area (Solo-Raya). This condition makes the dynamics of Surakarta difficult to be separated from a wider context.

Social structure

The population of Surakarta is dominated by Java ethnicity, together with minority ethnics, Arab and Chinese descendants. As explained above, the Dutch colonial government made the segregation pattern in the settlements based on the physical location. The location of Pasar Kliwon is dominated by Arab ethnic, while Loji and Sar Gedhe are dominated by Chinese descendants.

The domination of Java culture in the life of Surakarta people makes it as a base of the city reorientation in promoting the tourism industry in this city. Today, the tagline of Surakarta is the 'Spirit of Java'. The historical aspect of Javanese is the main material to promote the city tourism. This is followed by the policy to use ancient Javanese alphabet in naming the street, building, signboard and uniform. Teaching of local content and Javanese language becomes a part of curriculum from primary to secondary education. Although Java dominates the social life of Surakarta, the ethnicity-based classification never becomes a fundamental main factor in the political life. Political parties never put their recruitment strategy and policy orientation based on ethnicity.

Besides ethnicity, the social dynamic of Surakarta is also determined by religious and economic factor. It is recorded that there are **402,221** Muslims, **41,955** Catholics, **79,100** Christians, **1,594** Buddhists, **492** Hindus, **111** Kong Hu-Cu followers and **32** followers of other beliefs. There are **80** spiritual beliefs. The number of worship houses in the city in **2009** was **780** units consist of **582** mosques, **185** churches, four temples, seven monasteries and two shrines. On one hand, the multicultural background is the characteristic of Surakarta but on the other hand, it also brings challenge for the management of multicultural and multi-religion life.

There are many factors that set off a competition among urban people in various issues that could trigger a bigger conflict. The religion and ethnic diversity, which becomes the legacy supposedly, is able to be used as an asset to develop tolerance. Surakarta City experiences almost a periodical conflict with a different scale. It never really ruins the city from physical, social and mental aspect of the people. The last conflict has occurred in the form of social riot on **14-15 May 1989**. Surakarta had to bear losses for Rp **457** billion. The building that was burnt was **159,758m²**, the damaged building was **119,388m²** and the building that was closed down for business was **215** units (Waspada 1999). Lastly, the burning of city hall, which took place on **20 October 1999**, also confirmed that Surakarta is a city with a short fuse as it is prone to conflict. There were many speculations to

explain this incident. The most dominant was the external factor, which was beyond Surakarta, such as politics in national macro level that gives ammunition to trigger a conflict in Surakarta. The questions that we can carry on are: Why did Surakarta become an arena for the conflict expansion in national level? Why was Surakarta very easy or prone to be the provocation target of outsiders? These two questions, however, are not a part of the evaluation report on the democracy in Surakarta.

The susceptible condition to conflict cannot be separated from the early condition and transition that was experienced by Surakarta. At post-decentralization, many gaps that could lead to a potential conflict are anticipated in a better way. Open attitude by the city government – access development of public spaces, intense consolidation between stakeholders, policy priority so that the revenue imbalance will no longer be a big issue to the government assurance in various assistance pattern – are all designed as a strategy to handle bad possibilities from the memory conflict of community. Apart from these, decentralization that opened political canals makes it a more accommodating mechanism on several demands from the community, as well as the communication that is no longer in one way.

Economy

The economic status of Surakarta cannot be detached from Solo–Raya region (Klaten, Boyolali, Sragen, Karanganyar, Wonogiri and Sukoharjo). Surakarta City as the central of economic activities in Solo–Raya region positioned itself as the central of human resources and economy for this region. The record of Bank Indonesia of Surakarta indicates that the money distributed in Surakarta can reach up to Rp. 30 billion per day (Primartantyo 2011). If this figure is calculated by the number of working day in one year (i.e. 330 days), the amount of distributed money in Surakarta from the private sector is more than Rp. 13 trillion. If the figure from the private sector is compared against the regional revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, APBD*) of Surakarta in 2011, for instance Rp 1 trillion, then the money circulation of private sector in the economy life of Surakarta is 13 times bigger than the public sector (government). We can also say that the contribution of the public sector in the dynamic economy of Surakarta is not really significant. If we continue this logic, Surakarta can live without any intervention from the government.

The number of investments in Surakarta City continues to increase. In 2011, the figure reached to Rp. 1.67 trillion from the target of Rp. 2.5 trillion. The investment runs in major private sector, such as property/hotel industry (Rp.

1.347 trillion), medium business (Rp. 205.9 billion), small business (Rp 115.34 billion) and micro business (Rp 9 billion) (Solopos 2011). The high amount and number of investments made Surakarta City and awarded of the Investment Award 2011 as one of the best cities in capital investment, after the investment achievement as of August 2011.

The number of urban economic player consists of formal sector⁷⁸ for 6,169 units, where the medium business component is 706 units and small business is 5,463 units. Meanwhile, the informal sector⁷⁹ is eight times bigger than formal sector, which is 48,507 units. If the number of formal and informal business is summed up, there will be 54,676 micro, small and medium businesses in Surakarta. The informal sector in micro, small and medium level continues to grow significantly over the period of 2010 (Cooperative & Micro, Small, and Middle Business/Usaha Mikro, Kecil, Menengah, UMKM Division 2011).

Macro businesses, particularly the export products—textile, furniture and ceramic—are the biggest economy buffer of Surakarta. According to the Statistic Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) data in 2009, the furniture export was Rp 898.350 million and textile export was Rp 268.426 million. This number keeps on increasing based on the statistic data in early 2010, where it reached Rp 313.823million: Textile was Rp 55.937 million and furniture was Rp 54.140 million (Surakarta Government 2010).

Small and medium businesses provide big contribution to the structure of macro economy of the city. In 2005, this sector shared 26.42 per cent of total income of Surakarta City and in 2010, 21.98 per cent. The trade sector in 2005 reached 23.82 per cent and in 2010, reached 25.04 per cent. In total, the income per capita for Surakarta City is Rp16,352,463.41 billion per year and if it is break down to months, the number is Rp1,362,705.28 billion (Surakarta Government 2010).

Currently, Surakarta prides itself as the city that boosts the service sector, particularly in the incorporation of Meeting, Invention, Conference, Exhibition (MICE)–based tourism. This sector is joined with Cultural and Calendar Event, which is tied with global interest in various events that is developed by the city. It is expected to move the macro economic activities of the city (GTZ 2009).

⁷⁸ consists of poor people who provide goods and services to other poor people, such as sidewalk vendors, water sellers, plastic, paper, and metal recyclers and pedicab drivers

⁷⁹ characterised by high degree of ownership and control of industry by certain groups of people

In the economic development framework of the city, Solo held various events that make it as the venue to promote the tourism sector. In 2012, the Solo City Government held at least 47 festival events. For international music events, there were Solo International Ethnic Music (SIEM) and Solo Internasional Performing Art (SIPA). There was also Solo Batik Carnival (SBC), which is held regularly each year. Other events in Solo during the same year were the International Tea Festival, Solo Keroncong Festival, KREASSO (Kreatif Anak Sekolah Solo/Solo Student Creativity), Gunungan Charity Boat Race, Solo Batik Fashion, Kethoprak Festival, Pesona Balakembang, Solo Menari (Dancing Solo), Kemah Budaya (Cultural Camp), Solo Kampong Art, Festival Dolanan Bocah (Traditional Children Games Festival), and Javanese Theatrical (Bakdan ing Balekambang). In the same year, Solo was also trusted to be the host for three international conferences – Asia Pacific Historian Conference, Federation for Asian Cultural Promotion Conference, and Solo Investation Tourism Trade Expo (SITTEX).

Despite the progressive activity of the City Government in tourism and MICE, and the high turnover of money circulation in this city, poverty rate continues to grow. The income per capita in 2008 reached Rp1,101,707.76 billion and in 2009, reached approximately Rp14,665,886.47 billion . The population poverty line also continues to increase. In 2009, the poor population was 107,000 while in 2010, it was 125,000. In one year, the increase of poor population reached 18,600. This means, in 2011, the poor population in Surakarta has increased by 7 per cent (Seputar Indonesia 2012).

Politics

Actors

The involved actor in political life of Surakarta consists of state and non-state actors. The uniqueness of state actors in Surakarta is their leadership figure, which is the tandem of Ir. Joko Widodo and FX Hadi Rudyatmo in their two leadership periods (2006-2010 and 2010-2015). They are able to manage the aspirations of civil society, adapting it in the daily performance of the government and institutionalized it. On the other hand, the civil society, which is very dense in Surakarta, also has the openness to negotiate and contribute in the development activities in the city. Consequently, the relationship between the government and the civil society is accommodating rather than conflicting. This aspect makes Surakarta different from other regions.

State Actor/Public Institution

The number of government structure of Surakarta City and other state system total to **40** units, including judicial institution, legal and law enforcement. The center of city government is located in the city hall that controls the Regional Working Unit (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, SKPD) under the coordination of a mayor and deputy mayor together with regional secretary. Outside the regional secretary (*sekretaris daerah*), Surakarta has government organizations in five districts and **51** sub-districts, in order to give their service to **145,537** heads of family that consist of **595** harmonious citizens (*rukun warga, RW*) and **2,669** harmonious neighborhood (*rukun tetangga, RT*).

Besides these public institutions, the Local House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) serves as the political representative of community—an institution that resulted from the general election. There were **40** DPRD members after the **2009** general election. As a house member, their basic duty is authorization of legislation, budgeting and monitoring. The presence of house member, besides representing their political party, is also for public interest on representative and regional basis. The mechanism of public interest is then aspirated through and by the house member who designs and makes the policy to community in the city level.

Bureaucracy works are supported by institutions that involve the community, such as the Institute for Community Empowerment (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan, LMPK) as the government supporting agency. This is a volunteer agency and runs in community sector but more in the corridor to succeed the development plan from the government. The other supporting institutions include School Committee that is also a community organ—voluntary with the objective to smoothen the teaching process at schools. In the city level, there is Health Council (Dewan Pendidikan) and Education Council (Dewan Kesehatan) that helps in formalizing the health and education policy. Moreover, there is Woman and Child Independent Committee (Komite Independen Perempuan dan Anak, KIPAS), Integrated Service Centre for Women and Children (Pelayanan Terpadu Perempuan dan Anak, PTPAS), as well as task force groups, such as the Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordinating Teams (Team Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, TKPKD). These institutions show that there is a sectioning between state/government with the people and how the meeting of these two elements can take place.

Non-governmental Actor

There are many non-governmental actors in Surakarta city. There are non-governmental institutions that gain support from national and international development organizations, in the form of community forums and independent associations in the community. There are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Surakarta and they act as a thrust for the dynamics of urban people in general and in various areas. Consortium for Monitoring and Empowering Public Institutions (Konsorsium Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat untuk Monitoring dan Pemberdayaan Institusi Publik, KOMPIP) for instance, is a NGO, which engages in promoting local democracy based on good governance principle and human rights. Pattiro also engages in the same issue. Gita Pertiwi is involved in the environmental sector. Krida Paramita Foundation and Women's Solidarity for Humanity and Human Rights (Solidaritas Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan dan Hak Asasi Manusia, SPEK-HAM) are engaged in women empowerment sector. Social Analysis and Research Institute (SARI) and Love Our Children (Kepedulian Untuk Konsumen Anak, Yayasan, KAKAK) engage in women and child strength building. Indonesian Foundation for Legal Service (Yayasan Pengabdian Hukum Indonesia, YAPHI) and Advocacy for the Transformation of Society (Advokasi Transformasi Masyarakat, ATMA) are conducting legal advocacy activities. Konsorsium Surakarta focuses on poverty reduction issue. The Institute for Rural Technology Development (Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan, LPTP) has activities in developing the appropriate technology. The Public Policy Institute (Lembaga Studi Kebijakan Publik, LeSKAP) and Institute for Research and Empowering Society (INRES) engage in research and community development and many more. There are other NGOs such as those with mobile commitment in promoting interfaith and multicultural activities.

Meanwhile, the activity of non-governmental actors in the form of community forums is also providing colour to the political dynamics of Surakarta. One of them is Solidarity Forum for the Peripheral People of Surakarta (Solidaritas Masyarakat Pinggiran Solo, SOMPIS) that becomes the umbrella for 22 urban poor organizations with approximately 3,300 members from 11 urban marginal sectors. Paguyuban Masyarakat becomes the communication forum for Chinese community. The Community for Cultural Heritage of the Archipelago (Komunitas Peduli Cagar Budaya Nusantara, KPCBN) conducts activities for cultural heritage protection. Religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, FKUB) is the communication channel for intra-faith to Caring Community of Education of Surakarta (Masyarakat Peduli Pendidikan Solo, MPPS) that accommodates a community, which has education concern.

In the business sector, there are economy associations such as the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri (Kadin) Indonesia, KADIN), Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association (Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia, HIPMI), Indonesian Furniture Industry and Handicraft Association (Asosiasi Industri Permebelan & Kerajinan Indonesia, ASMINDO), Association of Indonesian Computer Entrepreneurs (Asosiasi Pengusaha Komputer Indonesia, APKOMINDO) and Youth Network or the Indonesian National Youth Council (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI). Besides formal associations, there are informal associations for economy: association for street vendors, traditional market traders, women's network for small businesses and many other small businesses networking that run well in the local level. They gather to strengthen their business existence together. Moreover, there are also tens of organizations that are based either on religious, belief, youth or merely a hobby. The city is specific on informal, strategic groups that have big influence in the decision-making at the city level. In various forms—network pattern and organization scheme—these informal groups grow and have their intervention at the city level.

The role of international NGO is very important in the development of community in Surakarta. Almost all big international donor organizations have programs in this city, such as GTZ Red, USAID, AusAID, UNICEF and Ford Foundation. The funding schemes that they provide encourage the acceleration of pro-democracy agenda, such as good governance, capacity strengthening of bureaucracy works, consultative activities, such as urban development planning; equally important is encouraging the community to actively get involve in the government works and help the development of inhabitable houses.

Relationship between State Actor and Community

The relationship between state actor and community in Surakarta has undergone an advanced development compared to other regions in Indonesia. If, in other regions the relationship character is mostly conflictual, in Surakarta, the relationship between actors is accommodative. It seems that there is a common equation tying the knot between the community and the nation, which is the democracy agenda in Surakarta. The informal agreement is later realized in the availability of each relationship party to complement each other on bringing a better political life in Surakarta, such as the implementation of City Development Planning Consultation (*Musyawahar Rencana Pembangunan Kota, Musrenbang*

Kota), the development evaluation forum, public hearing or certain public consultation. The existence of various actors frequently placed them as the second opinion on various existing policy in the city. In other words, the presence of NGOs becomes a bridge to various interests related to the policy, as well as in facilitating direct partnership with various SKPD.

The religious and urban poor groups also frequently meet with the city government to have a communication or raise advocacy on several issues related to the community protection. Facilitated by NGOs, the partnership built between such groups and the city government of Surakarta—through its openness in the decision-making—gives more indication of the two sectors' strong relationship. This condition is supported by the relatively high number of mass media, which facilitates the communication between the government and its people. Therefore, in the last decade, two-way communication becomes the mechanism that is frequently used and thus automatically reduces demonstration practices by the community as a response to the policy of city government.

Public Service Policies

City Budget

The city budget can be seen from the regional revenue performance. The regional revenue budget in 2009 reached Rp 799 billion with 91.18 per cent realization of the budget. The locally-generated regional revenue (*pendapatan asli daerah, PAD*) was Rp 110 billion with 92 per cent realization of the total budget. In 2010 regional budget, the locally-generated revenue was Rp 114 billion with realization of Rp 113 billion. The income from balancing fund was Rp 614 billion. The other valid revenue was Rp 141 billion. Regional revenue and expenditure budget (*anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah, APBD*) of Surakarta in 2011 was Rp1,005 billion with the expenditure realization of Rp 1,029 billion. Regional revenue (*pendapatan asli daerah, PAD*) breakdown was Rp176 billion, realized for Rp. 181 billion, which exceeded 102.79 per cent of target. That realization has increased by 3.21 per cent compared to the realization in the previous year that reached 99.58 per cent (Mayor Accountability Report 2011).

Looking at the city revenue component in the budget year of 2005–2009, it appears that the city revenue is still dominated by the balancing fund, which on average is 78 per cent, locally-generated revenue average is 15 per cent and

other valid regional revenue average is 7 per cent. This condition shows that the city government is still highly dependent on the balancing fund in managing and financing the regional government system management, where the biggest source of balancing fund comes from the central government fund through general allocation fund (*dana alokasi umum*), where the average contribution in period 2005–2009 reached 78 per cent.

Human Development

Human development is one of the government's target policies, particularly in education, health and a balanced social life. The early effort to conduct this human development is through the population service in the form of eliminating the cost in making the national identity card (*kartu tanda penduduk*) and birth certificate (*akta kelahiran*). The national identity card card is the foundation to determine the majority of occupation in Surakarta City, where it can or cannot access the policy.

In the education sector, Education Aid for the People of Surakarta (Bantuan Pendidikan Masyarakat Surakarta, BPMKS) policy was implemented as a scheme of funding assistance for poor families in order to access education. Education Aid for the People of Surakarta Program in 2010 was allocated with Rp. 18 billion to cover for 81,084 students from elementary school (*sekolah dasar*), junior high school (*sekolah lanjut tingkat pertama*) and senior high school (*sekolah menengah atas*). In 2011, the allocated fund was increased to Rp. 21 billion to cover 65,491 students, categorized to 47,846 of Gold card and 15,333 of Silver card. Moreover, in the health sector, there has been a program called Community Health Insurance of Surakarta (Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat Surakarta, PKMS), a health service in an activity form of promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative efforts provided by the government to the community. The effort to promote health through PKMS until the end of 2010 has served 208,428 people, composed of PKMS Silver for 195,391 people and Gold for 13,137 people, where the actual payment of hospital claim reached to Rp. 18 billion. The total budget allocation for health program in 2011 was Rp. 80 billion (Mayor Accountability Report 2011).

The inclusiveness of health service resource is relatively sufficient. Health insurance is important considering the ratio of doctors is 40:85 patients and midwives is 59:15. Although the data for infant and child death cases fluctuate, the stillbirth cases were 17, deaths of infants aged up to one year old were 49 and death of one to five-year-olds were four in 2010 (BPS Surakarta City 2010). However, the

health rate indicator in 2011 showed improvement: There was a decline of maternal mortality from 91.36 per 100,000 live births in 2010 to 39.42 per 100,000 live births in 2011; infant mortality was 4.73 per 1,000 live births and under five years mortality was 0.99 per 1,000 children under five years. In terms of nutrition status, there were no malnutrition cases for children under five years.

Other than the education and health programs that become the leading sector, the city government of Surakarta has also developed the city as a child-friendly city under the Stipulation Letter of Surakarta Mayor No.130/05/08/1/2008 on The Implementing Team of Child-Friendly City as the foundation. The fulfillment program of child needs for the entire Surakarta is launched that covers health, child protection, participation and education. Furthermore, there is a special program for poor community empowerment in the form of restructuring aid for a child-friendly city (*kota layak anak*), reorganizing street vendors and revitalizing traditional markets.

The proof of government's commitment to provide basic services for the community can be seen from the improvement of Human Development Index (HDI), with life expectancy rate continues to increase. In 2008, HDI of Surakarta City was 71.98 and in 2009, increased to 72.07. The literacy rate, which in 2008 was 96.66, increased to 96.67 in 2009. The purchasing power per capita of Surakarta people in 2008 was 646.45 and in 2009, was 648.23 (BPS Surakarta City 2010). In this case, the effort of the government of Surakarta to provide the people's needs has to be increased. The government policy also has to meet and reduce the inequality level in the community, which used to be the object of city development.

Representative Democracy

General Election in National Level

Surakarta City consists of five districts: Laweyan, Serengan, Pasar Kliwon, Jebres and Banjarsari. From the classification of the constituency for general election, there are four constituencies (*dapil*): Dapil I Laweyan, Dapil II (Pasar Kliwon and Serengan), Dapil III Banjarsari and Dapil IV Jebres. The voter 'divisor' used to determine the number of DPRD seat in all four constituencies based on the calculation of comparison between the total number of seats and the population size.

After the New Order era in 1998, three national general elections were held (1999, 2004 and 2009) to elect legislative member and president (since 2004). The election in the local level to elect the mayor was held twice in 2005, the general election in 2009 and the presidential election in 2009 to local leader election in 2010. All of these have been well-implemented. The general election stages were conducted transparently and defined with regulation released by the General Electoral Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU*) and monitored by the Elections Supervisory Committee (Panitia Pengawas Pemilu, Panwaslu) as the ad hoc institution. The election stages, which started with voter registration, registration of potential legislative of executive member, the campaign implementation, voting and vote calculation up to the determination and inauguration, were all done smoothly.

The general election system has granted political rights for all citizens from different background, from the right to vote and the right to be elected. The representation of a candidate is arranged by distribution of constituency region. The total number of 2009 legislative candidates was 543, of which 193 of them were female or 35.5 per cent of the total candidates. There were 10 elected women who sat on 25 per cent of the Local House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). Gender diversity was observed along with the fulfillment of quota proportion of female candidates for 30 per cent at DPRD. There were a total of 11 elected female members of DPRD in Surakarta from 2009 to 2014.

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) is the biggest party in Surakarta, both from the number of seat and in general. This party has dominated the seat for political parties in the last three elections in Surakarta. In 1999, PDIP won 20 seats while in 2004 and 2009, it won 15 seats. This condition indicates the distribution of major power from 1999 to 2009. According to the Head of DPRD, YF Sukasno, the party membership (*kartu tanda anggota*) of PDIP is less than 60,000 and the electoral dividing number (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih, BPP) is around 6,000. Therefore, the number of seats won by PDIP from its own members has reached the maximum number. Even from that number, PDIP Surakarta has an appeal for the non-partisan voters. Table 8.1 shows the seat in DPRD of Surakarta in 2009.

Table 8.1 Number of DPRD Seats of Surakarta in 2009

Party	Laweyan	Serengan	Banjarsari	Jebres	Total
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS)	1	1	1	1	4
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN)	1	1	1	1	4
Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Demokrasi Sejahtera, PDS)			1	1	2
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP)	2	4	4	5	15
Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, PD)	1	2	2	2	7
The Great Indonesia Movement Party The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Rata, Gerindra)	1	-	1	-	2
The People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, HANURA)	-	1	1	-	2
The Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar)	1	1	1	1	4
Total	7	10	12	11	40

Source: KPUD Surakarta City 2010

Local Leader General Election

The new tradition of city local democracy is marked by the commencement of direct local official election on 27 June 2005 and continued five years later on 26 April 2010. Under criticisms regarding the representative election during the New Order era, it started the new phase of direct election of local officials in 2004. The legal foundation of local official election is Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which was then clarified with Government Regulation No. 6/2005 on Election, Verification, Appointment and Termination of Local Leader and Deputy Local Leader. More detail arrangements are further governed by the Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs, Regulation and Stipulation of Provincial KPU and Regional Election Committee in Regency/City Level (KPUD Kabupaten/Kota) KPU. The implementation of city local official election is organized by the Regional Election Committee in City Level (KPU Kota).

The candidate teams in the 2005 local official election were (1) Ir. Joko Widodo and FX Hadi Rudyatmo who were nominated by PDIP with 99,961 votes; (2) Dr. Achmad Purnomo, Apt and H. Istar Yuliadi who were nominated by Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) with 79,286 votes; (3) Dr. H. Hardono and Drs Dipokusumo who were nominated by Golkar with 79,047 votes and; (d) H. Slamet Suryanto and Henky Narto Sabdo, ST who were nominated by Community Political Party Association (Persatuan Partai Politik Masyarakat) with 14,311 votes.

Meanwhile, there were only two candidate teams in the local official election in 2010: Ir. Joko Widodo and FX Hadi Rudyatmo (Jody) were nominated by PDIP and supported by Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and PAN. The pair earned 248,243 (90.09 per cent) of the votes. Dr. KP Eddi Wirabhumi, SH MM and Supradi Kertamenawi were nominated by Democratic Party and gained 27,306 (9.91 per cent) votes. Joko Widodo–FX Hadi Rudyatmo (Jody) won with landslide votes that reached more than 90 per cent while their competitor only shared 10 per cent of the votes.

Evaluation of General Election Participation

Participation

There are several things that can make a voter participate or not participate—all of them are related to the administration issue, such as not being registered in the permanent electoral list (*daftar pemilih tetap, DPT*), people who already passed away but still registered in DPT, voters' location that make them not participate in general election or those wandering people whose ID cards are still with their original location and others who cannot come on election day. The political aspect relates to those who do not use their right to vote because of their political choices and ideology, particularly related to their distrust of the government.

Transparency of political party

Up to the campaign period, there are some political parties that do not report their party funding. The report is often conducted for administrative formality, or in other words, it is not actual yet. Moreover, there is technical error in tallying votes, originating from human error considering the physical fatigue of the committee or witness. There is also the money politics issue or bribery of voters. Although such violation cases were not caught red-handed, almost all community members are aware of it, including the general election monitoring team. If the representative

general election is tainted by money politics in the parliament, then with direct general election, money politics can likewise spread within the community. This is an unavoidable condition but it appears that the existence of money politics describes the fundamental problem in the formation of parliament power in the local level.

Recruitment of political party cadre

The recruitment process in political party still has problems; for instance, in the popularity rate of legislative member candidate. The introduction of a candidate's track record is not maximized. The difficulty to market a party makes many parties nominate a candidate based on their popularity in the community instead of their legislation capability. As a result, there are many 'instant' cadres in the political party. Meanwhile, the community disappointment on legislative member can be interpreted as a party's failure in doing political regeneration.

Campaign theme

The issue of life quality improvement attracts voters. Education, health and housing issues for poor people always await concrete action, including specific issues like housing regulation theme, public space arrangement such as street vendors and flood management. The last two issues are unique issues to Surakarta that made Jokowi-Rudi tandem reelected in the second period as they focused and managed these two issues completely. The community also has concern on urban planning that is more convenient for public. For the last issue, it often clashes with the livelihood of marginal community, which relates with irregularity and slum.

The general election in the local level is monitored by Panwaslu. The committee does not work alone because the solution to general election dispute has started to be governed through the Integrated Law Enforcement (Sentra Penegakan Hukum Terpadu, Gakumdu). Gakumdu is an institution established based on mutual understanding agreement made on 28 June 2008 among The Attorney General of Indonesia, The Chief of the Police Force of the Republic of Indonesia (Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Kapolri) and Elections Supervisory Body (Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum, Banwaslu). The stipulation was formalized legally under the Attorney General Decree No.055/A/JA/VI/2008, Chief of the Integrated National Police (INP) Decree NoB/06/VI/2008 and Chairman of Bawaslu No. 01/Banwaslu/KB/VI/2008. The decree title is Center of Integrated Law Enforcement and Criminal Case of Legislative General Election Handling Pattern 2009 (*Sentra Gakumdu dan Pola Penanganan Perkara Tindak*

Pidana Pemilu Legislatif Tahun 2009). There are still many criticisms regarding effectiveness of the work of Gakumdu, mainly related to the needs of immediate handling of the criminal case in general election.

Panwaslu of Surakarta even has a discourse on whether or not it is necessary to have Gakumdu implement a general election in the city since it is evaluated as ineffective in handling the criminal case in the general election. Panwaslu found several violation cases in 2009 general election, such as administrative violation on the final list of candidates (*daftar calon tetap*), campaign violation in worship facilities, utilization of government building by political party, campaign involving children, putting political party signs in worship and education facilities, placing a billboard in front of other political party, no campaign notification letter by a political party, placing a provocative banner, assumption of leakage on answers of Sub-district Elections Committee (Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan, PPK) recruitment test by Panwaslu in city level KPUD, seven political parties that have not submitted the receipt of beginning balance, damage of ballot, DPRD's ballot switched with other constituency, the voting calculation did not match between witness and Voting Organizer Group (Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara, KPPS) and the recapitulation of PPK, missing votes in PPK and the case of additional votes.

Some violations were administrative issues, which mostly can be disciplined directly. However, there were criminal violations and the solution ethic was not clear enough. An example of ethic violation was the assumption of leakage on PPK selection. There was also an assumption related to additional votes. The last assumption was filed to the police but the follow up action was unclear. The condition proves that the presence of Gakumdu to implement a general election is ineffective in handling criminal cases in general election.

There are some debates related to the effectiveness and efficiency of general election institution, one of them is related to the tenure of Panwaslu of a regency/city. As an illustration, the tenure of KPU from central to region is five years while for the Panwaslu in central is five years. The tenure for the Provincial Elections Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu Propinsi) is also five years. Meanwhile, the Panwaslu of regency/city is ad hoc for eight months only.

In Solo, there is a complaint on general election committee funding that is not based on the number of polling station (*tempat pemungutan suara, TPS*), considering the area of Kadipiro Village is almost as wide as Serengan District.

Therefore, the number of TPS is definitely bigger compared to the other sub-districts. The proportional funding based on the number of TPS is considered as more logical than when it is based on village or district.

Evaluation of Officials

The 2010 local leader election is a product of a managed voting behavior that is controlled by mass and interpersonal communication. Joko Widodo⁸⁰ and FX Rudy Hadiyatmo⁸¹ (incumbent) have a record for being able to open up in communicating with various stakeholders, including grassroots and marginal groups to earn their approval. This is in addition to the massive publicity support by mass media on populist programs. Sometimes, the public impression is strengthened by the effective publicity by the media with attractive visualization—fulfilling the formation of voter’s perception towards the incumbent. The forthcoming general election is supposedly able to give adequate proportion and opportunity for all candidates to have an interpersonal and mass communication; the community can move their minimum level of participation, which is driven by money politics and physical imaging to the in-depth participation towards the vision and mission orientation, as well as the expectation of changes.

The executive leader of Surakarta directly stays close to the heart of the people. However, the same situation has not occurred yet in the legislative election result. As has been explained above, the political party cadre who becomes the legislative candidate tends to have little capacity as a politician is not rooted in the community, an ‘instant’ and more oriented to the power rather than to the constituent. Political parties, on the other hand, are very weak in executing their regeneration role. As a result, the elected political party cadre in the legislative institution is not capable in executing the basic roles as a people’s representative. Further consequence is in the existence of representative institution in general.

The capacity development of legislative function is an important aspect to be done in order to strengthen the role of representative institution. The involvement of NGOs and university, in cooperation with the poor and marginal communities in

⁸⁰ As of writing this report, Joko Widodo was the Governor of Special Capital District of Jakarta. He won the presidential election in 2014 and will be the President of Indonesia for 2014–2019.

⁸¹ After Joko Widodo was elected as the Governor of Special Capital District of Jakarta in 2013, FX Rudy Hadiyatmo became the Mayor of Surakarta for 2012–2015.

the grassroots, becomes the option to give an alternative perspective such as economy, social and culture's (ekonomi, sosial dan budaya, EKOSOB) rights for community.

Participatory Democracy

Local Government and Participatory Democracy

After the implementation of local official election in 2005 and 2010, the policy orientation of executive institution has shifted from the orientation of the nation to the community, at least in the decision-making process. The policymaking process is conducted through a mechanism that is relatively open, dialogic and work in two ways between the government and community. The commitment to open up has started from the executive to interpret their leadership by strengthening the participatory dimension.

Several methods of community involvement or participation are opened and the participation channel is provided. One of provided dialog mechanisms and which later becomes popular is *srawung praja*. *Srawung praja* is a field visit by mayor or deputy mayor to several areas in the form of informal activities, such as biking around the city, visiting people and having a direct dialog with them. This is a regular activity as the government attempts to filter aspiration from the community directly. *Srawung praja* is the most advanced approach in the direct communication between people and executive.

Another example is the introduction of planning meetings from RT, RW, village, district and then further developed in the city government level. The city government also makes public facilities available to accommodate various complaints from community, such as opening a SMS hotline provided by the mayor and deputy mayor. Both SMS hotlines earn many direct responses from the community.

To complete the communication with the public, the city government also provides an information channel through its website (<http://www.surakarta.go.id>). The website is a source for city government to disseminate information for the implementation of government service program. Moreover, the website also provides information on other services of the city government, such as legal service, electronic procurement service, online job market, Bantuan Pendidikan Masyarakat Surakarta (BPMKS), transportation and tourism. The website is also the channel for the city government to distribute information, particularly the activities of local

leaders through pictures and reports to the community. To develop and support the needs of the program, providing free Internet access to the community or a free hotspot in the center of the city will enable to open a gateway of distribution of and free access to information.

Several attempts from the executive to open itself to the community and the active role of mass media make it more vibrant. Various mass media are present in the community starting from local newspapers, such as *Solopos*, *Joglosemar*, *Radar Surakarta*, *Wawasan*, *Koran O* and *Suara Merdeka*, *Warta Jateng*, as well as *Timlo.net* to tens of radio networks, such as the Radio of Indonesia Republic (Radio Republik Indonesia, RRI), PTPN, Surakartapos, Ria, Metta and Prambors. There are even the community radio, SOMPIS, which caters to the urban poor, Radio Klewer to the local television and Terang Abadi, which provides daily information on various topics. The community gets their information from the media coverage of the city's daily dynamics, such as developing issues in the community or reports on region-based concerns. In the end, the media existence fully supports the information distribution of bureaucracy works to the community directly. With the facilitation done by the Public Relation Office of City Government, all activities, plans and responses on program implementation are directly provided through the mass media, which intensely reports on a daily basis.

Participation and Initiative of Local Leaders

In the last ten years, Surakarta cannot be detached from the outstanding policy news that is done by the leadership of the Joko Widodo–FX Hadi Rudyatmo duo. The first outstanding policy was the relocation of one thousand street vendors from Banjarsari Flea Market to Notoharjo. While the issue of street vendor relocation in other region was dominated by violence at Surakarta in **2005**, Joko Widodo–FX Hadi Rudyatmo administration directly led the relocation with a celebration of rice cone procession while riding a horse and witnessed by thousands of people.

In **2009**, in order to strengthen the participation of Surakarta people, the Joko Widodo–FX Hadi Rudyatmo administration released the Policy of Endowment Fund for **2,668** RT in the entire Surakarta. The Dana Abadi Rukun Tetangga (DART) program was designed as a development seed of Community-owned Enterprise (Badan Usaha Milik Masyarakat, BUMM). More than three thousand people were present at the city hall when DART was launched.

The third policy, which also created a buzz in the media, was the compensation for relocating residents who live in riverbanks. This community has obviously violated the rules since they reside in a green belt area or an area that cannot be used for housing. Instead of forcing them out of their houses, the City Government of Surakarta did prepared a compensation scheme that will allow the community to find alternative settlements in other location. Every year, the annual evaluation of government performance is held by involving thousands of people so they can directly give their perspective on the improvement that has been achieved by the city government or the inadequacy that needs to be improved.

Many other policies related to the normative universal principles are also attempted to be applied at Surakarta. On 10 December 2010, the deputy mayor led the commemoration of Human Rights Day to remind the bureaucracy to adopt the EKOSOB rights in the development planning. Clean government values were also tried to be adapted. Further impact of this was the International Transparency in 2010 where Surakarta was declared as a corruption-free city and sat on the third rank, with 6.0 GPA, after Tegal (6.26) and Denpasar (6.71). There were 50 cities surveyed in Indonesia.

The leadership of Jokowi-Rudi gives an image of simplicity and concerns to the grassroots. Almost in every opportunity, there is always an effort to show these two images. For example, in one opportunity, the deputy mayor refused a 'rice box' and requested to change it with a 'rice wrap', just like what was provided for 600 attending participants. When watching Opera Van Java, Jokowi preferred to sit with thousands of audience in Sriwedari Stadium rather than sitting in the 'honorary stage'. That incident reminds us of a pre-Mataram Kingdom with a king who dressed like the common people and chose to sit equally with his people rather than preparing a throne for himself. The effort to be a part of community should earn an appreciation whereas in other region, the local leader seems to pursue the attempt of building his own 'palace'.

In the process of decision-making, there is also the 'spirit' to move forward in realizing good governance values, particularly with the community involvement in the policymaking process and deliberative decision-making collectively. Once more, although it is still far from perfection, the effort must be supported as the turn of events can be an exemplary asset for a leadership model in in Surakarta in the future. The leadership figures of Surakarta, who open up themselves, are taken by the community group as an opportunity to encourage the adaptation of democracy ideas and good governance.

Linkage and Engagement between Regional Government and Civil Society Element at the Government of Surakarta City

The informal participatory democracy has been developed creatively by stakeholders in the civil society level, which has continuously moved forward in the last decade. A community group of Surakarta even claimed that the movement for a change can start from *hik-hikan* (a street cart)—solid and organized informal politics from intense meetings at a street cart as an everyday dining place. Networking between actors and civil society element is also aggregating the community aspiration whether through virtual communication networking or community forums, which have been established for a long time.

A forum, Study Group of Community Democracy Institution (Kelompok Kajian Lembaga Demokrasi Masyarakat, KKLDM), at the beginning of reformation from 1999 to 2000, is one of the significant origins of community participation. KKLDM succeeded in facilitating the gathering of civil society actors to conduct a study through a city forum, which is established through grassroots discussion. Reputedly, this initiative has inspired the beginning of participatory development planning in Surakarta.

In its development, KKLDM has grown institutionally and became an urban planning deliberative institution. In the deliberation, public meeting is held starting from the smallest level to the city level. Moreover, the deliberation is sectoral. In that forum, the city government absorbed the aspiration from administration bases in RT, RW, sub-districts, districts and city, including the cross-sectoral areas.

To maximize its capacity to fulfill the aspiration of the community, the mayor released the Mayor Regulation No. 27 A/2010, which is related to the effectiveness of the implementation of Urban Development Planning Meeting. This was then amended by Mayor Regulation No 15/2011 on Technical Implementation Guidance of Sub-district and District Development Planning Consultation, Forum of Regional Working Group-(Forum Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, SKPD) and City Development Planning Consultation. The regulation governs a Limited Discussion Group (Diskusi Kelompok Terbatas, DKT). In the limited discussion group, the shareholder group can attend the preparation of yearly planning. The implementation of DKT is a more advance process in *Musrenbangkot*.

All planning process has an output of Regional Development and Work Plan (*Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah, RKPD*), Regional Medium-Term Development Plan and Regional Long-Term Development Plan. Afterwards, RKPD implementation is included in the annual budget, which is covered by Local Regulation (*Perda*) No. 10/2001 on City Vision and Mission, Local Regulation (*Perda*) No. 2/2007 on Medium-Term Development Plan 2005-2010 and City Regulation No. 2/2010 on Long-Term Development Plan of Surakarta City for 2005-2025.

In other words, the initiation of participation activity, which was started from the community, was then adapted by the local leader (mayor/deputy mayor) of Surakarta and was institutionalized through a mayor regulation at once so it has legal binding.

Participation Process Evaluation

The implementation of development planning meeting has been completed with the evaluation instrument but it is still normative. Referring to the document of Mayor Regulation No. 27A/2010 and Mayor Regulation No. 15/2011 on Technical Implementation Guidance of Sub-district, Technical Implementation Guidance of District, Forum of Regional Working Unit and Development Planning Consultation, the evaluation mechanism is carried out after each activity series and streaming from the bottom. The evaluation is conducted by a team, which is the city government system of Surakarta, who does monitoring and periodic evaluation.

So far, the evaluation is dominated by practical-technical aspect rather than review of substantial issues. Considering that the implementation of development planning meeting almost lasts to a decade, there are still obstacles, such as insufficient preparation stage, minimum information distribution and allocation of schedule to the management techniques of meeting that tends to be ceremonial. This condition implies the participation of community in all levels of deliberation.

Furthermore, the main obstacle of community participation, in the context of implementation of development planning consultation, is the minimum impact experienced by the community related to the planning scheme or submitted proposal. As a result, the public feels that the conducted participation process is 'useless'. The tendency of the declining participation is the indication that apathy has just started. The absence of poor family representative in sub-district development planning consultations has highlighted the supposedly development

planning environment must benefit the marginalized groups. Further implication is with the stagnant initiative in city government programs that tends to follow the regular practice. Subsequently, this situation easily creates an exclusive process for the elite innovation of a local leader in developing activities in city level.

The biggest challenge in participatory initiation and in the forums of city development planning consultation is the existence of bureaucracy system. First, they seem slow in adapting the participatory model and new tasks that involves the improvement of community service. Sometimes, a classic problem occurs: for instance, a development activity, which is merely to fulfill formality that an activity has been held. Second, they are slow in following up suggestions from the community. To overcome the technical sabotage that is done by the bureaucracy system against the marginal groups, it is, therefore, required to improve new bureaucracy capacity on the importance of universal values of EKOSOB rights protection, mainly for vulnerable and marginal groups, as well as to create technical instruments in guarding the community participatory process.

The evaluation from the community side has found that participation requires energy, high stamina and does not always give a guarantee to success for a participatory activity. The courage of DPRD and city government to develop participation innovation in budgeting at Surakarta is commendable. The city government has other option, which is the involvement of stakeholders only to engage in the budgeting process or by providing the 'budget quota' in accordance with the widely known approach in planning. It means all approaches get the determined budget proportion and every party that has interest with the approach to ensure that they do their planning in their own space. It will be ideal if the innovation is related to these two options at once.

Summary

The democratic practices and its quality in Surakarta, specifically representative democracy and participatory democracy, are determined by several factors. First is the characteristic of Surakarta from the historical, economic, cultural, demographic (area) and geographic (population size) side. In terms of demography and geography, Surakarta is similar to the state-city in Greece, the place where democracy practice was born. A 'compact' Surakarta with short physical distance gives an opportunity for interaction— whether among residents or between residents and their local leader who is more qualified—compared with a leader of physically greater area. In economic side, Surakarta is a city, which has a total

money circulation in a month that exceeds the number of public funding managed by the government per year. It can be said that Surakarta has development intrinsic asset of local democracy. Second, the leadership factor in political level. The uniqueness, which has become the advantage for Solo, is that they have local leaders—the team of Joko Widodo and FX Rudi—who are open to initiatives from Surakarta people, mainly from the civil society in the last decade. Third is the power of civil society that is relatively consolidated and has become an asset to be the regional government partner, specifically in the context of the work of participatory democracy.

These three factors have made local democracy in Surakarta acquire a relatively a strong quality, at least, when compared to other five regions that are the subject of this assessment research for local democracy. Surakarta has a quite sturdy foundation to develop formal or informal participatory democracy. Human resources and civil society actor networking in Solo is without a doubt have the characteristic of a 'political literate' and the possession of relatively strong political capacity. For security reason, it has brought a peaceful life and preservation of the cultural diversity of Surakarta people, which in turn, will affect the quality of local democracy.

The biggest challenge for participatory democracy in Surakarta is the institutionalized community participation through the development planning meeting, especially from the bureaucracy of city government, which is not established yet. Politically, the participation of Surakarta people in the development planning meeting is guaranteed by the mayor. Empirically, however, this participation process is not completely conducted by the bureaucracy system. Bureaucracy tends to find an easy way and the community involvement in the development planning meeting is considered a hassle for the bureaucracy despite its potential as a strategic arena for democracy consolidation in Surakarta. Therefore, the next challenge is reaching a compromise with the bureaucracy and at the same time preserving the community's energy to maintain their participation in the budgeting planning over the territorial and sectoral community issues. Earning the bureaucracy's cooperation can be done through the political leader. In relation to this, the second challenge of participatory democracy in Surakarta is the leadership factor. For almost a decade, Surakarta is led by a visionary leader. The leadership capability has created a smooth political communication between the regional government and civil society. However, this process is individual, not institutional. Before Joko Widodo was elected to be the governor of DKI Jakarta in

2012, there was no complete institutionalization process of participatory democracy support element. Therefore it is vulnerable to other political agendas that might be more of a priority for a leader who will replace Jokowi. Another challenge to participatory democracy is the minimum support from DPRD in accepting, acknowledging and protecting the existence and political participation role.

For representative democracy, there are two prominent challenges: First is the existence of biggest political power, PDIP and the quality of elected officers. The fate of representative democracy is determined by the quality of the dominant party. Many issues in the representative democracy are related to the winning party of the general election, especially related to the basic role of political party in cadre recruitment and quality of human resources.

Recommendation

This part explains the recommendations of representative and participatory democracy in Surakarta. Before the recommendations are presented, the weaknesses and strengths of these two types of democracy are discussed.

Representative Democracy

The representative democracy practice is related to several aspects, such as (a) institutionalization of general election management such as institution and regulation on general election; (b) the general election participants, i.e. political party (for legislative election) and individual candidate (general election for local leader). The management institutions consist of management commission and the Election Monitoring Agency, while regulation is related with the arrangement on general election in the chain of electoral process. The one that is related with general election activities are the existence of political parties and their basic duties in association with the education of voters and cadre preparation.

In Surakarta and perhaps in other region in Indonesia, the institutional aspect that is related to the general election management body (including observer) and related regulation with general election has fundamental weakness. For example, there is no obscurity of KPU authorization related to the voters education. This role can actually be done by the political party but so far, it has not been managed. Another example is the duty and authority of monitoring committee that is not

completely governed. Mainly, it is related to the criminal case of general election. The regulation product is sometimes conflicted and inconsistent.

Further weakness is related to the post-election of candidates in public positions, such as DPRD and regional government. The pragmatism of political party cadre, whether individual or collective, causes the role of DPRD representative to not relate with its constituent but rather to themselves and party. The disciplinary process of a political party against their cadre in a representative institution is not employed. Activities of capacity strengthening of DPRD members are not effective yet, including their sensitivity towards issues related to human rights (gender, EKOSOB rights and development discourse).

All of these issues are governed by regulations issued by the national government and political party leader in Jakarta. Therefore, this issue is outside the reach of local democracy.

There are also strengths: First, the institutionalization of general election institutions (KPU and monitoring team) is relatively stable with distribution of duty between general election monitoring body/monitoring team with KPU. Second, the opportunity of political parties for their commitment in preparing the best cadre has started to strengthen.

Long-term Recommendation

General Election: The organizer and participants. To guarantee the citizens' political rights, there is a need to conduct a program for the improvement of quantitative and qualitative participation of voters on every opportunity for general election. The national government needs to make an amendment towards general election regulations, which actually undermine the guarantee of political rights of citizens. An example is to have a clear guideline on who will conduct the political education to the voters. At the same time, the political party needs to have a continuous regeneration so they will not have an instant cadre with a very pragmatic orientation in short term.

Medium-term Recommendation

Improving capacity building. Develop a discourse and capacity of DPRD on development issue.

Short-term Recommendation

- *Legislations.* It needs criminal procedure law of general election; KPU can be granted a room to conduct an education for the voters; The political party needs to use half of the party's aid fund to conduct a cadre's education and equip their legislative candidate with capacity to run the legislation function.
- *Financing the general election committee.* Design a more logical financing for the committee, regulated by the comparison of number of polling station, not sub-district-based.

Participatory Democracy

Weaknesses

- The yearly development planning is not yet placed substantially as a consolidated venue of local democracy;
- Participation in the development planning consultation is still considered indistinct;
- Poor people are not represented yet in the development planning consultation;
- The weak regulation implementation that explains the position and protection of the poor, marginal and women sectors in their regional development;
- The lack of community empowerment to be able to participate in yearly development planning (city development planning consultation);
- The implemented development planning consultation still has the tendency to be a ceremonial event;
- The community has technical difficulty in implementing activity related to the proposal writing, making a report and other techniques, such as tax calculation of the activity fund;
- Not open/exclusivity in the budgeting process;
- The expenditure by and for the bureaucracy is still wasteful

Strengths

- The community has freedom of expression, gathering and expressing their opinion;
- Stakeholders have the experience to do policy changes through

community forums;

- The political support from the local leader to strengthen the yearly development planning;
- There are forums innovated by the local leader to do yearly development evaluation by involving wider community;
- Openness of the local leader to communicate with all parties, including poor and marginal groups;
- Has the regulation to arrange territorial and regional development plan consultation;
- Big support of community participation in development planning consultation;
- The critical communities are able to address their required protection need;
- Many informal communication media, for example print and electronic media, such as newspaper, radio, TV and websites

Long-term Recommendation

- *Perspective.* Put the development planning as a democracy consolidation media in the local level.

Medium-term Recommendation

- *Commitment.* Define the gradual direction in the participation level of the development planning consultation that should be achieved in medium and long term.
- *Financing participation.* Place the community representative to participate in Regional Government Budget Team (Tim Anggaran Pemerintah Daerah, TAPD).
- *Budget quota.* The budget has to be allocated proportionally and has to describe all adopted planning approaches that are conducted.
- *Efficiency.* Conduct a comprehensive study on ideal number of employee that is required by bureaucracy.
- *Regulation.* Review and innovate regional regulation to ensure many regulations in the local level to give maximum protection to the citizens.

Short-term Recommendation

- *Commitment.* Involve the poor, marginal, vulnerable and women groups in the development planning consultation.
- *Development planning consultation process.* The development planning consultation should be held deliberatively and not as 'a competition' of filling in the form.
- *Information system of a planning consultation.* Build an information mechanism of planning process that is followed by response clarification and budget certainty for the participant of development planning consultation. This system also provides quick information on result created at each stages of an ongoing planning consultation.
- *Procedure.* Procedure of development planning consultation has to be simplified by putting forward the substance of targeted yearly development objective.
- *Capacity development.* The capacity development for internal bureaucracy has to be able to conduct a good facilitation of a planning consultation. Ensure there are changes in bureaucracy's perspective towards the informal sectoral group. There should be a social preparation for citizens so they can actively get involve in the development planning consultation. Provide capacity development for community so that they are capable in preparing proposal and calculating tax reasonably.
- *Supporting facility of development planning consultation.* The proposal format should be provided with options so that the planning process can run smoothly.
- *Regulation.* The institution of new rights should be directed towards the poor family, marginal, vulnerable and women groups so they can attend and influence the decision-making in the development planning consultation.
- *Efficiency.* Ensure the efficiency of goods and services expenditure by bureaucracy.
- *Accountability of public information.* The city government needs to optimize information media such as websites or cooperate with print media to inform the development planning meeting result.

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Conclusion: Diversity in Local Politics and its Implications for Democracy⁸²

*Abdul Gaffar Karim*⁸³

This chapter analyses the diversity in Indonesian local politics and how this diversity affects democracy and governance in this country. In doing so, this chapter assumes that one of the main aspects, which determine the progress of transition to democracy at local context, is the degree of consolidation both at the state and society levels. From this perspective, Indonesian local politics vary from each other, according to the degree of political consolidation at the levels of both the state and society, and how the channels between these two levels are managed.

This chapter explores two principal elements of local democracy that are critically important to the quality of rule by the people: (1) representative democracy (parties and candidates, elected authorities and elections) and (2) participatory democracy (civil society, forging consensus and civic engagement). In exploring these broad categories, this chapter pays attention to the institutional aspects (rules, organizations and key actors), as well as the process (types and methods of practice and implementation). It shows that the different levels of political consolidation at the local politics makes the implementation of democracy in this country differs from place to place. As a diverse democracy, Indonesia is better understood from local perspectives.

⁸² This Chapter is the revised version of a paper presented at International IDEA's *Panel on Local Democracy*, "Public Administration and Governance: Tradition and Transformation" Conference, The University of Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance, Manila, 27-29 June 2012; and at "Workshop on Engagement of Citizens in Three Southern Border Provinces of Thailand in Enhancing Good Governance and Democracy," Songkhla, 14-16 July 2012.

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What Diversity?

The word 'diversity' may have several meanings. Most of the time it refers to characteristics of a plural society: religious diversity, ethnic diversity and so forth. In this sense, Indonesia has always been described as a highly diverse country and many academic studies have been done that portray Indonesia's diversity in terms of religious and ethnic affiliation.

Although religious and ethnic diversity is one of the most visible features in Indonesia, this chapter will not particularly look at this issue. Rather, it pays more attention to the diversity in the degree of political consolidation at the local level because this may have been partly affected by local characteristics. However, as one of the latest accounts of Indonesian local political consolidation suggests, the country's transition to democracy, as well as the decentralization of politics, has been very much state-initiated and controlled (Buehler 2012). This means that the diversity in the society, and its implications for democracy and governance at the local level, can be better understood from the perspective of the society's relationship with the state. This relationship determines the dynamics of democracy and governance at the local level. So far, Indonesia's democracy has benefited in general from a high degree of civic engagement (Lussier and Fish 2012).

This chapter discusses the diversity of local politics in the six towns, in the light of political consolidation. It will look at the degree of political consolidation at the levels of both the state and society and how the channels between these two levels are managed.

Political Consolidation

These days, good governance is a *mantra*, a 'magic spell' for most democratic states. This spell was started (most likely very intentionally) by the World Bank's annual reports in the 1990s which emphasized that many states had failed to generate wealth for their people (Abrahamsen 2000; Pratikno 2007). The implications of the World Bank's thinking was to advance a new era of government that has less emphasis on the power of 'government', but more on the consolidation and interaction of strategic actors in the state and society at large as well as the intermediary players (Pierre and Peters 2000).

Consolidation is the key word in this *mantra*. The political actors in the state, intermediaries and society at large have their own interests as well as their own methods to achieve their interests according to their own orientation and attributes (Lane 2000). The state actors make use of their formal, regulatory powers to control the citizen. The intermediary actors, including the NGOs, develop the advocacy actions to accomplish their missions. Civil society actors work within agreed norms to achieve their common interests. As the methods used by the different sectors vary, so too do the methods used by actors within the same sector. Different interests and perspectives in civil society, for example, may lead to the different methods. It is essential, therefore, for these actors to always work together looking for a 'win-win solution'.

The main purpose of political consolidation is to encourage these actors to cooperate and make government work. The push factors should come from both ends of the spectrum: from the state and also from the society. These interactions are essential, since the state and the society are in an interdependent relationship (Shigetomi 2002). Civil society needs to allow the state to work effectively on policy processes; while, for its part, the state needs civil society to carry out collective action (Seller 2010).

This is to say that policy development is not the sole responsibility of the state, both at national and local levels. The processes might be intervened in – controlled and influenced and at the same time contributed to – by non-state actors by means of the various consolidation mechanisms. These non-state actors can be intermediary agencies, such as local NGOs and political parties or agents of society such as religious institutions, community groups, *adat* institutions⁸⁴, and private enterprises. However, it is imperative to say that this consolidation can be achieved only if both the state and society have settled their internal consolidation agenda. The state needs to make sure that it has accommodated the various political actors, while society has to be able to incorporate various class and social structures into the wider unit on common ground – if not a common agenda. Only consolidated state and consolidated (or cohesive) society can work together hand in hand.

In many cases, it is the society rather than the state that needs to pay more attention to its internal consolidation. Many societies have disjointed elements and suffer from serious conflicts across the board. This is an irony because according to

⁸⁴ *Adat* is the set of cultural norms, values and customs in Indonesian local communities.

the Tocquevillian perspective, civil society is one of the main instruments of democratization, with one condition: that it be highly cohesive and civilized (de Tocqueville 2004). A strong civil society will be able to push the state at the local level to become more stable and innovative through societal intervention and control. This will prevent the state from becoming authoritarian or illegitimate because civil society engagement in the policy process is an implicit indication of its support for the state.

Once the state and society are internally consolidated, it is essential to look at the channels to connect them both together. In this regard we should look at two channels for doing this--formal and informal. Formal channels are those provided by the state to facilitate community participation. The structures are created and managed by the state and sometimes operate formally as part of the state policy making process. The effectiveness of these formal channels, however, depends largely on both state and society actors.

The informal channels are initiated by the society. The most effective channels as far as the society is concerned are through autonomous associations (Harris et al. 2004; de Tocqueville 2004). These associations can use extra-parliamentary methods to contribute to policy processes. Extra parliamentary methods may include street protest, media releases and other forms of political communication. The more effective means, however, is to employ dialogue in which actors from the state, intermediary bodies and society can sit down and talk about problems and agendas.

The Six Towns and Their Basic Diversity

The six town composition reflects the diversity in Indonesian local politics: this includes history, society, power relations, degrees of economic prosperity, demographical features (such as the density) and so on.

Some Indonesian towns can trace their history back some hundreds of years to the times of old aristocratic power. To a large extent, many existing local governments are continuation of those older structures, not necessarily designed under the modern Indonesian state. Surakarta (Central Java) and Jombang (East Java) can date the history of their government as far back as 400 years ago or even longer. While the walls in the Presidential Palace in Jakarta display six Presidents from Sukarno to Yudhoyono, Jombang displays dozens of its *bupati* in the official residence of the district head, dating back to the pre-Indonesia era.

Other Indonesian towns have shorter histories as local governments although they have much longer history as communities. Some of their histories are strongly related to the Dutch colonial government system. Kupang and Manokwari were established as local governments by the colonial government, taking into account the local community power structure. Kupang started with an 'under-district' structure during the Dutch era and gradually gained its current status as a city government from 1955 to 1996. Quite differently, Manokwari started with a district-structure known as *afdeling* in the Dutch era and was transformed into a *kabupaten* when Papua was integrated to Indonesia in 1963.

Meanwhile, some Indonesian local governments developed historically for different reasons as they are the products of the splitting up of regions. Some of them are very recently established. Prior to 1956, Aceh Besar was part of *Kota Banda Aceh*. Splitting regions in Indonesia reached its peak in the 2000s, following the acceleration of the decentralization policy. Parigi Moutong is part of the mushrooming of new regions throughout the country. This *kabupaten* was established in 2002 and used to be part of *Kabupaten Donggala*.

The six towns also reflect the different relationships between the central and local governments. Aceh Besar and Manokwari are part of regions that have a long history of conflicts with the central government. Jombang and Surakarta are Javanese towns that enjoy much better relationship with Jakarta. These towns also benefit from better infrastructure in Java as compared to other islands and thus enjoy better education and health services, as well as better economic prosperity. Kupang and Parigi Moutong do not suffer from political conflict like Aceh Besar and Manokwari; yet neither do they enjoy the luxury of great education and health services found in the big cities in Java.

More importantly, the six towns show diversity in terms of political consolidation; such diversity became more apparent in the aspects of democracy as analysed in the SoLD assessment framework. The following sections will focus on these differences.

Degree of Consolidation

The elements of political consolidation (state consolidation, society consolidation and the relation between the two), show diverse levels of attainment in Indonesian local politics. The complexity of the consolidation process, along with social, economic and political challenges, has been contributing factors. The cases of the

six towns will bring us to a better understanding of how these elements work. We will have a closer look at three aspects: (1) political consolidation from the state perspective, (2) consolidation of civil society actors and (3) state and society consolidation through both formal and informal channels.

Contest at the Local Level

The main feature of local government in the six towns is contest. Generally, there is no dominant political actor. Government policies are basically the product of agreement amongst the actors. Some policies are able to accommodate the interests of the different actors, while the others cannot be implemented effectively because the policy processes have failed to accommodate conflicting interests.

Wealth distribution can be a huge issue in accommodating local actors, as shown in Surakarta. This city has segregated communities that are prone to conflict. Economic disparity is a significant problem and has contributed to social tensions from time to time. This situation is managed by the city government by undertaking intensive communication (mostly informally) with community groups in order to bring them together (i.e. to consolidate them). Current city government tries to reduce the gap using subsidies, particularly in the health and education sectors and has been successful in achieving this goal.

Similarly, state at the local level in Jombang and Kupang are relatively consolidated. Both towns are relatively homogenous in terms of religious affiliation. Jombang is predominantly Muslim, while Kupang is predominantly Protestant. This has given the local government clear ideas on engaging with community groups and bringing state actors together on common ground. However, these local governments still have to improve their policy on minority groups.

While a shortage of money is certainly a large problem for some local governments in developing countries, so can the flood of funding for local budgets also be a problem. In Aceh, Papua and West Papua, this has contributed to the problems of local state consolidation. The three provinces enjoy access to the special autonomy fund as part of the political compensation established by the central government to solve the problem of secessionist movements⁸⁵. At the same time, the local

⁸⁵ Many observers have expressed their doubt that this special autonomy strategy would work effectively to solve the separatism problems. As McGibbon (2004, p. viii) puts it, "Special autonomy arrangements are exceedingly difficult to entrench as national elites almost always resist demands to devolve political authority and are suspicious of any initiative that may set a precedent for other regions".

governments have opened their doors to multinational corporations to invest in these areas. This has also contributed to the economic growth and the improvement of infrastructure and government services. Nevertheless, this situation has revealed the limitations to the state capability to consolidate its actors. In Manokwari, the local government is too busy with investors (both national and multinational) and therefore unable to maintain a good participatory relationship with civil society associations, particularly the Church and the *adat* institutions. This is a large problem because these two institutions are very influential and are expected to work together with the local government in formulating state policies.

Aceh Besar does not suffer from the participation problems because the extra funds available for the provincial government encourage the local government to engage community groups in programme delivery. However, the government of Aceh Besar shares similar problems with other *kabupaten* and *kota* in Aceh. The most significant glitch is the incapability of local bureaucracy and politicians to manage the new opportunities brought by the influx of funds. Many local politicians were previously combatants in the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM*) and do not have the capacity to run local government even if they can facilitate the community participation in the policy process and programme implementation. In general, however, the local state of Aceh Besar is more consolidated than that in Manokwari, although both of them share similar problems of central–local conflicts.

Quite predictably, the most unconsolidated of the six areas is Parigi Moutong. This new *kabupaten* is still struggling to bring its executive and legislative to a better relationship. Conflicts between the two branches have manifested in the boycotting of each others' activities, which has led to serious problems in the policymaking process. As in Manokwari, job appointments in the local bureaucracy are highly competitive. This has added yet another ingredient to the conflict between state actors at the local level and reduced the state's ability to become more consolidated.

Civil Society Consolidation

Non–state actors have an effective role in controlling the state, including at the local level. This role, however, can only be performed nobly by societies with strong social capital because this enables them to develop a bargaining position vis-à-vis the state. Societies with weak social capital tend to have an insufficient degree of political consolidation.

Papua displayed the synergy between *adat* institutions, the Church and local government in policymaking processes. However, as mentioned earlier, the government and the political parties are preoccupied by their deals with the investors, causing this synergy to wither away. The *adat* institutions and the Church are now relatively disconnected from the state and from each other. As compared to the Church, *adat* institutions have less ability to promote cohesive civil society in Papua. While the Church may unite the local community in the name of religion, the *adat* institutions are scattered into smaller groups based on ethnic identities.

In other areas of the country, *adat* institutions hibernated for long time – at least since the founding of the Indonesian state – if not since the Dutch colonial era. After political reform, some of the *adat* institutions revived themselves in various ways and achieved new roles (Davidson and Henley 2007). In Aceh, the *adat* and religious institutions are closely related to each other, since its traditional values and traditions are strongly based on Islamic teaching. The *adat* institutions, dominated by the religious leaders, *tengku*, are formally accommodated by the local government. However, this does not reflect the level of consolidation in civil society. Rather, this is more of a co-opting of *ulama* (religious scholars) by the state.

Kupang tells a similar story. The Church and *adat* institutions have also been co-opted by the state and are utilized to legitimize state policy rather than being genuine partners in policy making. Even worse, in Parigi Moutong, the *adat* institutions play a limited role restricted to ceremonial activities.

If we go back to Java, however, civil society shows a different version. Civil societies in Jombang and Surakarta are more consolidated than other areas. Surakarta has two dominant groups in the structure of its society. There is the ethnic Chinese group on one hand, and Javanese people on the other. These two groups are in a potentially conflicting relationship. In fact, Surakarta is renowned as being a short-fuse society, where conflict between the two groups can lead to violence in just a blink of an eye. However, business and trading interests have bound the two groups together and thus enable the society to maintain control over the state.

A bipolar structure also occurs in Jombang. This town is known as a *Kota Santri*, literally the town of devout Muslims. It has at least four major Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) with a strong influence on the *santri* community. This community co-exists with the more secular community known as the *abangan* people. Each group develops its own norms and values and basically lives in harmony with each other. The local government or state structures are dominated

by the *abangan* group, while the society provides the arena for the *santri* community led by the religious leader known as *kyai*.

Channels between society and the state

Both formal and informal channels between the state and society have the same objective: to engage society in the policy making process. Commonly in Indonesian local politics, the formal channels (those provided by the state) are very unlikely to work effectively in achieving this goal. The six towns are no exception.

The main channel provided by the state is the development planning meeting (*Musyawahar Perencanaan Pembangunan, Musrenbang*) that formally brings community groups to a series of meetings from village to district levels. However, these meetings work effectively only at lower tiers of government and become basically moribund at the district level. More often than not, final decisions on district development planning are determined by political deals amongst the elites in the bureaucracy and political parties.

It is not surprising, therefore, that community groups tend to be skeptical about the *Musrenbang* meetings. Many of them prefer to use informal channels to access the policymaking process. In Jombang, community groups bypass the formal procedure and make greater use of the citizens' forum (*forum warga*) at the sub-village level. To make sure that the ideas developed in these meetings reach the decision-making process, they invite the local council members (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) to participate. Sometimes, personal relationships between council members and community leaders work effectively in pushing community engagement in the policy process. Similarly, citizens in Surakarta formed informal forums and groups to encourage the involvement of as broad a section of the community as possible. The formation of some of the informal groups even predates the *Musrenbang* policy.

A new region like Parigi Moutong has not been able yet to develop effective associations to promote civic engagement. In other areas such associations also exist but may not be working effectively. Kupang has a semi-formal institution called *kouncil kota* (city council), promoted by the then *walikota* (mayor) of Kupang. It was able to bring academics, ethnic group leaders and religious leaders into intensive participation in policy making during the Mayor's term of office. Unfortunately, this lasted only about three years before the DPRD started to criticize the *kouncil kota* for taking over its formal role as a representative body.

For societies in specific regions, such as Aceh, Papua and West Papua, the formal channels of participation include the *adat* structure. However, these structures function differently in Aceh Besar and Manokwari. We have discussed earlier that the *adat* institutions in Aceh Besar have actually been co-opted by the state to validate its decisions rather than playing true participation; while in Manokwari, the Church and *adat* leaders are left behind as the local government focuses more on the business investments in their area.

Democracy in Action

Finally, we can now ask the ultimate (perhaps fundamental) question: what do these all imply for the implementation of democracy at local level? We will find the answer to this question by simultaneously looking at two aspects: procedural democracy and participatory democracy at the local level. The first aspect deals with the formal instruments of democracy, i.e. the parliament, elections and political parties. The second is related to the basic idea of democracy as “from the people, by the people, for the people”. Democracy is all about participation in the process of government.

Procedural democracy deals with regulations and electoral systems, but the more fascinating issue to observe is for what purpose and for whose interests the procedures are carried out. Indonesian local politics tells us that the effecting democratic procedures may serve various interests. At the same time, people’s participation in local government processes varies from one place to the other.

Voter turnout (VTO) in Indonesia is considerably high. At national level, VTO in the 2009 general elections reached as much as 70.99 per cent⁸⁶. Unfortunately, in many areas, popular participation is limited to casting votes on the election day and no more than that. Civil society has not been able to ensure that the electoral processes are fair and free in all cases. In Parigi Moutong, we see a young local democracy where political participation generally means voting in the elections. Generally speaking, elections are the only public participation activities. Other than

⁸⁶ This is the lowest figure, as compared to previous elections, particularly under the authoritarian regime that showed VTO more than 90 per cent. However, compared to other countries, 70 per cent is considered high. See the list of the world’s VTO, available at <http://www.idea.int/vt/>.

these, political participations are basically scattered and not cohesive. Some national and international agencies are present in this area, such as the World Bank's Urban Sector Development Reform Project (USDRP), and capable of facilitating community participation. Obviously they would need local government support to actually contribute to participatory democracy. *Adat* institutions also have the potential to be participatory agencies for the community. However, they are either unable to achieve this potential or see a means of securing a better position for themselves by letting the local government make use of the *adat* as merely source of building legitimacy for state policies.

In Kupang, only some NGOs are actually active in maintaining control of the overall process of elections. Cohesiveness is absent when it comes to controlling the electoral process. This is one of the contributing factors to the notion of transparent elections in this area. Similarly in Parigi Moutong, the *adat* institutions have not developed their role where they are able to promote cohesive and significant public participation. These institutions are segregated along ethnic lines and can only work effectively within each ethnic group. This ethnic segregation is worsened by the potential conflict between the indigenous ethnic groups and the *pendatang* (migrant, non-indigenous people).

Ideally, the procedures of democracy are expected to contribute to the conflict resolution. In fact, one of the main objectives of these procedures has been to absorb conflicts within society and transform them into peaceful political contest. In Indonesian regions with a long history of conflict with the central government, the procedures of democracy are utilized to compensate the demands of secessionist groups. In Aceh Besar and Aceh province in general, the electoral process has enabled the ex-GAM members (Aceh Liberation Movement) to gain formal positions both in the executive and the legislative bodies. Through Aceh Party (Partai Aceh)⁸⁷, these ex-GAM people control 10 out of 35 seats in Aceh Besar DPRD (local council). In line with this, the ex-GAM combatants are now key players in the investment activities at the local level. These roles have enabled them to take the place of the *adat* leaders in the community, which leaves only a limited role for the local NGOs to participate.

Similarly in Manokwari, recent electoral processes have been used by *penduduk asli* (indigenous) Papuan to strengthen their grip on local politics, while at the same time limiting the political role of the *pendatang*. Rather than functioning as a

⁸⁷ In Indonesia, local political parties only exist in Aceh – also as part of the compensation for the secessionist pressures.

method of absorbing various actors and interests into the process, the procedures of democracy in Manokwari operate more as the means of letting the *penduduk asli* to be more in control of their own land, community and resources, in a somewhat discriminatory manner. Ironically, this has to some extent meant a shift in the conflict from the *penduduk asli* and *pendatang*, to conflict amongst indigenous Papuans of different ethnic backgrounds. The practice of democracy does not actually absorb conflict; it just transforms it into something else. It is unsurprising that political participation in this area also tends to be segregated along the ethnic identity lines.

The burden of absorbing conflict by procedural democracy in most of other areas is not as great as in Papua. Jombang and Surakarta enjoy political party and electoral processes that are able to recruit legitimate political leaders. Surakarta recently performed a successful electoral process resulting in a legitimate *walikota* with effective powers. The incumbent Joko Widodo was re-elected with a huge 90 per cent of votes, mostly because of his ability to fulfill his campaign promises and to reduce economic disparities in his first term of office. He is now an exemplary model of political leader who is able to maintain civic engagement and lead effective government⁸⁸. Obviously every political leader in cities like Surakarta will be under great pressure to facilitate society participation. The people are comparably highly educated and politically literate, while the civil society organizations are active and connected to national and international networks. Surakarta's long history of radical movements would also discourage the political leaders from neglecting popular demands for participation.

In Jombang, the electoral process serves an easier task as it formalizes the already established power sharing between the *santri* (devout Muslim) and the *abangan* (nominal Muslim) groups as mentioned earlier. The electoral process maintains the already existed political arrangement in which the *abangan* leader occupies the *pendopo* (official residence of the *bupati*); while the four major *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and their *kyai* (religious leaders) play their roles in the society not in conflict with the state's interests. Education services, for example, have been long provided by the *pesantren* – even before Jombang existed as regency in 1910 – without conflicting with state-provided education facilities. While the *walikota* of Surakarta is always under the pressure to accommodate the participation of society, the *bupati* of Jombang needs to pay serious attention to the boundaries set by the *santri* and *abangan* power-sharing arrangement. As long as the *abangan*

⁸⁸ At the time of writing, Joko Widodo was non-active governor of Jakarta and running for Indonesian Presidential Election.

government shows its (financial) support for the religious programs and activities, most of the *kyai* will easily see themselves as being represented in the state's policy.

Conclusion

Democracy, one might say, is the best of bad choices. Implementation of democracy requires a lot of money and other resources, yet the results are not always certain. Indonesian local politics displays wide variations in the degree of political consolidation, which in turn seems to affect the process and achievement of democracy. Countries like Indonesia are under huge pressure to implement democracy and good governance according to the international trend. This chapter has shown that the different levels of political consolidation at the local level makes democracy an even more uncertain business.

Starting with an understanding of how procedural and participatory democracy works at the local level, the Indonesian SoLD assessment found the likely factors contributing to democracy in action. There are three contributing factors: first, the unconsolidated state and society; second, the dominant nature of state, which tends to co-opt the civil society; and third, the condition where both the state and society are well consolidated and democracy works better. Obviously more in-depth research is needed to determine the relationship between the various aspects discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, the surface view of the six Indonesian towns gives us some early impressions.

In areas with unconsolidated state and society, such as Parigi Moutong and Manokwari, civil society is either non-participatory or only partly connected to the state policy process. Society is participatory only when it concerns electoral processes. Casting their votes on election days might have been the only effective political participation for some people in these societies. Even if they are involved politically, such participation tends to be impulsive and non-cohesive. Political participation sometimes leads to the deepening of segregation within an otherwise heterogeneous community.

In some cases, as witnessed in Aceh Besar and Kupang, the dominant nature of the state tends to co-opt civil society. Effective political participation is limited only to elite groups that are prone to being co-opted by the state. For the broader community, political participation remains limited to voting. Connecting the community elite to state policy can sometimes mean blurring the border between the two realms. The problem is that democracy requires a consolidated state and a

consolidated society with effective channels to connect the two, not a state and society with a blurred border. When both state and society are consolidated, democracy can work better. In areas with a consolidated state and consolidated society, such as Jombang and Surakarta, channels for political participation are working properly. Procedures of democracy can also bring expected result.

These imply that the implementation of democracy requires better understanding and closer observation of political diversity at local level. A highly diverse country like Indonesia cannot take single prescription for democracy and implement it across the whole nation. It needs several different prescriptions according to the local potential and problems.

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The Instrument of The State of Local Democracy Assessment in Indonesia

1. The Autonomous Regions in Context

Democratic governance takes place in a specific context of the historic, social, geographic and economic setting of each autonomous regions (regency/city). Certain features related to these settings must be either protected and further developed for community integration and democracy to succeed or dismantled because of the divisive / obstructive effects. In addition, the age and socio-economic status of population and income / employment opportunities are important aspects as they affect good governance and democracy at all levels. This section seeks to identify both the positive and the negative features of the autonomous regions.

1.1. Chronicle of Local Politics

Question 1.1. is answered by Aceh Besar Regency, Manokwari Regency and Parigi Moutong Regency.

- 1.1.1 a) Please describe the dynamics of local politics in Aceh Besar Regency in Aceh as a general.
- b) Please describe the dynamics of local politics in Manokwari Regency in a context of establishment of West Papua Province.
- c) Please describe the establishment of Parigi Moutong Regency as a new autonomous regions (daerah otonom baru-DOB).
- 1.1.2 a) How is the mapping of certain local politics democracy actors in the region (political actors, civil society, adat people, etc)?

1.2. Geography and Spatial Features

- 1.2.1 a) In what ways do the region's physical situation and spatial layout create features that give it a certain identity? (For example, geography may intersect with human settlement patterns to define a region centre, determine the relationship between the centre and the periphery / suburbs, affect transport corridors, and create distinctive places, or it may have a strong bearing on the city's economic opportunities or constraints.)
- b) In what ways do the geographic context and human settlement patterns affect daily life and social relations?
- c) How, if at all, do human settlement patterns relate to the practice of local democracy?
- 1.2.2 a) How many public spaces such as parks, public meeting venues, or other facilities exist?
- b) Are there guidelines and rules for managing public gatherings, protests and demonstrations, town meetings, or other major public events held in these public spaces? Please describe these places in the city and the implications of public activity in them for local democracy.

1.3. Demography, Social Structure and Social Relations / Heterogeneity of Population

- 1.3.1 a) What is the current population of the municipality (total and by gender, religion, and ethnic agama and ethnic).
Please provide data of ethnic composition, if available.
- b) What is the change in population (decrease or increase) in percentage over the last ten years? Please state the change in general, as well as distribution by gender.
- c) What is the rate of population growth in the city overall for the next ten years?
- d) What proportion of population growth is a consequence of normal population growth and what proportion is due to migration into the city?
- 1.3.2 a) What proportion of the city's present population is under 15 years old (providing data by gender)?
- b) What proportion of the present population is over 65 years old (providing data by gender)?
- 1.3.3 a) What are the principal home languages spoken in the city?

- b) What groups speak the languages identified in 1.3.3.(a) diatas?
 - c) What is the language policy envisioned and / or implemented by local government?
- 1.3.4
- a) What are the principal identity groups – e.g., ethnic, religious, racial, etc. – within the population?
 - b) What are the estimated sizes of these groups in terms of proportion of the population?
 - c) Are any of the groups officially recognized by the national or city government, for example, for special preferences (such as affirmative action) or as indigenous groups?
- 1.3.5
- a) What are the principal ethnic, religious groups and racial in the city?
 - b) Is anyone group especially dominant in social and political life?
 - c) Are relations among any two or more groups especially troubled, contentious or antagonistic?
 - d) Are any groups marginalized from the rest of society (under-represented in economic or political decision making)?
 - e) Are certain ethnic / racial groups considered substantially:
 - i. richer? (Please describe);
 - ii. poorer? (Please describe).

1.4. Socio-economic Base / Municipal Finance

Answering the questions below, please state data for the last three years:

- 1.4.1
- a) Which sectors of the economy and specific industries are most important to the city?
 - b) How do economic patterns shape society, peoples' livelihoods, and communities?
 - c) What new patterns in economic development have emerged in recent years, for example, in response to globalization?
- 1.4.2
- What are the pattern of employment, unemployment and income earning in the region?
- a) Is there a single manufacturer or economic sector that dominates?
 - b) How many Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in comparison between the population of the region? (if possible, in comparison per 1,000 people)

- c) What is the gender distribution of income earning through employment and / or small business ownership in the city?
 - d) Apakah Are young women or young men (from 18 to 25) especially likely to be unemployed? Please provide the data in percentage.
 - e) What is the dependency ratio¹ for a single average income in the city?
- 1.4.3 a) What is the rate of socio-economic inequality in the city (usually stated as a ratio between number of people in the highest income segment and the lowest)?
- 1.4.4 a) What percentages of the city's population live above and below the poverty line for basic sustenance and food security? Please state poverty rates (poverty as defined as the lack of income or consumption to meet basic human needs of shelter, food, and health).
Regarding SoLD Indonesia's instrument, please use BPS' data on poverty as a main source and employ other sources as a secondary or complementary data.
- b) Please provide the poverty rate by gender, for young people (below 24 years of age) and for the elderly (more than 65 years of age).
- 1.4.5 a) How does the region relate economically and socially to the adjoining rural areas? Berapa jumlah orang yang tidak tinggal di daerah ini yang harus datang untuk bekerja di daerah ini setiap hari kerja?
- b) To what extent is the regional city's economy closely tied to the economic activity that occurs in surrounding rural areas?
- 1.4.6 a) How many cases of legal disputes over land / property tenure, utilization and access were registered in the last three years (please state number of cases for each year per 1,000 inhabitants)?
- b) What efforts does the local government make to resolve / manage the land conflicts?
 - c) Were there significant land disputes that were not brought to the judicial authorities or other legal processes?
 - d) What other organizations are involved in resolution / management of the land conflicts? Please, clearly mention it.
- 1.4.7 a) What is the rate of violent crime such as assault, murder, and

rape in the city in the last three years? Please state number of cases for each year per 1,000 inhabitants.

- b) What is the rate of non-violent crime in the city in the last three years? Please provide data on non-violent crime such as theft, fraud, burglary or larceny per 1,000 inhabitants.
- c) How many cases of domestic violence (*KDRT-kekerasan dalam rumah tangga*) or sexual assault per 1,000 inhabitants were reported in the last 12 months?
- d) How many cases of human right abuses were reported in the last 12 months? Please state the numbers per 1,000 inhabitants:
 - i. officially reported by the authorities;
 - ii. estimated or reported by non-governmental organizations.
- e) How many cases of political violence² occurred the last three years?

In order to eliminate the gap of each data source, please provide two data sources; the highest and the lowest data only.

- 1.4.8 a) What is the overall Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget-*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (APBD)?
- b) What are the sources of regional revenue (the regional revenue-PAD, Balancing Fund, and others)?
- c) What share of its total regional revenue-PAD, does the region raise?
- d) What share of the regional revenue is received as subsidies from national or provincial sources of funding? Please state figures/percentages.
- e) How many cases of tax evasion from regional taxes were officially pursued in the last 12 months per 1,000 inhabitants?

- 1.4.9 a) How many instances of alleged corruption were investigated in the last three years?
- b) What was the outcome of such investigations? Please, do explain.
- c) What mechanisms exist to prevent / curb corruption in city government? Please describe with examples.

1.5. Development and Social Indicators

Answering the questions below, please state data for the last three years:

- 1.5.1 What is the income per capita?

- 1.5.2 What is the infant mortality rate?
- 1.5.3 What is the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants?
- 1.5.4 What is the number of Early Childhood Education (PAUD), kindergartens–kelompok bermain (KB), nurseries per 1000 inhabitants?
- 1.5.5 What is the number of elementary schools (SD, SLTP) per 1,000 inhabitants?
- 1.5.6 What is the number of teachers per 1,000 inhabitants?
- 1.5.7 What is the number of police apparatus per 1,000 inhabitants?
- 1.5.8 What is the life expectancy?
 - Males
 - Females
- 1.5.9 What is the literacy rate
 - Males
 - Females

2. Representative Democracy

This section assesses the institutional infrastructure of local democracy. It examines political party and other representative institutions, their functioning and effectiveness. Further it assesses the number of political parties and their functional structure at local level, their representative-ness, as well as the extent to which the electoral process is free and fair.

Institutions

2.1. National and Legal Frameworks

- 2.1.1. a) How frequently are local elections held?
Regarding Manokwari Regency, please provide Majelis Rakyat Papua–The Papua Assembly (MRP) election as well.

- 2.1.2. a) How does the national statutory and administrative framework affect the conduct of local elections? Please summarize and review national laws that establish local elected institutions and / or the processes for electing representatives to them.
- b) Please describe any constitutional provisions that directly address the institutional frameworks for local democracy or the processes for local elections.
- c) Please describe constitutional norms which rule
- d) Please describe the constitutional provisions that explicitly set the institutional framework of local democracy and the electoral process at the local level!
- e) Does national legislation specify the electoral system for use in local elections?
- f) Does national legislation provide details on size and structure of local house of representatives (DPRD)?
- 2.1.3. a) Are foreigners eligible to vote in local elections? Please state provisions and restrictions.
- b) What measures are taken to increase representation for disadvantaged groups, such as women, the disabled, young people or national minorities, and / or to ensure their inclusion or equal status in local government institutions?
- 2.1.4. a) How are electoral disputes handled?
- b) What electoral disputes have occurred in the last three local elections and how were these disputes resolved?

2.2. Electoral System Design and Performance

- 2.2.1. a) What electoral system applies at regional level? (e.g., FPTP, PR List, etc. See Appendix 1 for a full list of electoral systems).
This question will be answered by national assessors.
- b) What impact does the electoral system have on the structure of the political party system? (For example, does it provide advantages to bigger parties or to smaller ones?)
This question will be answered by national assessors.

- 2.2.2. a) In the past three elections, how did the preferences of voters get translated into ruling majorities in local house of representatives (DPRD) and in the regional election, *pilkada*?
- b) Did the electoral system produce a disproportion in the allocation of seats of more than 5 per cent for any political party?³ (If so, please provide the level of disproportional outcome.)
- c) Did the electoral system provide for transparency in the process by making clear to voters how their votes would be translated into seats in the local house of representatives (DPRD)?
- d) Did the electoral system provide for accountability such that the voters had the opportunity to select among individuals campaigning for seats in local house of representatives (DPRD)?
- e) Did the electoral system serve as a ‘mirror’ of the wide range of social diversity in the region, or does it tend to systematically exclude some important groups?
- 2.2.3. a) How does the electoral system affect the conduct of election campaigns?
This question will be answered by national assessors.
- b) Did the ways in which votes are translated into seats help determine how political parties and candidates pursued their campaigns?
- c) How did the electoral system provide incentives for parties to pursue certain segments of the voting population, for example, by making ethnic or religious appeals for support?
- 2.2.4. a) What were the principal issues that differentiated parties and candidates in the last three regional (*pilkada*) election campaigns?
- b) Please list five key issues that are commonly raised at regional election campaigns (e.g., education, water, etc). How do these issues reflect the city’s agenda for governance?
- c) Which of these issues are regional-specific issues and which are more a reflection of national-level, interparty

competition?

- 2.2.5. a) Is the region subdivided into territorial units, usually known as wards, for electoral participation purposes?
This question will be answered by national assessors.
- b) How do wards compare in terms of size and population?
This question will be answered by national assessors.
- c) In the last three years, how many disputes over the demarcation of wards have been brought to the electoral administration or judicial authorities?
- d) Were there significant ward demarcation disputes that were not brought before electoral or judicial authorities?

2.3. Party System

- 2.3.1. a) How many and which parties are registered and actively campaign in regional political contests?
- b) Please provide a list and further information about membership of the principal political parties.
- c) Which parties are represented in the local house of representatives (DPRD) based on national election on **2009**? Please state the number of their representatives.
- d) Please provide a brief description of the principal platform (plans, promises and issues for governance) of each political party.
- e) Are there ethnic or religious parties? (If so, please describe how these parties define their basis of representation in ethnic or religious terms.)
- 2.3.2. a) How are candidates for local election contests chosen?
- b) Do national-level party officials have formal or informal roles in approving or rejecting locally chosen candidates?
- c) Within political parties, how are candidates vetted and decisions made on candidate eligibility?
- d) What are the rules governing the financing of political parties at the local level?

- 2.3.3. a) In the past three elections, what proportion of party candidates were women?
- b) In the past three elections, what proportion of party leaders were women?
- 2.3.4. a) In the past three years, has the governing majority in the local house of representatives changed as the result of representatives ‘crossing the floor’⁴ to join other political parties or by political parties changing allegiances to produce a different majority coalition? (If this has happened, please describe how it occurred, how often, and the effect this change has had on decision making by the local house of representatives).
- 2.3.5. a) What is the impact of the party system in the performance of the institutions of the mayor, house of representatives, or other aspects of local authority?
- b) Does the electoral system produce a strong-public officials system in which the public officials is fairly autonomous from the local house of representatives or from political parties?
- c) How many times in the last 12 months has the local house representatives been deadlocked (unable to reach consensus through bargaining) on a public officials policy issue because of disagreements among political parties?
- 2.3.6. a) Do state how many party politics support elected public official? Do they become parliamentary dominant?
- b) Are opposition or non-governing parties able to put forward alternative policies and programmes and have their alternatives debated by the local house of representatives?
- c) Are opposition parties able to freely criticize and oppose the ruling majority?
- 2.3.7. a) Are there identity groups in the community – ethnic, racial, or religious groups or those such as women, young people or the homeless – who are not represented in proportion to their estimated

population size through formal channels of representation such as political parties?

- b) If so, how have these groups organized outside the formal channels to represent their interests?

2.4. Evaluating Elected Officials

- 2.4.1. a) How is a public official chosen?
This question will be answered by national assessors.
- b) Does the way in which the public official is chosen lead to his / her being an executive regent/mayor with authority over policy formulation and implementation, or is the post more ceremonial?
- c) What rule exist for structuring the relationship between the publi official and the local house of representatives?
This question will be answered by national assessors.
- 2.4.2. a) What are the mechanisms and processes for holding the mayor accountable to legislative powers such as the local house of representatives or directly to voters in between direct elections?
- 2.4.3. a) What orientation do newly elected and other representatives members receive on the roles, functions and operations of the local house of representatives? Please describe with examples.
- 2.4.4. a) Please describe briefly the size and functions of the local house of representatives and its internal decision-making procedures.
- b) In the past three years, have there been public criticisms of the size of the local house of representatives from political parties or the media?
- c) In the past three years, have there been significant public criticisms about the internal decision-making rules of the local house of representatives?
- 2.4.5. a) What are the powers and functions of the local house of representatives for overseeing the work of administrative agencies or appointed administrators?
- b) Does the local house of representatives have investigative capacities for obtaining information on

the work of city departments and agencies?

- c) In the past three years, has the local house of representatives exercised its oversight capacities to investigate or censure the operation of departments or agencies?

2.4.6. a) What are the methods for ongoing public evaluation of the performance of elected officials in between elections?

- b) Does the region have a system in place for ongoing measurement of performance, such as yardsticks, benchmarks or targets in the delivery of local government services?

This question will be answered by national assessors.

- c) When performance measurements are not met, what procedures are in place for review of current practices and methods for improving performance?

2.4.7. a) What are the procedures for formal censure or recall of elected officials? Please describe with examples.

- b) In the last three years, have the procedures for formal censure or recall of a region official been invoked?

2.5. Representatives of Local Institution

2.5.1. Is there any local institution (eg an *adat*-based) who has a function to represent people other than a local house of representatives?

2.6. Election Administration

2.6.1. a) Please describe the overall administration of local government elections, from keeping the voters roll, accrediting parties and candidates, designing and counting ballots, voter information, and certification of results.

This question will be answered by national assessors.

- b) Specifically, how and by whom is the electoral management body chosen and supervised?

2.6.2. a) In the last three elections, has the administrative framework for elections led to the conduct of free, fair and legitimate local elections?

- b) Was the outcome of the election challenged by any of the parties or candidates that sought public office?
- c) How many complaints or allegations of fraud or abuse were received by the electoral authorities?
- d) What electoral administration practices – in areas such as voter or candidate registration, ballot design, voting processes, precinct management, counting and verification processing, and election dispute management -- have been identified as successful and which have been identified as in need of improvement?

2.7. Evaluating Voter Participation

- 2.7.1.
- a) What are the voter turnout rates (ratio of actual voters to eligible voters) in local elections?
 - b) How do they differ from national voter turnout rates?
 - c) What is the minimum voting age?
 - d) Are there significant (i.e., more than 5 per cent) differences in the rate of voter turnout between women and men?

Please use the data of the last three elections (including regional election).

- 2.7.2.
- a) Please describe voter information and education programmes in the city.
 - b) Are any special measures taken to help voters who may face additional barriers to participation, such as the disabled or elderly, during the elections?
 - c) What measures are in place to ensure equal access by all eligible voters to voting and electoral participation?

3. Participatory Democracy

Overall, democratic local government could be characterized by four essential features: its openness towards the citizens, its fairness in treating them, the transparency of its structures and procedures, and its responsiveness to the needs of its citizens. This section examines these requirements for a functioning and effective system of participatory democracy at the local level.

Institutions

3.1. Local Authorities and Participatory Democracy

OPENNESS

- 3.1.1. a) What types of the local government bodies' meetings – local house of representatives meetings, hearings, etc. – were open to the public in the last 12 months? Please describe the ways in which the public has the opportunity to convey its views to elected representatives on matters of local governance.
- 3.1.2. a) What announcement methods are used to inform the public about the local government meetings that are open for citizens' participation?
- 3.1.3. a) Are the methods by which citizens can provide input to mayoral or city council decision making widely distributed to the public?

FAIRNESS

- 3.1.4. a) What policies and programmes exist in the municipality to promote inclusion of different interests, including those of identity and specific-interest groups? (*These outreach programmes may also be reflected in the responses to section 3.3; if these policies and programmes exist, please provide an illustrative example here*).

TRANSPARENCY

- 3.1.5. a) Which local government documents can citizens access and how?
- b) Does the city have a web site for communication through the Internet to provide information about the city, its governance, its administration, and its economy?
- c) How does accurate information provide in the website?

- d) Do citizens have a sufficient internet access?
 - e) Do citizens regularly use these technologies to access information or for other purposes?
- 3.1.6. a) What rules exist in ensuring transparency in discussing and adopting the regional revenue and expenditure budget (APBD)?
- 3.1.7. a) What rules exist in ensuring transparency of public decision making and other processes (such as soliciting contracts for local government purchases)?
- 3.1.8. a) How are vacancies in local government advertised (including method and period of announcement)?
- b) Is there any discrimination to get vacancies information in local government based on ethnicity, religion, etc?

RESPONSIVENESS

- 3.1.9. a) What types of system are in place to hear and address citizen concerns about issues of service delivery or other functions of the local government?
- b) How many complaints about service provision were submitted by citizens in the last 12 months? How many complaints did the local government act upon in the last 12 months? What is the percentage of recurring complaints?
- c) What percentage of citizens is satisfied / dissatisfied with the provision of a service?

3.2. Civil Society, the Private Sector, the International Community and the Media

Modern management of public affairs is increasingly taking the form of a public–private mix as the best strategy for success. This section assess the extent to which city officials, political parties, civic leaders and citizens regularly work together outside official and electoral contexts to forge a common vision for the city, to engage in information sharing, consensus seeking, and collaborative decision making.

- 3.2.1. How many civil society groups are estimated to exist in the city?
- How many NGOs⁵ are registered?
 - How many community-based organizations (CBOs)⁶ are active?
 - Please describe critical role of both NGO and CBO in the policy making process.
 - In what ways do local NGOs and CBOs contribute to policy formulation and implementation?
- 3.2.2.
- How many public-private partnerships exist between the city and private-sector firms for delivering services or responding to community needs?
 - How to follow up these partnership in a long term agenda?
 - Have these partnerships received high praise or have they been the subject of sharp criticism within the city, for example, in the council?
 - Have these partnerships received high praise or have they been the subject of sharp criticism by external sources such as community groups or the media
- 3.2.3.
- How many partnerships exist between the local government and CBOs for delivering services or responding to community needs?
 - How to follow up these partnership in a long term agenda?
 - Have these partnerships received high praise or have they been the subject of sharp criticism, for example, within the city council?
 - Have these partnerships received high praise or have they been the subject of sharp criticism by external sources such as community groups or the media?
- 3.2.4.
- Do private corporations provide essential services such as water or electricity?
 - Have these privatized arrangements received high praise or have they been the subject of sharp

criticism, for example, within the local house of representatives?

- c) Have these partnerships received high praise or have they been the subject of sharp criticism by external sources such as community groups or the media?
- 3.2.5.
- a) Is there a regularly scheduled meeting, a forum or other routine ways of communication and cooperation between the city and NGOs / CBOs?
 - b) Do NGOs and CBOs have programmes to resolve the underlying root causes of conflict that may give way to violence, such as systematic exclusion of population groups, gross inequalities, or patterns of discrimination in employment or other opportunities?
 - c) Are religious organizations active in social, humanitarian or charitable services?
- 3.2.6.
- a) Are international donors and international NGOs active in the city?
 - b) How much have international donors contributed to city-level programmes for development aid and / or humanitarian assistance?
 - c) How many international NGOs are active in the city?
 - d) What are the principal ways in which international actors such as donors and NGOs affect governance in the city?
 - e) Are there formal or regular processes or forums in which the international community is involved in policy formulation and decision making in the city?
- 3.2.7.
- a) Please describe the structure, editorial arrangements and independence of the local news media.
 - b) What sources of news do people turn to for information on local affairs?
 - c) Are the principal sources of news owned and operated by the government?
 - d) Are the editors of the sources of local news

- editorially independent of government authorities?
- e) Do the local news media have ombudsman or other procedures for investigating and responding to allegations of inaccurate or irresponsible reporting?
 - f) In the last three years, how many significant allegations of government interference in the reporting of local news have occurred?
 - g) In the last three years, how many times have the news media been criticized by local government or the community for seriously inaccurate or irresponsible reporting?

Processes

3.3. Forms and Methods of Citizen Outreach

Which of the following forms of citizen outreach were used in the last 12 months?	RATING Please mark with X		
	Not used at all	Used 1 to 3 times	Used more than 3 times
PUBLIC INFORMATION			
3.3.1. Distribution of printed materials (<i>leaflet, newsletter, dll</i>) to the public.			
3.3.2. Regular media briefings			
3.3.3. Public presentations and exhibitions			
3.3.4. Scheduled programmes in local media			
3.3.5. Computer-based application, e.g. web sites and e-mail			
3.3.6. Other(s) - Please specify			
CONSULTATION			
3.3.7. Consultative meetings			

3.3.8.	Community forums			
3.3.9.	Public Surveys			
3.3.10.	Other(s)- Please specify			
DECISION MAKING				
3.3.11.	Working and focus groups			
3.3.12.	Public workshops			
3.3.13.	Other(s)- Please specify			
ACTIVE IMPLEMENTATION				
3.3.14.	Public-private or public non-governmental partnership			
3.3.15.	Other(s)- Please specify			
3.3.16.	Please describe other forms.			

3.4. Evaluasi Penggalangan Partisipasi Warga

The concept of vision has become a useful pace-setter and framework for organizations and their members. This section evaluates the extent to which local officials and civil society leaders share a sense of common responsibility for governance and engage in thinking together about ways to advance joint action for addressing community problems or realizing opportunities.

- 3.4.1 a) Are evaluation and assessment methods built into the design of community outreach processes conducted by local officials?
- b) Is there a process for using the evaluation findings when introducing policy or other changes to improve local governance?
- c) Which forms and methods of community outreach have been evaluated as being especially effective, and which forms and

methods have been evaluated as being less effective?

- 3.4.2 a) Are evaluation and assessment methods built into the design of community outreach processes conducted by NGOs and CBOs?
- b) Which forms and methods of NGO/CBO community outreach have been evaluated as being especially effective, and which forms and methods have been evaluated as being less effective?
- c) What are the rates of participation in community outreach processes?
- d) What are the principal barriers to citizen participation (for example, literacy, apathy, access, time, or culture)?
- 3.4.3 a) Does the region have a statement that describes its longer-term vision, goals, and aspirations?
- b) Has the region conducted a community ‘visioning’ process by which alternative futures for city are systematically designed and considered through a process of community consultation?
- c) Does the region have a charter or policy document that establishes a strategic plan for realizing long-term goals and aspirations through community outreach and engagement?

3.5. Referenda and Citizen’s Initiatives

- 3.5.1 a) Are referenda or direct ballot initiatives used to resolve difficult policy issues in the city?
- b) What are the procedures for drafting, presenting and finalizing referendum questions?
- c) Are referendum questions decided during normal elections or are special elections held?
- d) What is the decision rule for the approval or rejection of a referendum question (e.g., 50 per cent, 66 per cent, or

higher)?

- 3.5.2 a) What are the processes for citizens to organize and place referendum questions before the community?
- b) Are there instances in which referenda are required by local, provincial or national legislation?
- c) Are there instances in which referenda have resulted in major conflicts or disputes among social groups?
- d) Are there instances in which referenda have successfully resolved major issues before the community?

4. From Assessment to Recommendation

The recommendations from the local democracy assessment are the most important part of responding to this questionnaire. Participants in the assessment process offer general and specific suggestions for enhancing governance.

SIX STEPS TO DERIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

Below are tips for translating the findings of the assessment questionnaire into recommendations for improvements in local democracy.

- Identify the most urgent priorities for making improvements in democracy and craft recommendations that can help address these most urgent issues from an immediate, medium-term and long-term perspective.
- Isolate those aspects of democracy which regional authorities and administrators can address on their own and those that require the involvement of other stakeholders (such as national or regional officials).
- Build on the strengths that are identified in the mapping and don't focus only on the shortcomings that the evaluation has brought to the surface or highlighted.

- Separate out problems that require major institutional change, those that involve personalities or individuals, and those that can be addressed through policy change.
- Develop an approach to making recommendations that links systemic problems with an integrated effort to ameliorate them over time. That is, rather than developing a simple list of things that could be done to improve regional-level democracy, participants are asked to think through a strategy that first addresses why the problems have occurred and then comes up with a series of steps involving political leaders, civic actors, and citizens.
- Sketch out a way in which these steps can unfold over a defined period of time (with the most critical concerns addressed immediately while at the same time developing a longer-term approach) and identify methods for monitoring progress on improving democracy.

SHORT-, MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM OPTIONS

Regions will appreciate recommendations that are grounded in the findings of the assessment and practice-oriented in their application. Recommendations should be feasible, that is, they should be clearly defined in terms of their duration, complexity, outputs and cost. In this regard, it may be helpful to separate out the recommendations in the following way.

Short-Term Options:

- Those steps or actions which are simple and low-cost, require few major policy or statutory changes, and are immediately feasible in the current context.

Medium-Term Options

- Those steps which may require reforms of existing policies and laws, that require major administrative changes, or for which substantial resources will need to be rallied.

Long-Term Options

- Those that require significant reform or restructuring of city-level institutions, significant cost, national approval, or major administrative or financing reforms.